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return, and that the state should effectively organize this work. While the practical measures recommended may have to be modified for other lands, the carefully collected materials for a judgment must be useful and influential in all civilized countries, for the plague of vagabondage is universal.

C. R. HENDERSON

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*Principles of Pragmatism.* By H. HEATH BAWDEN. New York and Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. Pp. x+364. \$1.50.

Critics have complained of the fragmentary and unsystematic character of the pragmatic literature thus far. The complaint is inevitable in the beginning of any movement, especially one so widespread as pragmatism. The beginning of such a movement is introductory to the more systematic work which follows. From the prefatory character of pragmatic writings thus far some have inferred that pragmatism is transitory, a "philosophic fad," and have professed that they already see signs of its disintegration. One of these "signs" is found in a decrease of the amount and temperature of controversy. This fact, however, may as well mean that pragmatists, having stated their theses, are at work on more detailed exposition and application. "Systematic" in the Hegelian or Spencerian sense, pragmatism of course can never become. But there is a recognition of the need for detailed interpretation from the pragmatist's standpoint.

At all events, Mr. Bawden's book, while it does not, and does not profess to, adequately meet this demand is a step nearer a systematic treatment of pragmatism than anything which has yet appeared. This shows in the chapter headings which are as follows: i, "Philosophy"; ii, "Experience"; iii, "Consciousness"; iv, "Feeling"; v, "Thinking"; vi, "Truth"; vii, "Reality"; viii, "Evolution and the Absolute"; ix, "Mind and Matter."

The substance of many of these chapters has already appeared in various periodicals, but the author has so worked over and arranged this material as to give it something of the unity of a treatise.

The author's interest and training in biological science broadens and freshens the discussion throughout. Indeed many may find that it is here in the connection between the development of biological

science and philosophy that the author makes his best contribution. The reviewer finds the first three chapters and the chapter on "Reality" the most suggestive.

The introductory chapter on philosophy defines philosophy as "The general theory of experience"; "It is the science of the principles of science." The query which the special scientist here raises, viz., whether anyone who has not worked in the special sciences has a license to expound the principles of sciences and whether, therefore, this definition does not read the philosopher out of court, is summarily disposed of with the statement: "The searchlight of special science must be supplemented by the world-view of philosophy." Doubtless the author has a good answer to the special scientist's inevitable "Why must it?"; and some readers will miss this answer.

The chapter on experience is no mere psychological analysis of a "stream of consciousness." It stretches from atoms to a theory of society and immortality. The exposition of the democratic character of the social implication of pragmatism contains some excellent passages. The brief discussion of immortality will interest and stimulate, if it does not convince many.

The author's critique of the parallelist's theory of consciousness is clear and conclusive. His own account of consciousness as arising out of the "conflict," "tension," "friction," etc., of unconscious activities suggests that more might have been made of the distinction between immediate, unreflective and reflective, cognitive consciousness, and that perhaps the term "consciousness" is sometimes used where *reflective* consciousness is meant. The author sees that the statement that conflict, tension, is "a condition of consciousness" (of all consciousness?) has forthwith to meet the questions, What can be meant by "conflict," "tension," "friction," as the "condition of consciousness"? Do not "conflict" and "tension" imply consciousness? Have they any meaning except as descriptive of consciousness, etc.? The author's answer is that "the conscious and the unconscious must be conceived as co-ordinate and supplementary functions within the process of experience" (p. 118). But would not the substitution of "reflective consciousness" for "consciousness" meet the point more directly, and recognize also the conscious character of instinctive action?

In the same paragraph with the above citation there is another, and as the author says, a "better," statement which reads: "The so-called unconscious is a name for describing organized conscious-

ness, capitalized or funded experience, the positive equipment of instincts and habits by which consciousness (reflective consciousness?) performs its function of mediating further experience." (Parentheses mine.)

The author clearly shows the futility of the metaphysical opposition of pluralism and monism, materialism and spiritualism, since these are logical determinations, working conceptions within experience.

In a few spots the style grows a little Spencerian, e.g., the definition of an organism (p. 103) and the sentence at the top of p. 109. But usually it is clear and forcible.

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*Parenthood and Race Culture.* By C. W. SALEEBY, M.D.,  
CH.B., F.Z.R. Edin. New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1909.  
Pp. xv+389.

In the words of the author, "the present volume seeks to supply what is undoubtedly a real need at the present day—a general introduction to eugenics which is at least considered and responsible." The book may be a responsible statement of what the eugenists are thinking, but it certainly is not "considered." Dr. Saleeby is apparently a man with one idea, so much so that his style is exceedingly bumptious, always intolerant, and sometimes downright vulgar. For egotistical cocksureness, we have rarely seen anything to surpass this supposedly scientific book. His scorn for "that lethal chamber," the English Parliament, and for the "politicians" (there are no statesmen, and will not be any until the eugenists are placed in charge) is exceeded only by his contempt for the economists. He constantly reiterates Ruskin's dictum that there is no wealth but life, and seems to suppose that every economist will take issue. Dr. Saleeby's knowledge of economics and economists apparently comes to an abrupt conclusion with Nassau, Sr., and the Manchester School. It seems popular in some quarters to take a fling at the economists. It is an egregious error however to suppose that economists do not realize the value of human life—of the right kind—fully as much as any other group of thinkers. Who will more often be found, for instance, in the United States, among the advocates of a national health bureau, a national child bureau, or more modern accident liability, than the economists? But of all this the author is in dense ignorance.