VASUBANDHU: THREE ASPECTS
A STUDY OF A BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHER

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### BIBLIOGRAPHY
This study of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu focuses on three of his works, which show him, respectively, as a logician, a scholastic, and a contemplative. It contains an introduction including an account of the life and times of Vasubandhu, and a discussion of the interrelationships between these aspects I see in his thought. The body of the paper consists of annotated translations of the three works—the Vādavidhi, the Karmasiddhiprakarana, and the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāsya, and the commentary on the Karmasiddhiprakarana by Sumatiśīla. This is followed by my editions of the Tibetan texts of the Karmasiddhiprakarana and the Karmasiddhitikā.

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This paper is dedicated to my parents, both PhD's in their own right, who opened my eyes to the cultural history of the Western world to such an extent, that I almost had to turn East to find something new.
VASUBANDHU: THREE ASPECTS
A Study of a Buddhist Philosopher

INTRODUCTION

I. GENERAL PROBLEMS AND PLAN OF THIS PAPER

VASUBANDHU, one of Indian Buddhism's "six jewels", "the writer of a thousand treatises", given by his Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan commentators the undisputed title of "the Master", was doubtlessly one of the most brilliant men of his day, and a philosopher whose total influence, direct and indirect, has been enormous. However, he has been treated somewhat strangely at the hands of Western Orientalists. They very bulk and diversity of his output has given rise to great suspicion. "À notre avis," Lamotte wrote¹, "Vasubandhu a trop vécu, trop pensé, trop écrit", and more recently a scholar has gone so far as to split him into two distinct personalities.²

For those who are trained in the Buddhist conception of nairatmya, "absence of a fixed self", the question of whether there were one or two or a thousand Vasubandhus may at first sight not seem very important. But the problem goes somewhat deeper. Traditions, particularly when they are unanimous, cannot just be thrown to the winds on the grounds of "inconsistencies" detected within an author's work. (Basing the singularity or plurality of philosophers on consistency seems hardly very viable, anyway, as the method would result in at least four Platos, not to speak of a dozen Bertrand Russells). Furthermore, making very much of inconsistencies in formulation, when one is dealing with a philosopher of Mahāyāna
Buddhism, indicates to me a fundamental lack of understanding of what this "Great Vehicle" is all about. It is also my belief that the traditional view of a single gradually evolving Mahāyāna master Vasubandhu shows us the very depth and multifariousness of Buddhist philosophy, and allows us to rectify some great misconceptions, both as regards Mahāyāna in general, and his "school", Yogācāra, in particular. It also offers us an almost unparalleled view of a philosopher's gradual development.

In this connection it may be mentioned that customary writing on Indian philosophy suffers from a different "root-error" than does the historiography of Western thought. The latter has tended to focus on individual philosophers almost to the extent of tacitly assuming that they created their systems ex nihilo. The former has been if anything over-attentive to the over-all outlook, and has tended to ignore individual philosophers entirely, by speaking abstractly of "schools". Though this procedure is warranted in part by later traditional Indian exegetical writing, it must be remembered that these exegeses often had the express purpose of glossing over discrepancies that had become disturbing. It is rare that the approaches of those Indian philosophers who are lumped into one "school" are really identical. The example of Saṅkara and Rāmānuja, both commenting upon an identical text, immediately leaps to mind. As regards "Yogācārans", the vocabulary and emphases of Mātreyanātha (whom I regard, with some reservations, as a historical personage), Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla, and Sthiramati, are often at great variance, so much so that at least two of them (Mātreyanātha and Vasubandhu)
are sometimes closer to Nāgarjuna, the founder of the great rival Mahayana school of the Mādhyamikas, than to their "fellow Yogācārins". Accordingly, for more rigorous investigations into Indian thought, balancing the "school-approach" with the "individual-philosopher-approach" seems the best corrective for overgeneralization, as the several excellent depth-studies of individual Indian philosophers have amply demonstrated.

As regards Vasubandhu, it is yet too early to make a comprehensive depth-study of this kind. Though some of his important works have been edited and translated into Occidental languages, especially French, a vast number has not been investigated at all. The matter is complicated by the fact that though several of his great works are now available in their original Sanskrit form, others are extant only in translations in Chinese and Tibetan. A Collected Works of Vasubandhu is a desideratum, but this is a project which several scholars would have to undertake together, and even then, it would take them quite a while.

Short of such a collection and comprehensive study based upon it, there is still much of value which one can do. One can edit and translate the less-known works, or one can focus upon the interpretation of the better-known ones, in itself already quite a corpus. Mr. Le Man That has recently completed a valuable study of the latter sort, attempting to deal with the most famous works of Vasubandhu from an analytical philosophical point of view. My own approach varies, and in fact my entire point of view is totally different. On this matter, Mr. That and I have had our long discussions, and
yet neither has been able to convince the other, and the manner of our differences perhaps demonstrates something rather curious about the present state of our societies. For both of us are actually rejecting the most prized values of our respective cultures. It is my opinion that Vasubandhu cannot be understood at all within the strict confines of analytical philosophy, as to me he is not only one of India's great dialecticians and scholastics, but also one of her foremost contemplatives. I can of course supply as evidence for my view the manner in which he was regarded by people in direct contacts with his memory. Thus the Indian Paramārtha says, "Though he lived an earthly life, his real nature is indeed difficult to understand." And there is this testimony from the Chinese Hsuan-tsang, who during his journeys in India saw many of the places where Vasubandhu had lived, and who was to become the chief interpreter of Vasubandhu's thought in China: "Vasubandhu Bodhisattva was attempting to explain that which is beyond the power of words to convey, and which came to him by the mysterious way of profound meditation." There is, in addition, the internal evidence of his works themselves. It is to this last that my paper directs itself.

I will attempt to demonstrate my thesis by a method combining the two types of studies mentioned above. This paper contains translations of four relatively unstudied texts, and this introduction will, I hope, serve at least as a preliminary depth-study of these. These texts were deliberately chosen to highlight "three aspects" of Vasubandhu, as logician, scholastic, and contemplative. As such it may be charged that I am prejudicing my reader, which is precisely
the case. But it is finally the philosopher himself who speaks here, and my arrangement of data is to be treated sceptically until and unless the reader can find it confirmed in his own reading of the texts.

As a logician, Vasubandhu has been underrated; as a contemplative, he has hardly been discussed at all. With this in mind I decided to frame the bulkiest and most scholastic text included here, the *Karmasiddhiprakarana* and its commentary by Sumatisīla, with the *Vādavidhi* on one hand, and the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* on the other. In comparing the three in detail, one can find a logical (not necessarily chronological) movement in which logic and dialectics are the preliminary sciences necessary for clear articulation of argument, the argumentation itself finds expression in intricate scholastic debates on problems central to Buddhism, such as retribution for acts, memory, and the experience of the highest meditations, and this scholastic leads to a higher metaphysic, where in the last analysis all mental constructions crumble before a great liberating contemplation. Several other "series of three" could have been evoked to demonstrate a similar tendency in Vasubandhu—at least the movement from scholastic to contemplation—the famous *Vimśatikā, Triṃśikā, and Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, for instance. (The first three chapters of Asanga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* gives us a clear model for how these works are to be ordered). But the three I have chosen, being longer works, give us perhaps an even more complete picture, and, besides, they have been little studied.

My procedure for translating the three works (four with the commentary on the KSP by Sumatisīla) differs in each case. As regards
the Vadavidhi, we owe its recovery to the painstaking labors of Professor Frauwallner, who gathered all the fragments of the text extant in Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan, presented them in a logical order, and translated them into German. As regards his work, there is little room for improvement. I have based my translation on his collected fragments, and in the main have followed his translation except where it seemed unclear or inconsistent with these as I understood them. The KSP, on the other hand, is available in its complete form, but only in Chinese and in Tibetan. Lamotte has given us a rather confused translation into French from the Chinese, which at any rate can hardly reflect the original Sanskrit as adequately as can the Tibetan. The Tibetan and Chinese are in fact often at such variance that we are almost dealing with two different texts entirely. This may be due to Hsüan-tsang's practise of shoving his own interpretations into the body of his version. The Tibetan is a good deal clearer than even Lamotte's translation of the Chinese, and aside from doubtlessly giving us a truer picture of the original, has the additional advantage of having a lengthy commentary, the Karmasiddhistika of Sumatisila. This latter work is a meticulous, almost line-by-line, study of the KSP, and the fact that it was translated by the same individuals who rendered the KSP itself into Tibetan, makes it all the more interesting. It is available only in this Tibetan translation, and was not consulted by Lamotte, who in spite of his drawback was able to correctly identify almost all the opponents attacked by Vasubandhu, a proof of his amazing erudition in Buddhist scholastics. My translation of this commentary is the first into any Occidental language.
making far too much of its consciousness-theory, only a preliminary in
the philosophies of Asanga and Vasubandhu), and to attempt some sort
of a tentative general ordering of Vasubandhu's works by which one
can trace his development. In addition I hope to show that the
reasons adduced for assuming two Vasubandhus are spurious and ultimately
misleading. For all Indian philosophers, I know of none whose develop-
ment can be traced as can Vasubandhu's—or indeed one who developed to
the extent that he did, yet maintaining, with ever-increasing surety
and depth of perception, a fundamental continuity of vision. It is
also my belief that Vasubandhu's final insights are of considerable
relevance today. And as Paramārtha has already told us, there is
much more to the man than immediately meets the eye.
II. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

1. Vasubandhu, His Life and Times

So much controversy has surrounded the person and the time of Vasubandhu that it may appear to the casual observer that arriving at any definite conclusion regarding these matters must be an impossibility. Actually, however, we are comparatively well informed as regards the great philosopher, and a determination of his date, which will contradict neither what Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, or Arabic sources have to say about his times, is manifestly possible. A brief resume of the problems is however in order.

One of Frauwallner's main reasons for assuming two Vasubandhus, other than his own distrust of flexibility of thought, is the apparent discrepancies of the Chinese datings of the Master. These had already been resolved by Péri, and have subsequently been thoroughly explained by Le Man That, as resting on different calculations for the date of the Buddha's Nirvana accepted at various times by Chinese tradition. By following all that it contained in Chinese tradition regarding the matter, both Péri and That arrive at the fourth century A.D. for Vasubandhu's approximate time. Their conclusion seems obvious when one considers that Kumārajīva (344-413) knew and translated works by Vasubandhu, which fact has in turn been the subject of vast and thoroughly sterile investigations into the authenticity of these ascriptions, whether the "K'ai-che Vasu" given by Kumārajīva as the author of the Satasastra-bhāsya can in fact be taken as "Vasubandhu", and so forth. Actually, as Péri has already shown, this work in one
portion has the complete name  and "K'ai-che Vasu" is also the only name given to the great master Vasubandhu in the colophon of the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, as well as elsewhere in Chinese sources. From the Chinese side, we also find that Kumārajīva is said to have written a biography of Vasubandhu (unfortunately lost today) in the year 409\(^\text{15}\), and that Hui-yuan(344-416) quotes a verse of Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā.\(^\text{16}\)

It has been said that the Indian tradition regarding Vasubandhu, as found in his biographer Paramārtha and several scattered literary notes in Sanskrit, contradicts the possibility of the fourth century A.D. as Vasubandhu's approximate time. Paramārtha calls Vasubandhu the subject of Kings Vikramāditya and Bālāditya. Those have been assumed to be the Gupta emperors Skandagupta Vikramāditya(455-467) and Narasiṃhagupta Bālāditya I.(467-473), respectively. However, there is evidence from Vāmana that the Bālāditya who became the pupil of Vasubandhu was in fact a son of Candragupta II., the most famous bearer of the biruda "Vikramāditya"(375-415).* This son is Govindagupta, who in fact did have the cognomen "Bālāditya". It has

*The passage, in Vāmana's Kāvyālankārasūtravṛtti, reads:
"Soyam sampratī Candragupta-nayam candra-prakāśo yuva/jāto bhūpatīr āśrayaḥ krta-dhiyāṃ diṣṭyā krtaṁḥaraḥ/ Āśrayaḥ krta-dhiyāṃ ity asya Vasubandhu-sācivyōpakṣeṇa-paratvāt sābhīṃprāyātvanm."

"This very son of Candragupta, young, shining like the moon, a patron of eminent men of letters, has now become lord deserving congratulations on the success of his efforts.

The words 'patron of eminent men of letters' contains an allusion to the tutorship of Vasubandhu." (Vanivilasam Press ed, p 86). Pathak suggests that Vasubandhu himself may have written the verse, to celebrate the consecration of Candragupta's son as King. 17
been assumed by some scholars that this passage in Vāmana refers to Govinda-gupta's more famous half-brother, Kumāragupta I., but this view is untenable because Kumāragupta never had the name "Bālāditya". However, it is argued, Govinda-gupta is not known to have ascended the throne, which both Vāmana and Paramārtha claim of Vasubandhu's pupil, and, besides, the death of Candra-gupta II, in 415, would bring us to too late a date for Vasubandhu, who is known to have lived eighty years, and to have seen the accession of Bālāditya, but yet influenced Kumārajīva with Mahāyāna treatises as early as 360, and must have been dead by 409, the date of his earliest biography. To uphold the congruency of the Indian and Chinese traditions, Le Man That has taken the rather radical course of doubting the very dating of the Gupta Kings, assuming them to have reigned twenty or so years previously to their traditionally assigned dates. It is true that the only direct source for the date 319/320 as the beginning year of the Gupta era is in fact the Arab al-Bīrūnī (1030 A.D.), who informs us of the identity of the Gupta era with that of Valabhi, 241 years posterior to the Śaka era, which is attested elsewhere. And it might be possible, in spite of the entire re-dating of Indian history which would have to follow as a result of this course, to assert that al-Bīrūnī merely confused the Gupta and Valabhi eras. But I am one who would not like to disturb any tradition, whether it be Indian, Tibetan, Chinese, or Arabic, unless I am absolutely forced to. I therefore have my own version of the time of Vasubandhu, which offends none of them, except perhaps the Tibetan one where it asserts that Asanga, Vasubandhu's brother, lived for 150 years. My version of Vasubandhu's date rests...
on what little we know about Govindagupta Bālāditya.

Govindagupta Bālāditya was the son of Candragupta II. by his first queen Dhruvadevi. According to several traditional Indian accounts, Dhruvadevi was originally the wife of Candragupta II's elder brother Rāmagupta, who had ascended the throne at the death of his father, the great conqueror Samāragupta. But when King Rāmagupta offered to give her away to a threatening Śaka rebel, Candragupta and several companions disguised themselves as women, and killed the Śaka satrap after having been admitted to his palace as Dhruvadevi and her attendants. Acclaimed as a hero, Candragupta shortly after overthrew his brother, and Dhruvadevi in gratitude for his protecting heroism took him as her husband. If these events occurred at all (and some modern scholars have tended to doubt it, simply because they are not attested epigraphically), they transpired around 375, initial regnal date for Candragupta II., if we follow al-Bīrūnī's chronology. Now Govindagupta himself is known only from a series of inscriptions, found and issued at Vaisālī (Besarh). Some of them he issued jointly with his mother, some of them with ministers under his charge. They all bear texts along this order: "Mahārājādhirāja- Śricandragupta-patni mahārāja-Śrigovindagupta-mātā mahādevī Śri-Dhruva-svāminī, śrī-yuvarāja-bhaṭṭāraka-padiya-kumārāmātyādhikāraṇasya", "Mahārāja-Govindagupta-Bālādityo yuvarāja-bhattāraka-padiṣṭ-balādhikāraṇasya", etc.22 "The wife of Śri Candragupta, Emperor, Great King of Kings, mother of the great king Govindagupta, (issues this) from the office of the prince-minister to his Highness, the Young King", "The great king Govindagupta Bālāditya (issues this) from the Military
Office of his Highness the Young King." These inscriptions were issued while Candragupta II. was still alive, yet Govindagupta had "ascended the throne", i.e. as Yuvarāja, "Young King", a term often somewhat inadequately translated as "Crown Prince". What we know of Govindagupta thus dispels all controversy. Neither Paramārtha nor Vāmana say anything about the death of Candragupta or Vikramāditya; they only say that Bālāditya ascended the throne during the life-time of Vāsuvbandhu. And as we know from ample other sources, it was common in the Gupta age for Kings to consecrate their own sons as "Young Kings" long before their own death. This was a full-fledged anointing ceremony, in every way comparable to the total ascension of a throne, and usually involved subsequent administration of given provinces by the newly-consecrated "Young King". It was both a method of giving the prince training in ruling, as well as a more Kauṭilyan expedient of assuring the continuance of the dynasty. We find parallel instances in the European Middle Ages, such as when the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. appointed his son Henry King in Germany. In classical India, however, these anointments of "Young Kings" seem to have been the general rule. Thus the Pallava king defeated by Samudragupta was Visnugopavarman, second son of the reigning King Skandavarman II., and "Young King" of Kāñcī. The practise seems to have been ancient in India, for in the Mahābhārata, Duryodhana is called King during the lifetime of his father Dhṛtarāṣṭra.

The usual age at which the prince acceded as "Young King" was sixteen years. In the case of Govindagupta, this seems to have been ca. 391, and the particular province given him was the central Gangetic
valley, including the cities Ayodhya and Vaisali. As ca. 390 is the beginning date of Candragupta II's campaign against the Western Ksātrapas of Gujerat, it is probable that Govindagupta was made Governor of the ancestral realm in order to give the people a royal symbol during Candragupta's extended absences from home. It is in fact known that Candragupta II, during his campaigns for a time had Ujjain as his capital. At the end of these campaigns, Candragupta II apparently re-established his capital at Paṭaliputra, as it is called the capital by Fa-hsien (in India 399-414).

Thus there is no necessity for going against any tradition whatever. Taking into account the possibility that Vasubandhu may have lived beyond his pupil Govindagupta's consecration as "Young King", I arrive at an arbitrary but plausible date, 316–396, for Vasubandhu. This should be taken as no more than a hypothesis, but it is at least one which should please all lovers of traditional history. It also places Vasubandhu in one of the most brilliant ages of Indian history, and associates him with one of her most brilliant courts. Among countless other eminent men who may be mentioned as contemporaries, the great poet Kālidāsa, the lexicographer Amarasiṃha, the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Śabara, and the erudite grammarian Vararuci, were in all probability at the same court that invited Vasubandhu to his most famous debates, and to his most famous tutoring position. Whether his pupil Govindagupta ever fully ascended the throne is doubtful, though there were allusions in Subandhu to troublesome times after the death of Candragupta II, so perhaps a civil war between Govindagupta and his half-brother Kumāragupta I., in which the latter emerged victorious,
is to be assumed. On the other hand, Govindagupta may have preceded his father to the grave. At present we have no way of knowing.

The details of Vasubandhu's life are known from several biographies in Chinese and Tibetan, the earliest of which is the Chinese rendering of the life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha (499–569), who composed it while in China.²⁷ There was, as mentioned, apparently a previous account by Kumārajīva, which has however not survived. The earliest Tibetan biography available to me is a good deal later—it is that of Bu-ston (1290–1364). In addition, there are several references to Vasubandhu in the works of Hsüan-tsang, Bāṇabhaṭṭa, Vāmanā, and other writers. We shall attempt to reconstruct the main outlines of Vasubandhu's life, relying most heavily on Paramārtha, and supplying my dates for its main events, so that my general dating of Vasubandhu can be put to the test.

VASUBANDHU, the Great Master of the Dharma, was born in Puruṣapura, present-day Peshwar, in what was then the Kingdom of Gandhāra, around the year 316 A.D. According to Paramārtha, his father was a Brahmin of the Kausika gotra, and his mother was named Virinçi. The couple already had had a previous son, later called Asanga, and a third, Virinçi-vatsa, was to follow.²⁹ Bu-ston, with his love for yoginīs and polyandry, assumes however that Vasubandhu was in fact a bastard, and that his mother, whom he calls Prassannāśīlā, "Pure Virtue" (and a most interestingly Tantric conception of virtue this tale shows), longing to produce great masters for Buddhism, had Asanga by a Kṣatriya, and Vasubandhu by a Brahmin. Again according to Paramārtha, Vasubandhu's father was a court priest. In all probability,
he officiated at the court of the Śaka princes of the Śilada clan, who at that time ruled from Puruṣapura.30

Gandhāra was no longer at that time the center of a great empire, as it had been under the last great Kushan Kings a century before; it had become a border land in the midst of petty kingdoms, and perhaps the amazing decline in its population, which Hsuan-tsang was to notice, was already taking place at that time. It was, however, an amazingly fertile area, and those who were willing to stay in a back-water country suffered no lack of prosperity. Though its ancient artistic tradition was dead by this time, this birthplace of the ancient Sarvāstivāda masters Dharmasērī and the Bhadanta Dharmatūta, kept up its old tradition of scholastic Buddhist learning. It was known as the seat of the "Western masters" (Pāscatīyas) of Abhidharma. A certain dogmatism and lack of creativity, certainly not apparent among the ancient masters of the Vibhāsā, was however becoming evident within these schools. Nonetheless, their continuing high reputation seems to have attracted both the young Asanga and Vasubandhu to begin their studies within them. If Paramārtha's account is correct, it is probably from his father that Vasubandhu received much of the Brahminical lore so obviously at his command, and it may be from him also that he was introduced to the axioms of classical Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, both of which exerted considerable influence upon him.

The name "Vasubandhu", which he never changed even upon entering the Buddhist priesthood, may perhaps tell us something about the character of its bearer. It means "the Kinsman of Abundance", in particular the abundance of the earth, and this name, in view of his
genuine concern for the material well-being of others, as well as his love of metaphors from teeming plant-life, rushing streams, and rippling lakes, is probably not entirely coincidental.

At an early age Asanga entered the Sarvastivada order, but, dissatisfied with that, undertook lonely forest-meditations for twelve years, in order to get insight into the Great Vehicle. Finally, the Bodhisattva Maitreya revealed himself to Asanga—according to Bu-ston, after Asanga had come to the aid of a half-alive dog full of worms, while helping the worms themselves to by cutting off flesh from his own body—a detail showing the characteristic Mahayana obsession with all-embracing compassion. Maitreya dictated several works to Asanga, and Asanga subsequently undertook the task of disseminating these, in addition to the sutras he had received, then began writing treatises of his own. Along with Maitreya or Maitreyanatha, who whether he was Asanga's own private hallucination, a historical hermit-philosopher, a manifestation of Ultimate Insight itself, or, which is most likely, all of these at once, certainly in "his treatises" writes in a far different style from Asanga's own, Asanga became the chief patriarch of the Yogacāra method of practising the Mahayana. The name "Yogacāra", "practise of yoga", itself demonstrates the primary importance of meditation for this method.

Vasubandhu had in the meantime entered the Sarvastivāda order himself, studying primarily the scholastic system of the Vaibhāsikas, those philosophers who took the Vibhāsā as their central text. Apparently he remained impressed with this magnificent all-encompassing structure for some time. He in turn amazed his teachers with the brilliance and quickness of his mind. His main teacher at first seems
to have been a certain Buddhamitra.

In time, however, grave doubts about the validity and relevance of Vaibhāsika metaphysics began to arise in Vasubandhu. At this time, perhaps through the brilliant teacher Manoratha, he came into contact with the theories of the Sautrāntikas, that group of Buddhists who wished to reject everything that was not express word of the Buddha, and who held the elaborate constructions of the Vibhāṣa up to ridicule. That there was a strong Sautrāntika tradition in Puruṣapura is likely in view of the fact that it was the birthplace and seat of activity of that maverick philosopher of the second century, the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta. In fact, the most orthodox Vaibhāsika seat of learning was not in Gandhāra, but in Kashmir, whose masters looked down their noses at the Gandhārans as quasi-heretics. According to Hsuan-tsang's pupil P'u-k'uang, Vasubandhu finally decided to go to Kashmir to investigate the Vaibhāsika teachings more exactly.31 Fear­ing that the Kashmirian scholars might distrust his intentions if they knew that he was a Gandhāran, he entered Kashmir under a false name.32 Bu-ston says that Vasubandhu in Kashmir studied at the school of Sanghabhadra.33 But it is unlikely that this intellectually acute and cantankerous individual assumed the professorship at that time, for from what both Paramārtha and Hsuan-tsang tell us34, Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra seem to have been about the same age. It is however more than likely that it was the same school that Sanghabhadra was himself attending as a student, and this is in fact attested by P'u-k'uang.35 He says that the main master there was the teacher of Sanghabhadra, whose name is given in Chinese transcription as
Sai-chien-ti-lo or Sai-chien-t'o-lo. This name has been variously interpreted as "Skandhila" and "Sugandhara", though P'u-k'uang's translation, fits neither of these reconstructions. Sai-chien-ti-lo, whatever his Sanskrit name might have been, is known as the author of the brief but incisive Abhidharmāvatāra, an orthodox Vaibhāṣika treatise preserved both in Chinese and Tibetan. Vasubandhu studied in Kashmir for four years, probably from about 342-346. He however was no docile student, but rather in his increasing frustration with the over-intellectual and category-ridden dogmatics of the Kashmirian masters, frequently voiced his own refutations of many of their points. The master Sai-chien-ti-lo, disturbed by the obstreperous student, went into a deep meditation, by the powers of which he discovered Vasubandhu's true origin. He then told Vasubandhu privately that he should return to Gandhāra before his "uncultured students", among whom I can well imagine the witch-hunting Sanghabhadra, found out and attempted to harm him. Vasubandhu, doubly convinced that the Vaibhāṣika system did not reflect true Buddhism, shortly after did so, returning to his native city Puruṣapura.

Soon after returning, he began to prepare for an enormous project that had been in his mind for quite some time. He was at this time unattached to any particular order, and lived in a small private house in the midst of Puruṣapura. (Hsuan-tsang three centuries later saw this house, which was marked with a commemorative tablet.) According to Paramārtha, Vasubandhu supported himself by lecturing on the Vaibhāṣika system before the general public, which presumably remun-erated him with gifts. Such was the customary income for Buddhist
public lecturers even in the days of the Astasahasrika. At the close of each day's lecture, Vasubandhu composed a verse which summed up his exposition for the day. Paramārtha says, "Each verse was engraved on a copper plate. This he hung on the head of an intoxicated elephant, and, beating a drum, made the following proclamation: 'Is there anyone who can refute the principles set forth in this treatise? Let him who is competent to do so come forth!' So in time he composed over six-hundred verses, which gave an extensive outline of the entire Vaibhāṣika system. As the time covered by their composition was thus roughly two years, the date 348 for their completion seems likely. These verses constitute the Abhidharmakosā, which is probably the earliest work we have by Vasubandhu, and certainly in many respects his most ambitious. He sent it, along with fifty pounds of gold, to his old teachers in Kashmir. Though Sai-chien-ti-lo himself cautioned, all the others at the Kashmir school exulted that Vasubandhu had come over to their side, and had composed such a brilliant epitome of Vaibhāṣika doctrine besides. They were disturbed only because Vasubandhu in his treatise so often used terms such as "kīla", "it is claimed", and "ity āhuḥ", "they say", etc.

As a matter of fact, during this entire time Vasubandhu was working on his real project, his autocommentary on the Kosa, which contains a thoroughgoing critique of Vaibhāṣika dogmatics from a *In light of the fact that its arguments and solutions are less developed, the Pudgalapratisadhaprakarana, "Treatise of the Refutation of Self", seems even earlier than the Kosa. It was originally an independent treatise, but was finally attached by Vasubandhu to his Kosa as its ninth chapter.

Sautrāntika viewpoint. He found his chance to publish this Kosabhaśya when several of the Kashmirian Vaibhaśikas, puzzled by the abstruseness of many of the verses in the Kosa, sent his fifty pounds of gold back with an additional fifty, and asked him to write a commentary. Vasubandhu sent them his Kosabhaśya, by this time completed. For the subsequent furious indignation of the orthodox Kashmirians, we need not rely on traditional accounts only—it is amply attested by the relentless invective against Vasubandhu employed by contemporary Vaibhaśika writers such as Sanghabhadra and the Dipakāra. Vasubandhu was to the latter "that apostate", "that subscriber to fantasies that please only fools", and the sharp-tongued Sanghabhadra could hardly find words harsh enough to vent his spleen: "that man whose theories have the coherence of the cries of a mad deaf-mute in a fever-dream."

Vasubandhu had thus at a fairly early age already achieved a certain notoriety. It has been said that the Kosa could not possibly be the work of such a young man, because of its ripeness and brilliance. But brilliance and verbosity (it is certainly the longest work by Vasubandhu) are by no means a monopoly of the aged. What maturity there is stems mainly from its digestion of a centuries-old scholastic tradition, and certainly it is more erudite and argumentatively brilliant, than truly profound. There is also, as Lamotte has noted, sometimes a certain hesitancy of argumentation, and though its destruction of the Vaibhaśika system is fundamental, it often has few new viable solutions of its own. These solutions begin to appear in the KSP, which is in many ways a bridge between Vasubandhu's earlier and later philosophies. The Kosa is nonetheless a magnificent
treatise, and certainly one of the best things North Indian Abhidharma ever produced. It is also no doubt the most thoroughgoing critique of the Vaibhāṣika system. As such, it became the standard Abhidharma textbook for the unorthodox in India\(^4\), and due no doubt in part to Vasubandhu's subsequent fame as a Mahāyāna master, in China, Japan, Tibet, and Indonesia, as well. But it could very well be the work of a young man burning with a desire to retaliate against the pomposity of his former teachers. Other works of parallel authority are known to have had authors even younger. Another of the most famous philosophers India produced, Śaṅkarācārya, after all lived only thirty-two years. It is interesting to note in this connection that the older Vasubandhu became, the shorter his works seem to have become.

This successful challenge to the Vaibhāṣikas was no doubt for Vasubandhu a great cause for pride and reflection. The Vaibhāṣikas had developed the most clearly-ordered philosophy Buddhism possessed. That they were still full of vigor in Kashmir and Gandhāra—we might in fact speak of a "Neo-Vaibhāṣika movement" in the fourth century—has already become apparent.

In the years directly subsequent to the composition of the Kosā, Vasubandhu seems to have spent much of his time travelling from place to place. It is certain that he stayed for a time at Śakala, several hundred miles to the south of Purusāpūra.\(^4\) This city was at this time the capital of petty kings of the Mādraka dynasty. Around 350, Samudragupta completed his lightning-quick conquest of North India, and the fate of Bhāratavarṣa was sealed. Among the frightened rulers of the frontiers who rendered their personal obedience to the Emperor,
and who promised to pay tribute and obey all orders, was the Madraka King. 48

It was in all probability subsequent to that event that Vasubandhu as well as his teachers Buddhamitra and Manoratha, decided to move to Ayodhyā. 49 Ayodhyā, the ancient city of Rāma, had become one of the main metropolises of the new Gupta Empire. Vasubandhu took residence in the Old Sanghārāma of the city 50, and Hsuan-tsang later saw the hall in Ayodhyā where Vasubandhu preached to "kings and many eminent men". 51

The next cardinal event in Vasubandhu's life could have occurred anywhere from 350 to 355. Suddenly, Asanga fell very ill, and sent messengers to Vasubandhu in Ayodhyā, to urgently beg him to return to Purusapura to see him. 52 Vasubandhu had up to this time had but little regard for the Yogācāra treatises of his elder brother. He had perhaps seen the voluminous Yogācārabhūmi compiled by his brother, which may have simply repelled him by its bulk. At any rate, he is reported to have said, "Alas, Asanga, residing in the forest, has practised meditation for twelve years. Without having attained anything by this meditation, he has founded a system, so difficult and burdensome, that it can be carried only by an elephant!" 53

The result of the reunion of the brothers was the conversion of Vasubandhu to the Great Vehicle, and the beginning of his career as a true contemplative. In fact, all versions of his life are unanimous in stating that Vasubandhu so regretted his former disregard of the Mahāyāna that he wanted to cut out his own tongue. 54 Asanga urged him instead to use his tongue and mind to spread the deeper insights
which Vasubandhu seemed to grasp immediately, but which had taken himself so much time to realize. Vasubandhu accordingly began his great meditations, read voraciously in the Mahāyāna sūtra and sāstra literature, and composed a tremendous series of commentaries upon them. Though several of the famous treatises of Maitreyaṇātha and Asanga were chosen for these commentaries, he also commented on Mādhyaṃika works, of which his appreciation can hardly be doubted, and on the most varied texts from that incredibly rich collection of the Mahāyāna sūtras. His most favorite sūtra, according to the Tibetans, was in fact either the Astasāhasrikā, or the Satasāhasrikā. That these texts should have so pleased a man who so loved argument, and who in my view was possessed of such a great sense of humor*, is hardly surprising, as they reveal the most profound insights through "mind-blowing" dialogues which are never far from laughter. Another favorite text of Vasubandhu's, which supports, as does the entire ethical slant of the MVB, the theory that both he and Asanga were involved in the earliest Anuttarayoga-Tantra practises, seems to have been the Usnīṣa-vijaya. This great period of Vasubandhu's absorption of the Mahāyāna, which falls according to my computations within the late 50's, the 60's, and 70's, would also include the composition of the MVB.

Taking my chronology for the events in Vasubandhu's life, and all that is known about his absolutely penetrating mind, he could indeed have been an enormously famous Mahāyāna master in 360, the approximate year in which Kumarājīva took instruction from Bandhudatta in

*See the section "The Possibilities of Humor".
Kucha. By this time, Vasubandhu could easily have written those commentaries which Bandhudatta transmitted to his brilliant pupil. Actually only one is specifically known to have been studied by Kumārajīva in his youth: This was a commentary on the Saddharmapundarīka-sūtra, which by its very nature is likely to have been an early Mahāyāna work of Vasubandhu. That Bandhudatta should have recognized the mastery of Vasubandhu, though he was probably his peer in age, is hardly surprising. A certain Bandhusūrī, who belonged to Vasubandhu's generation, made the first abbreviated commentaries on Vasubandhu's Vimsatika and Trimśikā. It is not impossible, in view of the fact that Chinese renderings of Sanskrit names are often susceptible to more than one interpretation, that this Bandhusūrī and Bandhudatta are in fact identical.

The year 376 brings Candragupta II., Vikramāditya, to the throne of the Gupta Empire. As well-known for his liberal patronage of learning and the arts, as for his successful maintenance of the Empire, his reign marks one of the high points in the classical Indian period. And Ayodhya, where Vasubandhu has again taken up his abode, becomes for a while the great Emperor's capital-in-residence. It may have been shortly after this date, at a time when Vasubandhu was about 59, that a great debate occurred, which was to stick in the memories of the Buddhist biographers.

Philosophical debating was in classical India often a spectator-sport, much as contests of poetry-improvisation were in Germany in its High Middle Ages, and as they still are in the Telugu country today. The King himself was often the judge at these debates, and
loss to an opponent could often have serious consequences. To take an extreme example, when the Tamil Saivite Nânasambandar Nâyanâr defeated the Jain acâryas in Madurai before the Pândya King Mâravarman Avanîsûlâmani(620-645), this debate is said to have resulted in the impalement of 8000 Jains, an event still celebrated at the Mînâksî Temple in Madurai today. Usually, the results were not so drastic: they could mean formal recognition by the defeated side of the superiority of the winning party, forced conversions, or, as in the case of the Council of Lhasa, which was conducted by Indians, banishment of the losers. One of the most stirring descriptions of such a debate is in fact found in the account of Paramârtha, where he describes how the Sânkhyâ philosopher Vindhyavâsin challenged the Buddhist masters of Ayodhyâ, in the presence of Emperor Candragupta II. himself. At that time both Vasubandhu and Manoratha were absent from Ayodhyâ, "travelling in other countries"(Vasubandhu seems really to have enjoyed a peripatetic existence!), and only the ancient Buddhamitra was left to defend the Dharma. Assuming that Vasubandhu was twenty years younger than his old master, Buddhamitra would in fact at this time have been around 79 years old. Buddhamitra was no longer the man he once was, and was defeated, having to undergo the humiliating punishment of being beaten on the back by the Sânkhyâ master in front of the entire assembly. When Vasubandhu later returned, he was enraged when he heard of the incident. He subsequently succeeded in trouncing the Sânkhyâs, both in debate and in a treatise called Paramârthasaptati. Candragupta II. rewarded him with three lakhs of gold for his victory over the Sânkhyâs. These Vasubandhu employed for building three
monasteries, which were, respectively, for the use of the Mahāyānists, his old colleagues the Sarvāstivādins, and for the nuns, apparently great favorites of Vasubandhu. Refutations of several Vaiśeṣika and Saṅkhya views had been presented by Vasubandhu already in the Kosa, but it was perhaps from this time on that Vasubandhu became regarded as a Brahman philosopher among Brahman philosophers, capable of beating any of them.

Around 383, at his eighth birthday, the crown prince Govindagupta Bāladītya was placed by the Emperor under the tutelage of Vasubandhu. Queen Dhruvadevi herself also went to Vasubandhu to receive instruction. This recognition marks perhaps the high-point of Vasubandhu's external career.

The attitude towards Buddhism taken by Candragupta II. was somewhat ambiguous. He and his successors seem to have patronized any religion which would legitimize their paramouncty over the whole of North India. Though Candragupta II. calls himself a "parama-Bhāgavata", "an ultimate worshipper of Krishna", and his eldest son also has Krishnaite name, his second son, the famous Kumāragupta I., has a name which marks him as a Śaivite. The religious interests of Candragupta II., like those of his predecessor and successors, seem to have been based mainly upon political expediency. It was even at that time difficult to find one common denominator which could unite the entire Bhāratavarṣa. In Asoka's time it was possible that only Buddhism was universal enough to sanction the idea of a Universal Monarch, over against the localized Brahmanical traditions. But by the time of Candragupta II., the chief theistic cults had already
spread all over India. Yet Buddhism was also extremely strong, so to favor any one religion exclusively would have been a mistake. Direct patronage was given only those faiths which were universal enough to truly encompass the whole Empire. Thus, Samudragupta had used the ancient Vedic sacrifices to underline his status as World-Conqueror, and Candragupta II. in turn performed delicate balancing acts calculated to appease all the major religious forces of his day. Thus, he calls himself a worshipper of Krishna, and he uses the city of Visnu's other chief incarnation, Rama, as his capital. He patronizes a staunchly Śaivita poet such as Kālidāsa, and allows one of his sons to become a devotee of Karkiteya. He gives munificent support to the Buddhist community, fosters the development of Pātaliputra with its Mauryan and "Hinayana" memories, and puts his eldest son under the foremost Mahāyāna master of the day. And his successor Kumaragupta I., however strong his Śaivite leanings may have been, is after all also the founder of the Buddhist University of Nalanda.

In his old-age, Vasubandhu seems to have taken up the wandering life again. Some of his last treatises are known to have been written in Śākala and in Kauśamhī. Kauśamhī, for instance, is the place where he wrote his Viṃśātikā and Trimsikā, and Hsuan-tsang saw the old brick tower there, near the ancient Sanghārāma of Ghoṣira, where these famous expositions of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra thought were written.

In the year 391, the consecration of Govindagupta as "Young King" took place. He and his mother begged Vasubandhu to settle down in Ayodhyā and accept life-long royal support. Vasubandhu accepted the offer. The ever-young master was creative even at this advanced
age, and more than a match for Vāsuṛāta, the Young King's grammarian brother-in-law, in his favorite sport of debate. With the fantastic sums of money he received as remuneration for his debating victories, he built several rest-houses, monasteries, and hospitals in Ayodhya, Gandhāra, and Kashmir. But primarily, as Hsün-tsang tells us, Vasubandhu was going farther and farther with his contemplative experiences. 64 Debate was for him primarily upāya: if it could lead to noone's interest in the Mahāyāna, he would not engage in it. Thus, when Sanghabhadra, who had written his two great treatises, one of which was a furious demunciation of the Kośa, challenged Vasubandhu to defend the Kośa's statements, and was invited to come to court and debate by the jealous Vāsuṛāta, Vasubandhu told his pupils that he could see no good reason for such a debate, but diplomatically sent the official answer that Sanghabhadra would indeed be hard to defeat. He probably knew from his student days that Sanghabhadra would not be convinced by anything, and besides, the Kośa itself was probably no longer very important to him at this time. Thus, the debate never took place, but we can almost see the forms it might have taken, by comparing the Kośa, the Nyāyānuśāra of Sanghabhadra, and the KSP. Sanghabhadra in fact died shortly after. At first, Vasubandhu had only this to say of the whole incident of his refusal to take on the Kashmirian: "Though the lion retires far off before the pig, nonetheless the wise will know which of the two is best in strength." 65 A little later, he seems to have made a more generous appraisal of his greatest rival in the field of Vaibhāṣika scholastics. "Sanghabhadra was a clever and ingenious scholar" he is reported to have said; "His
intellective powers were not deep, but his dialectics were always to the point. 66 No utterance attributed to Vasubandhu could more clearly demonstrate the difference he felt between mere intellectual acumen and true profundity.

Vasubandhu did not long survive Sanghabhadra. In the eightieth year of his life, ca. 396, he died. Tradition is unanimous in stating that he died at eighty, but there are various versions as to the place of his death. Paramartha says that he died in Ayodhya, 67 but Bu-ston may be correct when he says that he died in the northern frontier countries, which he calls "Nepal." 68 For Hsuan-tsang corroborates the information that Vasubandhu was in the northern frontier at the time of Sanghabhadra's challenge to debate, which according to all traditions was one of the last events in Vasubandhu's life. He says that Vasubandhu was at that time at Sakala, where in fact the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, possibly Vasubandhu's last work, 69 was written. 70 Bu-ston gives us an interesting detail about this last journey of the Master. He says that while Vasubandhu was in the north, he went to visit a monk named Handu. Handu was inebriated, and was carrying an immense pot of wine on his shoulder. Vasubandhu upon seeing this cried, "Alas!—The Doctrine will go to ruin!", recited the Usnīsa-vijaya-dhārani in reverse order, and died. 71 Such is the account of his life, filled with prodigious productivity, which can be reconstructed from the copious data of his biographers.

The personality of Vasubandhu which emerges from his works and his biographies shows him as a man filled with great compassion for the mental afflictions of others, and with a genuine concern for their
physical well-being, as well. The monetary rewards which he received for his teaching and debating victories he did not keep (in contrast to Manoratha, who according to Hsüan-tsang must have amassed quite some capital72), but utilized to build monasteries, rest-houses, and schools. His familiarity with the classical Indian medical art of Caraka indicates a similar concern. One of his most passionate passages describes the delivery of a baby. It is filled with infinite compassion, verging on horror, for the suffering mother and the newborn child.73 That passion, when tempered by great compassion and insight, was for him no danger can be amply seen in the MVB. Both Indians and Chinese recognized him as a Bodhisattva, and perhaps this tells us as much about him as we need to know. He was in addition possessed of an ironic but subtle sense of humor. The gravest thoughts can be skirted in his works with teasing, "mind-blowing" jokes. As according to the Tibetans, he loved the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras, and, as according to Sumatiśila, he was greatly influenced by the Lāṅkāvatāra, which opens with the Buddha's cosmic laugh, all this is hardly surprising. The Tibetan historians tell us that Vasubandhu loved meditating on the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras while sitting on a soothing oil-bath.74 His works are permeated in addition with a precision and an elegance of expression. Some of his verses of homage and dedication are close to being poetry. He did in fact compose many poems of a religious nature, mostly stotras, which we preserved in Tibetan. According to Pathak, he may be responsible for at least one poem of a secular nature, as well.75 His knowledge of Indian metaphysical systems, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, was predigious, and, in re-
gard to the latter, he is usually critical of Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika on what seem to be quite valid grounds. He has less patience with the theists. His most famous pupil, according to tradition, was Dignāga. 76

In traditional Buddhist art, which always tells us something even if it does not represent portraiture in the strict sense of the term, Vasubandhu is depicted usually as he may have appeared as an aged master. In the most famous statue of Vasubandhu, a Japanese work by Unkei at the Kofuku-ji at Nara, Vasubandhu is portrayed as a slightly rotund old man with an expression betraying both deep thoughtfulness and a great sense of humor. His lips are curved in a slight ironic but benevolent smile, and there is a fascinating gleam to his eyes. In contrast, the figure of Asanga, by the same master, is haggard, and its look intensely serious. 77 These artistic conceptions fit in well with the contrast made by the biographers between the brothers—the one obsessed by a tremendous mystic vision, the other the calm and humorous systematizer, who yet glows with the radiance of one truly fulfilled.

To order Vasubandhu's works in their true chronological order is a near impossibility. All we can say of the KSP is that it is posterior to the Kośa and the Vyākhyāyukti, both of which it quotes, and as regards the MVR, we can only surmise that it must date from what I call Vasubandhu's great period of assimilating the Great Vehicle. Of the Vādavidhi, we may say that it is posterior to both the Kośa and the KSP, as these two works make use of argumentation forms which are not quite as rigorous as the Vādavidhi would demand. It is also
customary to regard the Viṃśatikā, Triṃśikā, and Trisvabhāvanirdesa as the last works of Vasubandhu. For the sake of convenience, and for purposes of demonstrating the coherence of Vasubandhu's development, we may assume three major periods, which however chronologically seem to overlap. To the scholastic period belong such works as the Kośa, the KSP, and the Pañcaskandhaka, though the latter two come obviously after Vasubandhu's conversion by Asanga, and their quasi-Vaibhāṣika mold may be largely an upāya (cf. KSP, note 59). To the period of the "Great assimilation", belong the commentaries on the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras. Finally, his "rounding-up period" consists mostly of original aphoristic works, as profound as they are brief.

Vasubandhu's approaches and vocabulary were susceptible to great changes, depending largely, as I see it, on the people for whom the works were intended. For this reason, to assume with any definiteness anything regarding the chronological order of a work, on grounds of internal evidence, remains highly dubious. More telling are the verses of homage and dedication, which clearly mark at least those works of Vasubandhu written after his conversion.
2. Sumatisīla, his times, and the training of a commentator

Nothing could more clearly show the changes that Buddhism underwent in India after four centuries, than a comparison of the treatises by Vasubandhu included here, with the commentary on the Kṣṭ by Sumatisīla.

Tāranātha tells us that Sumatisīla was a subject of King Devapāla of Bengal(810–850)79, the third ruler of the brilliant Pāla dynasty, which was consistently Buddhist. King Devapāla is particularly known for his munificent support of Buddhism, and of its great University of Nālandā. Actually, we must assume that Sumatisīla lived into the times of Devapāla, but that his Kṣṭ was written under Devapāla's predecessor Dharmapāla(770–810), since the Tibetan translation of the work was corrected by dPal-brtsegs, and is listed in the Tibetan catalogue of Buddhist works compiled under King Khri-srong-lde-btsan, by dPal-brtsegs, Nam-mkha'i-snying-po, and Klu'i-dbang-po79, either in the year 788, or, which seems more likely, in the year 800.80 Tibet and Greater Bengal were in close contact at the time, and King Dharmapāla was in fact the founder of the great Buddhist University of Vikramaśīla, from where much translation activity from Sanskrit into Tibetan was being conducted.81 It is the period when Tibet was truly devouring everything that came from Buddhistic India, and when in the Pāla Empire itself, voluminous writing in Buddhism was being done. This writing activity falls into two categories: analytic treatises, including books on logic and epistemology, and works concerning the dominant Tantric practises. Among the authors
whom Tāranātha lists as contemporaries of Sumatiśīla are Krishnacarin
the Younger, author of the *Sambaravyākhyā*; Śākyamitra, the composer
of stotras to the Tantric goddess Tārā, and the Tantric masters
Jñānacandra, Vajrāyudha, Mañjuśrīkīrti, and Vajradeva. The pre-
ceptors of King Dharmapāla, Haribhadra the Elder and Buddhajñāna, are
known equally for their Tantric writings and their works systematizing
the Mahāyāna sūtras. It was also a time of much purely academic
writing, centered at the two great universities of Nālandā and
Vikramśailā.

Of these the older, Nālandā, is where Sumatiśīla held a profes-
sorship. It was founded in about 425 by Candragupta II's successor
Kumarāgupta I.(415-455), and was revived to its full glory probably
by Gopāla(750-770), founder of the Pāla dynasty. Sankalia has written
a highly interesting book on the University of Nālandā during these
halycon days under the first three Pālas, when students from all
over the Eastern world came to study there, and the highest standards
of scholarship were maintained. Though it is interesting to note
that some scholars were equally skilled in logic and in Tantric
studies, some seem to have limited themselves to topics of a strictly
academic nature. The most brilliant mind at Nālandā in the genera-
tion of Sumatiśīla's teachers was Sāntarakṣita(725-788), best known
for his *Tattvasāmgraha*, a compendious work telling us much about the
extensive philosophical curriculum at Nālandā, which included both
Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems. Probably of the same generation
is Yaśomitra, the famous commentator of the *Kosa*. 
The fact that studies of the ancient scholastic systems, long dead as truly creative forces in India, were undertaken by these Nālandā pandits, indicates to what extent their focus had become purely academic. Sumatiśīla's colleague Daśabalaśrīmitra, for instance, wrote a vast compendium of all the major ancient scholastic systems of the Hinayana, the Samskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya, which, with its brief definitions of all their categories, was obviously intended as a textbook or encyclopedia. Śāntarakṣita also shows this concern, including in his work refutations of the ancient Vaibhāṣika.

Sumatiśīla's work clearly shows the same tendencies. Though he makes some slight mention of Vasubandhu as a Mahāyāna writer, it is clearly the ancient scholastics themselves which are interesting him in the KST, and his approach is entirely academic. It is the only work of Sumatiśīla which has survived. Perhaps his great reputation was mainly that of a professor of Abhidharma, for he was famous enough for Tāranātha to include him in his list of Buddhist masters under King Devapāla.

The KST is a classical example of a later Indian Buddhist commentary, and a typical academic production of the University of Nālandā. What is surprising is its meticulousness, and the rigorousness of its formal logical re-casting of Vasubandhu's arguments. But with all the intellectual prowess and erudition it contains, there is little indication that Sumatiśīla was anything more than an academic, writing on what was to him a purely academic subject, in a purely academic style. It is a conscientious commentary, which unlike many Indian works of this genre, does no fundamental violence to the text before
it but it also lacks the brilliance of the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Sthiramati, and, for that matter, of Vasubandhu himself. I must admit that much of it I find downright dull. But it is an invaluable aid to the study of the KSP, as long as one remembers that the KSP itself contains far more, and it is an interesting example of later Indian commentarial literature in its most typical, and hence necessarily less than completely brilliant, form. It also gives us an excellent picture of the training of an academic in those days. We know that the curriculum at Nalanda presupposed a thorough grounding in Sanskrit grammar, and Sumatiśīla is evidently quite familiar with Pāṇini's grammatical vocabulary. A subject which was not compulsory at Nalanda, but which was made almost so by the exigencies of the times, was logic, and here Sumatiśīla was a true master. He was thoroughly trained in the Dharmakīrtian logical tradition, and uses inference schemata which are flawless in their formalizations of Vasubandhu's arguments. He is obviously also fully familiar with non-Buddhist philosophical systems, and in particular seems to know Vaiśeṣika quite well. Though his own sympathies are obviously with the Yogācāra manner of formulating Mahāyāna insights, he is equally familiar with Mādhyamika, as his work contains one allusion to Nāgārjuna's discussion of causality. This is not surprising, since both Mādhyamika and Yogācāra studies were prominent at Nalanda. Sumatiśīla's contemporary Haribhadra the Elder, for instance, studied Mādhyamika with Śāntarakṣita, and Yogācāra with Vairocanabhadra, and Sumatiśīla doubtlessly knew both these teachers. As regards Yogācāra, Sumatiśīla has distinct preferences for the formulations of Dharmapāla, which again is not
surprising, since Dharmapāla and his pupil Śilabhadra together officiated at Nalanda for quite some time. Abhidharma was part of the fixed curriculum at Nalanda, and was the subject studied after one's grammatical and logical training was completed. The standard textbook for studying the ancient scholastic masters was Vasubandhu's Kośa, a fact which certainly would have caused those ancient masters themselves no end of consternation. Sumatisīla's erudition in the ancient scholastic schools is in ample evidence in his commentary, and another of its chief merits is its identification of all the schools combated by Vasubandhu in the KSP.

A word should perhaps be said about the translations of the KSP and KST into Tibetan. The translators were contemporaries of Sumatisīla. Visuddhisimha is a well-known translator of Sanskrit works into Tibetan, and was himself for a time a preceptor at Hālandā. He may have taken Sumatisīla's commentary to Tibet shortly after it was produced during the latter half of the eighth century. There is nothing to indicate, however, that Sumatisīla wrote the text with the Tibetans in mind, as it uses advanced grammatical and logical terminology, and as such is obviously directed at his colleagues and students at Nālandā. dPal-brtsegs, who corrected the text, no doubt for inclusion into his catalogue, was one of the most famous of the early native Tibetan translators, and a favorite of King Khri-srong-lde-btsan(755-797). He is best known for his translations of Tantric works, some of which he did together with the famous master Padmasāṃbhava. He also worked together with the well-known Vimalamitra on several occasions.
dPal-brtsegs was well versed in Abhidharma, and in fact is in the lineage of the masters transmitting the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asanga. It is interesting to note that the other main text presented here, the *MVB*, was also translated at this time, and was also included in dPal-brtseg's catalogue.

Tibetan translation work being a government project, with prescribed Tibetan equivalents for Sanskrit terms, there is little room for individual variation. As regards the Tibetan translation of the *KSP* and *KST* by Viśuddhisimha, Devendraraksita, and dPal-brtsegs, we may surmise that it is a typically proficient job by these masters of translation. It is only in the case of the translation of the *KST* where we can detect that the translators may have been in something of a hurry. Often in the Tibetan terms are glossed with identical words, where there were probably synonyms in the original Sanskrit. In most cases, I have omitted these irritating glosses from my translation.

* *

For ease in referring to the works and masters that stand as a background to the *KSP* and *MVB*, I include here a "jungle chart", which gives the names and works of preceding masters in Abhidharma and Mahāyāna, with parallel developments in Indian philosophy as a whole, in their approximate chronological order. More details concerning these masters and works can be found in my index of the names appearing in the notes to the *KSP*. 

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III. PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

1. The Vādavidhi and the Logical Forms

in the KSP and KST

At the University of Nālandā in the days of Sumatiśīla, the study of Abhidharma presupposed a thorough grounding in logic, and Abhidharma was in turn a prerequisite for any deeper studies in Yogācāra.94 This type of arrangement of curriculum may go back to the manner in which Vasubandhu himself operated pedagogically. At any rate, he gives us treatises which are primarily logical, others which have as their focus scholastic problems, and yet others which hint at the deepest insights of Yogācāra Buddhism. Among the first, the Vādavidhi takes for us a prominent position, not because it is Vasubandhu's most mature work in the field of logic, but rather because it is the only of these works which has to any extent survived.95

"Logic" may seem on first view a somewhat misapplied term when used in connection with a work such as the Vādavidhi, which stands in India's ancient tradition of dialectical handbooks, of use first and foremost to those engaged in philosophic debate. The very title of the treatise means something like "A Method for Argumentation", and it is in all probability Vasubandhu's frequent occupation with philosophic debate that led him to compose it. One might thus expect a work of the type exemplified in times prior to Vasubandhu by the Nyāya-sūtras, Caraka's section on inference in his medical work, the Buddhistic Tarkasāstra96, and Asanga's section on rules of debate in the Yogācārabhūmi.97
However, what is most striking about the Vadavidhi, when compared to these other works, is its formalistic tendencies, which mark in fact the dawn of Indian formal logic. Several of the formalisms most often associated with the name of Dignāga can now be seen as innovations of Vasubandhu himself.

The primary topic of the old dialectical handbooks was the manner of formulating a valid inference-schema (anumāna). They had been content with a formulation of the following kind:

(demonstrandum)

Thesis: This mountain is fire-possessing
Justification: because it is smoke-possessing
Exemplification: just as a kitchen (is smoke-possessing and fire-possessing), and a lake is neither fire-possessing or smoke-possessing.

Assumed was a vyāpti, a "logical pervasion", which was usually defined as the invariable concomitance of the property described in the justification with the property described in the demonstrandum. But as this "logical pervasion" did not have to be stated within the argument itself, we see that the latter can hardly be called a true inference at all. It is in fact Vasubandhu in the Vadavidhi who insists that the statement of the logical pervasion is a necessary part of the inference-schema, and that it has to take the form of an inseparable connection of the sort "Wherever there is smoke there is fire." Any inference-schema, to be valid, must then for Vasubandhu take the following form:

Thesis: This mountain is fire-possessing
Justification: because it is smoke-possessing
For wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.
It is also Vasubandhu in the Vādavidhi who evolves one of the first more exact definitions of "logical pervasion". According to his definition, logical pervasion represents an inseparable connection (āvinābhāva) which ensures that the property designated in the justification can never be associated with an absence of the property designated in the demonstrandum. It was later found that even Vasubandhu's definition did not cover several instances of valid "logical perversions", and an exact definition of the term became in fact one of the main concerns of the Navya-naiyāyikas, the late formal logicians of India. The recognition of the necessity for the inclusion of the statement of "logical pervasion" within the inference-schema has often been attributed to Dignāga, but in the Vādavidhi, we can see that it is in fact an innovation of his master Vasubandhu.

It has also often been said that Dignāga is responsible for reducing the old five-membered Indian inference-schema to three members. In the Nyāya-sūtras, it was actually customary to formulate arguments as follows:

1. This mountain is fire-possessing
2. because it is smoke-possessing
3. as a kitchen
4. and this is so (that there is smoke on the mountain)
5. therefore that is so (that there is fire on the mountain).

As we can see from the Vādavidhi, the redundancy of members 4. and 5. was seen already by Vasubandhu. That this is an innovation of Vasubandhu's is almost certain, since even the Tarkasāstra, which antedates Vasubandhu by only a short time, still has only the five-
membered formulation.

Thus, Vasubandhu's inference-schema is concise, and there is nothing essential omitted. Dignāga's "wheel of justifications", sometimes held to be the first formulation of what constitutes the validity and invalidity of an argument, is in fact nothing of the sort: it is a pedagogic device mapping out in detail what Vasubandhu's criteria for a true inference-schema already presupposes.

Less satisfactory is Vasubandhu's discussion of false objections. It appears that those which he calls "reversed"(viparīta) rest on confusions of the proper functions of the members in the schema, and that those which he terms "contradictory"(viruddha) contain self-contradictions within them. The second category, "erroneous"(abhūta or asamya) is a little harder to pin down. That Vasubandhu should include in the category of "contradictory" those inference-schemata which are in contradiction with other doctrines of the speaker's philosophy, does not necessarily indicate an extralogical criterion, as long as the primarily intensional character of Indian logic is kept in mind. As regards these false objections, Vasubandhu shows himself here at his least original, as the Tarkasastra already had the same divisions. It is also interesting that this tradition died with Vasubandhu, as it was not followed by Dignāga.

In comparing the criteria for a valid inference-schema, as elucidated in the Vādavidhi, with the logical form of the argumentation employed in the KSP, we find an interesting feature. Though Vasubandhu's argumentation in the KSP is in every instance formulated with three members only, it rarely contains a complete statement of the logical
pervasion. Thus, in KSP 8, we have a formulation of this kind:

"Materiality, etc, may be non-possessed of a cause of destruction, because other things are non-possessed of a cause of destruction, such as cittas and caitasikas."

In this case, the statement of a logical pervasion may in fact not be very relevant. Actually, the manner in which the arguments of the KSP are formulated rarely make such statements necessary. However, where Sumatisīla rephrases the arguments, he invariably manages to find logical pervasions, some of which, however, have validity only given his particular philosophic point of view.

As regards Sumatisīla, it must nonetheless be admitted that he is an impeccable master of Indian logic. Obviously he has carefully studied the Buddhist logical treatises, in particular those of Dharmakīrti. Indeed, Dharmakīrti's formulations were already a hundred years old when Sumatisīla undertook the writing of the KST. And in fact Sumatisīla's manner of formulating arguments demonstrates a greater and more consistent rigorousness than is to be found even in Dharmakīrti himself. He uses as his model a type of inference-schema found occasionally in Dharmakīrti\textsuperscript{103}, in which the statement of the logical pervasion, plus the exemplification, precedes their application to the special case in question, and a conclusion follows. Unlike Dharmakīrti, he uses this model invariably, and with a precision which marks him as a true logician. Among the terms often employed by Sumatisīla in the elucidation of his formulations, "the logically pervaded"(vyāya) means that property which cannot be found except when associated with a given other property, and "the logical pervader"
(vyapaka) is that property with which a given property is invariably associated. As an example of the extreme rigorousness of Sumatisila's formulations (which we may almost call "formalizations"), there is this argument at KST, end of 10, 209, 3:

"Whatever is momentary is without progression to another locus, as, for example, fire-blazes and shadows, etc. Since conditioned things, materiality, etc, are also momentary, "momentariness" and "non-momentariness" being mutually exclusive, and contrary by their states of being (avasthāviruddha), if it is apprehended that something is momentary, its non-momentariness is vitiated and because there is thus a logical pervasion of 'being possessed of a progression to another locus', the logically pervaded, by 'non-momentariness', the logical pervader, in the case of materiality, the logical pervader is contradicted. And if its non-momentariness is false, than the logically pervaded, 'being possessed of a progression to another locus', is also vitiated."

We may designate Sumatisila's terms of an inference-schema as follows:

**Udāharana:** statement of the logical pervasion (nibandhana), plus the exemplification (drṣṭānta)

**Upanaya:** the application of the udāharana to the special case in question (this member serves also as a justification)

**Nigamana:** conclusion.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the sophistication achieved by Indian logic during the years following the fourth century, than this detailed comparison of the Vādavidhi with the intricate formulations of the KST, and yet the main seed, to use a metaphor from Vasubandhu, was sown with the Vādavidhi's recognition of the necessity of including within the inference-schema the statement of the logical pervasion. By comparing in turn the five-membered inference-schema of the Nyāya-sūtras, the three-membered argumentation of the KSF, the formulations of the Vādavidhi including the logical pervasion, and the rigorous formalizations of the KST, we can in fact see the major developments in Indian logic prior to the Navya-naiyāyikas, who perfected one of the most intricate methods of formal logic the world has known. 104

2. The KSF and the Problems of retribution, memory, and the highest meditations

Nature of the Text and Background of the Problems

The Karmasiddhirakarana, "Treatise of the Demonstration of Acts", holds a highly interesting position among Vasubandhu's works. Even by itself, it clearly demonstrates the spuriousness of the reasons adduced for the theory of the two Vasubandhus, for it is a work totally resistant to classification by "schools". It is obviously by the same masterly hand that composed the Kośa: many of its arguments are identical to those of that great anti-Vaibhāsika compendium. Its problematic and approaches to it are quite similar to that of the Kośa. It is a scholastic work, using the technique of expressing the author's views as objections to opponents' theses, and
it is obviously directed at the same schools, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, to which the Kosa was addressed. And, as in the Kosa, the Vaibhāsikas are frequently refuted by theses which have a Sautrāntika ring. But it is not a Hinayana treatise. Professor Yamaguchi has supposed that it was written shortly before Vasubandhu was converted to the Great Vehicle, and that it forms a bridge between the period of the Kosa and the period of his Mahāyāna activity. But this does not actually seem to be the case. The Yogācāra "store-consciousness" is raised to solve the holes in the retribution-theories maintained by the Hinayana scholastics, the Mahāyāna sūtra Sandhinirmocana is quoted as authoritative scripture, and the treatise ends with verses expressing beautifully the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva ideal, with its transference of all merit gained to all living beings. Also it quotes the fiercely Mahayanistic Vyākhyayuktī, and thus is posterior to that work by Vasubandhu. It is a transitional treatise in the sense that it contains those features of Yogācāra doctrine which were probably at first most impressive to the restless mind of this drop-out from the Vaibhāsika school, and in the sense that he uses these to lure the Vaibhāsika to become involved in the further implications of Yogācāra theory, thus creating a transition for the reader himself as he moves from the tomes of the Kosa to the Yogācāra works of Vasubandhu. I do not believe that it was written at a time when the thought of Vasubandhu itself was in transition, for it is sure of what it is doing, to an extent that the Kosa is not, and leads relentlessly to its conclusion. Like many other rigorous Buddhist treatises, it is also not to be categorized under any of the rubrics common in Western
philosophy. It was readily grouped by the Indian tradition as a work of Yogacara Abhidharma. This includes primarily what the Westerner is trained to call "psychology", though in this instance, it has definite metaphysical and ethical implications.

The KSP's main problem is how, in the absence of a fixed entity self, which is denied by almost all Buddhist schools*, one can account for the retribution of past acts, which is similarly a central doctrine of Buddhism. For Vasubandhu, this problem reduces itself to the whole question of the continuity of somatic and psychic events within one organism. Thus he also touches upon the problem of memory, and the experience of the highest meditations, where all consciousnesses are absent. For the Buddhist schools in which Vasubandhu was trained, the question of continuity was made even more complex by the fact that they maintained that all experiential realities are completely momentary. They may form "series" which are causally related and are seen as quite similar, but in the last analysis reducible to discrete individual moments. Those of us who know Hume or de Broglie will find this view unstartling, but the question remains as to how it arose in the Buddhist schools themselves. I suspect that the meditations on sensory objects, practised by Buddhist initiates, as well as the introspective meditations focused on the course of one's own thoughts and impressions, may have done much to bring it about. As difficult as it by necessity is to demonstrate logically, it is something which I am sure anybody can see if he wants to, and Vasubandhu apparently

*and is refuted in KSP, 40.
felt the same way, as he regards it as self-evident. It is only later, in the somewhat desperate period of the later Buddhist logicians, that we find arguments and entire treatises attempting to demonstrate momentariness, and in my own opinion, these fail—by necessity.

As an ancillary to the problems of continuity and the question of the nature of the ethicality of acts (which is in theory the KSP's main focus), there arise a host of other problems, usually brilliantly treated by Vasubandhu. My extensive notes on the KSP may help to clarify all that one needs to know to understand and appreciate these problems and their solutions. Here, I will limit myself to the problems of memory and the attainment of the highest meditations, through which the mechanism of retribution can itself be demonstrated. In order to give a continuous narrative, it will be necessary to draw at times from the Kosā and from the Abhidharmayānusāra of Vasubandhu's great opponent Sanghabhadra.

The Transformation of the Series, the Alternatives of the Vaibhāsikas, and the Critiques of Vasubandhu

In what is probably Vasubandhu's earliest theory, in Kosā IX, memory is explained by a sensory or mental impression leaving a potentiality for future transformation within the consciousness-series. This potentiality is given the metaphoric designation "seed", on an analogy with the seeds of plants that lie in the earth long before their emergence as sprouts. Thus, volitions of beneficial and unfavourable actions similarly leave such "seeds" within the series, which ripen as retribution. In the case of the experience
of the highest meditation, "the attainment of the cessation of feelings and concepts", this schema, as it is stated, runs against some difficulties. For in this state all the normal functions of consciousness are suspended, and yet after some time, to speak conventionally, the practitioner emerges from his trance with memories and retributions which continue exactly where the last moment of full consciousness left off. During the time of the attainment, where can these psychic "seeds" exist? The theory as stated is inadequate to account for this.

The Vaibhāṣika masters, with their eagerness to systematize everything important to Buddhist dogmatics, had evolved a manner of dealing with both problems. They assumed, first of all, that the attainment of cessation was in itself an "entity", and that nothing further was needed to "experience" it. And to solve the problem of the continuity of the psychic series, they used a curious theory which stated that in any given moment, all past and future experental realities have existence. The obvious existence, in the present moment, of anticipations of the future, and of memories of the past, was one of the main phenomena bringing them to their view. The Vaibhāṣikas were also upholders of the theory of momentariness—it was simply that for them reality could not be limited to the present moments themselves.

Each of the four "Great Masters" of the Vibhāṣa, the Bhadanta Vasumitra, Ghosaka, Buddhadeva, and the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, had given an opinion as to how the continuing past and future entities were to be characterized in contrast to the momentary fully-cognized
present entities to which they corresponded. The most commonly accepted of these theories was that of the Bhadanta Vasumitra, who said that the difference between present, past, and future dharmas lay in the states (avastā) of their efficacy (kriyā or kārita). In its full efficacy of engendering a consciousness of any kind proper to it, an entity is obviously present and momentary, but it can also be remembered with all the characteristics it had when present, and prior to its arising could be anticipated with all the characteristics it was to possess—the only difference lying in the fact that as a past and future dharma, solely the mental consciousness could apprehend it* while only in its moment as a present dharma could it be seen, felt, smelled, etc, if it was capable of giving rise to such consciousnesses at all.

The relevance of the theory of the existence of the past and future to the problem of memory is obvious. As regards the experience of the highest meditations, and re-emergence from it, this could be explained by the last moment of the consciousness-series losing its full efficacy, i.e. becoming past, and the next future moment of the series becoming fully activated, i.e. present, after a lapse of time has removed the obstacles to such a development. We may diagram this conception as follows:

*On the Abhidharma consciousness—theory, see KSP, note 3.
In this schema, *prāpti* and *aprāpti* are metaphysical connectors and repellers, respectively. *Prāpti* is according to the Vaibhāsikas an entity, which links diverse related elements together—as such it plays a role not unlike that of the inherence-category (*samavāyapadārtha*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, except that the latter, at least in the earlier theory, is single, whereas each instance of possession and relationship constitutes a different *prāpti* for the Vaibhāsikas. *Aprāpti* is in turn a factor which dissolves this relationship.

Vasubandhu, in *Kosa II*, ad 44 ff, admits that the Vaibhāsikas can solve the problem of the highest meditations in this way. But the entire edifice of purely hypothetical entities which is being evoked here goes completely against his grain. To speak of the existence of the past and the future is to him nonsense, since the past is that which is no longer existing, and the future is that which does not exist yet. At *Kosa V*, ad 27, as again at *KSP* 16-17, Vasubandhu subjects the Vaibhāsika theory to a series of sharp attacks. One of the main points raised in the former passage is that the Vaibhāsikas, by insisting upon the necessary correspondence of everything that exists as an object-of-consciousness, with some existing thing outside of the consciousness-series, run into serious difficulties. The Vaibhāsikas of course can restrict their claim somewhat by admitting only those objects-of-consciousness which have been clearly analyzed. Thus "self" and "God" (and in fact any object-of-consciousness supposedly dealing with what are not Vaibhāsika dharmas) are not true objects-of-consciousness, because they have not been subjected to such analysis, whereas objects-of-consciousness such as "past dharma X" and
"future dharma Y" can withstand any amount of investigation.\textsuperscript{111} Vasubandhu however makes a distinction which parallels the medieval European differentiation between "truths of existence" and "truths of mere understanding".\textsuperscript{112} He makes a contrast between those entities which serve as conditions for a consciousness-moment inasmuch as they are its objects-of-consciousness(ālambanapratyāya) and those which are its truly generative conditions(janakapratyāya).\textsuperscript{113} The first need not exist anywhere except as objects-of-consciousness, whereas the second must have real existence outside of the particular consciousness-moment. Vasubandhu allows the Vaibhāṣika the objection that if that which absolutely does not exist can be an object-of-consciousness, a thirteenth sense-field\textsuperscript{*} could be an object-of-consciousness as well, an idea which is patently absurd.\textsuperscript{114} What Vasubandhu does with this objection is absolutely brilliant. He says, "Then, according to you, what is the object-of-consciousness corresponding to the notion 'thirteenth sense-field' which appears in your statement? Will you say that it is nothing but a name? In that case, an object-of-consciousness can be nothing but a name, and the object which it refers to need not exist."\textsuperscript{115}

Again, the Vaibhāṣika theory cannot account for the distortion of memories, or for disappointments in anticipations. If an existent past dharma accounted for every instance of memory, it is difficult to see why memory should become distorted, or indeed why one should not have all memories of all past events at any given moment.\textsuperscript{116} The

\* cf. KSP, note 3.
disappointment of anticipations makes for an even more potent argument, since one may anticipate objects which never become existent as present entities.

The Reaction of the Orthodox Vaibhāśikas

We have already seen how the criticisms of that upstart apostate Vasubandhu reduced the orthodox Vaibhāśika masters to paroxysms of fury. His denial of the existence of the past and future was for them particularly pernicious, as even quite unorthodox masters, such as the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, had at least agreed on this. The Dīpakāra, along with Sanghabhadra among the chief masters of the Neo-Vaibhāśika movement, feverishly defends the existence of the past and future by stating that it is mentioned in the sūtras, that there could be no production of a retributinal effect without an abiding past deed, and that each consciousness-moment must have an existent object. A causal relation is possible, he says in reply to Vasubandhu's distinction between conditions-as-objects-of-consciousness and generative conditions, only between two existing dharmas. Thus no dharma of purely designatory reality can exist without some reference to a dharma ultimately real. The Dīpakāra rounds off his rather ineffectual arguments with the statement that the author of the Kośa, "that apostate from the Sarvāstivāda", has fallen straight into the precipice of the emptiness theory of the Mahāyānists, and that now he is affirming all sorts of arrant nonsense, such as three different kinds of "natures" in reality.
The great Sanghabhadra in turn has only one criterion for regarding something as existent: it must engender at least one consciousness-moment as its object-of-consciousness. He reduces all error to wrong connective combinations occurring after one has perceived an impression of the existant. There is really no such thing as an object-of-consciousness which has reference to a non-existent object. Even in the case of dreams, Sanghabhadra maintains that all objects-of-consciousness refer to things that have been experienced at some time, or which will be experienced, combined with present experiences in a confused manner. (This view is quite close to the theory of error and dreams later upheld by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa). The distortion of memory, and the disappointment of anticipation can be explained in the same way. "If the manner of seeing a present thing is infinitely variable," Sanghabhadra says, "why cannot the same be true in regard to a future thing?" In spite of the convulsions of invective that are hurled against Vasubandhu in the pages of his Nyāyānasāra, Sanghabhadra here reveals himself as a truly formidable opponent. Not only does he defend the existence of the past and future, he takes the offensive against the transformation-of-the-series theory raised by Vasubandhu in Kōśa IX.

One cannot consider an action as being the beginning point for a gradual transformation of a consciousness-series, Sanghabhadra maintains, because the act and the cittas* may be totally different in nature and their manner of conditioning what follows. In a "karmic"

*cf. KSP, note 3.
series, a beneficial action is followed according to Vasubandhu by a series of cittas of which the last (which can itself be unbeneficial) is supposed to have the force (projected by the long past act) to produce an agreeable sensation. The seed-metaphor used by Vasubandhu for this process seems singularly inadequate, says Sanghabhadra, since in the case of the series flower-fruit, there is always a constant relationship between the seed and the final fruit, i.e. such and such a seed always eventually gives rise to a fruit of the same nature. Sanghabhadra is here showing quite a bit of psychological insight, by implying that each action must have an effect distinct from cittas following as a result of cittas, otherwise the sudden arising of an unbeneficial citta after a beneficial one could never exist.

Vasubandhu's Counter-Offensive, and Alternate Theories

Vasubandhu is not lacking in replies to the orthodox Vaibhāsikas in his KSP. As regards the insistence of Sanghabhadra and the Dīpakāra, that an objectively real dharma must be posited for each object-of-consciousness, he says only that in regard to the past and the future, it is really present causes and anticipations which allow us to think of "something future", and present effects and memories that allow us to think of "the past".

KSP 16-17, which sounds almost like a direct reply to Sanghabhadra, makes in addition much of the point that certain moments never project a complete efficacy, and thus can never be "present" according to the Vaibhāsikas even though they are perceived as such. The example given is that of the last moment in the life of the Arhat who
has destroyed all his rest-afflictions, and who is thus about to "go into Nirvana". As this moment has no efficacy to produce anything phenomenal at all, it cannot be "present" by the Vaibhāṣika criteria, and thus can never become past, either. Furthermore, says Vasubandhu in the KSP, what kind of a force is a dharma exercising when it is past, and how or why should there be a sudden occurrence of a new type of efficacy for a dharma once it gives its effect of memory, the arising from the highest meditation, or "karmic" retribution? 127

On the other hand, Vasubandhu in the KSP is aware of the potency of Sanghabhadra's arguments, and realizes that the schema given in Kosa IX is seriously flawed. He repeats it at KSP 20, but this is only a tentative venture, directed this time, it seems, primarily at attracting the Sautrāntikas. For at the end of KSP 21, it is already clear that he considers his own early theory inadequate to explain the re-emergence of the citta-series after the highest meditation. It does no good to speak of the citta which attains the highest meditation as a directly antecedent cause* for the emerging citta, since the continuity of the series has obviously been interrupted within the meditational attainment. 128 To speak of past "seeds", which are momentarily deprived of their function, but which subsequently regain their efficacy in time, on the analogy of natural seeds frozen in the ground, does not really explain the status of these factors, nor what suddenly arises to reactivate them and connect them to the emerging moments of consciousness.

* cf. KSP, note 39.
Finally, Vasubandhu gives us a highly interesting alternative, which may be re-phrased in a manner resistant to his objections to it. In fact, one can re-state it in such a way that it can explain the attainment of the highest meditation and re-emergence from it, without having to use either the Sautrāntika "seeds" combatted by Sanghabhadra, nor the Vaibhāṣīka theory of the existence of the past and future rejected by Vasubandhu. As re-stated, the theory simply says that the citta emerging from the highest meditation need not rest on the citta preceding the attainment, but can arise from the re-awakened body supplied with the sense-organs.* This theory can be schematisized as follows:

This is a coherent and parsimonious theory, and, as I shall state elsewhere**, it does not appear to me that it has been done full justice by either Vasubandhu or Sumatisīla. The heaviest charge that it faces is of course that it is absolutely undemonstrable.

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* There is in fact an ancient sutra which emphatically states that the sense-organs are still functioning in the attainment of cessation, but that connected mental processes are absent: Majjhima I, 296.

** KSP, note 41 b.
It also has the disadvantage of doing little towards explaining the more general problem of psychic continuity.

The next theory discussed by Vasubandhu is that of the Bhadanta Vasumitra, one of the Vaibhāṣika "Big Four". The Bhadanta Vasumitra says simply that the highest attainment must be endowed with citta. The continuity of consciousness can thus be explained by the influence each citta exerts on each subsequent one. The ticklish problem of memory is admittedly not clarified thereby. The Bhadanta Vasumitra also has to meet the furious onslaughts of his contemporary Ghoṣaka, another of the Big Four, who says that the entire idea of a consciousness without concomitant feelings and conceptualizations is clearly absurd. The highest meditation being "the attainment of the cessation of conceptualizations and feelings", Vasumitra is truly in trouble.

Ghoṣaka himself proposes that the attainment of cessation itself constitutes an efficacious entity, which can be seen by the fact that it keeps the consciousness-series from renewing itself for some time. Again the whole problem of continuity is left by the wayside. In addition, Vasubandhu can attack Ghoṣaka's thesis by demonstrating that it is obviously not the attainment of cessation itself which has this function, but the moment of consciousness directly antecedent to attaining the meditation. It is this consciousness which is endowed with a volition strong enough to reach the transic state where all normal consciousness itself is suspended. The attainment of cessation is to Vasubandhu no more than the absence of the full functioning consciousnesses.
The Solution of the KSP

The solution of the KSP is to introduce the concept of a special consciousness, which at first is cautiously identified with the "retri-butory consciousness" of certain Sautrāntika masters, but which is finally openly described as the store-consciousness of the Yogācāra sutras. Though Chinese, Japanese, and Western interpreters have focused unduly on the concept of this consciousness ever since the days of Hsuan-tsang, its nature has been little understood. In Vasubandhu's thought, it is an admitted metaphor supplying a locus for the potential transformations of the consciousness-series, which are designated more concretely by the name "seeds," and it may in fact be regarded as nothing more than the collection of these gradually evolving seeds themselves. It is a series of subconscious or supraconscious psychic moments, though not undergoing the same radical transformations as do the six kinds of consciousness relating to visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and mentally cognizables, respectively. But its unity is only metaphoric, as it is like then a series of momentary events. The relation of the store-consciousness to these six consciousnesses is symmetrical, since every cognition of the six consciousnesses deposits new seeds in the store-consciousness, and these seeds in turn influence and color future cognitions.

In the attainment of the highest meditation, the six consciousnesses are arrested by a powerful volition of the last conscious moment previous to this state, and all psychic processes remain latently within the store-consciousness, which continues to function in a steady stream during the entire time of immersion in the medi-
tation. Gradually, through a diminution of the impairing force, certain of the seeds deposited by the last fully conscious moment develop to allow the six consciousnesses to renew themselves. Continuity is maintained because each of these moment-seeds influences the next—thus all the consciousnesses arising from them when the meditation has ceased are endowed with memories of the cognitions of the past.

Sanghabhadra's objections are met because the citta-series is no longer one-tiered, but rather involves now a separate series underlying the six consciousnesses. The retribution of a past act may be explained by the volition of that act influencing the store-consciousness, and after the maturation of the seed there, its penetrating to the fully conscious level in the form of a pleasurable or unpleasurable result. The fact that the citta antecedent or concomitant to this result may be beneficial when the result itself is painful, no longer disturbs, for the pain can be traced back to the unbenevolence of the seed previously deposited within the store-consciousness.

With the reciprocality of the relationship of the store-consciousness and the six consciousnesses, memory can also be explained. A perception leaves an impression in the store-consciousness, which colors future cognitions, but in addition, under special stimuli, the seed of that perception may suddenly evolve, penetrating the sixth consciousness in form of a memory.

It may perhaps be argued that this schema does not really explain anything. This is in a sense true. As it is used in the KSP, it is a metaphorical filling up of holes acutely felt by the Northern
Indian scholasticists of Vasubandhu's day. But do the theorems of modern psychology, or even more those of modern physics, really explain anything either? They are equally metaphorical, though in many instances this has not been realized. To call the schema metaphorical is however in no way to denigrate its value—indeed all language is after all in a sense metaphorical. Vasubandhu is already far beyond most modern psychologists in that he recognizes that his theory is a metaphor.

The theory is an upāya, as all theories for Vasubandhu ultimately are. On a superficial level, it was the best means of getting Vasubandhu's old comrades, the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, interested in Yogācāra, by presenting a viable solution for the continuity of psychic phenomena. But if this were its only use in Yogācāra, it would probably never have been introduced there, for though it serves similar purposes in the works of Asanga, this was not the reason it was devised in sutras such as the Laṅkāvatāra, the Sandhinirmocana, and the Suvarnaprabhāsa. We will return to this deeper purpose, and will attempt to clarify some of the misunderstandings regarding the concept of "store-consciousness", in a later section of this Introduction.* First another matter, which strikes me as particularly vital, must be touched upon.

*"The Solutions of the KSP: ethical and metaphysical implications".
3. The Possibilities of Humor

When I first began to read the writings of Vasubandhu, I had an interesting reaction, particularly as regards his works of a primarily scholastic nature. On reading the first chapter of the Kosa, for instance, my immediate impulse at many places was to laugh. This reaction is apparently uncommon among Western readers of this text. The problem which concerns me here is whether it is "wrong". That is to say, is such a reaction merely a reflection of my own attitudes, or might it have been intended by Vasubandhu himself? The many people who don't laugh could after all be wrong themselves, and in light of their frequent concomitant lack of sympathy for the Master, this is more than likely.

My laughter was not the sort which is associated with feelings like "How quaint and ignorant this sweet old ancient philosopher must have been!" It was rather always filled with a deep awe for the skill and penetration of a first-rate intellect. It always struck me that the humor was intended, and that Vasubandhu himself was smiling broadly while composing these passages. It may perhaps be said that I am treading on very uncertain ground here if I insist that this was the case, and that what an Indian of the fourth century considered humorous would not be what a Westerner of the twentieth century finds so. Granted that this is possible, there are certainly Indian works from that time, such as Sudraka's drama Mrcohakatika, that were definitely intended to be funny, and which are still funny today.

A similar debate as the one I am entering into here was in fact raised in connection with the fourteenth-century European philosopher
John of Jandun. Western scholars were at first either horrified, or delighted by what appeared to be countless philosophical jokes raised by John at the expense of doctrinaire Christian theology. John for instance speculates on the matter of a corporeal fire for a non-corporeal soul, and states that though philosophy has proven time to be eternal, we must believe, BY GOD!, that it had had a beginning. He says, "Without a doubt, there's no evidence to support any of this, but one should believe it by the authority of revelation, and the custom of hearing this, as well as other things of that nature, since our childhood, helps us very much in believing them." Further he says, "One must admit, with Christian faith, that it was God Himself who created the earth out of nothing and without any pre-existing matter. The pagan philosophers didn't know this manner of creating something. And there's no reason to be surprised, because one can't get the idea from perceptible objects or from reasoning. All the more so since this manner of production is very rare, as it hasn't taken place but one time, and since so much time has elapsed since then." And there are countless other passages of this kind.

More recently a scholar has proposed that John of Jandun is to be taken completely seriously—that he suffered from a sort of Augustinian-Averroistic schizophrenia, and that "the evidence for postulating any scepticism or insincerity on Jandun's part rests on a sensitivity to delicate textual nuances that I am reluctant (or unable) to credit." Yet even this scholar admits that John openly attacks the closed-minded attitudes of the theologians, particularly those in the Franciscan camp. This reluctance to come to a con-
clusion in matters where no amount of evidence is going to change the picture reflects a kind of scholarly attitude I for one refuse to share. It reminds me somehow of Origen's self-castration.

In the case of Vasubandhu, we have even less to support a humorless attitude, than in the case of John of Jandun. It is true that John of Jandun often sounds like an Augustinian, and though this in no way precludes the possibility that he may have been sick to death of the pronouncements of the theologians of his time, it is at least room for caution. With Vasubandhu, this is not the case. His disdain for many features of the Vaibhasika system is expressed time after time in the Kośa and the KSP. There is nothing to stand in the way of the possibility that on many occasions he was deliberately driving Vaibhāṣika-style speculation to a point of complete absurdity.

One of the most splendid examples of what I hold to be Vasubandhu in a laughing mood appears in the Kośa's discussion of the number of sensory faculties. It is asked why it is that for each "individual" there is only one visual faculty, whereas there are two eyes. Similar questions are raised in regard to the faculty of hearing and the ears, and the faculty of smell and the nostrils. The grave reply is that with one eye, one ear, and one nostril, we would be very ugly. Vasubandhu objects by saying that many people are ugly in spite of having two ears, two eyes, and two nostrils. Yasomitra has the Vaibhāṣika reply that these ugly people are still beautiful in comparison with people who would have only one eye in the center of their foreheads, one nostril, etc. A similar instance occurs when Vasubandhu enumerates the Vaibhāṣika material elements, earth, fire, water, and
wind, and gives definitions and examples of each of these. He calls earth the solid principle, and gives as an example of the solidity of clay, etc. But when he comes to wind, he calls it the mobile principle, and gives as his example a fire! In light of the manner in which the Vaibhāṣikas regarded the elements, this is not an illegitimate example, but nonetheless a somewhat dubious one for Vasubandhu to introduce if his intentions were entirely serious.

In the KSP, we find similar instances. For example, in 12 and 13, a series of alternatives are raised regarding the nature of a corporeal act, which alternatives would have been absurd even to the compiler of the Kathāvatthu. Vasubandhu's outburst near the end of these sections leaves little doubt as to the nature of his intentions here. "Beloved of the gods!" he exclaims, "Though it can be seen that you are making efforts to the best of your abilities, what is the use of making an effort towards things that cannot be demonstrated by any effort whatever!" The exclamation that appears a little later in the KSP, "To say that a past act exists is a pustule arising on top of a boil!" is also in all probability meant to induce a smile—particularly if we remember the contexts in which Kālidāsa uses the expression—contexts with which Vasubandhu's was almost certainly very familiar. This gives a certain support to the possibility that much else in the KSP may have also been written tongue-in-cheek.

Even in works of a most profound nature, such as the Trisvabhāvanirdesa, Vasubandhu seems to be capable of mind-teasing word-playing jokes. That such should be the case would not at all be out of character for a lover of the Lāṅkāvatāra and the Prajñā-paramitā-sūtras. It is
thus possible that by reading Vasubandhu with an all-too-serious eye, we may be dangerously close to missing the point.

4. The Solutions of the KSP: Ethical and metaphysical implications

The solution of the KSP regarding actions carrying retribution is to reduce them to volition. Vasubandhu here stands within the earliest of Buddhist traditions, where it is one's intentions that determine the ethical nature of an act. This focus of Buddhist ethics had been dropped by the Vaibhāṣika masters, with their insistence that bodily actions themselves carried a fixed retribution regardless of the volitions lying behind them. This view was perhaps adopted because of the constant attacks the Buddhists faced on this score from the Jains, whose insistence on the inevitable retribution following upon every act helped give the literatures which they dominated, for instance the Old Kannada courtly epics, their peculiar stark power.

Vasubandhu, as a Mahāyāna writer, has a particular interest in re-establishing the idea that it is the intention that determines the ethical nature of an act. With his affirmation of a Nirvana not different from Samsara, it is obvious that ethics can no longer be reduced to the simple injunctions and prohibitions of Kośa IV. For the world itself has become the place of release, and accordingly actions of an un-Vinayic nature may have their place, and may indeed be necessary. As such Vasubandhu expresses an attitude that was to take root in the Tantra (and which contrasts strongly with Nāgārjuna's strangely vituperative attitude in the Ratnāvalī), and which can
include the whole of life, with its full sensuality and sufferings, within a spiritual practice. In this way it can be shown how the KSP may serve as a bridge to a text such as the MVB, where these new attitudes become explicit.

In the short text *Silaparikathā*, Vasubandhu cites the all-embracing importance of good conduct, but says little about its specific nature. In MVB ad V, 6, its specific character becomes simply "non-harming of others".

The second principal solution of the KSP is the introduction of the store-consciousness to explain the continuity of psychic series. It has been assumed that since the store-consciousness is held responsible for the other consciousnesses and the manner in which they perceive, Vasubandhu's Yogācāra represents a form of idealist philosophy. The peculiar slant of Dharmapāla and Hsuan-tsang, which focused philosophical attention on the store-consciousness, has done much to support this view. However, when one reads the Yogācāra works of Vasubandhu, one can easily see that the notion of a "Yogācāra idealism" is thoroughly misleading in his case. In the *Mahāyānasamgrahābhāṣya*, Vasubandhu makes it clear that the interreaction of the store-consciousness and the six consciousnesses need in addition some sort of an external stimulus. When Vasubandhu lamhasts the idea of an external object in the Viṃśatikā, this seems to mean that the object-of-consciousness, the perceived datum, is internal, and that whether we can infer an object which refers to it exactly is highly dubious.

The external stimuli are only inferrable—what we see directly is always our own cognition, colored by our own particular psychic "seeds".
What is involved here is that these stimuli may be interpreted by different psychic series in quite different ways.

Rather than pointing towards an idealistic system, the theory of the store-consciousness is used for totally different purposes by Vasubandhu. It is the recognition that one's normal mental and psychic impressions are constructed, i.e., altered and seemingly statisized by our consciousness-complexes, that forms the actual main point of the Trimsika.153 "Cognition-only" involves primarily the doctrine of the three natures of reality and their interrelationships.154 In fact, the store-consciousness serves only as a bridge to this more essential doctrine, which in the last analysis reduces itself to a śūnyavāda which is thoroughly all-embracing.155 The best place to find Vasubandhu's śūnyavāda is no doubt the Trisvabhāvanirdesa, but the MVB, which contains some parodies of Nāgārjuna's Mula-madhyamika-kārikās, is almost as good, and is in many ways one of the most striking texts in the entire Yogācāra literature.

5. The MVB and the Uses of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra

As regards the MVB, it is not my purpose to present a detailed analysis, though this would be most interesting. Some necessary glosses are given in my text, and in one instance, in the descriptions of the obstacles to the paramitas at the end of II., the clearer explanations of the Suvarnaprabhāsa-sūtra have been substituted for Vasubandhu's own. It is my hope that the translation itself will be adequate to convey the profundity of the work, with its constantly shifting points of view, and its final contemplations that involve
the erroneousness of all mental constructions. One to the fact that
different purposes require different aspects, and different ways of
seeing reveal different levels of reality, the MVB abounds in con-
tradictions, yet it is a consistent and sensible work.

Every one of the pāramitās enumerated in II and V. has its place in the spiritual practise of the MVB. But the key in many ways seems to be the pāramitā of meditational trance, which is the chief topic of IV, a chapter I omitted simply because the practises and attainments described therein have not been directly experienced by me. But it would be wrong to regard the intellectual reading and understanding of a text such as the MVB as standing in any sort of opposition to the meditational practises themselves. As MVB III, ad 10 b tells us, "education in this kind of conventional truth is necessary for the realization of ultimate truth". Besides, the reading, understanding, and reciting of such texts may serve themselves as a kind of meditation. Meditation itself must at any rate not be the sole occupation of the practitioner, as sitting in endless meditation, and not going forth into Samsara, is regarded as an ob-
struction. 157

Comparing Vasubandhu's commentary with the bare enigmatic verses of Maitreyanātha, we can see to what extent Vasubandhu is original here. I do not think one should dismiss the commentaries even if they are found not to be original, since they still give us tremendous in-
sights into Vasubandhu's great period of assimilating the Mahāyāna.
To come back to our specific example, there is quite a bit in the MVB which is obviously not in the brief text of Maitreyanātha, and many
of the ways of expression in the MVB find their way into what may be
Vasubandhu's greatest work, the Trisvabhāvanirdesa.

Here I will only note what seem to me some of the uses to which
a text such as the MVB can be put. Comparisons between Buddhism and
Western psychiatry have proliferated lately, and there have been
counter-warnings that the practises of Buddhism by necessity involve
only those who are already in no need of psychiatry. I do not like
most of the comparisons I have read, but on the other hand the second
assertion is true only if interpreted in a somewhat special fashion.
It is obvious to me that a text such as the MVB is of use primarily
to the disturbed, or to the undisturbed in dealing with the disturbed.
The MVB is steeped in compassion, and it is a means worked out with
insight. The alleviation of those unnecessary suffering that come
from the purely mentally constructed (parikalpita) is its main goal,
though the attainment of a fulfilled nature (parinispānasvabhāva)
involves a voluntary connection with the sufferings inherent in
Samsara. 156 It is directed particularly at those afflictions that
come through self-categorization, and so the entire impersonal
momentary dharma theory of the KSP can be employed here as a theoret-
ical substratum for what is initially an art of mental alleviation.
This stands in a rather stark contrast to the methods of some modern
psychiatrists—Western psychiatry is currently so bankrupt and dis-
oriented theoretically that it is impossible to make any generaliza-
tions—where categorizations of "personalities" are wittingly or
unwittingly the main tool used. It is of course important to make a
contrast here. The sorts of states which are labeled "psychotic" by
Western psychiatry—and which it seems incapable of dealing with in any way—would not necessarily have been regarded as mental afflictions in ancient India. Some of the greatest saints of India are persons who would today in the West be locked up, lobotomized, shock-therapied, or, as is current usage, transformed into zombies by little-understood pill therapy. Even those regarded as possessed by demons at least had complete freedom to tear up and down the countryside. It is not people of such special perceptions that serve as the focus for alleviation in the MVB, but rather the more humdrum psychic series ensnared by illusions of the permanent reality of petty fleeing dharmas. It is also important not to press these comparisons and contrasts too far. The MVB's goal is a good deal more inclusive than any psychiatric aims, and in fact involves a disregard of what is conventionally called "prosperity". Its goal is in fact a complete at-one-ment with the universe, a state which necessarily lies beyond all discursive description. It thus reveals Vasubandhu's third aspect, which for lack of a better term we may call "contemplative", though contemplation is here circumscribed by a prodigious activity for the true welfare of beings in Samsara, to such an extent that it may be better to speak, as the ancient tradition does, of the Bodhisattvic aspect of Vasubandhu.

By comparing the texts which follow, we can see how Vasubandhu the logician aims towards flawlessness in argumentation, how Vasubandhu the scholastic utilizes such well-reasoned arguments to bring his opponents to the realization of the inherent values in Yogācāra, and how Vasubandhu in his third aspect hints at the deepest insights
of which this "Yogic practise" is capable, and urges the practitioner to take up the burdens of Samsara with renewed insight, and with an all-pervasive compassion.


3. Notable exceptions exist, of course, such as Wolfson's monumental work on Spinoza.

4. e.g. K.C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, Chowkhamba Research Series No. 1, Benares, 1963.

5. Paramārtha, Life of Vasubandhu, T'oung Pao, 1904, p 293.


8. MCB IV, pp 161 fr.

9. Yamaguchi, Seshin no jōgorōn.


12. See the bibliography for articles and monographs on V's date.


14. That, "Dua vao viec khao cuu triet hoo Vasubandhu",


24. Ibid, p 84.

25. Two additional problems which have sometimes been raised to give credence to the existence of two Vasubandhus rest upon textual misinterpretation. It has been said that Yaśomitra, the famous commentator of Vasubandhu's Kośa, himself believes in two Vasubandhus, as there are references to a "Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu" whose views are combated by the author of the Kośa. An investigation of the text simply does not bear this out. "Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu", or "Sthavira Vasubandhu", is named only three times in Yaśomitra, at Vyākhya ad I 13-14 c; ad III, 27; and ad IV, 2b-3b. The first of these passages says that it is the Vṛddhācārya V's opinion regarding unmanifest action, that it is called "material" because it depends on the material elements of the body. (cf. KSP, note 2). This is, as a matter of fact the opinion adopted by the Kośa itself. The second has been mistranslated by LVP(Kośa III, p 70, n) who makes it say that Sthavira V., the master of Manoratha, upheld the theory that nescience comes from
improper mental attention. This is again a view strongly upheld by the Kośa against the orthodox Vaibhāṣikas. But what Yasomitra actually says is "Apara iti Sthavira Vasubandhor ācāryo Mamorathopādhyāya evam āha": "The phrase 'an additional (theorist says that nescience comes from improper mental attention)' refers to Manoratha, the teacher of the Sthavira V, who spoke of this matter in this way." Thus the theory of two V's, one the teacher, the other the pupil of Manoratha, seems absolutely ruled out. Manoratha is in fact always called the teacher of V. The third passage states that the Sthavira V. and others believe that a flame is destroyed by an absence of a cause of stability. This is again clearly the position of the great V, as is amply demonstrated by Kośa IV and the KSP. The objection "An absence cannot be a cause" belongs to the Vaiśeṣika. In each of these cases, the opinion attributed to "Vṛddhācārya V" of "Sthavira V" is in fact the one adopted by the author of the Kośa, and one of them does not refer primarily to the opinion of V at all, but to that of Manoratha. It may seem strange that Yasomitra only on these occasions names V, whom he usually calls simply "the Master". But in each of these passages, there are several alternative opinions listed, so some ambiguity might have resulted from saying simply "the Master". "Vṛddha" in "vṛddhācārya", by the way, does not necessarily mean "old"; it may simply mean "eminent" (Apte, p 1491). Similarly, much has been made of the fact that Yasomitra calls Asanga a pūrvācārya, "ancient master". Since Yasomitra lived several centuries after Asanga, this should not be surprising. But besides, the expression may mean simply "previous master", i.e. a master prior to V. La Vallée Poussin has also used
a passage from the Chinese translation of the Samyuktābhidharmasāra of Dharmatrāta, which speaks of a Vasu who wrote an Abhidharma commentary in 6000 slokas, to support the idea of an older V. ("Vasubandhu l' Ancien", B.A.R.B. 16, 1930, pp 15-39). But this passage was inserted as a kind of foot-note by the translator Sanghavarman in 434, and it may in fact refer to our V, whose Kosa has 600 verses, easily exaggerated to 6000 by one who remembers the bulk of the entire work.

The second problem rests on the manner in which Paramārtha organizes his data in his life of V. It has been assumed that events are told in a chronological order. This has given rise to problems, because V's conversion by Asanga is mentioned only late in the text. But as a matter of fact, Paramārtha does not necessarily mention prior events first. Attention must be paid to the temporal particles in Paramārtha—when he says "first" (as on page 287), this usually refers to a happening which occurred prior to the event being discussed directly before. Paramārtha's digressions on the founding of Puruṣapura and the compilation of the Vibhāṣā, also clearly show that he is not writing in the historical order of the occurrences.

26. Vāsavadattā, v. 7
27. tr. Takakusu, T'oung Pac, 1904, pp 269-296.
29. Acc. to Paramārtha, all 3 brothers originally had the name "Vasubandhu".
30. The Classical Age, p 53.

32. Ibid.

33. Chos 'byung II, p 142


35. Sakurabe, p 363.

36. Taisho no. 1554.

37. Tohoku no. 4037; Peking-Tokyo vol. 119, p 43-4-3 ff.

38. P'u-k'uang, Sakurabe, p 363.


40. ca. first century B.C., "the Story of Sadāprarudita and Dharmódgata"

41. Paramārtha, p 287.

42. Ibid.

43. See Jaini's collection of these anti-V passages in the Dīpa, given in his article "On the Theory of the Two Vasubandhus", BSOAS 21, 1958, pp 48-53.

44. from Sanghabhadra's Abhidharmāvyānaśarasāstra, as trl LVP, MCB V, pp 25 -180.

45. p 180, Ibid.

46. cf. Bāna's Harsacarita VIII, p 317 (Bombay Skt Series ed), where even the parrots of the Buddhist community can recite portions of the Kosa.

47. HT, Records I, p 172.

49. Nonetheless, V. seems to have had fond memories of Śākala, as he returned there towards the end of his life. (HT, I p 196).

50. HT I, p 225.

51. Ibid.

52. Paramārtha, p 290.


54. Paramārtha, p 292; Bu-ston, II, p 143; HT, Records I, p 228.

55. Bu-ston II, p 145 says Śaṭa., but Tāranātha says Asta.

56. Bu-ston II, p 144.

57. This is either the Śaddharmapundarikopadesa, 1519–1520, or, as Waymann supposes, 1524. Analysis, p 22.

58. cf. Péri, p 379.

59. HT's account of the debate (I, pp 97–109) differs somewhat, though it agrees in the important detail that the Emperor Vikramāditya was present, and that V was not at hand to defend the Dharma. He says that the debate was in large part due to a personal vendetta of the Emperor against Manoratha. That Master, not Buddhamitra, is designated by HT as the victim of the heretic's attack. He also gives the site of the debate as Śrāvastī.

60. The traditional time for the beginning of a prince's instruction.

61. Paramārtha, p 288.


63. Record I, p 172; I, p 236.

64. Ibid I, p 192, 195.

65. Ibid I, p 196
67. Paramārtha, p 293.
68. Bu-ston II, p 145.
69. This is at least the opinion of Professor Nagao
70. HT I, p 196; I, p 172.
72. HT I, p 108.
73. Kośa III, ad 19.
74. Bu-ston II, p 145.
75. Pathak, Op Cit, p 186.
76. Some modern scholars have tended to doubt that Dignāga
was a direct pupil of V. It is true that Dignāga in his
Pramanasamuccaya is in doubt whether the Vādavidhi is a work by V,
but this may be, as Stcherbatsky has said, a polite way for Dignāga
to express his fundamental disagreement with his teacher. At any
rate, D. wrote a small work on Abhidharma called the Marmapradīpa,
which is nothing more than notes on the Kośa, and seems to be an
early work. If Kalidasa in Meghadūta v. 14, is in fact making an
allusion to the 'eaviness of D's philosophy, this would tend to support
the latter's tutelage under V.
77. See figures 409 and 410 in Sherman Lee, History of Far
Eastern Art, p 316.
78. Tāranātha I, p 211.
79. Lalou, "Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sron-


82. Taranātha I, p 211.


84. Peking no. 5865, Tokyo vol. 140, pp 4-109.

85. The example I had in mind is Candrakirti's Prasannapada, which in many instances wrecks Nāgarjuna's entire argumentation.

86. Sankalia, pp 142-143.

87. Sankalia, p 72.

88. The Age of Imperial Kanauj, p 271.

89. Sankalia, p 144.

90. gZhon-nu-dpal, Blue Annals, p 102.

91. Ibid, p 102, p 126, p 170.

92. Ibid, p 44.


94. Sankalia, p 148.

95. The Vādavidhāna is probably later than the Vādavidhi, but very little of it has survived. Dignāga also tells us that V. rejected opinions expressed in the Vādavidhi. (Prāṇasaṃuccaya, I ad 1).

96. On this work, see Tucci, "Buddhist Logic before Dignāga", JNAS 1929, pp 451-488.

98. Vādavidhi, fr. 5.


100. cf. Mathurānātha's Vyāptāpancañcarahasya, in Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logie, pp 90 ff.


104. On further details regarding the intensionality of Indian logic, etc, see KST, notes 2 and 3.

105. Among the latter, the Vaiśeṣikas particularly are prominent, and the refutations of the self in KSP 40 are directly mainly at them.

106. Seshin no jōgorōn, Introduction.

107. e.g. Ratnakirti's Ksanabhaṅgasiddhi.


109. See KSP, note 9 on the absence of a radical mind-matter duality.

110. cf. Vibhāṣa, 76, 11, MCB V.

111. cf. Dipa V, 304, 306.

112. cf. Thomas Aquinas, Quaesstiones disputatae de veritate, q I a 5, ad 27.

113. Kosa V, ad 27, LVP, p 60; cf. II, ad 62 c.

114. Kosa V, ad 27, LVP, p 61, bottom.
116. cf. KSP 16-17.
118. Dīpa V, ad 315, p 276.
119. Dīpa V, ad 319, p 279.
120. Dīpa V, ad 324, p 282, cf. MVE, comments ad I, 5.
122. Ibid, p 40.
124. Nyāyanusāra, chapt 50, MCB V, p 73.
125. Ibid, chapt. 51, p 80 ff.
126. Ibid, p 74.
127. KSP, 16-17, end.
128. KSP, 22.
129. KSP, 23.
130. KSP, 24.
131. KSP, 25; Abhidharmāmṛta 66, 12; KSP, note 43.
132. Abhidharmāmṛta 66, 12.
133. KSP, 30.
134. KSP, 32, 33.
135. KSP, 32; Trimsīkā 1, 20.
136. KSP 32, particularly the alternate translation, cf. KSP, note 57.

137. See the fascinating book by Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor.


141. from John of Jandum, *De Anima*, in Gilson, p 67.

142. Ibid, pp 67 ff.


144. Ibid, p 39.

145. *Kosa* I, ad 19, LVP, p 34.

146. *Kosa* I, ad 12 c-d, LVP, p 22.

147. cf. KSP, note 7.

148. KSP, 13.


150. KSP 45-47.

151. *Dhammapada* 1, 2, etc.


154. cf. MVB I, III.

155. The *Mahāyānasamgraha* also arranges the truths of Yogācāra in this way.

156. MVB ad III, 6.

157. MVB ad II, 9 a-b, last paragraph.

158. See the description in Bāna's *Kadāmbari*, p 322 (Chowkamba ed).

159. MVB, ad II, 9.
Vâdividhâna, fr. 3 and 4. An argument (vâda) is an utterance (or statement) (vacana) which has as its purpose the demonstration of one's own position, and the removal of the adversary's position. It (succeeds) through demonstration(sâdhana) and refutation(dûsana).

\[ \text{svaprapaśayoh siddhyasiddhyarthām vacanaṁ vādah. te sādhan-adūsanaṁ.} \]

Demonstration consists of thesis(pratijñā), justification(hetu), and exemplification(drstânta).

fr. I-3,4 The paksa is the object(artha) which one wishes to investigate. \[ \text{pakṣo vicāranāyām isto 'rthah.} \] The thesis has as its mark(laksana) the denotation(abhidhāna) of the demonstrandum (sādhyā). The demonstrandum is, for example, fire, the seed, and the non-eternity (of the sounds of speech) (in various stock examples of inferences). The justification has as its mark the denotation of a property(dharma) which is connected with the demonstrandum in an inseparable manner. An object which never occurs except when this other demonstrandum-object is present is designated as one which is connected with the demonstrandum in an inseparable manner. Or, to put this another way, a property which never occurs except when another property is present, is said to be connected to this other property in an inseparable manner. For example, the sounds (of speech) never occur apart from non-eternity, because that which has arisen on account of an effort never occurs apart from non-eternity, and similarly, smoke never occurs apart from
fire. The denotation of such a property is given in the form "because (it is) effort-produced" or "because (it is) fire-possessing", and such a denotation is a justification. Where the denotation of such a property does not occur, there is no justification. For example, there is no justification when one says, "Sound is non-eternal, because it is grasped by the eye", etc.

fr. 5 The exemplification is the denotation of the connection of these two. That through which the connection, i.e. the inseparable connection (āvinābhāva) of these two, i.e. the inseparable connection of the property in the justification with the property designated by the demonstrandum, is denoted, is called "the exemplification". It must take the form of a specific parallel instance on "like a pot", plus the statement of the inseparable connection: "Whatever has come about through an effort is not eternal". These three members (thesis, justification, and exemplification) form a demonstration. If they are false, or if they do not occur with the proper inseparable connection, then we have only a pseudo-demonstration.

fr. 6, 7 A pseudo-justification is (1) one which is not demonstrated, (2) one which is not sufficiently strong, and (3) one which incurs a self-contradiction (sāvāvirodha). An example of one which is not demonstrated is: "Sound is not eternal, because it is grasped by the eye." An example of one which is not sufficiently strong is: "It is eternal, because it is not embodied (āmūrtatvāt)". An example of one which incurs self-contradiction for a Vaiśeṣika is: "It is not eternal, because it is perceived through the senses"; for a Sāṅkhya: "The effect is contained in
the cause, because it comes to be (through the cause)."

fr. 8 A pseudo-justification occurs, when the object is not demonstrated; for instance, when one says, "(Sound is eternal, because it cannot be touched), like a cognition, like a pot".

fr. 9 A direct perception (pratyakṣa) is cognition because of the object itself only. When a cognition arises only on account of the object, by which it is designated, and not through anything else, then this cognition is direct perception. With this definition, false cognitions (mithyājñāna) are rejected, for example the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver. For this cognition is designated by "silver" as "a silver-cognition", but does not arise on account of silver, but rather is evoked through mother-of-pearl. A conventional cognition (samvrti-jñāna) is also rejected by this definition. For such a cognition is designated "a cognition of pots", etc, but does not arise on account of pots which are really existing, but rather through juxtapositions of the visible or tangible which are interpreted as "pots". The pots themselves can in no way give rise to this cognition, because they are illusory, and thus cannot serve as conditions. Finally, cognition through inference (anumāna) is also rejected by this definition, because such a cognition occurs through the cognition of smoke and the recollection of its inseparable connection with fire, but not through the fire itself. That through which exclusively (eva) the cognition arises, and does not arise, is regarded as an "object" in this passage.

fr. 10 Inference (anumāna) is the direct perception of an inseparably connected object by someone who is aware of this inseparable
connection. An object which cannot occur without another object, is said to be inseparably connected with that other object, as for example, smoke with fire. Through this inseparably connected object, that other object, which is itself not directly perceived, is inferred (anumāṇyate), for "inference" means that it has been inferred through this other thing (anumāṇyate 'neneṭy anumāṇam).

Vādaśīdāna fr. 9 A refutation (dūṣāṇa) consists in showing that the demonstration of the adversary contains too little (nyūṇata) or too much (adhikata), that there are fallacies in its members (avayavābhāṣāḥ), that there are flaws in his reply (uttaradosa), or that objections are possible (akṣepabhāva). [dūṣāṇāni nyūṇātadhi- 
katottaradosākṣepabhāvodbhāvanāni. ebhir hy asau parapakṣo dūṣyate]

Chin. fr. 1839 The demonstration of the adversary contains too little (1) when the thesis is present, but the justification and exemplification are lacking; (2) when the justification is present, but the thesis and the exemplification are lacking; (3) when the exemplification is present, but the thesis and justification are lacking; (4) when the thesis and justification are present, but the exemplification is lacking; (5) when thesis and exemplification are present, but the justification is lacking; (6) when the justification and exemplification are present, but the thesis is lacking.

.......

fr. 11 Flaws exist in a reply when it is reversed (viparīta), erroneous (asanyak or abhūta: the Tib is yang dag pa ma yin pa) or contradictory (savirodha). A reply is reversed because of identity (of the members) (sādharmya), complete unrelatedness (of the members)
(vaidharmya), the non-differentiation (avisesa-) or lack of justification (ahetu-), because of the possession and non-possession (of properties which are in reality not possessed or possessed) (praptyaprapti-), the reversal based on apprehension (upalabdhi-), on doubt (samsaya) and, on non-naming (anukti-), or because of identity of function (karyasama). Where doubts regarding the properties described in any of the members of the reply occur, the reply may be regarded as refuted.

fr. 14a A further reversed quality occurs in a reply due to the various possible constructions (vikalpa) [or "alternatives"— "vikalpa" may mean "a choice"] which may be involved. When one argues from a justification of dissimilarity where similarities may occur, this is a case where such various possible alternatives enter in. Assuming that the thesis is as follows: "Sound (of speech) is not eternal, because it has arisen through an effort, like a pot", the speaker of such an erroneous objection (jativadi) may say the following: "Though in this case, the similarity alleged by you exists, yet the pot is fired and perceptible by the eye, whereas sound is not. Therefore the pot is not eternal because of its perceptibility by the eye, and its state of being fired [in the original no doubt a -tra word. The Tib indicates this with nyid], whereas the same is not the case with sound (of speech). On the other hand, sound is imperceptible by the eye, and can never be said to be 'fired', but can be heard, whereas the pot cannot. Thus sound is eternal on account of its non-perceptibility the eyes, whereas the pot is not". Such a reply is reversed. For when non-eternity does
not occur, then the state of coming about through an effort also cannot be obtained (nopalabhyate), as in the case of fire and smoke. The state of coming about through an effect can thus be recruited for purposes of a justification. But when a state of being fired does not occur, non-eternality can by no means be observed on this account, as in the case of a wind produced by a fan. Thus this reply is "reversed". As regards its audibility, this is not sufficient to demonstrate anything, since when a sound (of speech) occurs, there must still be an effort responsible for its arising. The presence of an effort in its arising however never occurs for an object which is eternal. Thus, this part of the reply is also reversed. So if one attempts to arrive at the eternality of an object because of similarities and dissimilarities, it is nonetheless not observed that audibility is present only in the eternal, and non-audibility necessarily in the non-eternal.

......[No doubt an explanation of avīsesasama: the "reversed" quality of an argument where the demonstrandum and justification are identical. That this was the topic of this section can be surmised from Dignāga's discussion of the Vādavidhi's enumeration of fallacies in the Pramāṇasamuccaya].

fr. 15a, b A reply is reversed due to possession and non-possession in the following instance: When a justification is adduced with its exemplification, and one says, for example "Sound (of speech) is not eternal, because it has arisen through an effort", and the reply is given, for example, in this manner: "If the justification demonstrates that the demonstrandum is pos-
sessed of a certain property, then it follows that it is not different from the demonstrandum, like the water of a stream which has entered the ocean. A possession of a property is not possible if an object (which possesses it) is not obtained. But if the demonstrandum is obtained, what purpose can the justification possibly have? On the other hand, if it is not possessed of the property of the demonstrandum, then it is not different from those objects which are not justifications, and thus is not a justification itself."

To this it may be replied as follows: This reply is reversed. The speaker of the reply is speaking of a cause-as-condition-for-a-cognition. But instead of recognizing this, he speaks of it as if it were an material cause (upādānakārana), and attempts to refute the inference in this way. He is thus saying something reversed, because he is combating something other than the cause-as-condition-for-a-cognition. Thus this reply is reversed.

fr. 16a, b and c. When one adduces another justification, through which the demonstrandum is cognized, then we have a corresponding case of a reply based upon apprehension (or similarity of apprehension: upalabhisama). For instance, in the case already given, where the non-eternity of sound (of speech) is inferred through its state of having arisen due to an effort (lit. "effort-having-arisen-ness"), the adversary may reply: "This is no justification for non-eternity, because in the case of lightning, etc, non-eternity is apprehended through other means-of-cognition, such as direct preception, etc. In the absence of such additional
means-of-cognition, we cannot speak of a justification." Others formulate this in another manner: "There is no justification for non-eternity here, because there is no logical pervasion (vyāpti), just like in the case of the necessity of conscious activity for trees because of their sleeping at night, which occurs only for śirīsa-trees."

To this it may be replied as follows: This reply is reversed. For we are by no means claiming that non-eternity can be demonstrated solely through the state of having arisen due to effort. If there is anything else, which can be adduced (as a means-of-cognition), we can only be all the more happy. This reply is reversed, because we are intending to say that from the state of having arisen due to effort, we can infer only non-eternity, whereas the adversary is claiming that we are saying that non-eternity is inferrable only from the state of having arisen due to effort. As regards the second formulation of the objection, we are not claiming that everything non-eternal has arisen due to an effort, but rather only that that which has arisen due to an effort must be non-eternal. Thus this reply is equally reversed.

.....
discussion of reversal through doubt, almost entirely lost.

fr. 17a, b When one assumes that since the justification does not exist before its utterance, the demonstrandum must also not exist, there is a case of a reply based on non-naming (anukti). For example, the adversary may reply to this same argument that sound (of speech) is non-eternal because it arises due to an effort, as follows: "Since the justification does not exist prior to its
apprehension and utterance, it follows that the demonstrandum also does not exist. Thus, since sound (of speech) is said to be non-eternal because it has arisen due to an effort, it follows that, because the justification does not exist prior to its utterance, that the sound is not yet non-eternal. Thus it must be eternal prior to the utterance of the justification. But once it is eternal, how can it become non-eternal?"

To this it may be replied as follows: This reply is reversed. We adduce the justification as something which brings about a cognition, but not as something which brings about an annihilation. The adversary however is attempting to refute us on the grounds that the justification itself is supposed to bring about an annihilation. Thus this reply is reversed.

fr. 18-19 When one attempts to show that the demonstrandum is not demonstrated on account of a minimal difference in efficacy or function, it is a reply based on the identity of function. When, for example the thesis has been set up as follows: "Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect, like a pot", the adversary may reply as follows: "The pot is non-eternal on account of its being an effect (or having an efficacy) of a different sort, so how does this apply to sound? [kāryatvāc chabdo 'nityo ghatavad iti krtvā kāryāntarena ghato 'nitya ity atra śabde kim syāt]"

[To this it may be replied, as follows: We are claiming that every effect is non-eternal, so the difference in its efficacy is irrelevant."
A reply is erroneous when it is based on an over-extension of principles, or on a mere supposition. When one demands a justification for something which is recognized by both parties, this is a reply based on overextension of principles (atiprasaṅga). For example, when one says that sound is non-eternal because it has a cause, like a pot, and the adversary replies: "What is your justification for saying that a pot is non-eternal?"

To this it may be replied: This reply is untrue (abhūta or asamyag). Why? It is erroneous, because it demands that a directly perceived (pratyaksita) object be demonstrated in addition by a justification. For one can see by direct perception that the pot, which has a cause, is non-eternal.

A reply made on the grounds of a supposition (arthāpatti) is as follows: When one asserts something unaccepted (anista) regarding the negative example (vipaksa) on the grounds of a self-evident supposition, then we have a case of a reply made on the grounds of a supposition. For instance, when it is argued that the soul does not exist, because it cannot be perceived directly, just like the son of a barren woman, the adversary may reply as follows: "Then the self-evident supposition is incurred, that everything which is perceived directly must exist. But there are objects which though they are perceived directly do not exist, such as the circle which is perceived when a torch is hurled in an arc."

To this it may be replied: This reply is erroneous, because it is being assumed that everything which is directly perceived
exists. (What is being argued is however that that which is not
directly perceived, and which cannot be inferred, does not exist.)

fr. 22-23 Replies made on the grounds of "not-having-arisen" and
on grounds of "eternality" are contradictory.

A reply made on the grounds of not-having-arisen (anupatti)
occurring when one assumes that before its coming into existence, the
justification cannot have existed, and consequently the demonstran-
dum can also not have existed. For example, when it is being
argued that sound (of speech) is non-eternal because it has arisen
through an effort, the adversary may reply: "If it is non-eternal,
because it has arisen through an effort, then prior to its arising
it has not arisen through an effort (because it has obviously not
yet arisen), and consequently is eternal."

To this it may be replied: The reply is contradictory, for
before its arising the sound does not exist. And to maintain that
it does not exist and is eternal, is a contradiction, because non-
existence and eternity cannot co-exist. Thus this reply is con-
tradictory. This same reply is also erroneous on grounds of resting
on a supposition. For the adversary is saying: "Since before the
arising of the sound that which has arisen from an effort is not
obtained, it follows as a self-evident supposition, that it has not
arisen through an effort, and thus it is eternal." To this it may
be replied as follows: This reply is erroneous. For it is by no
means necessary that that which has not arisen through an effort be
eternal. Because there are three possibilities here: Some things
are eternal, like space (ākāśa), etc. And some things are non-
eternal, such as lightning, etc. And some other things do not exist, like a sky-flower, etc. Thus the reply is erroneous.

When one argues from an object's inseparable connection with non-eternality to eternity, then we have a corresponding case of a reply based on a (false overextension) of eternity. In this case the adversary replies to the assertion that sound is non-eternal as follows: "In that case, sound is eternal, because it is always connected with non-eternity, and its nature is thus eternal."

To this it may be replied: This reply is contradictory. And why is this? Because something non-eternal is being called "eternal." And this is a contradiction.
It is said in the sutras: "There are three (kinds of) acts: bodily acts (kāyakarma), verbal acts(vākkarma), and mental acts (manahkarma). On this point certain people say, "The acts which are committed by the body are 'bodily acts'; speech(vāk-) itself is 'verbal action', and both of these singly constitute 'manifest and unmanifest action' (vijñapti, avijñapti). Acts which are associated with manas are 'mental actions', and they are (equivalent to) volitions(cetanā)." (But) this matter has to be investigated at this point.

What is this dharma which is called "manifest action"?

Opponent: To begin with(tāvat), a "manifest action of the body"(kāyavijñapti) is a configuration(samsthāna) which has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it.

V: Of what is it a configuration?

Opponent: It is (a configuration) of the body.

V: If it is (a configuration) of the body, how can one call it an act which has been committed by the body? It is, after all, said to be an act committed by it.

Opponent: Since such an act (i.e. a bodily act) has reference to one part of the body in general, it is called"(a configuration) of the body", (i.e. a configuration of one part of the body, e.g. "a
gesture of the hand"), and since it arises dependent upon the great elements (mahābhūta) of the body (in general), it is called "an act committed by the body". Verbal expressions (śabda) which refer to things in general (often) also refer to their particular parts, as for instance when it is said "He lives in the village" or "He lives in the forest" (when what is meant is: "He lives in a house in the village" and "He lives under a tree in the forest.")

V: What is the purpose of saying that it "has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it"?

Opponent: Even though in speaking, there may arise a configuration of the lips, etc, this (description) is not appropriate (na yujyate) (for such a configuration), because it has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, but rather has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to words. And though there may be (a configuration) which has arisen from the citta of a former aspiration (prānīdhāna), this (description) is not appropriate (for such a configuration), either, because it has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, but rather has also arisen from another citta, which is a retributory cause (vipākahetu).

V: Why is it called "manifest action"?

Opponent: Because it informs one of (or: manifests to one) a citta which is instigating action in another. (lit. "instigator-citta": pravartaka-citta).
"By the transformations of external motions, one is shown the intentions in living beings' hearts, As one is shown a fish living hidden in a lake, through the transformations of the waves."

V: Well then, what is this which you call "configuration"?

Opponent: It is this (tad idam—Mnt. 5454): "length", etc.

V: But what is "length", etc?

Opponent: It is that by virtue of which concepts (samjñā) such as "This is long! This is short!" arise.

V: To which sense-field (āyatana) does it belong?

Opponent: To the sense-field of visibles (rūpa).

3.

Now is ("configuration") to be regarded as a special kind of atom (paramānuvisesa), like color, as some special aggregate of atoms (paramānusaṅghataviśesa), or as some other single entity (dravya) pervading the aggregates of color (atoms), etc? If it were a special kind of atom, "long", "short", etc, would have to be comprised separately in each part of the aggregate (to which it belongs), just as color is. If, on the other hand, it were some special aggregate of atoms, what would be the difference between it and a special aggregate of color-atoms? It could be due to a special aggregation of these colors that "long", "short", etc, arise (as concepts). Moreover, if it were a single entity pervading the aggregation of color (atoms), then, because it would be single, and because it would pervade, it would have to be perceived (prhyate) separately in each part (of the aggregation), because it would have
to be in all of the parts (at one time). Or else it would not be a single (entity), because it would be constituted with various parts.\textsuperscript{5a} Furthermore, (your) basic doctrine which states that the (first) ten sense-fields\textsuperscript{3} are aggregations of atoms, would be invalidated (by this view). And it would strengthen the doctrine of the school of Kaṇāda, which states that composites(\textit{aṅginaḥ}) exist as entities (which penetrate their components(\textit{āṅga})).\textsuperscript{11}

4. \textsuperscript{12}When an aggregation (of color) appears in one direction in great quantity, it evokes the idea(\textit{mati}) of "long". If it appears thus in only a small quantity, it evokes the idea of "short". When it appears equal in each (of four sides), it evokes the idea of "square". If there is a equal distance everywhere from its circumference (\textit{khor yug- parisamanta}, Mvt. 6493) (to its center), it evokes the idea of "circular"(\textit{parimandala}). When a greater quantity (of color appears amassed) at its central portion, it evokes the idea of "convex"(\textit{umnata}), and when a smaller quantity (appears there), it evokes the idea of "concave"(\textit{avanata}). When it appears (to go along) in one direction, it evokes the idea of "even"(\textit{sāta}), and when it appears (to go along) in various (conflicting) directions, it evokes the idea of "uneven"(\textit{visāta}).

*Though ideas of (various) configurations may arise when a variegated quilt(\textit{citrāstarana}) appears in such a manner, yet (following your theory) these various kinds of configuration cannot

\textsuperscript{*}of. \textit{Kośa} IV ad 3 c (LVP p 10, 2nd arg).
properly be situated within one locus (deśa), just as, for example, various colors cannot. But (kim tu—Mvt. 5416) if they could, the idea of every configuration could arise in reference to every locus, and this is also not the case. (On the other hand, one configuration for each locus is ruled out because one can construe various configurations in one section of an embroidered quilt). This being so, there is no separate entity "configuration". We form ideas of "long", etc, when color, and nothing else, is situated in special loci (deśa viśesu). As for example, (we form ideas of new "entities") with regard to arrays of trees, birds, ants, etc. There seems to be no flaw (in this reasoning) (kha na ma tho ba med pa: niravadya, Mvt. 799; anavadya, Mvt. 7238).

5.

Opponent: If this is so, how is it that (something) is discernable (bhedyā) at a long distance through an object-of-consciousness of its configuration, while it is not discernable through an object-of-consciousness of its color-aggregations?*

V: Well, how is it that (some things) are discernable through an object-of-consciousness of the configurations of the arrays or groups (to which they belong), while they are not discernable through an object-of-consciousness of their main own configuration (*agrāsāmsthānālambanena)? There is no further entity involved here. As a matter of fact, when we are confronted (with something) at a long distance, or in a dark cave, (the object) is undiscernable

*Ibid, though the Kośa argument is not quite identical.
through objects-of-consciousness referring to either (color or configuration), and we say, "What is this? I can only perceive it dimly. What are we seeing here?" Since this is so, it should be recognized that at this time, its color is not being clearly perceived, (nothing more**). (i.e. When its color is not clearly perceived, its "configuration" isn't, either.) For this reason, manifest action consisting of "configuration" cannot be demonstrated (na sidhyate).

6.

Certain other people say: "Manifest action is a movement(gati) which has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it."

V: What is the purpose of saying that it arises from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it?

Opponent: To exclude the movement of the lips, etc, which takes place in speaking.

V: What is this which you call "movement"?

Opponent: It is the progression(of a thing) to another locus(ādesāntarasamkrānti).

V: To which sense-field does it belong?

Opponent: To the sense-field of visibles.

**Kośa IV ad 3 c (LVP, p 11) develops the counter-argument in a slightly different manner.
V: How (do you know) that there exists such a progression of the same thing to another locus?

Opponent: Because there is no special (differentiating) characteristic (vīśeṣa) which can be ascertained (avadhrta) (for the thing). (i.e. any special characteristic which would distinguish the thing at locus A from the thing subsequently at locus B).

V: But even though there is no special characteristic which can be ascertained for a product arising in a dyeing-process when it is removed immediately after conjoining with the conditions allowing it to arise in the process, i.e. fire, the sun, ice, plants, etc., yet this does not mean that (the product) is not something else than (what has existed) before. And though there is no special characteristic ascertained for different fire-blazes in contact with similar sections of tall grasses all about to be burned, this does not mean that they are not different. Now if (the sequence of) products arising in the dyeing-process did not begin to arise immediately upon the conjoining (of the thing being dyed with the conditions of dyeing), then it could not begin later, either, because there is no special characteristic (changing) within the conditions. And furthermore, if other fire-blazes did not also arise in some other sections of what is about to be burned, then, because of its special characteristics (in the one section involved), there would not be any (new) special characteristic in the blaze's extent, glare, or heat. For these reasons it is not appropriate (yukta) to say that something must be the same thing (that existed before),
simply because no (new) special characteristic can be ascertained for it.

8. Opponent: Well, (but there is such a progression), because there is no cause for the destruction (of the thing previously at locus A).

V: What is the cause of destruction for (things that are certainly momentary): cittas, caitasikas, sounds, etc, and flames? (These things have no causes for their destruction.) Similarly, there may not be one for other (things), either.*

Opponent: But these things do have a cause for their destruction: their own innate lack of duration (svānityatvā).

V: Why don't you similarly accept (such a cause) for other things, as well? Just as there is no other (cause) for these things, in the same way, there need be no (other cause) for these other things, either.

Opponent: If there were none, then the materiality (rūpa) of wood, etc, would not be perceived even before its contact with fire, etc, just as (it isn't) after it. Or else, afterwards, it would be just as it was before.

V: * Now this is similar to the case where the flame of a lamp and the sound of a bell are both perceived before they are in contact with (a gust of) wind or a hand, respectively, but afterwards are not. Those two are not, however, destroyed because of these two

*cf. Kośa IV ad 2 b–3 b (LVP p 6, 4): "If one needed a cause for destruction, one would need one for every destruction."
(because different phases in the flame and the sound constantly displace each other, anyway, and finally lead to their own destruction even without the intervention of a gust of wind or a hand).*

b. If the materiality of wood, etc, were no longer perceived because it is destroyed by fire, etc, itself, then it would be (destroyed) even when removed immediately after its simple contact (with fire). 14

c. Though the external conditions (bāhyapratyaya) for the products which arise in a dyeing-process remain undifferentiated (nirviśista), (these various products) arise through a gradual succession of causes first causing them to take on a special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic to a great degree. However, through what does the destruction of the previous (characteristic) come about? It is not appropriate to say that something that exists because of something ceases to exist be cause of this same thing. It is commonly known (prasiddha, sammata) that the causes of two contradictory results cannot be one. 15 This being so, (we must conclude) that these (previous characteristics) are destroyed without a (specific) cause of destruction.** That "something" is perceived or no longer perceived in the manner in which "it" was before, should be known as being due to the continuation (pravartana,

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* cf Kośa IV 2b-3b (LVP pp 5-6).

** Kośa IV ad 2b-3b, LVP p 8.
pravrtti, anuvrtti, Mvt. 2000, 2124, 2664) of a series of momentary events (samtana) without (the intervention of) any extraordinary special characteristics, and to the transformation (ldog pa: perhaps vivartana, Mvt. 2665) of this series (respectively).

d. If (these things that are destroyed) become (destroyed) possessed of a (specific) cause of destruction, then no cittas, caitasikas, etc, would become (destroyed) without such a cause, either. Just as, for example, (they depend on a specific cause) for their arising. (On the other hand), an innate lack of duration in any way different from the events themselves cannot be demonstrated.

e. There would be a special characteristic for it stemming from each of these special causes (if a special cause of destruction were necessary). Just as there are (diverse) products which arise in a dyeing-process from fire, the sun, ice, grasses, etc, (respectively).

f. Destruction would also be possessed (of a cause), as are material substances. (An infinite regress would result). This being so, there can be no special cause of destruction.

9.

Opponent: Well, (the thing at locus B) is ascertained to be the same because there is no cause for the arising (of anything new) in this manner.

V: But since there could be a cause for the arising of this subsequent thing, namely the preceding thing, there could be such a (cause of arising). This would be like the cases where another citta arises from a citta, a different product in dyeing arises from a
(previous) product, curds arise from milk, wine arises from the juice of grapes, and vinegar arises from wine. If this were so, there would be nothing which could be called a (true) movement which has the characteristic of a progression (of the same thing to another locus).

10.

Moreover (kim ca, Mvt. 5413), when a thing is stable (avasthita), it has movement. And if it has no movement, it is constantly stable. On the other hand, if it is not stable, it also has no movement.*

Opponent: If this is really so, what is it that appears in another place (in those cases which we construe as being movement of the same thing)?

V: The same thing doesn't appear.

Opponent: Well then what does?

V: It is similar to the case where grass-fires or shadows (appear) in each locus as something new and something new again. The same shadow never appears in another locus. For (1) while that which is possessed of it remains stationary, it appears to arise, to be obscured, and to change, because the sunlight is far away, near at hand, or changing; (2) as soon as a bright area is darkened in another place, a shadow appears.

Our opponent may well object: "Though, if someone says that there is a progression consisting of the same thing moving to another

* cf. Kośa IV ad 2b–3d, LVP, pp 4–5, on the second part of this argument. The dilemma itself is new to the KSP
Opponent: To the sense-field of visibles.

V: In that case, why isn't it seen by them, as color is? And if it isn't seen, how can it be a manifest action which informs others? How can one even recognize that it exists?

Opponent: If it does not exist in this manner, how can a body arise in another locus?

V: It is through the element wind which has arisen from a certain citta (that something arises in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing in the first locus).

Opponent: If this is so, what (exactly) is the cause for something's arising in another locus?

V: It is the agitation (samudāranatva) of this same element wind.

Opponent: How can it be (the cause of this immediately subsequent arising in another locus) in regard to grass and leaves?

V: (In this case, "motion" occurs) because of the element wind, which causes a disturbance (cala, īnjā), causes a thrust, and which has conjoined (with the grasses, etc). And furthermore, if it is admitted that it is the same thing from which motion is held to arise, that causes something to arise in another locus (immediately subsequent to a previous thing at the first locus), what use is there for an investigation (vicaya) into a (principle of) motion which cannot be revealed by any possible object-of-consciousness?
12.

Opponent: In that case, is it that same special wind which has arisen from a special citta, and which is the cause for a body's arising in another locus, which is manifest action?

V: How can something which does not have the capacity for informing (others) be manifest action? To hold that the sense-field of tangibles is either beneficial (kusala) or unbeneficial (akusala) is not (the doctrine) of the sons of Śākya.*17a

Opponent: In that case, is the body which arises in another locus through the special citta itself manifest action?

V: (If this were so), manifest action would be purely mentally constructed (kalpita), and would not be a (true) entity, since there is no constituency as an entity (dravyātmaka) as regards the body.** And also, manifest action would become non-informing, because there is no informing of others (of the intentions of living beings) through the smell, etc (inherent in the body). (Furthermore), to hold that the sense-field of smell, etc, is beneficial or unbeneficial is not (the doctrine) of the sons of Śākya.***

Opponent: In that case, is the color which arises from a special citta itself manifest action?18

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*cf. Kośa I, ad 29 c-d.

**cf. note 5a.

***cf. Kosa I ad 29 c-d.
V: It does not arise from a special citta.

Opponent: In that case, how does it arise?

V: It arises from its own seed (bīja) and from a special element wind.* To hold that color is beneficial or unbeneﬁcial is also not (the doctrine) of the sons of Śākya.

13.

Opponent: If it is correct that color is not (manifest action), is its arising in another locus itself manifest action?

V: Beloved of the gods (devānāmpriya)! Though it can be seen that you are making efforts to the best of your abilities, what use is there in making an effort towards things that cannot be demonstrated by any effort (whatsoever)? Since (this new supposed manifest action) is not seen, as visibles are, and as its force (śakti, samartha) is also an object which is not seen, unlike in the case of an eye, etc, how is it possible to demonstrate its existence as something separate? It has already been stated that if it is not seen, (it must be explained) how it can be manifest action. If color could be beneﬁcial and unbeneﬁcial, then its arising could also be so, but it has already been explained that color is not like this. This being so, it appears that there is no manifest action which could be bodily action.

*See Sumatiśīla's commentary.
Opponent: Then is bodily action only an unmanifest action?

V: What is this which you call "unmanifest action"?

Opponent: It is materiality belonging to the sense-field of mentally cognizables (dharma), consisting of self-control (samvara), etc.  

V: Then an unmanifest action taking place in the realm of desire would arise without there being a (previous) manifest action.  

Opponent: If this is so, what is entailed?

V: (Unmanifest action) would be subordinated to citta (cittanuparivṛta), as it is, for example, in the realm of materiality. Accordingly, there could be neither self-control nor an absence of self-control in those who are possessed of a different citta (i.e. a citta which itself had nothing to do with producing the unmanifest action), or in those who are without a citta (i.e. in an unconscious state, such as the highest meditational trances).

Opponent: This is not so, because it is projected (aksipta) from a determined (vyavasthita) time (by a previous manifest action).

V: But how could there be a lie when there is no talk during a Prātimoksa recital? (At the confessional during the reciting of the Prātimoksa of the Vinaya, if a monk guards his silence and does not confess the misdeeds he has done, this constitutes a lie, a kind of unbenefficial action, even though in this case there has been no manifest action, either previously or at the time of the recital.) Now because unmanifest action is twofold, it can never
be indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), and because unmanifest action is dependent, it cannot arise as a bodily act which is both beneficial and unbeneficial at the same moment. 24

15.

Though it is possible to imagine that bodily and verbal actions are material, their beneficility and unbeneficility is not demonstrated. And why is this? When the body has released (*pratinisṛj; utsṛj*) the action, how can it be demonstrated as having a pleasant (*manojña*) or unpleasant (*amanojña*) result (at a later time), since it itself has entirely come to an end (by that time)?

Certain people say that a past act, through which a pleasant or unpleasant result comes about at some later time, also exists (at that later time), so how can one say that (an act's beneficility and unbeneficility) is not demonstrated? 25

V: To say that a past act exists is a pustule arising on top of a boil! 26 The expression "past" designates something that existed in a former time, is subsequently no longer existing.

Opponent: In that case, how could it have been said by the Exalted One (*bhagavat*),

"Even after hundreds of aeons (*kalpa*),
acts do not perish.
Obtaining their (needed) complex (of conditions),
and their (needed) time,
their effects ripen for living beings."*

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*The original Sanskrit for this verse appears in *Divyāvadāna* (XXI, 3), II, 19; X, I; XI, 7; etc., and in Candrakīrti's
V: But what is the meaning of "do not perish"? It means that they are not without effects, as is shown by the latter half. It is not held (here) that acts also exist for a long time along with their effects. What is to be investigated is how they give their effects; whether this is through a special transformation (parināmaviśesa) of the series, as is the case with a seed of the rice-plant, or whether it is through a condition in their own-characteristic (svalaksanāvasthā). If only a condition in their own-characteristic can give their effects, then it must be explained that they give their effects through not being destroyed.

Opponent: It is not because of their non-existence as far as their own-characteristic is concerned, that they are said to be destroyed?

V: On account of what is it then?

Opponent: On account of the fact that they do not exercise their (full) efficacy (kriyā). And how do they not exercise it? They do not project (āksip) an effect.

V: Why don't they project it?

Opponent: Because they have already completed projecting it, they are unable to project it again. Just as what has arisen does not arise again.

Prasannapada (LVP ed p 324), as follows:

"Na praṇāśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api sāmagrīṁ prāpya kālāṁ ca phalanti khalu dehināṁ."
16-17.

V: Why doesn't it project another effect similar to it? As far as that goes, how does it project its effect (at all)?

Opponent: Because it prepares it for its arising.

V: But the last state of one who has destroyed all outflows (ksīnasrava) does not project an effect, and there is also the stoppage of an effect through any cessation which has not come through contemplation (apratisaṅkhyaṇirodha). Since from the beginning these cases do not exercise an efficacy, how can they later be destroyed? (i.e. Never exercising their efficacy, i.e. never projecting an effect, the last stage of an Arhat and the last stage of a dharma before it undergoes apratisaṅkhyaṇirodha, are never really "present", and thus never become "past".) Thus, the projecting of an effect for something with such a nature cannot be demonstrated.

Opponent: In that case, how (is an effect projected)?

V: An effect is projected through the obtainment and development (posana) of the effect's seed (bijā). As (according to your theory) a future (thing) also exists as an entity just as a past (thing) does, why doesn't it project an effect? If there were a constant existence for all entities, and nothing would cease to be because destroyed, would an effect ripen (only) if it obtained the (necessary) complex (of conditions), as the verse says? At this point it should be demonstrated through what it is determined that the effect exists, and also what the force is which is operating in this case. (If an act ceases to project its effect as soon as it becomes past, but yet continues to exercise some sort of force, the
problem lies with the determination of this force, as well as its final giving of a retributitional effect). Thus, the existence of a past act which causes an effect to arise at a future time is not demonstrated.*

18.

Opponent: In that case (it must be that) a certain other dharma disassociated from cittaviprayukta arises in the aggregate-series (skandhasaṅgata) associated with beneficial and unbeneﬁcial bodily and verbal acts. Some people call it "the accumulation" (upacaya), others again call it "the imperishable" (avipraṇāsa). It is that through which a pleasant or unpleasant effect is brought about (abhinirvṛta) at a future time. (This dharma must be posited also for mental acts). If this other dharma did not arise in the citta-series, how could a mental act which has already disappeared (nivṛtta), as another citta has arisen, bring about an effect? Without a doubt (this dharma) must be accepted. 33

19.

V: In that case, when one has studied a text, and after a long time has elapsed, a memory is still engendered regarding it, and memories are engendered in regard to other objects that have been seen, etc, what is the dharma through which this memory is later engendered for (this object) which has been studied or seen,

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*cf. Kośa V, ad 27.
etc? And at what moment does it (actually) arise?34

Also, as regards the citta which attains (samāpatticitta) the attainment of the cessation (of feelings and concepts) (nirodhasamāpatti), through what does the citta which emerges from this state (vyutthānacitta) later arise?34a

When a lemon flower (mātuḷuṅgapuṣpa) is penetrated by the red of liquid lac, and it perishes along with it, what is the dharma through which there is later produced, within its fruit also, a red within its inner core?34b

20.

Thus, as there is no generation of this other dharma, which seems to be mentally constructed, imaginary (parikalpita)35, it should be known that, because a special force (ākāriṇīsuṣṭa, samarthavīṣeṣa) is produced within the citta-series by a volition, an effect arises at a later time through a special transformation (parināṃvīṣeṣa) within the series which has been influenced (lit. "penetrated") by this (volition). Just as, for example, in the case of the lemon flower, it is through the whole series (from flower to fruit) being penetrated by the liquid lac that the inner core of the fruit arises as red.36

21.

Opponent: In that case, why is it that, as regards the citta-series, it is not accepted that it is influenced (penetrated) by bodily and verbal acts, also?

Reply: They become beneficial and unbeneficial in this way
dependent upon citta. Though it is appropriate that when something is rendered beneficial or unbeneﬁcial by something, there be the force (necessary) for the same thing to give a pleasant or unpleas- ant effect in the series of that thing, the series of that (itself) is not (capable of doing so).37

V: In that case, if an effect arises at a later time because of the citta-series which has been inﬂuenced (penetrated) by an act endowed with this force, how is it that the effect of a former action arises for these who have interrupted the citta-series in the two meditational attainments that are without citta(acittasamāpatti)38, or in a state without conceptions(asāmājñika)?38

22.

Certain people say that it is through the citta-series, which has been inﬂuenced by it, retaking its course (pratisamādāti) at this very time.

But how does it retake its course?

It retakes its course because there is the citta which attains the meditational attainment, which serves as a directly antecedent condition(samanantarapratyaya).39

But since a long time has elapsed since this (citta) has come to an end, how can it be a directly antecedent condition? There has already been the rebuttal that an effect does not arise from that which is past. So from where does that other citta (that emerges from the meditational attainment) arise?
Certain people say that it is from its seeds which rest upon the material organs (rupindriyanisrīta) (that this citta arises after the meditational attainment has been completed). The seeds of the cittas and caitasikas rest upon the citta-series or on the series of the material organs, or on both, depending on the case.*

But isn't it said** that mental consciousness (manovijnāna) arises dependent upon (āsṛitya) manas and a mentally cognizable? When there is no manas, how can it arise?40

Opponent: It should be known that sometimes there is a metaphor (upacara) of an effect for a cause (i.e. the expression designating something's effect is employed metaphorically in place of the expression designating the cause.) So that one says "manas" for manas' seeds. (In this case, when "manas" is said, what is meant is the seeds that give rise to manas, which in our opinion rest upon the material organs during the attainment of the cessation of feelings and concepts). Just as, for example, one says "hunger" and "thirst" for a certain kind of tangible (sensation, when really this tangible sensation is the cause of hunger and thirst).

V: In that case, there would be two separate series of seeds for cittas and caitasikas, but this situation is not seen in things that (naturally) have seeds: sprouts, etc.41 (I.e. If in states

* cf. Kośa II ad 44 d (LVP, p. 212)

** cf. Samyutta II, 72; IV, 33.
with citta and materiality, there is a seed for manas resting upon
the material organs, and another that rests upon the citta-series,
then manas in these states results from two series of seeds. Two
series of seeds for one result are never found within things that
have natural seeds). Though conditions (for something) may not be
single, this is not the case with its seeds.

Furthermore (kim tu), with this theory there only remains the
flaw as to how the former actions of those who have interrupted the
citta-series in the two meditational attainments without citta, or
in a state without concepts, give their effects at a later time.41b

24.

Opponent: That flaw lies within the theory itself.

V: In what theory?

Opponent: In the view of those who say that these states are
without citta. Certain people accept the idea that these states
are endowed with citta. For instance, it is said by the Bhadanta
Vasumitra in his Pariprastha42: "There is a flaw in the view of
those who say that the attainment of cessation is without citta.
In my view, the attainment of cessation is endowed with citta."
And there is also a basis (for this view) in a sutra, which can be
raised at this point, which says, "For him who has entered the
attainment of cessation, bodily forces (kāyasāṃskārāh) are stopped,
but the sense-organs (indriyāni) are not and continue to function,

*cf. Kośa II ad 44d (LVP, p 212)
and consciousness is not separated from the body."*

25.

V: What consciousness is held to exist for them at that time?

Opponent: Certain people say that it is a mental consciousness.

V:**But hasn't it been stated by the Exalted One that a mental consciousness arises dependent upon manas and mentally cognizables, and that (at the same time there must exist) a contact consisting of the conjunction (saṃnipāta, saṃvasarañña) of the three, along with simultaneously arising feelings, concepts, and volitions?*** And how can there be a conjunction of the three without contact? And how can there be contact without feelings and concepts? And this in a state which is called "the cessation of concepts and feelings".43

Certain people say that though the Exalted One said that craving (trsna) is conditioned by feelings, yet not all feeling is a condition for craving. So in the same way, contact is not always a condition for feelings.44

V: But these have been clearly differentiated (viśista) by the Exalted One, in other (passages), for he says, "Craving arises dependent upon the feelings that arise from a contact accompanied

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Vāksamāskāra: vitarka, vicāra (cf. note 3)
Manahsamaññkāra: volition, conceptions, etc.

**cf. Kosā II ad 44 d (LVP, pp 212-213)

***Samyutta II, 2; 13, 14.
by nescience (avidya)." But contacts have not been differentiated anywhere. Thus, because there are no such (special) differentiations (within contacts), this (what is said by the opponents) is no rebuttal.

26.

The adversaries say that when the meeting (of manas, mentally cognizable, and mental consciousness) is endowed with a (special) force giving rise to contact, then it is called a "conjunction". At this time, however, the meeting of the three is without any force, as this force has been forfeited because of the attainment (of the cessation of feelings and concepts). For this reason, as there is no contact at this time, how could there be concepts and feelings? For this reason, only a mental consciousness remains (in this state). (I.e. The attainment of cessation is a state where there exists a mental consciousness without the force to enter into real contact with mentally cognizables, and thus powerless to help give rise to feelings and conceptions.)

V: In that case, of what sort is it? Is it beneficial, or afflicted (klista), or unobstructed-indeterminate (anivrtavyakrta)?

Opponent: What is implied by this?

27.

V: If it is beneficial, how can it be beneficial without being conjoined (samprayukta) with the roots of the beneficial (kusalamula): non-covetousness (alobha), etc? When there is non-

*Samyutta III, 96.
Opponent: What if it is beneficial because it has been projected by a directly antecedent condition, which is beneficial?*

V: But this is not (sufficient to guarantee the beneficiality of anything), because immediately subsequent to something beneficial, there may arise cittas of all three kinds (beneficial, unbeneficial, indeterminate), and because when there is a citta which has beneficiality, which has been projected by the power of the roots of the beneficial, it is not suitable that there be a cause for these (roots) to be removed, (thus it cannot be beneficial), and its being unbeneficial leads (similarly) to an absurdity (prasajyate). The attainment of cessation is beneficial in the same way that (final) cessation is.

If it were afflicted, how could it be afflicted without being conjoined with afflictions (kleśa)? When there are afflictions, how can it be that there is no contact? Thus it was said by the Exalted One in the Daśaparipṛcchāsūtra, "Any possible aggregate of feelings aggregate of concepts, or aggregate of psychic formations (sāṃskāra) arises dependent upon contact." Furthermore, if it is not accepted that the concept-less meditational attainment (asamjñīsamāpatti) is afflicted, how much the more so (kim uta) in the case of the attainment of cessation!48

Now as to its being unobstructed-indeterminate, is it the result of retribution (vipakāja), or is it related to bodily postures

*cf. Kosā II ad 43 a (LVP, p 203).
(airyapāthika), related to artistic activity (śailpasthānika), or to magical creations (nairmānika)?

Opponent: What is entailed by this?

28.

If it is (supposed) that it is the result of retribution, how could a retributonal citta, which is (necessarily) of the realm of desires, become manifest immediately after a citta which has entered into the attainment of the summit of existence (bhavāgrasamāpatti, i.e. the meditational state which is neither conceptual nor non-conceptual (naivasaṃjñāsamājnāyatana), as (such a citta) has already been severed for eight successive other (meditational) stages?

How would the absurdity not ensue that the attainment (of cessation) also belongs to the sphere of desires? And how could the citta of utter non-agitation (aniñjyacitta), etc, be manifest immediately after this (attainment)?

Thus it has been said in the Mahākausthila-sūtra: "When one has emerged from the (attainment of ) cessation, the contacts which one reaches are three, Mahākausthila: they are (contact) with utter non-agitation, with nothing whatever, and with the signless."

(Supposing that this mental consciousness) were a retributonal citta projected by former actions, what is the reasoning (yukti) here which would ensure that for those who have entered the attainment of cessation, it would not have been transcended (atikṛanta) at the period of emergence, as it (was engendered) by a former volition?

Indeed (tāvat), how is it that when the citta of the attainment of the summit of existence, which has cessation as its object-of-
consciousness, has come to an end (niṣṭhāgata, niryātigata), there
should be obtained, because it is demonstrated as being present in
the following attainment of cessation, the continuation (pravartana)
of a retributio nal citta, which has laten impressions of the past,
and belongs to the realm of desires, when (such a citta) has not
existed for a long time previously?

And indeed, why would a retributio nal citta retake its course
when retributio nal materiality, being severed here, does not retake
its course? 

29.

Now as to (the theory) that it is related to bodily postures,
etc, can there be a citta at this time which has as its object-of-
consciousness a bodily posture, etc? How can (such a citta) be
formed (abhisamīrka) when there is no contact?

Because it is held that the nine attainments of successive
stages (navaṇupūrvavihārasamāpatti) and the eight deliverances (vimokṣa)
are beneficial, it is not appropriate that there be an afflicted, or
indeterminate, citta at hand at this time. 

The attainment of the cessation of concepts and feelings
occurs dependent upon the attainment of the summit of existence,
where there has been a mental attention (manasikāra), associated
with tranquility, directed at (such) cessation. Thus it was said
in the Mahākausthilasūtra in reference (adhikṛtya) to the attainment
of cessation, "The causes and conditions for the attainment of the
sphere without sighs (animittasamāpatti) are two, Mahākausthila:
an absence of mental attention to any signs, and a mental attention to the sphere without signs."

If there is a mental consciousness for those who have attained the cessation (of concepts and feelings), what is its object-of-consciousness, and what is its aspect (ākāra)?

What if it had cessation as its object-of-consciousness, and tranquility as its aspect?

In that case, wouldn't it be beneficial? And being beneficial, wouldn't it be conjoined with non-covetousness, etc? And if it were thus conjoined, wouldn't there be (scope) for the conditions of contact?

What if it had some other object-of-consciousness and aspect?

How could it be suitable that the cittā immediately after the cittā which attains the attainment of cessation, be agitated (vikṣipta)?

Because of these same two (previously given arguments), this other additional indeterminate (kind of cittā) constructed (samkalpita) (by the opponents) themselves, is also contrary to fact.

Accordingly, since you dialecticians (tarkikāh) do not understand things according to the intent of the scriptures (āgamārthena), your understanding that there is a cittā which is a mental consciousness within the states of the attainment of cessation, etc, is thought out in unheeding rashness (rabhasah, cf. Mūt. 2966)."
30. Opponent: In that case, how is it to be held that (the attainment of cessation) is endowed with citta?

V: In the manner in which certain Sautrāntikas hold it.

Opponent: In what manner do these certain Sautrāntikas hold it?

V: (There is a special retributory consciousness viperākaviṣayāna.) As this retributory consciousness, which contains all the seeds (coloring future perceptions, etc), continues in a stream, once it has arisen taking on conception (in the womb: pratisandhi), taking on various forms because of various retributory causes, without any interruption until the limit (paryanta) of Nirvana (this consciousness) is not severed at this time. On this account, this state is called "endowed with citta". But the group of (remaining) six consciousnesses does not continue there, because their seeds have been impaired for a short time by force of the citta which enters the attainment of cessation, etc. On this account, (this state) is called "without citta."  

31. Citta has two aspects: the first accumulates (cinoti) seeds, the second is manifold (citra) on account of having various objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and particularities. (The state) is said to be without citta because there is a deficiency (vaikalya) of the second (kind) there, just as, for example, one calls a chair that has only one leg, "legless", because of the deficiency of its
other legs.*

32.

The state which impairs the seeds gradually(kramena) becomes weak, weaker, and even more weak, in the same manner in which there is a (gradual) diminution(apacaya) in boiling water, or in the velocity of a projected arrow, and because of this, when at the time of the emergence (from the attainment), the conclusion (paryavasāna) of the projection is reached, through a special transformation in the retributory consciousness from one moment to the next, and through the resumption of the seeds, the mental consciousness, and subsequently the other consciousnesses, also, arise as their conditions have(renewed themselves). The retributory consciousness, where there are only the various kinds of seeds themselves⁵⁷, is influenced(or penetrated) by the other beneficial and unbenevolent dharmas arising together(sahabhū) with the consciousnesses different from it, by means of their augmentation of these seeds, according to circumstances(yathāyogam). In accordance with the force of this special transformation of the series, the process of impression(vāsanā) resumes, and desired and undesired effects are brought about.⁵⁸ In reference to this, it has been said:

"This citta which has limitless seeds continues in a stream,

and when, for this citta, there arise its proper conditions,

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*On the etymologies, cf. Trisvabhāvanindeva, v. 7, which has an identical analysis.
it and its seeds become augmented.
Augmented by them and resuming its course,
it is able to give its effects in time,
just as for the dyed lemon flower,
the color appears in the core (of its fruit)."*

Regarding this also, it was said by the Exalted One in the Mahāyāna sūtra named Sandhinirmocana:

"The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
moves with all its seeds like the current of a stream,
It has not been taught by me to fools,
so that they might not imagine it to be a self."**59

33.

It is further called "the appropriating consciousness" (ādānavijñāna), because it appropriates a body for the factors at conception (in the womb) during the time of re-birth (punarbhava). 60
Because it becomes the support (ādhāra) of the seeds of all dharmas, it is called "the store-consciousness" (ālava-vijñāna). Because it is the retribution for former acts, it is called "the retributory consciousness."

34.

Furthermore, if it is not accepted, then by what consciousness is the body appropriated? There is no other consciousness apart

*See Sumatiśīla on the authorship of this verse.

**Sandhinirmocana, v. 7.
from it which does not leave the body for life's duration (yāvajjīvam), or which remains pervading it.

And where do the residues (anusāya) of afflictions (klesa) reside when they are removed by their antidotes (pratipaksa)? If it is said that it is within this same citta which is their antidote, how would it be suitable that it be the antidote, since it would be conjoined with the residues of afflictions?  

For those who, born into the immaterial realm, possess a citta-series which is afflicated, beneficial, or without outflows (anāsrava), though their body (or consciousness-complex: samucchraya?) is a certain retributional object collected by their particular destiny (gati, i.e. their being born in the immaterial realm), their destiny itself would not be retribution nor connected with retribution (vipākasamyukta) (if there were no special retributory consciousness.)

When non-returners (anāgaminah) at the summit of existence, are engaged in destroying their outflows, and they manifest the citta without outflows which belongs to the stage of nothing whatever, through what is it that they do not fall away into death? Generic similarity (nikāyasabhāgata) and life-force (jīvitendriya) (which are employed by the Vaibhāṣikas to explain the absence of death in these highest meditational states) are not entities which are apart, because they are only metaphors for the similarity and continuity of the retributory aggregates (vipākasankha). Just as there are no separate entities of similarity and continuity in the case of the similarity and continuity of foliage. Accordingly, without a doubt, another consciousness (of the type) as has been described, must be accepted.
35. The honorable Tāmraparnīya recognize this same (consciousness), calling it the consciousness which is the requisite of existence (bhavāṅgavijñāna). Others again call it the "root consciousness" (mūlavijñāna).

36. Opponent: In that case, what is its object-of-consciousness, and what is its aspect?

V: Its object-of-consciousness and aspect are undiscerned (acchinna).

Opponent: How can it be a consciousness and be like this?

V: The adversaries who claim that there exists a consciousness in the states of the attainment of cessation, etc, will have to agree to this.

Opponent: In that case, in what appropriating aggregate (jupādanaskandha) is it included?

V: Following the literal meaning of the term (arthena), it would be included) within the appropriating aggregate of consciousness.

37. Opponent: In that case, how can one explain the statement of the sutra which says, "What is the appropriating aggregate of consciousness? It is the collection of six consciousnesses"*, and

*cf. Majjhima I, 53.
"In the statement 'The psycho-physical complex (nāmarūpa) comes about through the condition consciousness', what is consciousness? It is the collection of six consciousnesses."*

V: It must be recognized that these passages have an underlying purpose. Just as, in the passage "What is the aggregate of psychic formations? It is the six classes of volition", this is not to say that other dharmas are not also included here.**

Opponent: What is the underlying purpose in this?

V: How this has been stated by the Exalted One himself in the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra:

"It has not been taught by me to fools, so that they might not imagine it to be a self."

Opponent: Why would they imagine it to be such?

V: Because its aspect is without (fundamental) changes as long as Samsara lasts. The purpose here was to indicate only those consciousnesses which are gross (sthūla), on account of their substrata, objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and particularities being easily delimited (suparicchedya), in which the processes of affliction (saṃklesa) and alleviation (vyavadāna) are determined on account of their being connected with both afflictions and their antidotes, and through which, being its effects, the consciousness related to their seeds can be inferred, but not (to indicate) the cause-consciousness (hetuvijñāna), because it is opposite from those (other

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*Samyutta III, 60.

**cf. Kosa I ad 15 a-b.
consciousnesses) (as regards these features). In regard to this matter, it can be replied that the consciousness which is the requisite of existence can be indicated suitably (yathāyuktam) as (being) the collection of six consciousnesses.

It has also been demonstrated in the Vyākhyāyukti that nowadays not all sutras are extant. Thus even if in the (extant) sutras it is not mentioned explicitly, this does not mean that the store-consciousness is not to be accepted.

38.

Opponent: Now if it is thus (as you say), then there would be two consciousness-series simultaneously (yāgapadāyata): the retributorial consciousness-series and the other.

V: If this is so, what flaw is incurred?

Opponent: A body which has two consciousness-series must be regarded (upacaryate) as two sentient beings (existing) separately simultaneously.

V: This is not so, because of the admission (praveśa) that the two are not different as regards the entitiness (dravyatva) of their cause and effect, and because the retributorial consciousness is influenced (or penetrated) by the other (consciousnesses). In the case of two consciousness-series belonging to different bodies, this state of affairs (dharman) does not exist. Accordingly, this flaw does not occur.
Opponent: Isn't there sometimes a difference to be seen between the (series of the) seed and the series which has the seed? (At the time when the result of the seed can be seen, i.e. the fruit which "has" the seed, the original seed itself is no longer seen.)

V: In the case of a blue lotus (utpāla), etc, the roots and the things possessed of the roots can both be seen (simultaneously). Thus, if it is seen, it is suitable, and if it is not seen, it is also suitable. If it is not accepted that it is thus (as we describe it), then the difficulties ensue (prasaṇjayante) as we have described them. Thus, without a doubt, (the store-consciousness) must be accepted.

Opponent: In that case, why not accept a self (ātman) with existence as an entity, as the substratum for the six consciousnesses?

V: In what way is (a self) accepted? If it presents itself (anuṣṭhāti) only in a series, and transforms itself through conditions, then what is the difference between it and that (store-consciousness)?

Opponent: But it is one and constantly without transformations.

V: In that case, how can it be demonstrated that it is also influenced by the latent impressions (left) in it by the consciousnesses, etc? It is the latent impressions which produce the special forces (which make the consciousness-series continue), just as a lemon flower is penetrated by liquid lac. If there is no special
characteristic which undergoes transformation, how, as there are no impressions (possible in such a case), do there arise in time special memories, cognitions (jñāna) passions, etc, from special familiar former experiences (ānubhava), cognitions, and passions, etc? As this self would exist in those states that are without citta, through what would it be that a mental consciousness later arises (at the culmination of the state), as there are no special characteristics (undergoing transformations) within the self? In what way are the consciousnesses subject to it, through which it could be understood that the self is their substratum? If the arising (of the consciousnesses) is (subject to the self), why do they arise gradually, as there are no special transformations within the self? If it is that they are dependent (apeksya) upon other auxiliary causes, why should these (causes) be acknowledged at all, since the force for making these (consciousnesses) arise lies (according to you) in something quite apart from them?

Now it may be claimed that their stability is subject to it. But what sort of stability is there for things that cease to abide as soon as they have arisen, and which cannot be (truly) attained (āpatyante)? Accordingly, such an entity (which is stable, unchanging, etc) cannot be accepted as their substratum. And in this way (i.e. if the theory of a self were upheld), there would also be a violation of scriptural authority, as it is said, "All dharmas are without a self."* Accordingly, the conception that there exists a

*cf. Majjhima I 138, 297; II, 263.
lasting, independent (svatantra) entity "self", is a poor one. Thus, effects seem to be given at a later time by the store consciousness being affected by certain volitions. But thus it is also demonstrated that bodily and verbal actions are not possessed of the characteristics which have been described for them.

41.

Opponent: If bodily and verbal actions are not accepted in that manner, is it possible to deny the statement of the sutra, which states that there are three (kinds of) acts?

V: It is not possible. But it is possible to explain (all this) in such a manner that no flaw exists.

Opponent: How will there not be a flaw (if an explanation denying the interpretation that "a bodily act" is an act committed by the body, etc, is adopted?)

V: It is our purpose to explain why it has been taught that there are three (kinds of) acts, what the body is, what an act is, in what sense (the passage) speaks of "body" and "action" and of a "bodily action". Similarly, it is our purpose to state this also in regard to verbal and mental acts, and as to why (the sutra) has spoken only of bodily acts, etc, and not of acts of the eye, etc.

42.

To begin with, why has this been taught (in this manner)? In order to summarize the ten paths of action (karmapatha)* with

* cf. Sumatiśīla's commentary.
three (kinds of) action for those who would become frightened by the many things to be done, just as the three disciplines (śikṣā) were taught to Vṛjiputraka* (for a similar purpose). Certain people say that only (the actions) committed by the body (truly) exist, and that verbal and mental acts both do not exist, because they are only mental constructions (vikalpa), and it was also to explain to them that these two are also action (that the three kinds of acts were taught in this manner).

43.

The body is a special collection of primary and secondary materiality, a corporeal mass (kalevara) possessed of organs (indriyāni). Action is a special volition (thus bodily action is actually a volition directed towards the body).

44.

A body exists in the sense that an accumulation exists, for it is an accumulation of atoms of primary and secondary materiality. Certain people say that it exists only in the sense of an accumulation of defilements, because the body is a well (kūpa) of impure entities (āsucidravya). But following the view of these people, there could be no bodies for gods.

An act is a (certain) conditioning (abhisam̄skāra) of the agent's manas. 73

An act which sets the body into motion (kāyacalanakarma) is called a "bodily act". There are three kinds of volitions: that which prepares (gamayati), that which decides (niścayati), and that which "sets into motion" (calayati). The one which "sets into motion" is the one which is called "bodily action", as it is that through which there is brought about the wind which is the cause for the arising in another locus on the part of the series which is possessed of it. (It is called "bodily action"), because the middle phrase (which should properly be included within the term, to make it read "an act which sets the body into motion"), has been omitted, just as one speaks of "medicinal balā-oil", 74 or of a "dust-wind".

Opponent: But as three divisions of the paths of action, namely: the taking of life, the taking of what has not been given, and sexual misconduct, are admitted to be bodily action, how can this term refer to a volition?

V: Because this killing and taking and misconduct take place because of it. That which has been committed by a bodily series engendered by it is said to be committed by it. (i.e. that which is committed by a bodily series impelled by a volition, is said to be committed by that volition). Just as one says "a village burned by thieves" and "rice cooked with grass".

Opponent: How can a volition be called a path of action?
V: Though it is also (simply) action, it is also a path of action as it is the path which leads to the two kinds of destinies: good and bad. Or, if you will, the path of action is the "motion" of the body, since the three kinds of action we have called "volition" evolve dependent upon it.

47.

It is as a favor to worldlings (laukika) that these are also described as bodily action. Though there is nothing beneficial or unbenevolent within them, they are thus designated metaphorically (upacārena), because by that means the world will undertake resorting to, and abandoning, certain volitions.

Opponent: If only volition is beneficial and unbenevolent action, how is it that it was said in the sūtras*, "There is a threefold action which, when committed by the body after having been intended (samcētya), is accumulated as unbenevolent, giving rise to suffering, and having suffering as its retribution." 75  

V: The intention was to speak of (the volition's) medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness. The volition which is different from those (volitions having a medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness in the body or voice) is called "mental action", because it is associated with manas, and because it does not incite the body or voice.

Opponent: If this is so, how is it that the Exalted One has spoken of "volition" and "the act which is committed after having

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*cf. Anguttara V, 297 ff; Madhyamagama*1, p. 437b 25-438a 23.
willed"(cetayitva-karma)?*76a

V: Among the three kinds of volition which we have indicated previously, it is the third which is called "act committed after having willed", since (the body, etc) is incited by it after this has been willed by the (first) two(volitions).

48.

"Speech" means "words", i.e. those special vocal omissions (ghosa) which communicate meanings(arthan pratipādayanti).76 (Verbal) action is that volition which brings forth(utthāpayati) these utterances). Something is speech because it is certain sorts of syllables(aksara), or inasmuch as it expresses a desired meaning. Just as before, the action which originates(samutthāpayati) speech, because, just as before, the middle phrase has been omitted.

49.

Consciousness is manas. It is manas because it produces a sense of ego(mamakrtatvat), and because it becomes intent on other births and objects of sense(visaya). The rest is to be explained just as before.

Opponent: If volition only is bodily action, how can there be either self-control, or absence of self-control, in those who are of distracted citta, or without citta, as there can be no volition (in these states)?

V: Because the impressions left by a special volition have

*Anguttara III, 415.
not been suppressed, both self-control and the absence of self-control may exist (in these states). The term "special" refers to that special volition which can be examined as originating the unmanifest actions "self-control" and "absence of self-control".  

Opponent: What is the suppression of these impressions?

V: As has been (commonly) acknowledged, (this suppression is) the absence of any cause for a volition of either abandonment or non-abandonment (of the unbeneﬁcial paths of action).

Opponent: Through what does this suppression take place?

V: (It takes place) through whatever volition can be examined as originating a manifest action which is the cause for the rejection of self-control and its absence (*saṁvarāsaṁvaratvāgahetuvijñaptisamutthāpakavicitacetanā), and through other causes of rejection different from that.

50.

Actions of the eye, etc, are not spoken of (in the sutras by the Exalted One), because he desired to speak only of those acts connected with an effort (vyāyāmikakarma), and not of (simple) acts of performance (karanakarma).  

Opponent: What is an act connected with an effort?

V: Anything which conditions the agent's manas.

Opponent: What is a (simple activity) performance?

V: Wherever there is (simply) the distinct force of the eye, etc, (there is a simple activity of performance).
Having explained the three (kinds of) acts which were spoken of by the Exalted One, completely demonstrating them in a manner in which they had not been explained before, with those solemnly declared demonstrations of actions, may the (beings in the) destinies, through whatever merit I have gained, obtain the purities belonging to the Buddhas.

The *Karmasiddhiprakarana*, composed by the Master Vasubandhu, ends here.

* Translated by Viśuddhisimha, the preceptor from India, and the translator-monk, the venerable Devendrarakṣita. Corrected and published by the revisor, the venerable dPal-brtsegs.
1. **Action and its threefold division**

The threefold division of action into bodily, verbal, and mental acts occurs in fully-developed form already in various suttas of the Pali Nikāyas (notably Dīgha III, 191, 245, and 279; Majjhima I 415-420; Anguttara I, 32, 104, and 201). The germs for such a division can be seen in some of the earliest Buddhist writings, where the monk is implored to guard himself in body, speech, and mental activity (Sutta-nipāta 330, 365; Dhammapada 231-234, 281, 361, 391). Sometimes in the suttas there are mentioned only two kinds of activity, e.g. at various passages where guarding body and speech are referred to only (Majjhima I, 461; Samyutta I, 182). But the triple division is taken for granted in both early Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Dhammasaṅgani 981; Bareau, Sectes— Sarvāstivāda thesis no. 117, p 150) as well as in other Abhidharma traditions (e.g. the Mahīśāsaka (?) Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, 1548, cf. Bareau, p 198, thesis no. 42). It is a natural enough division for a school of thought that holds that intentions themselves determine the ethical nature of an act, though the specific interpretation of what it includes differs radically among Buddhist ethical theorists.

It must be kept in mind that when Vasubandhu, and his Vaibhāṣika opponents, speak of "action"(*karma*), they mean an activity which can be subsumed under one or another of the retributional categories: beneficent (*kusāla*), detrimental (*akusāla*), and
indeterminate (avyākṛta).* That is, they either have, for the "agent", a consequence of suffering, or freedom from suffering, or are volitional but devoid of a definite consequence. By no means all activity (Sumatiśīla's "karana") is action in this technical sense.

2. Vijñapti and avijñapti

A "vijñapti" (lit. "an announcement", "communication," "intimation") is an act which is manifestly perceptible to others besides the agent. A "manifest action" of the body is thus any action which can be seen by another, such as a gesture, etc.; a "manifest action" of speech is the actual opening and closing of the lips perceptible by the visual consciousness, and the result which is perceived by the audial consciousness.

"Avijñapti", on the other hand, is a peculiarly Vaibhāṣika term involving some difficulties. An avijñapti is always preceded by a manifest action (see Kośa I, ad 13-14 c), and represents a subtle continuation which the action proper, the manifest action, has initiated. It may arise even when the agent is not conscious. Initially dependent on a conscious manifest action, or a mental action, it represents a residual force which has as its locus the material elements of the agent's organism. It is itself regarded as material for this reason (Kośa I, ad 13-14, LVP, p 20), though it is exempt from the usual characteristics of materiality, inasmuch as it is not directly perceptible, and does not exercise

*See note 17 a on my translations of these terms.
physical resistance.

To clarify this somewhat difficult concept, one may take recourse to an example employed by both La Vallée Poussin (Kośa IV, p 3, n. 2, 2) and Gokhale ("What is avijñapti-rūpa?", New Indian Antiquary, I, 1938, p 69) in their explanations of the term: A man orders another man to commit a murder, and in so doing commits a manifest verbal action. The assassin in turn, at the time of the murder, commits a manifest bodily action. When the murder is committed, the instigator himself becomes guilty of the crime, though he may not be committing any manifest action at the time, and may in fact be asleep. To the Vaibhāṣika, there must be a real entity present to account for his acquiring the retribution of a murderer, and this is supplied by positing an "unmanifest action", which arises as soon as the crime is committed, but which can be traced back to the verbal action and the volition which instigated it. Unmanifest actions are divided into three general types: those which can be characterized as "self-control"(saṁvara), as "lack of self-control"(asaṁvara), and as neither one nor the other (Kośa IV, ad 13 a-b, LVP, p 43). Our murder would actually belong to the third type, which is described as any unbeneificial or beneficial act which can be comprised neither within manifest action, mental action, nor within the self-control of disciplinary rules, meditation, and the holy man's path, nor within their reversal. (Kośa IV, ad 37 c-d, LVP, pp 93-94). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the beneficicality of the higher meditational states, where there is no more possibility of manifest action or volition, is due to the
**avijñāpti** of self-control resulting from the initial act of entering into meditation. A monk's keeping silent at the confession of misdeeds during the recital of the Prātimokṣa would similarly be an unmanifest action of lack of self-control, if he has committed misdeeds, as again no manifest or mental action may be present during his silence. *"Avijñāpti"* is, by the way, not really analogous to the psychoanalytic concept of "unconscious act", since a conscious act must always precede its emergence. Nor should it be considered the mechanism of any retribution, as this is taken care of in other ways by the Vaibhāṣika, and avijñāpti arises only as a result of certain acts, not all (On this, see the article by Yamada, "On the idea of avijñāpti-karma", IBK 10, 1962, pp 51-55).

Vasubandhu defined unmanifest action (*Kośa* I, 11, LVP, p 20) only to subsequently refute it as a real entity (*Kośa* IV, ad 3 d, pp 14-26). His definition came under the attack of Sanghabhadra in his *Abhidharmasamayapradīpika*, and resulted in Vasubandhu's revision of his definition in his *Pañcaskandhaka*. (On this, see the notes of La Vallée Poussin and Gokhale). Arguments against unmanifest action are also to be found in the *KSP*.

3. **Manas, vijñāna, and citta.**

These three terms have usually been rendered "mind", "consciousness", and "thought", respectively. Of these translations I have retained "consciousness" for *"vijñāna"* only. As regards the other two terms, I feel that the traditional renderings mislead more than they clarify, and the same has been true of alternate translations
that have been devised from time to time. So I finally decided to leave them both untranslated, and hope to convey something of their meaning in this note.

My reluctance to adopt "mind" for "manas" may seem somewhat curious, since I do not hesitate to use "mental action" for "manahkarma", and thus am engaged in what is, etymologically speaking, an inconsistency. There are, however, good reasons for abandoning the former translation which do not arise to the same extent with the latter. Van Buitenen has called the translation "mind" for "manas" "always a makeshift" when one is dealing with the Upanisads or early Sāṅkhyā ("Studies in Sāṅkhyā" II, JAOS 1957, p 18, n), and it is similarly an inadequate rendering in Buddhist contexts, though for somewhat different reasons. For the majority of Buddhist theorists*, psychological events are plural, without any single entity underlying them, or a "whole entity" somehow composed of them, in any way figuring in. Basing her statements on the Nikāyas themselves, C. Rhys-Davids could say, "(The Buddhists) saw in the person a plurality held together by a name, and by an economy of mental procedure. Their philosophy is synthetic, starting from many. When it analyzes it reveals, not fractions, but a number of coordinated ultimates." (Buddhist Psychology, p 56). As far back as the Dhammasaṅgani and the Vibhaṅga (ca. IV century B.C.),

* Exceptions are the Vātsīputrīya schools, such as the Sām-mitiyas, who maintain a kind of personality-factor which cannot be totally identified with the five aggregates usually held to make up "the individual", and perhaps Dharmapāla and his followers, who make all pluralities aspects of consciousness.
Buddhist psychological analysis had focused on complex successions of particular phenomena, and while treating them genetically, had refused to comprise them into hypothetical wholes. (On the contrast between the method of the Dhammasaṅgani and the roughly contemporary De Anima of Aristotle, C. Rhys-Davids has already written an admirable essay, cf. her introduction to her Dhammasaṅgani translation, p XXXVII). As regards Vaibhāṣīka and Sautrāntika Buddhism, with which we are here dealing, these particulars, or, as the Vibhāṣā would say, "these dharmas inasmuch as present"*, are in addition completely momentary. One psychological event may condition the next, and, indirectly, even one far in the future: thus, speaking metaphorically, we say that these events form "series"(saṁtānāḥ), but as truly present phenomena they are momentary. (How a momentary event can condition something future to it is in fact one of the main problems discussed in Vasubandhu's KSP). It is clear that the translation "mind" is at best misleading in such a context, since no matter what sort of a conception one may have of the meaning of that term, it still denotes some kind of a stable psychological whole or substratum whose functions would be analyzed by the Vibhāṣā into a number of types of more or less clearly distinguishable psychological events (e.g. vijnāna, saṁjñā, and manaskāra).

My reasons for rejecting "mind" thus stated, there remains the question as to what exactly manas is supposed to be. And with this question, there arise several additional problems which have

* cf. Vibhāṣā selections, tr. La Vallée Poussin, MCB V, pp 135 ff.
to be attacked. For one, there appears to be on first sight a certain redundancy, as well as an apparent inconsistency, in the psychological outlines generally accepted by the Abhidharmikas. On one hand, there is the scheme of the six vijñānas or consciousnesses which are enumerated invariably as follows: I. visual, II. audial, III. olfactory, IV. gustatory, V. tactile, and VI. manovijñāna.

Each of these has an āśraya ("Support" or "substratum"), a factor which is necessary for its functioning: for I., the eyes, for II the ears, for III. the nose, for IV. the tongue, for V. the body, and for VI., manas. This relationship is a symmetrical one, as these organs are also referred to as having the consciousnesses as their āśrayas.

The objects of the consciousnesses and their organs are enumerated as visibles (rupa—see note 9), sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas (which in this case, as we shall see, we could define as "mentally cognizables"). Together, the objects and the sense-organs form the twelve āyāfana or "sense-fields", and all eighteen categories together are called the basic constituents (dhātu) of experience. The sixth consciousness is described as one which may arise subsequent to any one of the others (Kośa I, 17 a-b), and its objects, the "dharmas", are conditioned in part by the more sensory objects of the other, preceding vijñānas. (Kośa I, ad 16-17; Asanga, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Pradham ed., pp 2-3).

The question which arises immediately is: If the manovijñāna is the consciousness which orders and coordinates impressions, and which deals with ratiocination and memory in normal states, and is the impelling vijñāna in meditational states, (all of which seem to
be its functions as early as the Dhammasaṅgani—cf. p LXXVII), what exactly is the manas? In fact, Vasubandhu attacked this generally accepted outline of the consciousnesses on the grounds that either a redundancy, or an ambiguity, resulted from positing a manas apart from manovijñāna. (Kośa I, ad 16 c–d; ad 17). If there can be a manas distinct from the six consciousnesses themselves, he asks, what are its functions? If it finally said by the Vaibhāṣika that the term "manas" is employed in order to assign an āśraya to the sixth consciousness. (Kośa I, 17 c–d): it could thus, as La Vallée Poussin says (Kośa I, p 31, n 3), be regarded as a consciousness immediately preceding the arising of a manovijñāna, and standing in the same relationship to the succeeding consciousnesses as the eye does to a visual consciousness. But, though Vasubandhu recognizes this quest for the āśraya of the manovijñāna as the motivation behind the Vaibhāṣikas' positing a separate manas, he basically regards the distinction between manas and the collection of six consciousnesses as one which "ought not be made" (Kośa I, ad 16 c–d, LVP, p 31, last sentence; cf. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism, p 53). The term "manas" would thus be employed for any consciousness which serves as a direct stimulus for a consciousness of the sixth, or "mental", variety, and as such, could be used for any such occurrence of any of the six consciousnesses. (The identity of vijñāna with not only manas, but with manovijñāna, was accepted in Theravāda Abhidhamma already in Dhammasaṅgani, 6. This would imply the simultaneity of sensory and related ratiocinative events. Vasubandhu, however, prefers to speak of vijñānas in succession, and
this wariness towards accepting simultaneous consciousnesses of different types colors even his later philosophy. On this, see the article by Schmidthausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen im Viṃśatikā und Trimsikā," WZKSOA XI, 1967, pp 109 ff. It is also interesting to note that this very same problem of an āsraya for the sixth consciousness was used by Asanga to introduce his seventh consciousness, which he also calls "manas", but which means, in his system as well as Vasubandhu's later philosophy inspired by it, an "I-consciousness", "consciousness of ego" underlying the other six consciousnesses. cf. Asanga, Mahāyānasamgraha I, 7, p 18/Lamotte tr/; Vasubandhu, Trimsikā 5-6).

In contrast to this classical Vaiguśika outline which terms manas and manovijñāna psychological events distinguishable from the other consciousnesses, there is a formula, ancient in Buddhism (cf. Samyutta II, 94), which equates manas with vijñāna and citta. We have already seen that Vasubandhu upholds the identity of manas and vijñāna. At another place, he is even more specific, stating the identity of citta, manas, and vijñāna unequivocally(Kośa II, 34 a-b, LVP p 176). He notes a slight difference in the nuances of the terms, observing that "manas" is derived from the verbal root man- (manute) which means pre-eminently simply "to perceive, know, cognize", whereas "vijñāna" stems from V- jñā + vi, and thus has overtones of "discerning" objects-of-consciousness. (Kośa II, ad 34 a-b, LVP, p 177). The difference is slight, and Vasubandhu is emphatic on the point that the two terms denote exactly the same kind of phenomenon. Since it is the manovijñāna which properly has the functions of
ratiocination, memory, and the attainment of meditational states, I have called it "the mental consciousness", and left "manas", which is the term used for any psychological event which conditions such a consciousness, untranslated.

"Citta" is the term among the three that is the most difficult to translate, precisely because of its very basic and central role in Buddhist psychology. Standing as it does for any basic psychological event, whether sensory or non-sensory, it cannot be very well rendered by "thought", since this over-emphasizes a ratiocinative aspect. Guenther suggested the translation "attitude", presumably because a citta, at least as long as it is sensory and ratiocinative, is always linked to definite concomitant events, the caitasikas. (Philosophy and Psychology of the Abhidharma, p 15). According to some earlier Abhidharma theorists, such as the Bhadanta Vasumitra who is quoted in the KSF, the experience of states where there is neither conceptualizations (samjñā, perhaps to be rendered more generally "awarenesses"), nor feelings (vedanā), can also be reduced to cittas. But according to others, such as Ghoṣaka, this is impossible, as citta always involves certain caitasikas, two of which are invariably conceptualizations and feelings. (Ghoṣaka, Abhidharmāmṛta, 66, 12; Kośa II, ad 44 d). Being thus according to Ghoṣaka always imbued with at least a basic intellective and emotive side, and according to Vasumitra separable from both, citta is not rendered very well by "thought" in either case. The usual nuances of "thought" in English are different, and, as C. Rhys-Davids noted (Buddh. Psych., p 82), perhaps correspond most closely to the caitasikas vitarka and
vicāra, which will be discussed below. "Attitude" on the other hand has a flaw which "thought" does not have, inasmuch as attitudes, unlike cittas, are not usually regarded as momentary. "Citta" being any basic psychological event (except, if we follow Ghoṣakā, those in the highest meditations), I toyed with various artificial translations such as "psychemes", but finally decided that the term could be better explained than translated. It is curious that Hume, who certainly knew about cittas, gave us no good English word for them.

To return to the immediate problem, it appears that these three terms' varying nuances, as noted by Vasubandhu, condition to some extent their usage in Abhidharma. As C. Rhys-Davids has observed, "manas" is often used when the more intellective functions of consciousness are being referred to, that is, in places where it might be more exact to use "manovijñāna"; "vijñāna" is used most often for "the field of sense and sense-reaction"; and "citta" stands perhaps, as she says "pre-eminently for the subjective, inward-looking aspect of consciousness". (Buddh. Psych., pp 18-19). By upholding the identity of the three, Vasubandhu may be implying that though different, more or less sensory or intellective parts can be abstracted from events of consciousness, fundamentally these are no more than aspects of one kind of phenomenon. No two of these momentary phenomena will be exactly the same, but normally all of them will share at least those concomitant events making them susceptible to being called either "manas", "vijñāna", or "citta". Though Vasubandhu's lists of these caitasikas concomitant with every citta
differ slightly in various works*, the enumerations do not vary as regards the inclusion of *saṁjñā*, most associated with *manas*, and of *sparśa* ("contact" with the object-of-consciousness), most associated with "*vijñāna". Throughout Vasubandhu's psychology, there are in addition always volition(*cetanā*), feelings(*vedanā*), and "mental attention" or "focus"(*manasikāra*). (Even the more radical caitasika-theories of Śrīlāta and the Bhadanta Dharmatrātā admit at least feelings, conceptualizations, and volitions as "sarvatragas", cf. Lin Li Kuang, *L'Aide-Mémoire de la Vraie Loi*, p 45. There were however some philosophers, notably Harivarman and Buddhadeva, who apparently denied the concept of caitasikas present in all cittas. Harivarman did so because he held that each single caitasika is produced by another, and had to be considered as belonging to separate cittas /cf. LLK, p 45/ and Buddhadeva because he denied the separate existence of caitasikas altogether /cf. Kośa LVP I, 35, n. 2; II, p 150, n. 2, Abhidharmadīpa ad 115, p 73 ff/ It should perhaps also be noted that the usage of the terms "*manas*", "*vijñāna*", and "*citta*", and hence also the concept of "*sarvatraga*", becomes somewhat different for Asanga in his *Mahāyānasamgraha*. As we have mentioned, the term "*manas*" becomes reserved for the seventh consciousness, the ego-consciousness added by Yogācāra theory, "*vijñāna*" is used most often for consciousnesses I–VI, and "*citta*" is used for the eighth, or store-consciousness. The sarvatragas contact, mental attention,

*Kośa II, 24 gives the Viśhāsa's list of ten "mahābhūmikas", but see later where he begins the process of eliminating some of these, e.g. *samādhi* at VIII, ad 1; the Pañcaskandhaka (Peking-Tokyo ed. vol 113, p 237, 5, 1) reduces them to five "sarvatragas", which five are retained in *Trimsikā* 3.
feelings, conceptualizations, and volition are associated with the store-consciousness inasmuch as it evolves vijñānas I–VII, and not in states where it does not do so. They and additional sarvatragas are associated specifically with vijñānas I–VI. /Mahāyānasamgraha I, 6, p 15/ This usage of "sarvatraga" is adopted by Vasubandhu /Trimśikā 3, 9, 10/, but he does not follow Asanga in his employment of the terms "vijñāna", "manas", and "citta", and even as late as the Vimsātikāvṛtti (p 3), insists that all three are synonyms. He does, however, use the term "manas" for the seventh consciousness.

Actually, even Asanga, in his Abhidharmasamuccaya, defines "manas" both in the new way, as the ego-consciousness, and in the old, as whatever citta immediately precedes and conditions a mental consciousness /Abhidharmasamuccaya, p 12/.

It would appear that for those philosophers who accept the existence of these "mahābhūmikas" or "sarvatragas", a radical distinction between prior cognitions without mental construction (nirvikalpajñāna) and succeeding ones with mental construction (savikalpaka–), such as was maintained by later Buddhist philosophers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, would be impossible. That is, for the former philosophers, a so-called sensory vijñāna, such as a tactile consciousness, would already have inherent within it an element of discrimination (saṃjñā), a volition or intention (cetana), and a predominating feeling (vedanā) conditioning in part further responses to it. There would not be any possibility for a "pure sensory experience" preceding ones constructed cognition: there could at most be only degrees of mental construction accompanying
and succeeding ones sensory cognitions. And this seems in fact to be the point of view adopted by Vasubandhu, as he says that the only cognitions completely free from mental construction are those which occur in states of meditation (Kosa I, ad 32). Vijnānas I–V are normally accompanied not only by samjñā and vedana, but also, as Vasubandhu specifically states, with vitarka and vicāra (Kosa I, 32 a–b). Actually, as the discussion at Kosa II, ad 33 reveals, what he himself means to say is that vijnānas I–V are at least accompanied by vitarka. Vitarka and vicāra are two kinds of mental construction— in fact, the first of them is to Vasubandhu svabhāvavikalpa—basic mental construction—the kind that makes all other kinds possible. (Vitarka and vicāra are both regarded as existing together within vijnānas I–V by the Vibhāṣā, and by orthodox Vaibhāśikas such as Sanghabhadra and the Dipakāra. Consequently they regard both vitarka and vicāra as basic vikalpa. But in face of Vasubandhu's attacks, that these two are not generically different, but only different stages in the same process, and thus cannot be situated together within one moment of consciousness, both Sanghabhadra and the Dipakāra are forced to admit that vicāra can be present in v's I–V only in an unmanifest state, cf. Abhidharmadīpa ad II, 123, p 83; Yasomitra's citation of Sanghabhadra's Abhidharmaśāmanvānusāra, ad II 33, Law ed II, p 57. My translation of these passages is given in the Appendix. See also Jaini's discussion, Dīpa introduction, pp 83–88).

Vasubandhu has defined "vitarka" and "vicāra" as follows in his Pāñcaskandhaka: "What is 'vitarka'? A mental discourse of
initial inquiry, a certain kind of volition and discernment which (can be characterized as) a 'gross state of citta'. What is 'vicāra'? A mental discourse of (further) examination, which in the same way (can be characterized as) 'a subtle state of citta'. (Pancaskandhaka, Tib vol 113, p 238, 4, 3: "rtog pa'i yid kyis brjod pa ste/ sans pa dang shes rab kyi bye brag gang sans t rtsing ba'o// spyod(emendation: dpyod) pa gang zhe na/ so sor rtog pa'i yid kyis brjod pa ste/ de bzhin du gang sans zhi ba pa'o//", quoted in Yasomitra, Abhidharmakosavyākhya, ad I, 33, Law I, p 74: "Vitarkāḥ katamāḥ? Paryēsako manojaḷpaś cetanāprejñāviśeṣo ya cittasyaudārikatā. Vicārāḥ katamāḥ? Pratyaveksako manojaḷpaś tathaiva ya cittasya sūkṣmatā.") To Vasubandhu, āśaya is not really a separate dharma, but represents a certain kind of volition and constructing discernment existing, as he says, even in the sensory consciousnesses (cf. Yasomitra's discussion, Vyākhya, ad I 33, Law I, p 74), whereas according to older definitions, such as the Vibhāṣa's and Asanga's, it and vicāra rest upon volition and discernment, rather than being strictly identifiable with them (Abhidharmasamuccaya, p 10; Yasomitra, Vyākhya, ad II 33, Law II, p 57). Following Vasubandhu, āśaya is volition or discernment inasmuch as it does or does not involve deduction (cf. Yasomitra, ad I 33, Law I, p 74: "Anabhyūḥāvasthāyatāḥ cetanā abhyūḥāvasthāyatāḥ praṇjneti vyavasthāpyate."). (The discussion of Schmidthausen in his article "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen im Vimsatikā und Trimsikā", which attempts to uphold some kind of a fundamental distinction between sensory and non-sensory consciousness in Vasubandhu's psychology,
is confused to some extent by a misquotation from Yaśomitra in Jaini's edition of the Abhidharmadīpa. Vitarka is certainly not for Vasubandhu "nur eine bestimmte geistige Aktivität(cetana)", as Schmidthausen claims (WZKSOA XI, 1967, p 123). Jaini's quotation from Yaśomitra is "Cetanaāviseṣa eva vitarka iti" (p 19, n 4), "(He says) that vitarka is only a certain kind of volition", but the text clearly reads "Cetanāpraṇāviseṣa" "a certain kind of volition or discernment". (Yaśomitra, ad I 33, Law I, p 74). Vasubandhu does not place too much weight on the "gross" and "subtle state" distinction central to the Vibhāṣa's definition*, as he considers such descriptions quite relative (Kosa II, ad 33 a-b, LVP, pp 173-174).

Sthiramati explains that the "grossness" of vitarka when compared to vicāra consists in the fact that vitarka investigates only the object, without further connections being made. These are made by vicāra. ("Audārikateti sthūlatā vastu-mātra-paryesaṇā-kaṇaratvāt", Trimsikavijnaptibhasya, p 32).

We could translate "vitarka" as "initial mental application" and "vicāra" as "subsequent discursive thought". (See also Dhammasangani 7-8, and C. Rhys-David's comments on Buddhaghosa's Atthasālinī 114, 115, where vitarka is described as a "distinctively mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, a deliberate movement of voluntary attention, and vicāra as "the movement and

* As to Vyāsa's, ad Yoga-sūtra I, 17: "Vitarka is a certain gross expansion of citta on its object; a subtle (expansion) is vicāra." ("Vitarkas cittasyālambane sthūla ābhogah. Sūkṣmo vicārah.")
maintenance of the voluntary thought-continuum, as distinguished from the initial grappling with the subject of reflection."

Dhamasangani translation, p 10, note 1; p 11, note 2).

The only reason that the normal sensory consciousnesses are sometimes called "avikalpaka" (devoid of mental construction) is that recollection(anusmarana) and complete determination of the object(nirūpana) do not take place until further reflection on the impression is brought about by a consciousness, or series of consciousnesses, of the sixth variety. Vijñānas I-V in usual states are "avikapalka", as Vasubandhu says, only in the sense that a one-footed horse is "footless"(Kośa I, ad 33 a-b). This is also in consonance with Vasubandhu's view that there is no real difference between "seeing" and "cognizing a visible" (Kośa I, ad 42, LVP, p 83), which view the Theravāda theorists share with him over against the usual Mahāsāṃghika and Vaibhāṣika opinion. (cf. Kathavatthu XVIII, 9). It is furthermore characteristic of Vasubandhu's later thought that the cognitions of all the consciousnesses in ordinary states are regarded as "parikalpita" or mentally constructed. (Trimsika 17, 20; Trisvabhāvanirdesa 2, 4, 5, 14). There is actually some problem with positing a pure sensory consciousness outside of meditation in any system that accepts the complete momentariness of all phenomena, and which rejects the possibility of a causal relationship between simultaneous events (Vasubandhu does the latter at Kośa II, ad 50-51, LVP, pp 248-255). A visual consciousness supposedly arises subsequent to a visual object, but at the time when the former arises, the latter has already ceased to exist. At the time of the more com-
plete determination of the object through a citta of the sixth variety, the first consciousness acting as its stimulus has ceased. Thus all sense-perceptions are really indirect, and the external object is in a way only inferred (cf. Kośa I, ad 44 c-d, LVP p 95, counter-arguments of Diṇa I, ad 77, pp 47-48). In the Vimsatika, Vasubandhu develops this reasoning further, concluding that normally a pure direct perception is impossible. ("Yadā ca sa pratyakṣa-buddhir bhavatīdaya me pratyakṣam iti tadā na so 'ṛtho dhṛṣyate manovijnānenaiva paricchedācakṣurviṣṭijñānasya ca tadā niruddhatvad iti, kathām tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭaṁ?" "When the knowledge of direct perception arises in the form 'This is my direct perception!', the object itself is (already) not seen, since this ascertainment takes place only through the mental consciousness, and the visual consciousness has already ceased by that time, so how can one accept its being a direct perception?" Vimsatika, ad 16, p 8). Schmidthausen, in the above-mentioned article, attempts to interpret this passage a la Dignāga. But it is not being stated here that a pure direct perception does not exist because v. VI constructs where v's I-V don't (which in my own opinion would still be an improvement on Dignāga), but rather because v. I, whatever its nature may be, is past by the time one fully determines, or further constructs, its content. As a matter of fact, it will be impossible to get at an isolated v. I on a discursive level in any case. In the Kośa, Vasubandhu does not go this far, and it is taken for granted that sensory consciousnesses, conditioned however by accompanying conceptualizations and volitions, precede the more detailed investiga-
tions of "the object", i.e. the vicāras of the sixth consciousness. In the Vadavidhi, which is probably the earliest of his logical works, Vasubandhu calls direct perception that cognition which has to do only with the object itself, without implying thereby that these perceptions are in any way unconstructed (Vādavidhi, Frauwallner Anh I, fragment 9; tr, p 120). That the views of Vasubandhu and Dignāga are not in consonance on this point is further evidenced by the fact that Dignāga continually attacks the definitions of the Vadavidhi, and insists that the real difference between direct perception and inference must lie in the former's being completely free of mental construction. (Pramāṇasamuccaya, I, II 2 a-d, Hattori, pp 32-33.) It is true that Dignāga's conception of "vikalpa" always includes determination of the object by categorization, and that in this sense there is some support in Abhidharma for calling v's I-V. "nirvikalpaka": (Pramāṇasamuccaya I, I ad 4 a-b, Hattori, p 26), as they are free from the mental construction of complete determination of the object. But to Vasubandhu some of this determination is effected already by vitarka while v's I-V are arising. Contrary to what Stcherbatsky says (Central Conception, p 16, p 88), there is thus a fundamental difference between the philosophies of Vasubandhu and Dignāga, and Vasubandhu avoids the radical distinction between direct perception and inference which plays so problematical a role in Dignāga's system. There is, by the way, even less possibility for "pure sensory cognitions" in the philosophy of Sanghabhadra, since for him all forms of vikalpa are present in the sensory consciousnesses, only in a weaker state (cf. LVP, Kosa I,

Cognitions without mental construction do occur for Vasubandhu as well, but only as a result of meditation. Both vitarka and vicāra are eliminated fairly early in meditation, and in fact the second meditational trance is already free of both of them (cf. Dīgha I, 73 ff; Samyutta II, 210 ff; Majjhima I, 276 ff, 336 ff, 454 ff; Vibhanga 257 ff). According to the Abhidharmadīpa, consciousnesses which are meditatively concentrated at all have already discarded the mental construction of complete determination, i.e. all concern with detailed categorization of the "object". At the meditation where there is neither conceptualization (or "awareness") nor non-conceptualization (naivasam, nānasam, naivasam, nānasam, patti), only the vikalpa of recollection is still present in v's I-VI (cf. Dipa I 21, 22, pp 20-21, and my translation in the Appendix). Conceptualizations and feelings are not completely absent until the last stage of meditation, the "attainment of cessation" (nirodhasam, patti). I can personally attest to the fact that one may reach stages where concepts are still present, but it is absolutely impossible to make any discursive connections between them. Conscious moments without conceptualization are no doubt experienced by everyone, but the attainment of cessation is something more, involving the complete eradication of all concepts and feelings for quite some time.

The realization of the non-separability of normal sensory, conceptual, and emotive psychological events was an early one in
Buddhism, and is expressed in the Nikāyas themselves in a manner with which Vasubandhu would have few objections. (Majjhima I 293):

"Yā ca avuso vedanā ya ca sāna yaū ca viññāṇām ime dhammad samsāṭṭhā no visamimāṇām, na ca labbā imesaḥ dhammad vinibbujitvā vinibbujitvā nānakaraṇām pannapetum. Yām h'avo sāna na ca labbā imesaḥ dhammad vinibbujitvā vinibbujitvā nānakaraṇām pannapetum ti." "Those dharmas which are 'feeling', 'conceptualization'(or 'awareness'), and 'consciousness' are conjoined, not separate, and it is impossible to point out any difference between these dharmas even after one has analyzed them again and again.

Whatever one feels, one conceptualizes, and whatever one conceptualizes, one discerns, therefore these dharmas are conjoined and not separate, and it is impossible to point out any difference between them even after one has analyzed them again and again." The sutra goes on to say that the only point at which one can speak of consciousness without feelings and conceptualizations is in the higher meditational states, and here, where feelings are absent, conceptualizations will be absent. At this point, one could speak of a "nānakaraṇa" between vedanā and samjñā on one hand, and viññāṇa on the other, except that in the absence of samjñā, no such distinction could be made within this state. The sutra thus accepts the analysis of non-conceptual meditational states into citta, which is contrary to the opinion of Ghoṣaka and orthodox Vaibhāsikas such as the Dipakāra (Dīpa II, ad 136, p 73-75), but in consonance with the views of Vasubandhu and the Bhadanta Vasumitra.)
4. Cetanā

"Volition" is the traditional translation for "cetanā", but it has several problems. The cognitive and deliberative aspects of cetanā emphasized by Theravāda theorists (cf. Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy, p 236) disturbed C. Rhys-Davids at an early date, and led her to translate "cetanā" simply by "thinking" (Buddh. Psych., p 8). In the later edition of Buddh. Psych. Ethics (1923), she adopted "volition", which translation she again questioned by 1936 (Birth of Indian Psychology, p 276). Her final decision was again for "volition", because its third mark, āyuhana ("effort"), is regarded by Burmese theorists as its primary characteristic (Notes to Compendium, p 237). La Vallée Poussin, though he adopted the translation "volition", noted the inadequacy of the term for Vasubandhu's system in the Kośa, where cetanā can refer to a reflection regarding a past bodily act (Kośa IV, ad 4 a–b, p 22; Kośa IV, p 2, n 3. The reflection "I have killed my mother!" may be a cetanā).

Nonetheless, "thinking", "reflection", and similar terms, which may fit well with some of the common meanings of the word in Sanskrit (cf. Apte, p 703), do not indicate the peculiar characteristics given for cetanā in the definitions of Asanga, Sthiramati, and Vasubandhu himself. Asanga defines "cetanā" as follows: "Cetanā katamā? Cittābhisamāskāro manaskarma kusalākusalāvāyaktēsu cittapreranakarmikā." (Abhidharmasamuccaya, p 6). "What is 'cetanā'? It is a mental action conditioning (or preparing, moulding) a citta, which has the function of impelling a citta towards the beneficial, the unbene­ficial, and the indeterminate." Cetanā being always included in the
somewhat heterogeneous skandha called "the sāmākāras", the definition of this skandha is therefore also of some interest. Asanga defines it as follows: "Sāmākāra 'bhisāmākārasvabhāvo yena kusālākusālā-vyākṛtesu pakṣeṣu cittāṃ prerayati". "Sāmākāra is that (factor) having a conditioning nature, through which citta is impelled towards beneficial, unbeneficial, and indeterminate alternatives." (Abhidharma-maṇḍūcayā, p 5). Sthiramati defines "cetanā" thus: "Cetanā cittābhisaṃkāro manasaś cestā, yasyam satyam ālambanām prati cetasaḥ prasyanda iva bhavati ayaskāntavaśāt ayahprasyandavat." "Cetanā is an exertion of manas which conditions a citta: When it exists, there occurs, as it were, a rapid motion of citta towards and object-of-consciousness, which is like the rapid motion of iron due to the force of a magnet." (Trimsikaviñaptibhāṣya, p 21). As for Vasubandhu, he defines "cetanā" as follows in his Pañcasandhaka (Tib vol 113, p 237, 5, 3): "sems pa gang zhe na/ yon tan dang nges pa dang guyi ga ma yin pa la sems mngon par 'du byed pa yid kyi las so//" "What is 'cetanā'? It is mental action which conditions citta towards good qualities, flaws, and that which is neither(i.e. the indeterminate)." At Kośa II, ad 24, LVP, p 154, he again calls cetanā the conditioner and impeller of citta. And at Kośa I, ad 15 a-b, LVP, p 29, he calls cetanā the primary sāmākāra, because it conditions all future modes of being.

Sthiramati's definition, with its comparison of cetanā to a magnet, is the most dramatic. It suggests the translation "drive", which was in fact adopted by Guenther(Philos. and Psych. of the Abhidharma, p 61). But cetanā is definitely not subconscious, as it
can always be subsequently verbalized (cf. Kośa IV, ad 4 a-b, LVP, p 22), and, besides, it is the mental act par excellence. Thus the translation "drive" seems absolutely ruled out. It fits, in fact, far more adequately the Buddhist term "chandas" (cf. Asanga, Abhidharmasamuccaya, p 6).

Vasubandhu in the KSA passage has the Vaibhāsika equate "mental action" with cetanā; that is to say, all mental acts are cetanā. The term "mental action" is also used by Asanga and Sthiramati only in regard to cetanā, though, as my translations suggest, this does not necessarily imply an identity between the two. This identity is however urged by at least one sutta of the Nikayas (Anguttara I, 32). But not all the mental actions enumerated in the famous sutra of Anguttara V, 292 (see my note 75) allow themselves to be reduced to volitions, and a difference between mental action and cetanā may also be surmised in the sutras that mention "cetanā" in addition to the three kinds of action (Anguttara II 42). The matter becomes solved for Theravāda by the time of the Kathavatthu, where all action with a retributory result is reduced to cetanā (Kathavatthu VIII, 9; X, 7). In the Sarvāstivāda schools, it seems to have been customary to regard the matter as Vasubandhu's Vaibhāsika views it, i.e. a division of bodily, verbal, and mental action is upheld, and only the last of these is cetanā. (Bareau, Sarv. thesis no. 117, p 15, Ibid, p 257). Ghoṣaka, perhaps the most consistently psychologically oriented philosopher among the Vibhaṣa's "Big Four", continued in this tradition, defining "mental action" as "an exertion of manas, a cetanā of manas" (Abhidharmāmṛta, p 44).
Since he calls cetana a "cittasamprayukta", an event always associated with citta (Ibid, p 60, 3), he does not mean to imply that there is anything like a cetana unconnected with manas. The Karmaprajnaptisastra, an early treatise which may have had a great influence on Vasubandhu*, is also quite explicit on this point. ("ched du byas pa zhes bya ba la de la sems pa'i las dang bsams pa'i las dang gnyis yod de/ sems pa'i las gang zeh na/ smras pa/ sems pa dang mngon par sems pa dang sems par gyur pa dang sems par gto gs pa dang sems mngon par 'du byed pa dang yid kyi las gang yin pa 'di ni sems pa'i las zhes bya'o/" "Under the above-mentioned term 'sañcetikakarma' are included both the act of cetana itself(cetanakarma), and 'the act which has been committed after having willed'(cetayitvā-karma). And what is the act of cetana itself? It is explained: Whatever is cetana, the forming of an intention(abhisamcetanā), reflection(cintana), a state of having willed(cetayitvata), a conditioning of citta, and a mental action, is designated as an 'act of cetana itself'". Tokyo-Peking ed., vol. 115, p 86 5, 7- p 87, 1, 2).

As cetana includes all mental action according to these definitions, the old C. Rhys-Davids translation "thinking" might appear plausible to some. But by designating cetana as "mental action," all that is intended is that it is the only mental activity that itself directly gives rise to a retribution (cf. my note 1). There are other mental activities—in fact most of the events included in

*See La Vallée Poussin, Kośa Introduction, p XXXVIII.
the list of caitasikas could be designated as such—but they are not mental acts in the technical sense because they of themselves carry no retribution. They carry it only because of association with cetanā.

The Karmaprajñāpati's definition "cetayitvā", "the state of having willed", may serve to explain how the term "cetanā" can be applied to a reflection such as "I killed the son-of-a-bitch." Such a reflection would be cetanā presumably if the same sorts of caitasikas were present as were associated with the original volition. In other words, the reflection "I killed the son-of-a-bitch" would not be a cetanā of murder if associated with the predominating caitasikas of inner and outer shame (ḥṛṣi, apātrāpya), but if associated with the same emotions that gave rise to the murder, would constitute a cetanā-karma, qua cetayitvā, "a state of having willed".

"Volition" seems a good enough translation, though "intention", in the psychological, not logical, sense, may be in some contexts better. Both fit in well with some of the usual meanings given for the Sanskrit root cit-, "to aim at, intend, design".

5. Saṃsthāna

To the Vaibhāsika, the visible is divided into two aspects: color and "saṃsthāna". (See Kosā I, ad 10 a, LVP, p 16). These two are considered distinct sense-impressions, and are thus for the Vaibhāsikas two separate sorts of real entities (dravya, see note 5 a). "Saṃsthāna" is usually divided into eight general categories: "long", "short", "quadrangular", "circular", "convex", "concave", "even" or
"straight", and "uneven" or "crooked" (on my translation of these terms, see note 12). The omission of triangles may rest on the fact that they can be derived from quadrangulares.

"Samsthāna" can thus be rendered as "shape". The only reason I employ "configuration" is because "samsthāna" is either a shape that appears stable to the visual consciousness, or one which is undergoing changes. It is to this second kind of "samsthāna" that the Vaibhāṣika reduces manifest bodily actions. For example we say that we see a man moving his arm, but what we actually see, the Vaibhāṣika says, is certain combinations of visual shapes undergoing changes. Apparently manifest bodily actions, to be truly manifest have to be seen, since they can only be inferred by a blind man. Of course, one's own bodily actions are directly manifest to oneself, but the defining characteristic of "vijñāpti"—manifest action—is that it should be manifest to another.

As I am using it, the word "configuration" means both a shape and any combination of shapes, changing or unchanging.

5 a. Dravya.

The Vaibhāṣika criteria for considering something a real entity, or dravya, are:

(1) its characteristic must be distinguished as special by at least one consciousness (Kośa I, ad 10 d, LVP, p 19) (a characteristic of this sort is called a sva-laksana, "own-characteristic").
(2) it must not be susceptible to further division (Ibid, and Kośa VI, 4, LVP, p 139).

True entities would thus to the Vaibhāsika be only the moment-atoms of materiality and the momentary flashes of feelings, psychic formations, conceptions, and consciousness-perceptions. A body, a flame, and, for that matter, a consciousness-series, can thus not really be considered a dravya. (cf. Vibhāṣa, MCB V, pp 128-129; Sanghabhadra's Abhidharmayāvānusāra, chapt. 51, tr. LVP, MCB V, p 106).

A dravya has a specific manner of being, or nature (its "own-being", svabhāva), which is apprehended by one or another of the consciousnesses, or a combination of several, as an "own-characteristic". A change in characteristics is always a change in things: there are in fact no underlying entities which have characteristics—there is only whatever is presented to the consciousnesses themselves.

In this connection, the Vibhāṣa makes much of its distinction between two levels of reality. First, there is common-sense reality, conventional reality (saṃvrati-satya), sometimes called "truth of designation"(prajñāpti-satya), which speaks of "people" as people, "jars" as jars, and, even more remotely from any true dravyas, "nations" as nations, "armies" as armies, etc. Then there is ultimate truth(paramārthasatya), which has as its object the true śvalaksanas of true dravyas. Actually, one could very well say* that the Vibhāṣa really distinguishes three levels, because it categorizes all events into 75 basic types of dravyas, constituents which

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*Vasubandhu in fact does something of the sort at Kośa II, ad 22, LVP, p 149.
even in the last analysis work in a certain way. This is not quite the same as \textit{paramārthasatya}, since it subsumes true dravyas, the momentary entities, into various broader categories. We might for convenience's sake call this level "\textit{dravyasatya}\", though this term is usually used by the \textit{Vibhāṣā} as a synonym for "\textit{paramārthasatya}\".

At least one of the philosophers held in great esteem by the \textit{Vibhāṣā}, namely the Bhadanta Vasumitra, had come to an interesting conclusion regarding \textit{paramārthasatya}. He held that all designations are only prajñaptisat, but that underlying each designation there is some complex of moments which are paramārthasat but in their true state hopelessly elusive, to those who rely on discursive thought alone, and characterizable only by the most general of designations (such as "being in the state of having causes and conditions") (\textit{Vibhāṣā}, quoting the Bhadanta Vasumitra, MCB V, pp 166-167). And the \textit{Vibhāṣā} itself, in one of its "options", went so far as to say that it was possible to hold that there is only one theory regarding conditioned things which is really ultimately true, i.e. "All things are empty and devoid of self." (\textit{Vibhāṣā}, MCB V, p 164). This is, of course, the opinion of Nāgārjuna as well as, ultimately, the opinion of Vasubandhu himself. (Even a quick perusal of the \textit{Trisvabhāvanirdesā}, or the \textit{Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya}, will dispel the notion that Vasubandhu's Yogācāra is in any way fundamentally in disagreement with Śūnyavāda.

This does not mean that it may not contain disagreements with Madhyamika, which uses a peculiar upāya Vasubandhu may not have considered particularly efficacious). Whether we have here an influence of Nāgārjuna on the \textit{Vibhāṣā}, or whether the case is rather the reverse,
involves some complex chronological problems obviously outside the scope of this paper.

However that may be, later Vaibhāsikas seem to have lost sight of Vasumitra's word of caution. Evidence for this is to be found not only in Vasubandhu's critiques of their theories (which after all may have been hardened into more rigid shape by Vasubandhu himself, in order to make his polemic more convincing*), but also in the treatises of Sanghabhadra and the Dipakāras themselves.

To return to the question of "dravyas", the Vaibhāsikas consider the sense-fields such true entities, though strictly speaking they meet neither of the criteria given above. A sense-field is really a collection of dravyas, grouped together because of certain common distinctive general characteristics (sāmānyavīsesalaksana)—they are thus (in our usage) "dravyasat", but not paramārthasat. Vasubandhu attacked the Vaibhāsikas for calling such a collection a "dravya", and said that their use of the term was inconsistent and capricious (Kośa II, ad 22, LVP, p 147, 149). As a matter of fact, for the Vaibhāsika to remain consistent, a "sense-field" can have only "truth of designation", since they are collections of atoms (cf. Kośa I, ad 44 a–b, LVP, p 94), and the individual atoms themselves, according to the Vaibhāsika, are not perceptible, and thus cannot be sense-fields (Kośa I, ad 20 a–b, LVP p 39). Similarly, a

*It is at least the opinion of G. Sasaki that Vasubandhu may have deliberately made the Vibhaṣa sound more dogmatic than it is (A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy, Introduction, p 3 ff).
skandha, or aggregate making up "personality", cannot be a real entity, since it is a series of momentary events (Ibid, p 38). It had been usual for a long time within Abhidharma to subsume all the basic constituents of experience under at least one of the skandhas, and one of the sense-fields (See the methodology of Dhātukathā I). This again cannot be an ultimately real way of looking at things, particularly if atomism is adhered to. On the other hand, an object-of-consciousness has to be a real dravya, because what isn't real has no faculty for producing a cognition. The Vaibhāṣikas' atom has no such faculty, and "aggregates of atoms", which are said to have it, have no unity, and thus can't be dravyas following the Vaibhāṣikas' other criterion. Vasubandhu, on this and other grounds (see Kosa I ad 10; I, ad 13; I ad 44; II, ad 22; I ad 43 c-d; III, ad 100 a-b), dispenses with atomism, and while maintaining the two criteria, regards as dravya that which is perceived as one, thus ruling out the Vaibhāṣika atom as well as collections such as "a body", "an army", etc. (Dignāga, following Vasubandhu, also criticized the Vaibhāṣika atom on the grounds mentioned above, cf. Pramāṇasamuccaya I, II, ad 2 c-d, Hattori, pp 33-34; Alambanaparīkṣa, and cf. Hattori n. 2, 17, p 118. Similar arguments are to be found in the Jain logician Mallavādi, cf. Dvadasāranayacakra, ed. Muni Jambuvidya, p 96).

Sanghabhadra himself drops the Vibhāṣa's criteria, and the character of a dravya is for him simply that it can give rise to a citta, when this citta arises without having to depend on anything but the one thing perceived. (Nyāyānusāra, chapt. 50, LVP, pp 28-29). According to Sanghabhadra, a dravya may differ in bhāva's, specific
types, but its general manner of being, its svabhāva, is of one sort. This would seem to be some sort of a distinction between essential and secondary characteristics, which the Vibhāsā itself, in spite of some resulting difficulties, does not make. In fact, the Vibhāsā considers this distinction a major flaw in the theories of the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (Vibhāsā, MCB V, p 24). It is certainly anathema to Vasubandhu, who holds that criteria for the determination of primary, as against secondary, characteristics cannot be found (KSP 15-17).

6. Ālambara

I translate this term as "object-of-consciousness" in order to bring out the distinction between it and visaya. The latter is usually defined as the object of the sense-organ itself, whereas the former is the object of the corresponding consciousness. The visaya is properly the "thing out there" as the organ comes "into contact" with it; the ālambara is ones impression of it. (See Kosa I, ad 29 b-c, LVP, p 52).

7. The great elements

The great material elements accepted by the Vibhāsā are earth, water, fire, and wind. It has been held (cf. Jaini, Dīpa Introduction, p 90) that the theory of these elements may have been inspired by the Vaiśeṣikas, who enumerate earth, water, fire, wind, ether, time, place, soul, and manas as dravyas (Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika-sūtras I, I, 5). But their adoption in Buddhism may actually antedate Kanāda, as it is in evidence in the Dhammasaṅgani (648). It is possible that
both Buddhist Abhidharma and Vaiśeṣika may derive their elements from cosmological categories in the Brāhmaṇas (Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, and see also Robinson, Classical Indian Philosophy, p 161 ff).

Already in the Prakaraṇapāda of Vasumitra (Chinese translations 1541 and 1542), a text held in canonical esteem by the Vibhāṣā, these elements are not the common things usually designated by the names "earth", etc, but rather represent more abstract principles to be found in materiality. Earth is the solid principle that holds things in place, water the wet principle which has cohesion as its special activity, fire the hot principle that cooks and transforms, and wind the mobile principle that expands and displaces (Prakaraṇapāda 13 a, quoted LWP, Kosa I, p 22). Vasumitra says further that these elements are directly perceptible only by the fifth, or tactile, consciousness. This rather sophisticated view of the elements was accepted by the Vibhāṣā, and also by Vasubandhu (Kosa I, 12, LWP, pp 21-23; see also Robinson, Op. Cit., pp 168-169, and the whole discussion, pp 161-177).

8. Vipākahetū

A retributory cause is any volitional act with an ethical "charge" strong enough to give a result either of suffering or of freedom from suffering for the "series" which instigated it. (cf. Kosa II, 54 c–d, LWP, p 271). Presumably, what is intended here by "a configuration which has arisen from a former aspiration" is any change in shape, size, etc, which was longed for in the past, and which has finally been attained due to beneficial past actions.
Sumatisīla's example of redness of lips ([KST] 204, 4, 8, my transl., p 8) is perhaps not completely adequate, as this would not necessarily entail a change of configuration for the Vaibhāsikas. But it is a humorous example of the kinds of rather frivolous motivations which often lay behind Buddhist acts of piety. As an example of such an aspiration which includes the Vaibhāsikas' "configuration", and yet echoes the spirit of Sumatisīla's example, there is the following inscription of the Burmese Queen Caw, from about the VIII–IX centuries, marking the dedication of a monastery at Pagan: "Meanwhile, before I reach Nirvana, by virtue of the great work of merit I have done, may I prosper as a man and be more happy than all other men. Or as a spirit, may I be full of color, dazzling brightness, and victorious beauty. But more especially I would like to have a long life, freedom from disease, a lovely complexion, a pleasant voice, and a beautiful figure. I would like to be the loved and honored darling of every man and spirit. Gold, silver, rubies, coral, pearls, and other lifeless treasure—elephants, horses, and other living treasure—may I have lots of them. By virtue of my power and glory I would be triumphant with pomp and retinue, with fame and splendor. Wherever I am born, may I be filled with noble graces, and not know one speck of misery, and after I have tasted and enjoyed the happiness of men and the happiness of spirits, may I at last attain the peaceful bliss of Nirvana." (Archaeological Survey of Burma, inscr. no. 334, quoted Nihar Ranjan Ray, Theravāda Buddhism in Burma, p 165).
9. **Rūpa**

"Rūpa" is a term used both for the first skandha and for the object of the first consciousness. As "rūpa" is not defined in the same manner in the two usages, we are forced to translate the term in two different ways. As the object of the first consciousness, "rūpa" is defined as a "visible", whereas as a skandha, it is on "rūpa's" destructibility, dimensionality in a spatial locus, and physical resistance or impenetrability (i.e. the space occupied by one rūpa cannot be simultaneously occupied by another) that the definitions focus (cf. Asanga, Abhidharmasamuccaya, p 2, p 12). Even in the Dhammasaṅgani, it is stated that not all rūpa is visible. ("Atthi rūpam cakkuvinnaṇṇassa vatthu; atthi rūpam cakkuvinnaṇṇassa na vatthu", Dhs 585). As a skandha, rūpa need not belong to the field of any one vijñāna, and different aspects of it are susceptible to vijñānas I–V. According to the Yamaka, in fact, the rūpa-skandha and the rūpa seen as "attractive", etc, are mutually exclusive ("Pīyarūpam sātarūpam rūpam, na rūpakkhandho.", Yamaka II, I, 4, 26. For a diagram of this exclusion, see Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, p 93). Presumably this is said because the primary characteristics of the rūpa-skandha are cognized by the tactile consciousness.

A good translation for "rūpa" as a skandha is "matter", "materiality", "material bases", whereas as the object of the first consciousness, I translate it simply as "visible". The Chinese often translate rūpa as the object of the visual consciousness by "color", but to the Vaibhāśika system, color is only one aspect of the visible.
The reason I adopt the somewhat clumsy "materiality" for a translation of "rupa" as a skandha, is that I wish to avoid the impression of a radical mind-matter dichotomy. There are in Abhidharma terminology compounds such as "nāma-rūpa", which seem to divide the "individual" into material and non-material aggregates, but similarly there is the category "kāyaka", "bodily," which includes all the skandhas except consciousness (cf. Dhammasaṅgani Introduction, p LXXV). And also, there persists the notion of the consciousness', as well as the sense-organs, "contact"(sparśa) with their objects. This hints at a conception of perception where the external object is held to penetrate the sense-organ and its consciousness, somewhat as in the philosophy of Democritus. No distinction is drawn between physiological and psychological process within this "contact", and in fact this dichotomy simply does not seem to occur. As materiality in its various aspects is primarily the objects of v's I-V, one might be tempted to assume a psychological "priority", but if the dichotomy itself is not recognized, to speak of a "priority" at all is clearly a non-sequitur. To C. Rhys-Davids, the absence of a clear distinction between the psychological and the physiological constituted a major flaw in her beloved Dhammasaṅgani(pp LIV-LV): I personally, influenced by the "psychosomaticists" and physiological psychologists of the present day, would tend to call it another great advantage of Buddhist psychology.

The researches of Maryla Falk reveal that though the aggregates subsumed under "nāma" might be said to be "immaterial", one must be
careful of the latter term because they also have spatial existence. On the other hand, she says, the dimensionality of *ruṣpa* does not rule against its genetic connection with *nāma* (*Nāmarūpa* and *dharmarūpa*, passim). One of the main problems to which the KSP is addressed is in fact the *locus* of such mental factors as memory and residues of past afflictions, (cf. also Johnston, *Early Śāktaka*, p 38, "Early Indian thought—drew no clear line of demarcation between the material, mental, and psychical phenomena of the individual," and the discussion of Robinson, "The Classical Indian Axiomatic", *Philosophy East and West* XVII, 1967, 145-146.)

10. The Vaibhāsika Atomic Theory

The atomic theory evolved by the Vaibhāsika philosophers is found neither in the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the ancient work on which the *Vibhāsā* is ostensibly a commentary, nor in any of the other six "padas" of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (see McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p 125). One of the earliest texts to give the theory is apparently the *Abhidharmasāra* of Dharmaśrī, which was translated into Chinese (†1550) in 250 A.D. McGovern thinks that Dharmaśrī borrowed the theory from Kaṇāda, and that the Jain atomic theory may have a similar source. But Dharmaśrī's atomism is quite different in nature from Kaṇāda's, and the Jain theory, which may actually antedate Kaṇāda, differs radically from them both (cf. Schubring, *Doctrine of the Jainas*, p 131 ff). An important difference between Dharmaśrī's and Kaṇāda's atomism is that for Kaṇāda, atoms are eternal, whereas to Dharmaśrī, they are momentary,
though they may form "series". Another difference lies in the fact that Dharmasrī maintains fourteen different kinds of atoms: Besides the atoms of the four great elements, each sense-object and each sense-organ has within it a special kind of atom to which its particular qualities are due (Abhidharmasāra 1, quoted McGovern, p 126). This is, as McGovern says, similar to the conception of late XIX-century chemistry, where each of the ninety-odd elements was held to have a special kind of atom. Though perhaps the seed for Dharmasrī's atomism may be seen in his familiarity with the Vaiśeṣika and Jain theories, to speak of an outright borrowing, as McGovern does, is somewhat strong in light of the fact that his theory is really quite unique, and moulded to Buddhist sentiments of impermanence. Dharmasrī's theory is considered standard by the Vibhāṣa, which makes frequent use of it. Through this highly influential text it found its way not only into the crystallizations of its system in the philosophies of the "Neo-Vaiḥāṣikas": Sanghabhadra, the Dīpakāra, and, in fundamental opposition, Vasubandhu, but even into the Theravāda theories of Buddhaghosa (in the Atthasālinī) and Anuruddha (Compendium, p 164 ff). (The question of the extent of Vaibhāṣika influence on V-century Theravada has as yet not been much investigated: I myself have a hunch that Buddhaghosa derived many of his specific theories from the Vibhāṣa. Certainly Anuruddha's atomism, at any rate, is identical with the Vibhāṣa's). (On a probable influence of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra on V-century Theravāda, see S. Sarathcandra, "The Abhidhamma Psychology of Perception and the Yogācāra Theory of Mind," U. of Ceylon Review, IV, 1956, 49-57).
There are thus, in standard Vaibhāsika theory, these fourteen different kinds of atoms: atoms of "earth", "fire", "water", and "wind" (see note 7), atoms of color, sound, smell, taste, and the tangible, eye-atoms, nose-atoms, ear-atoms, tongue-atoms, and body-atoms, for the specific parts of these organs that function as sense-fields for the consciousness (on the arrangement of these special atoms in the organs, see Kṣa I, ad 43c-44d, LVP pp 93-94). The atoms corresponding to the sense-fields owe their origination and their specific qualities to transformations and combinations within the elemental atoms—therefore they are called "derivative" (upādāya) or "secondary" (bhautika).

In the theories of Sanghābhadrā and the Vaibhāsika as criticized by Vasubandhu, a minimum of eight kinds of atoms must join to form an aggregation or molecule (sāmghāta) for actual perceptibility in the realm of desires, i.e. the normal world outside of meditation (see Kṣa II, ad 22, LVP, pp 144-145). These are the four kinds of elemental atoms and the four atoms of color, odor, taste, and secondary tangibility (i.e. smoothness, roughness, etc. Primary tangibility—liquidity, etc—is a mark of the four great elements themselves). Each atom of derivative materiality needs a set of four elemental atoms for itself, so that the actual number of atoms in the simplest molecule is sixteen. In the case of molecules which resound, there will in addition be present a sound-atom, so that there will be five derivative and twenty elemental atoms. The molecules of the simplest animate bodies will become even more complex, since they must each contain an atom of the tactile sense-organ,
touch being in Vaibhāsika biological theory, as in Aristotle's and Darwin's, the most basic and primitive sense held by living beings. Molecules of the other sense-organs must have at least ten kinds of atoms, since each must contain not only the four elemental atoms, four sense-object atoms, and the atom of the tactile sense-organ, but also an additional kind of atom for the particular sense-organ in question. It can thus be seen that no matter what the number of atoms in a molecule may be, the four great elements always appear together, and in equal proportion. There is as much of the hot element, "fire", in wood, or in water, as there is in a flame. The difference lies only in the "intensity", which is not further explained, at least not in the Kośa, the Dīpa, and the Abhidharmāvatāra. Vasubandhu says that the presence of "water", the cohesive element, in a flame is proved by the flame's keeping a shape, and the presence of the solid element, "earth", in water, is shown by the fact that water can support a ship(Kośa II, ad 22, LVP, p 146).

Within this theory, an atom should strictly speaking be that portion of materiality so small that it cannot be subjected to any further division, whether physically or by reasoning, just as the moment is the smallest extent of time. This is the manner in which Sanghabhadra defines it(Nyāyānusāra 23, 3, cf. LVP, Kośa II, p 144, note 3). But Vasubandhu notes that occasionally there is an inconsistency in the terminology of the Vaibhāsikas, i.e. sometimes they say "atom" where they should say "aggregate of atoms"(Kośa II, ad 22, LVP, p 144). Sanghabhadra himself is very careful to make the distinction(LVP, Kośa II, p 145, note 3), but it seems somewhat
botched in the discussion of the Dīpakāra(Dīpa II, 110-111, pp 65-66). For the Dīpakāra, the atoms are the ultimate units of materiality which have the capacity for appearing in the world, i.e. they would correspond to what Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra designate as an "aggregate". When referring to the different elements making up this "atom", the Dīpakāra speaks only of "entities"(dravya).

Furthermore, his discussion differs from Sanghabhadra's and Vasubandhu's on the question of the minimum number of kinds of "entities" necessary for an atom's appearance in the realm of desires. He says seven, which presumably would be the four great elements, color, odor, and taste—the tangible being for him entirely included within the properties of the great elements. The whole discussion is perhaps of some interest, and my translation of it will be included in the Appendix.

11. The Vaisesika Theory of Composite Wholes

This theory, which states that a composite exists as a new entity, a composite whole(avayavin) penetrating its component parts, is, as Vasubandhu tells us, a specialty of the Vaisesikas. However, it is not found in the sūtras of Kanāda himself, but rather finds its first extant explicit mention in the Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama (I century B.C.-I. c. A.D.?)(NSIII, 31-3; IV, II, 4-16). It is further elaborated by Praśastapāda, and by Vātsyāyana, both of whom may have been elder contemporaries of Vasubandhu's(cf. Praśastapādabhāsyatikāsāngraha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 255, pp 169, 173; Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya, ad II, I, 31-37; ad IV, II, 4-16).
The reasons for the formulation of this theory are, in brief, the following: The Vaiśeṣika, like the Vaibhāsika, subscribes to an atomic theory, though his atoms, unlike the moment-atoms of the Vaibhāsika, are eternal. To both, discrete and detached minute entities form the basic stuff of the material universe. External reality as it presents itself to us however has unified realities, and the question emerges as to what the unifying agency is. To the Vaibhāsika, as to Vasubandhu, and as later to Dignāga, these unities are constructed subjectively, but the Vaiśeṣika, being a "realist" (curiously in both the modern and the medieval senses of the term), has to posit an objective reality as their basis. There is, furthermore, a problem because Vaiśeṣika atoms, like Vaibhāsika ones, are imperceptible, and yet their compounds are perceived (cf. NS IV, II, 13-14). The Vaibhāsika takes care of this problem by assuming that aggregates of atoms become perceptible, though atoms in isolation are imperceptible, just as one hair may not be visible at a distance, but a mass of hair will be. The Vaiśeṣika, however, assumes atoms to be absolutely imperceptible. Thus it is assumed by the Vaiśeṣika that a composite is an entity in itself, having a different set of qualities from its parts, though occupying the same locus. If the composite whole did not exist, Vātsyāyana says, one could only infer, and never directly perceive, objects like trees, since at any one time one has only a partial perception of the parts of a tree. According to Vātsyāyana, the perception of the composite whole "tree" takes place simultaneously with the perception of certain parts of the tree (Nyāyabhaṣya, ad II, I, 30-37). He adds that
unitary conceptions, such as "tree", "jar", etc, must arise from something which is really one, and can't emerge from mere aggregations (Nyāyabhāṣya, ad II, I, 37).

The concept of the composite whole also plays a role in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika causality. In a cause and effect sequence, a new substance, a composite whole (cloth) emerges from the material causes (threads), and the parts continue to exist within the composite whole, though, according to Vātsyāyana, the avayavin together with its parts make up only one entity. It was not until Uddyotakara that the parts were regarded as separate entities persisting along with the composite-whole entity. (See D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, pp 262-271, on the difference between the earlier causal theory of Vātsyāyana, where the cause, as an entity, is destroyed before the emergence of the effect, and the later theory hinted at by Uddyotakara, but not crystallized until Śrīdhāra, where the causes continue to exist as entities within the composite whole.) Even to Vātsyāyana, atomic causality is an exception: the two atoms making up the composite whole of a dyad (dvyanuka) continue to exist as entities. The fact that all further combinations of atoms are composite wholes having different qualities from their parts, will explain why a jar is perceptible, whereas its atoms are not.

Vasubandhu does not here bother to refute the composite whole alternative, since its mere mention would probably be enough to make a true Vaibhāṣika flinch. On a previous occasion, however, he has presented a refutation of the avayavi theory, a theory he considers "infantile" (Kośa III, ad 100 a-b, LVP, p 214). His arguments there
for the most part rest on the same sorts of epistemological reasons that Vātsyāyana raises in favor of the concept. They can be outlined as follows:

(1) When the organ of the visual or tactile consciousness is in contact with one thread, the cloth is not perceived. If the composite whole "cloth" exists in each thread, it would have to be perceived even if only one of its threads is (Kośa III, ad 100 a-b, LVP, p 211).

(2) If the Vaiśeṣika says that the composite whole does not exist within each of its parts, how will it be demonstrated that it is anything but the collection of these parts? (Ibid, p 212)

(3) If the Vaiśeṣika says that the composite whole does exist within each of its parts, but that the perception of one thread does not result in the perception of cloth because the perception of cloth presupposes contact of the organ with several of the parts, then if one sees the border of a cloth, one would see the whole cloth.

(4) If the Vaiśeṣika says that the perception of the composite whole depends upon the perception of its central and other portions, one would never see a composite whole, since one can never see its central and end-parts simultaneously.

(5) If the Vaiśeṣika says that these parts are perceived in succession, then the perception of "cloth" does not differ from the perception of a "circle" that results from hurling a torch in a full arc. Objects-of-consciousness of such perceptions cannot be real-entities in any way.
(6) When threads of different colors come together to form a cloth, how can this cloth be considered an entity? (Ibid, pp 212-213). This argument depends on the fact that according to Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, qualities like color, etc, must pervade their substances wholly. Thus one substance can have only one quality of a type. So what does one do with a cloth of many colors? Clearly it cannot be a substance-entity in the Vaiśeṣika sense. This last argument was quite terrifying to the Vaiśeṣikas, and prompted Uddyotakara to assume that "variegated color" must in this case be regarded as one color. This conclusion was rejected as absurd by the Navya-Naiyāyikas (cf. Shastri, p 256). Even admitting Uddyotakara's rather far-fetched solution, the question can be re-phrased in a manner that makes the problem remain: What does one do about a cloth which is variegated in color, but has a border of one color only?

Other criticisms, some of which had already disturbed Vātsyāyana:

(1) If one thing exists at one place, it can't at the same time exist in another. According to the Vaiśeṣika, the dyad, being a composite whole, resides in its two parts. But its existence in one atom would necessarily exclude its existence in the other.

(2) Does the composite whole, which is one, pervade its parts in its entirety, or partially? In the former case, the composite whole will be exhausted in one part, and the remaining parts will be without it. In the latter case, the composite whole must itself have further parts, by which it pervades its constituent parts.
3. If the composite whole is a different entity from its parts, it should have a different weight.

4. There seems to be no criterion for which combinations of entities give rise to a composite whole (not all do, e.g. a forest does not).

5. Nor which objects should be regarded as ultimate composite wholes (i.e. those which cannot form further composite wholes).

6. No composite whole can be formed out of parts based on different material elements, because there is no possibility for generality(samānyā), which must inhere in every particular instance, according to the Vaisēsika. Thus neither a human body, which contains blood(water-element), as well as earth-elements, nor a tree (with its sap) can be a composite whole.

12. This passage is close to, though not identical with, Kośa IV, ad 2b-3b, LVP, p 9. Both the Kośa and the KSP passages have been translated into French with some confusion. The Kośa passage reads, in the Tibetan(Tokyo-Peking ed. vol 115, p 193, 1, 5 ff): "phyogs gcig gi sgor kha dog phal cher byung ba la/ gzugs ring po zhes 'dogs par byed// de nyid la bltos nas nyung ngur byung ba la/ thung ngu zhes 'dogs par byed// phyogs bzhir mang por byung ba la/ gru bzhī zhes 'dogs par byed// thams cad du mnyam na/ lham pa zhes 'dogs par byed de/ thams cad kyang de dang 'dra'o// dper na mgal me phyogs gzhan cig du myur du 'dab chegs par snang ba na ring po snyam du shes la/ thams cad du snang na zlum po'o snyam du shes kyi dbyibs.
If one compares La Vallée Poussin's and Lamotte's translations with the originals, one can see that they have translated similar segments in two quite different ways. To LVP, "lham pa" means "circular", to Lamotte, it means "square". In Tibetan, "lham pa" means only a "square", "rectangle", or "quadrangular" in general (Dge bshes chos kyi grags pa, p 960: "lham pa/ gru bzhi'i ming dang lhan pa la'ang/"); p 959: "lham pa/ gos kyi lhan pa dang lham pa'ang zer grub bzhi dang ldan pa'i dbyibs phal cher gru bzhi yin pas na'ang/"). Hsuan-tsang’s translation of this portion of the KSP is equally unambiguous (1609, vol. 31, p 781 b-c):

This is also my source for the key phrase "four sides", ommitted in the Tibetan, which I have included in my translation in parentheses. With this addition, Vasubandhu’s definition of this shape becomes very clear and unproblematical. In fact, he is specifying a certain kind of quadrangular—a square.

Following the Tibetan, the translation of the Kośa passage then reads: "When there is color in one direction in great quantity, one designates it as a 'long' visible object. When it is (thus) seen in a small quantity, one designates it as 'short'. When it spreads in four directions, one designates it as 'quadrangular' (gru bzhi: caturaśram). When it is equal in each (of these four directions), one designates it as 'square' (lham pa). And all (the other varieties of configuration) are similar. For example, if a torch appears to be moving in one direction, like a bird, one thinks
of it as 'long', and if it appears to be moving in all directions (from a fixed point), one thinks of it as 'circular' (储能 me: parimandala). Thus it appears that configuration is not a separate entity.

One problem remains, however: What is the Sanskrit original for lham pa? The Sanskrit original of the Kosabhaṣya, which has been edited by Prahлад Pradhan, has still not been made generally accessible, so we must turn elsewhere for tentative answers. The Mahāvyutpatti, in its list of the varieties of "samsthāna", (1878-1886), gives the equivalences vṛtta: lham pa: न, ल. This is most strange, for we have here words which unequivocally mean "quadrangular" (lham pa and न ) grouped together with words that clearly mean "circular" or "round" (vṛtta and ल ). Vṛtta always means "circle" in Indian mathematics (cf. Āryabhatīya, II, 7, 10, 13, 17, 18). I have no idea how all this confusion originally arose.

It is doubtful that Vasubandhu's word is "vṛtta". It may very well be "varga". This is the term for "square" employed by Āryabhata in both the senses of an "equiquadrangular" and "the product of two equal quantities". (Āryabhatīya, II, V. 3: "Vargas sama-caturaśrah phalaṇa ca sadrśa-dvayasya samvargah." '"Square' means 'an equiquadrangular', 'the area( of such a quadrangular)', and 'the product of two equal quantities.").

The terms "unnata" and "avanata" have been rendered by both translators into French as "high" and "low", respectively. न and ल are also the usual translations into Chinese (cf. Mvt. 1884 and 1885). However, though "unnata" is a common word for "high", "avanata"
does not usually mean "low". Besides, the inclusion of "high" and "low" in a list that has already included "long" and "short", seems somewhat strange. Add to this the fact that Vasubandhu's definitions of the terms "unnata" and "avanata" make little sense if they are supposed to refer to "high" and "low". They in fact define the terms "convex" and "concave". The translation of "unnata" by "convex", and "avanata" by "concave", is unproblematical as far as the Sanskrit is concerned. "Unnata" means not only "raised, elevated", etc, but also, as Apte's dictionary provocatively puts it, "projecting, plump, full (as breasts)." (p 435). And though we may not want to translate "unnata" as "convex" when we are translating Kālidāsa ("nibadōnnata-stanam": "full, projecting breasts", Mālavikāgnimitra, Act II, v. 3), this translation fits well with the less passionate and more analytic point of view of a fellow Gupta protégé, Vasubandhu. Mālavikā's shapely breasts must certainly be appreciated by Vasubandhu at least as ideal examples of convex configurations! As for "avanata", it never seems to mean "low" in classical Sanskrit, but rather "bent down", "stooped", "crouched", "bowed". All these are concave configurations. Further light on the terms was provided by the anonymous Abhidharmāvatāra preserved in Tibetan. In its list of the various kinds of configuration, the usual terms "mthon po" and "dma' ba" are omitted, and in their place we have "sgang" and "gshong"(Tokyo-Peking ed, vol 119, p 44, 1, 1). "Sgang" means "a hill-spur, the ridge or top of a hill"(Sarat Candra Das, p 320), "a projecting hill or spur at the side of a larger mountain" (Jāschke, p 113), and seems to be cognate to the verb "sgang ba",
"to grow" or "become full", specifically used in the "becoming full" of a nubile girl (Jäschke, p 114). "Gshong" can also be a "mountain-ridge", but the usual meaning is "pit, hole, cavity, excavation, valley" (Jäschke, p 563), and it seems to be cognate to the verb shong ba, "to have room or space in" and "to remove and carry away".

A mountain-spur can be either concave or convex, depending on what part one is looking at, but the term sgong emphasizes the projection, a convexity, whereas gshong emphasizes the cavity, a concavity! A "valley" is indeed "low" in comparison to a mountain, but even more it too is a concavity: 

The terms "sāta" and "viśāta", finally, have been translated by both Lamotte and LVP (Kośa I, p 16) as "égal" and "inégal". But it makes little sense to speak of a configuration "equal", since "equal" expresses a relationship. The trouble may lie in the fact that "sāta" and "viśāta" have been defined by both Vasubandhu (Kośa I, ad 10 a, Tib vol 115, p 128, 5) and the Abhidharmāvatāra (Tib vol 119, p 44, 1, 2) as "mnyam pa" and "mi mnyam pa", respectively. "Mnyam pa" and "mi mnyam pa" are almost certainly equivalent to "sama" and "visama", as occurrences of these equivalences far outnumber any other (cf. Mvt. 103, 238, 242, 324, 334, 337, 571, 587, etc). Now "sama" may mean "equal", but that is by no means the only meaning of the term. It also means "even, level, straight, plain, easy, pleasant, convenient". "Visama" correspondingly may mean "uneven, not level, rough, painful, troublesome". Besides, "sāta" never means "equal", anyway. Its meaning is "sharpened, whetted, polished, smoothed, made even, thin, pleasant". It is clear that as configurations,
"sāta" and "visāta" must mean something like "even" and "uneven", or "straight" and "crooked". Vasubandhu's definitions seem to bear this out. (Mnyam pa and mi mnyam pa, by the way, occur again at Kośa I, ad 10 c, LVP, p 18, Tib vol 115, p 128, 5, in reference to smells. Here LVP's translation "excessives" and "non-excessives" are very good, provided he is translating visama by "excessive", and "sama" by "non-excessive", not vice-versa. This is the "pleasant" and "rough" nuance of sama and visama).

It is interesting that Vasubandhu here concentrates solely on the visual aspect of "sāmsthāna", which becomes reduced to color. And as far as visual configurations is concerned, this reduction seems unassailable, particularly if one remembers that the ancient Indians, unconfined by the definitions of modern optics, regarded any shades of light and dark as colors. The Vaibhāṣikas in their color-lists included, of the colors recognized by ordinary language, only white and the primary colors blue, yellow, and red. Green, etc, were correctly recognized as compound colors, and thus unworthy of entry into a list of elements. Aside from these four, the Vaibhāṣika listed as colors cloudy (ubhram), smoky (dhūmāh), dusty (rajah), misty (mahikā), shadowy (chēyā), bright or hot light (ātapa), dimmer or reflected light (āloka), and darkness (āndhakara) (cf. Kośa I, ad 10 a, LVP, p 16), which seem to be different gradations and mixtures of light and dark.

In contrast to his exclusive focus on visual configuration in the KSP, in the Kośa (IV ad 3 c, LVP, p 9), Vasubandhu made a powerful argument against configuration's being an entity on the grounds that
configuration is equally an object of the fifth, or tactile consciousness, as of the visual, or first. In fact, the convexity of Malavika's breasts can be perhaps most fully appreciated by means of the fifth, not the first, consciousness! The Vaibhāsika objection that the tactile consciousness does not properly apprehend configurations, but only construes them on the apprehension of certain arrangements of the soft, hard, etc, is brilliantly converted by Vasubandhu into the statement that the visual consciousness does not apprehend them either, but similarly construes them on the apprehension of certain arrangements of colors. "Configuration" is thus not a distinct object-of-consciousness which could be allotted definitely to one sense-field, and as such is not a real entity, at all. Why Vasubandhu chose to omit this beautiful argument from the KSP is puzzling. Perhaps he thought he had enough ammunition, already.

*The geometry of Vasubandhu and Aryabhata

Āryabhaṭa's geometry is particularly interesting to a student of the KSP, as this great mathematician is close to Vasubandhu in both time and place. Assuming the Skandagupta-Narasimhagupta I. date for Vasubandhu, he belongs in the V. century, and assuming the perhaps more probable Candragupta II.-Govindagupta date, his activity belongs largely to the IV. (On problems of Vasubandhu's chronology, see the Introduction). Āryabhata, who is the earliest extant exponent of the mathematics and astronomy of the school of Pāṭaliputra, gives his own birth-date as 476, and the date of the composition of his Āryabhatīya as 499. (Āryabhatīya III, v. 10. This is assuming
that he used the date 3102 B.C. for the beginning of the Kali-yuga, which is almost certain, as in fact he may be one of the foremost exponents of this date, cf. Fleet, "The Kaliyuga Era of B.C. 3102", JRAS 1911, pp 480 ff). The Sanskrit reads:

"satya abdänāṁ sastir yadā vyatitāḥ trayas ca yugapādāḥ, try-adhika vimāsatir abdās tadēha mama janmano 'tītah."

"Now, when three yugapadas and sixty times sixty years have elapsed, twenty-three years of my life have passed." (N.B. The end of the third yugapāda marks the beginning of the Kali-yuga).

He specifies Kusumapura, i.e. Pātaliputra, as the seat of his activity, or at least as the place where his work was appreciated. (II, v. 1:

"Āryabhaṭas tv iha nigadati Kusumapure 'bhyarcitaṁ jñānam."

He may thus also have been a subject of the Guptas, presumably of Budhagupta and his successors.

He is most famous for his contributions to astronomy, arithmetic, and algebra. He was apparently the first Indian astronomer to hold that the earth is a sphere and rotated on an axis (IV, 2,6,7,9), for which he was severely criticized by Brahmagupta and other later astronomers. His arithmetic and algebra is quite advanced. And though his solid geometry often leaves something to be desired (cf. II, 6 b and 7 b), his plane geometry is quite impressive. For instance, he arrives at a value for $\pi$, 3.1416, which is not far off the mark (II, 10). Unfortunately, the Āryabhatīya is not a complete text of mathematics, and many definitions are taken for granted.
However, there are certain definitions of shapes in Āryabhaṭa, and these contrast with Vasubandhu's in several interesting, though to some extent predictable, ways. Āryabhaṭa defines "square" quite rigorously from a mathematical point of view; "Vargas sama-caturaśraḥ." (II, v. 3) "'Square' means 'equiquadrangular'," (i.e., a plane figure which has only four angles, all of them equal. His term for "equiquadrilateral", a quadrilateral whose sides, but not necessarily whose angles, are equal, would be "samacaturbhujal" (cf. II, 11). Following this definition, Vasubandhu's is geometrically inexact, as he is defining the seeing of an equiquadrilateral only. (I was tempted to accuse Āryabhaṭa's commentator Paramesvara of a similar slip in his gloss on "equiquadrangular". He says, "Yasya caturaśrasya kṣetrasya catvāro bāhavah parasparaṁ samāṁ syuḥ kṛṣṇadvayaṁ ca parasparaṁ samāṁ bhavet tat kṣetram samacaturaśram ity ucyate." "Any quadrangular plane figure of which plane figure all sides are equal to each other, and of which both diagonals are equal to each other, is called an 'equiquadrangular'." But karna, "diagonal", is actually a very special sort of diagonal, meaning only one which conjoins with a right angle. Thus it is used for the hypotenuse of a right triangle and the diagonal of a square or rectangle. Thus Paramesvara's definition holds).

Āryabhaṭa's definition, on the other hand, is useless for Vasubandhu's purposes, i.e. as an aid for discovering what is occurring physio-psychologically when we speak of "seeing a square". It does not include anything that Vasubandhu could recognize as being fundamentally, i.e. psychologically, existent. It must however
be noted that what we see as "square" is actually not always, as Vasubandhu says, a "color-aggregation which appears equal in each of four sides". This may be how we geometrically determine that it is a square or an equiquadrilateral rhombus, but if we take into account what the visual consciousness presents to us, whenever we speak of a "square", an equal appearance of each of the four sides is not always involved. At present there is a "square" alarm-clock on my desk—but what the visual consciousness is actually presenting to me is a kind of rhomboid with unequal sides! Vasubandhu may leave himself a way out with his verb "appear", which could include interpretations immediately put on the object of visual consciousness. Thus, while Āryabhaṭa's is a precise mathematician's definition, Vasubandhu's may be almost as good a one for telling us what underlies it psychologically. In fact, it is in dealing with plane figures that Vasubandhu's reduction in shape to color is most convincing.

Āryabhaṭa, though he gives us several methods of determining whether a figure is a circle (II, 7; II, 13), unfortunately gives us no complete definition. As regards Vasubandhu's definition, my translation may be too geometrically exact. I supply a key phrase (in parentheses), this time without authority. Without it, however, Vasubandhu's definition makes little sense. With it, it is an impeccable definition even Āryabhaṭa could have appreciated.
The causes and conditions for dyeing an object here enumerated may refer to different types of dyeing, any deliberate changing of an object's color being referred to in this way. Fire, as Sumatisīla's explanations will subsequently show, refers perhaps primarily to the firing of pottery. But the other three examples, like Sumatisīla's additional example of "chemical dyes", seem to refer to the dyeing of garments. Fire also being an auxiliary condition in cloth-dyeing (the boiling of water containing colorific plants and chemical dye-stuffs), perhaps all the examples refer actually to the dyeing of garments. Bleaching also being regarded as a dyeing-process, the inclusion of "the sun" and "ice" becomes clear to one who is familiar with the ancient bleaching processes employed in Kashmir and Gandhara. Freshly-dyed garments were often bleached by long exposure to the sun, and encasing a garment in ice had a similar effect. On some of the dyeing and bleaching techniques employed in ancient India, see Jātaka no. 38; Asanga, Mahāyānasamgraha I, 18, pp 36-37; Hasmukh Sankalia, The Ancient Indian Textile Industry, Madras, 1940.

In reply to similar Sāmmitiya arguments in favor of external causes of destruction, Vasubandhu had already previously engaged in a rigorous investigation of combustion (Kosa IV, ad 2-3, LVP, pp 5-6)—an investigation which, like so many of Vasubandhu's regarding natural phenomena, leaves us with the most un-rigid conclusion ("Whatever you may say about it may be right, but isn't necessarily
so). The Śāṃmitīya supposes his argument, that in the case of combustion, fire is an external cause of destruction for wood, to be self-evident, i.e. "demonstrable through the means-of-cognition of direct perception". Vasubandhu however counters that actually there is no direct perception of motion. When we suppose that wood is being destroyed because of its relation with fire, it is simply because we no longer see the wood intact after such a relation. To go from the direct perception of the disappearance of wood to the assumption that fire is the external cause of the wood's destruction involves an inference, and what is more, an inference which is not entirely fool-proof. Actually, Vasubandhu says, the fact that we no longer see the wood after its relation with fire is susceptible to two interpretations: either the wood is destroyed on account of the relationship, as the Śāṃmitīyas claim, or the wood is constantly changing within itself, and maintaining a certain continuity because of other factors within itself, which factors are transformed in proximity with fire. Vasubandhu accuses the Śāṃmitīya of inconsistency, for the Śāṃmitīya does admit that flames are destroyed spontaneously, and yet a gust of wind, conventionally speaking, may "put out a flame". To the Śāṃmitīya, this means only that the wind has served as a catalyst for hastening a process which would at any rate have come about anyway intrinsically, i.e. the annihilation of the flame. Vasubandhu says that analogously, the flame may only be a similar catalyst in regard to wood. He thinks that this alternative is not only just as possible as the other, but even more likely, since the wood is not destroyed immediately when brought into con-
tact with fire.

Relating the same argumentation to the dyeing example, Vasubandhu would argue that there is a constant series of modifications in the products resulting from contact with fire, rather than the fire itself changing the product. We may symbolize the reactions as follows:

Key: Fire-moment, Wind-moment, Solid-moment, — power to renew full series of same kind, ~ loss of power to renew series, X in decrease to annihilation.

There are an infinite number of conditions that may give rise to ~, and some of them are clearly not dependent on anything external, but rather to changes within the fire itself. Wind is not necessarily the cause for a flame's destruction, as the following may equally well happen:

and occurs regularly.

The idea that any one reaction (or intervention of a substance) should be held an inevitable cause for any given other substance, or its annihilation, seems to be ruled out in Vasubandhu's framework.
i.e. The cause of a cannot at the same time be the cause for the destruction of a. This axiom is traceable to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇḍāda, where it occurs as follows: "A substance is not destroyed either by its effect or by its cause". ("Na dṛḍvyam kāryam kāraṇas ca badhati", VS I, I, 12). This axiom seems to have been accepted at large among Indian philosophic circles. Kaṇḍāda himself of course restricted it to substances, which are only one kind of entity within his system. He in fact supplies an answer to Vasubandhu's contention in KSP 8 a, that sounds need no external cause of destruction, by assuming that attributes like sound are destroyed by their effects, as well as by their causes. The first sound in a series of sounds is destroyed by its effect, i.e. the succeeding sound, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last sound but one destroys the last (the axiom "Udbhayatha gunāḥ", VS I, I, 13). Vasubandhu presented a refutation of VS I, I, 13 at Kośa IV, ad 2-3, LVP, p 6, bottom, and is thus able to extend the axiom of VS I, I, 12 over the whole range of the Vaiśeṣika categories. In the case cited in the KSP, the destruction of a characteristic cannot occur on account of the same causes which are responsible for its intensification.
These are examples of what are termed "homogeneous causes" (sabhāgaheta) in Vaibhāsika philosophy. This type of cause was fully accepted by Vasubandhu (Kośa II, 52 a–c, LVP, p 253 ff). When a substance gradually gives rise to another substance, in such a manner that one can speak of a "transformation of the original substance", and no other external substance can be recruited to serve as an external cause for this transformation, Vasubandhu and the Vibhāsa speak of the original substance's being a "homogeneous cause" for the later substance. The concept of "homogeneous cause" served to fill many gaps in causality which we nowadays tend to explain by such phenomena as chemical decomposition, or the intrusion of microbes. As regards the latter example, Vasubandhu has perhaps the last card, since the growth of an organism itself is termed by him an instance of homogeneous causation. The advantage of employing the concept of homogeneous causality in this instance lies in the fact that the continuity between the dharma at locus A and the new dharma at locus B could be accounted for.

The element wind being properly the mobile principle which expands and displaces (see note 7), its role as the principle of motion is recognized by both Vasubandhu and the Sauryodayika. Vasubandhu, who, as regards motion, carries a Heraclitean stand to a Parmenidean conclusion in KSP 10, must of course modify the traditional viewpoint considerably. For him, calling the element wind the mobile
principle can mean only that it is responsible for making a new dharma arise in another locus immediately subsequently to a previous dharma which is related to the new dharma by being its homogeneous cause.

Again we see that "mental" phenomena such as citta, and "material" elements such as wind, are genetically related in such a manner as to make a dichotomy untenable. In Kosā IX (LVP, p 294), Vasubandhu enumerates the processes taking place to give rise to a "manifest bodily action", as follows: A drive or impulse(chandas) is followed by an initial mental application(vitarka) towards an effort, which effort produces a wind-series which in turn sets the body "into motion".

17 a.

"Beneficial": kuśala, "unbeneficial": akusāla. Sometimes translated as "good" and "bad". These are not very good translations because the ultimate good of Buddhism is either the eradication of suffering, or, as in Mahāyāna, the knowledgeable acceptance of unavoidable suffering necessary for the realization of the identity of Samsara and Nirvana(cf. Vasubandhu's Madhyāntavibhāgabhaṣya, ad III 6, 7b, 8). Kuśala actions are strictly speaking those which have retributions conducive to the eradication of suffering, akuśala those which carry a retribution of suffering. Thus, kuśala actions are productive of good, i.e. the alleviation of suffering. The caused good itself is always retributionally indeterminate. Thus Nirvana itself is so categorized (cf. Dhammasaṅgani 983, 989;
C. Rhys-Davids *Buddh. Psych.*, p 139). The *Karmaprajñāpatisāstra* extends this principle even further, stating that though volitions in meditation where one is not fully concentrated are *kuśāla*, volitions where one is completely collected and tranquil, are indeterminate. (*Kp*, Tokyo vol. 115, p 87,2,4-6: "gzhan yang yongs su zin pa ma yin pas bstam gtan bḥīgang gzugs med pa bḥībṣagom pa 'i sems pa gang yin pa nas sems mngon par du byed pa dang yid yī las kyi bar du sbyar te 'di ni dge ba'i sems pa zhes bya'o—" p 87,5,3-5: "yongs su zin pa'i sems kyis bsam gtan bḥī dang gzugs med pa bḥī—'di ni lung du ma bstan pa'i sems pa zhes bya'o//" "Furthermore, any volition,—impelling of thought, and mental action of one who is cultivating the four trances and the four immaterial attainments with cittas which are not completely collected, is designated as a beneficial volition. Any volition—impelling of thought, and mental action, of one who is cultivating the four trances, etc, with cittas which are completely collected, is designated as inde-

18.

Configuration having been refuted as an entity, is manifest action to be accounted for simply by the remaining visible quality, the "moving" color combinations which we see when we say "I see him doing that!"? To my view, Vasubandhu is obviously playing here, and relishing a series of totally absurd alternatives. A given color can clearly intrinsically be neither beneficial or unbeneicial, as all materiality is basically indeterminate. (cf. *Kośa* I, ad 29 c-d, *Kathāvatthu* VIII, 9).
19.

On the gradual shift of this term from being the honored epithet of King Asoka to meaning something like "simple fool", see S. Lévi, *Journal Asiatique*, 1891, p 549, and Bull. Ac. Royale de Belgique, 1933 n. 1-6, pp 12-15; La Vallée Poussin, *Bulletin de l'Académie de Bruxelles*, 1923, p 35 ff. The usage is common in Vasubandhu (cf. Kosa II, ad 26 a-c, LVP, p 162), and also in Śaṅkara (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, ad I,2,8; ad II, 4,5).

20.

The eye proper, i.e. the actual seeing part of the eye, is itself properly inferred, not seen, since according to the Vaibhāṣika theory accepted by Vasubandhu it consists of an invisible subtle materiality covering what is conventionally called "the eye". It is inferred through its force or efficacy of presenting visibles to our citta-series (cf. Kosa I, ad 9, LVP, p 15). On this subtle materiality, see also Dhammasaṅgani 616, 628 and Vibhanga 122.

21.

The divisions of Vaibhāṣika unmanifest action are self-control, absence of self-control, and neither-one-nor-the-other. For their meaning, see note 2.
According to the Vibhāṣā, the arising of an unmanifest action is not the same in the three "realms of reality" (see note 23). In our normal non-meditative states here, "the realm of desires", the state of self-control or absence of self-control is always originated by a manifest bodily or verbal action. In the states subsumed under "the realm of materiality", discipline is subordinated directly to citta. This cannot be the case in the realm of desires, since unmanifest action develops even when cittas are absent in sleep.

Vasubandhu, in denying the real existence of manifest actions, i.e. bodily and verbal activities which themselves carry an ethical and retributional nature, must also deny "unmanifest action" in the realm of desires. As a matter of fact, Vasubandhu has already lambasted the entire Vaibhāṣika concept of unmanifest action (Kosa IV ad 3 c, LVP, pp 13-23).

23. The realms of existence

The three realms, or spheres, of existence are the "realm of desires" (kāmādhātu), "the realm of materiality" (rūpādhātu), and the "immaterial realm" (arūpyadhātu). Any state where all the senses are operative, and all passions have their full opportunity to develop, is subsumed under "the realm of desires". Thus, all non-meditative states within the world in which we live are included here. The "realm of materiality", sometimes called "the realm of forms" by some translators, comprises the four lower meditational stages (dhyānas 1-4), where certain senses, such as smell and taste, are...
not operative. It is "the realm of materiality" because all of the consciousesses which allow us to discern material objects are still present, and rid of the discursive thought-processes of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, these sensory objects "come through" with their greatest intensity. In the traditional Buddhist conception, certain god-realms which are analogous to these meditational states, are also subsumed under "the realm of materiality". The "immaterial realm" comprises any state where all senses except the mental consciousness are suspended. They are "immaterial", then, in the sense that the first five consciousesses no longer perceive material objects. These states are the extreme meditational concentrations, the four "immaterial attainments", which culminate in the attainment of the cessation of all conceptualization and feelings. Certain gods again are also said to belong to the immaterial realm. For the distribution of various states and destinies under these three realms, see Kosa III, ad 1-3 (LVP, p 1-7).

The conception of these "realms" in Buddhism shows an amalgamation of cosmological needs with the results of meditational experimentation. In the earliest Buddhist conception, there were apparently only two realms: a "realm of materiality" and an "immaterial realm" (cf. Sutta-nipāta 755-756, Itivuttaka 51, 73). Przyluski noted that the contrast between "the realm of desires" and "the realm of materiality" was added later ("Bouddhisme et Upanishad", BEFEO, 1932). Falk supplies an explanation for this added dimension where Przyluski failed to come up with a convincing one: she says that the assumption of a three-realm division was
made necessary by increasing experimentation with the immaterial attainments (Nāmarūpa, p 98). Originally, these meditations were not very important in Buddhism, though they were practised and held central by several ascetic orders, including that of Udraka, the second religious teacher of the Buddha. In Digha III, 131 ff, it is stated that the four simpler meditational trances are all that is needed to attain the fruits of sainthood, and it is also significant that directly before his death, the Buddha went into these four trances in only (Digha II, 156). Increasing experimentation with the sense-suspending attainments made it necessary to distinguish "realm-wise" between them and the simpler meditational stages, because of their radically different characters. Thus a "realm of desires" was devised to contain non-meditative states, "the realm of materiality" was relegated to dhyānas 1-4, and "the immaterial realm" comprised these ultimate experiments in meditation, which grew to greater and greater importance in North Indian Buddhism.

24.

A bodily action may have a double ethical change, which results in its being indeterminate only insomuch as its beneficilaity and unbeficilaity are roughly equal. Because unmanifest action according to the Vaibhāsika is always either clearly beneficial or unbeneficial, it could never occur in connection with such a manifest action.

According to Vasubandhu unmanifest action is also ruled out as an explanation of the unbeficilaity of an impure monk's remain-
ing silent during the Prātimokṣa recital, since for the Vaibhāṣīka to be consistent, he must here also assume a prior manifest action, which simply does not seem to occur in this case. Sanghabhadra attempts to defend the Vaibhāṣīka position by noting that the very sitting down in an assembly hall for the recital constitutes a previous manifest action (cf. Kosa IV, LVP, pp 163-164, n 5). This argumentation is feeble, because, as has been shown, unmanifest action cannot arise from actions which are indeterminate. Vasubandhu would of course explain the unbeneficaility of the monk's silence simply by the unbeneficaility of his volition to remain silent. If he remains silent without such a volition, e.g. if he has suddenly been struck dumb, there can for Vasubandhu be no question of a misdeed. Vasubandhu succeeds here in giving a viable explanation of what determines the ethical nature of a "sin of ommission", where Sanghabhadra, in his attempt to buttress the traditional Vaibhāṣīka structure, seems to singularly fail.

25.

The existence of past and future dharmas is the cardinal doctrine of the old Sarvāstivāda school, from which the Vaibhāṣīka is derived. It is criticized already by the Kathāvatthu (I, 6-7), and defended against these criticisms by the snarling polemic of Devasārman, author of the Vijnānakāya. (Vijnānakāya, tr. LVP, Études Asiatiques 1925, pp 343 ff). The Vīhāra adopts the theory (Vīhāra 76, pp 393 b, tr. LVP MCB V, pp 5 ff), and the genius of the "Great Four Masters" of the Vaibhāṣīka camp was enlisted to ex-
plain it. These philosophers were the Bhadanta Vasumitra, the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, Ghosaka, and Buddhadeva. All their solutions are rejected by Vasubandhu (Kośa ad V 25-28). The doctrine was again defended against Vasubandhu by orthodox Vaibhāṣikas such as Sanghabhadra (Abhidharmayāyanusāra, 50-52, MCB V, pp 75 ff) and the Dīpakāra (Abhidharmadīpa V, 289-324, Jaini, pp 245 ff). The whole controversy was finally summarized by Sāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgraha, 1793-1806.

26.

The expression "pustule arising on top of a boil" was a common Sanskrit idiom at the time of Vasubandhu. It is found also in Kālidāsa, Śakuntalā Act II, opening speech of the Vidūṣaka: "Tato grāndasyopari pindakah samvrtaḥ." The idiom is used to express the idea of additional troubles where troubles enough already abide. In this case, the troubles are the poor Vaibhāṣikas'.

27.

The mechanism for the retribution of an act can be reduced, Vasubandhu says, either to a special transformation within the series of momentary events making up the aggregates of "personality", or to a change in the state (avasthā) of the act itself. The Bhadanta Vasumitra had reduced the differences among dharmas in the three times to differences in their states, or modes of being (cf. Vibhāṣa 76, 11, MCB V, p 1 ff). That is to say, a present dharma has a full efficacy-range, and is able to give rise to visual, etc, objects-
of-consciousness, whereas a past dharma, though existent, can only be remembered, and a future dharma only anticipated. As the Vibhāṣa itself had a clear preference for Vasumitra's explanation of the doctrine, the Vaibhāsikas, who took it as their cardinal text, followed suit. The retribution of an act, following Vasumitra, would be explained by assuming that an act, though it loses its full efficacy-range as soon as it is past, continues to exist, and finally undergoes an additional change in its state, which allows it to give its retributinal effect.

The Vaibhāsika vocabulary employed here involves some technicalities: An act W "projects" an effect as long as it is present, but it W "gives" its retributinal effect when it is already past.

The two alternative mechanisms can be diagrammed as follows:

![Diagram]

(The connection of the act with the skandha-series is explained by the Vaibhāsika through prāptis, "metaphysical glues" joining disparate but related elements).

Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhāsika explanation, alternative 2, violates the principle of the momentariness of all dharmas. This principle is, curiously enough, accepted by the Vaibhāsika as much as it is by the Sautrāntika. Vasubandhu's argument is however not a valid criticism of the Vaibhāsika, given the Vaibhāsika's framework. Vasubandhu is quick to recognize this himself, as he has the Vaibhāsika reply with the proper Vaibhāsika view of momentariness.
Though in its "own-characteristics" a dharma exists in the past as well as the future (since it can be remembered or anticipated with all its characteristics), it no longer has the power to "project" its full effect, as it cannot be perceived by vijñānas I–V. And it is this power, marking the dharmas as a present thing, which is momentary. When it ceases, we say the dharma is destroyed, i.e. it has entered upon another state of being.

28.

If the act is still around, what is it that keeps it from continuing effects similar to the effects it projected in its moment as a present dharma? In what sort of "cold storage" are we to assume the act to be?

29.

The last moment of one who has eradicated all the root-afflictions (the "outflows", or, if you prefer the Jain interpretation, "inflows") does not project an effect. That is, once such a person dies, his physio-psychic series are not resumed within another existence: in other words, "he goes into Nirvana". This is "the cessation which has come about through deliberation", i.e. the deliberation and realization of the Four Noble Truths.
A cessation which has not come about through deliberation is any stopping of a physio-psychic series which does not have the realization of the Four Noble Truths as its root-cause, but rather the deficiency of the necessary conditions for the continuance of the series. The contrast between deliberative and non-deliberative cessation has been much discussed, sometimes (as in N. Dutt's article "Pratisamkhyaṇa-rddha and aptatisamkhyānirodha", IHQ 33, 1957, pp 156 ff) with considerable obfuscation. The passages which in detail discuss "cessation which has not come about through deliberation" seem to indicate that any cessation of a series' continuation can be designated in this way, as long as the cessation has not been caused by a realization of the Four Noble Truths, nor by the inherent destruction of each moment-entity making up the series. (This latter type of cessation, which refers to entities rather than to series, is called by the Vibhaṣa "anityatanirodha", (Vibhaṣa 31, tr. LVP, BEFEO XXX, 1930, p 1). Thus, a non-Buddhist yogin who through meditations is able to annihilate factors of suffering, has achieved this through a "cessation which has not come about through deliberation", because the specifically Buddhist knowledge of the Noble Truths was not involved. And a series of yellow visual objects-of-consciousness ceases, for the consciousness-series in question, when the external object giving rise to the yellow objects-of-consciousness is removed, and this also constitutes an example, this time a far more obvious one, of a cessation which has not come about through deliberation. The nature of these cessations was the subject of much
dispute among the Northern Indian scholastic Buddhist writers (cf. Vibhāṣā 31-32, tr. LVP, BEFEO XXX, pp 1-28; Vasubandhu, Kośa I, ad 5-6, LVP, pp 7-9; Sanghabhadra, Abhidharmayāyanusāra, I 32, tr. LVP, BEFEO XXX pp 259-260, cf. pp 263-298.)

"Cessation which has come about through deliberation" is, by the way, essentially a synonym for Nirvana (Vibhāṣā 31, synonym no. 1, tr. LVP, BEFEO XXX, p 10).

31.

"The obtainment and development of an effect's seed" is a metaphorical expression employed by Vasubandhu for the actualization, within a series, of a potentiality to produce a new effect. The concept of "seeds" developing within a psycho-physical series is used by Vasubandhu to illustrate the continuity of such a series. "Prāpti", described in note 27, serves much the same function for orthodox Vaibhāsika philosophers. But whereas Sanghabhadra and the Dīpakāra insist that prāpti is a real entity apart from the series itself, it is recognized by Vasubandhu that his "seed" is only a metaphor for a force within entities constituting a "series" which allows them to gradually undergo transformations. (Kośa II, ad 36 c-d, LVP, p 184). More exactly, "a seed for a dharma" means simply the psycho-physical complex itself, when it is capable of producing this dharma as an effect, either immediately or mediatly, through a transformation of its own series (Ibid, p 185). The word "seed" is used because this force is comparable to the inherent power of yielding rice found in a sprout which has also been born of rice.
In his commentary on Asanga's Mahāyānasamgraha, Vasubandhu glosses the expression "seed" as "a special force" (śaktiviśesa) within the series (Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, Tokyo vol. 112, p 277, 5,1). He emphasizes again and again that it is a mere metaphor, helpful to explain inherent ever-occurring transformations of psycho-physical series. Many of the criticisms raised against the concept by Sanghabhadra (Nyāyānusāra 31) and the Dīpakāra (Abhidharmadīpa, V, 259-261, pp 219-225) have not taken this into account.

The metaphor of the seed is an old one: Anguttara III 404-9 likens the arising of beneficial and unbeneifical dharmas from tendencies within the series to sprouts arising from seeds in the ground. It is interesting that this same sutra is referred to by the Dīpakāra, who uses it, however, to support the notion of prāpti! (Abhidharmadīpa, I 129 a-b, pp 86-87).

By this botanical analogy, Vasubandhu is able to maintain an organic, dynamically changing universe. In the "transformation of the series" diagram given at 27, we can thus have recourse to yet another model:
The aggregates: skandhas: elements making up what we term "personality". They are materiality or material bases (rupa) feeling, conceptualizations, psychic formations (including motivational predispositions and volitions), and consciousness-perceptions.

The view that a special dharma disassociated from citta is responsible for an act's retribution is, as Sumatisīla tells us, a speciality of the Sāmmitiyas and Mahāsāṅghikas. The Kathāvatthu, which already discusses and criticizes the theory, attributes it to the Sāmmitiyas and the Andhakas (the Mahāsāṅghikas of Andhra). There it is stated that according to the Sāmmitiyas and Andhakas, a dharma must be posited for the continuation of retributonal results even in those cases where the citta-series is interrupted. Thus the citta-series itself cannot be responsible for retribution. The Kathāvatthu counters that when mental processes are interrupted, the karmic process must by rights be broken off as well (Kathāvatthu XV, 11).

Vasubandhu asks how the theory of upacaya-avipraṇāśā can explain memory. As said, the problem of the retribution of acts is only an aspect of the larger problem of the continuity of the psycho-physical series. Thus any theory which explains retribution, but which cannot explain this continuity in broader terms, must be rejected as inadequate. One of the main problems regarding the con-
tinuity of the physio-psychical series is the question of memory. As Sumatisila tells us, the theory of upacaya-avipranaśa cannot serve to account for memory, since an upacaya, or avipranaśa, arises only with acts that are clearly beneficial or unbeneficial. The studying of a text, and the initial perception of an object-of-sense, which serve as the root-causes for future memory regarding the text or object, are however completely indeterminate acts. Thus, an upacaya, or an avipranaśa, cannot arise in these cases. Even if it could, there would remain the problem as to which moment produces the upacaya-avipranaśa: Is it the moment of the initial perception of the object, the moment in which the memory arises, or yet some other moment? Clearly none of these alternatives can explain the phenomenon.

It is interesting to note that with all our so-called scientific knowledge, the factors of memory are still not really understood, though they have been the subject of psychological research since Hermann Ebbinghaus. The largely metaphorical solutions with which modern psychology has emerged, such as "changes in the synapse taking place with vivid impressions", "increase in the size of the synaptic knobs following such impressions", though supportable by electro-stimulatory experimentation, are in their way no more adequate or inadequate than Vasubandhu's admittedly metaphorical solution of an impression-storing consciousness-substratum (cf. Rosvold's "Memory", McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, 1960, vol 8, pp 216-223.)
34 a.

The question of what goes on in the highest meditation, "the attainment of the cessation of feelings and concepts", is one of the crucial problems in the psychology of the Northern Abhidharma theorists. This will become apparent later in the KSP. Here the problem more specifically is that the theory of upacaya-aviprañāsa cannot account for the re-emergence of the citta-series, since obviously no particular beneficial or unbeneficial action directly precedes this emergence.

34 b.

This is an argument by analogy. The idea seems to be that the continuity of redness from flower to fruit does not depend upon a special dharma, so similarly, the continuity of the transformation from seed to retribution needs no special dharma either. This sort of Occam's Razor principle is employed often by Vasubandhu against the Vaibhāṣika categories in the Kośa. In addition, some amount of botanical experimentation seems to have been done in an attempt to discover possible principles of continuity! Nonetheless, this argument against upacaya-aviprañāsa seems to be the weakest of the three.
The "parikalpita" is the lowest of the three aspects of reality according to Vasubandhu's later philosophy. It has sometimes been rendered as "the imaginary", but both its etymology and its characterizations by Vasubandhu (cf. Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, comments ad I, 5) do not support such a translation, though the ontological status of "the imaginary" in ordinary language may be close to that of the parikalpita. The "parikalpita" is literally "the thoroughly constructed", the seemingly fixed, ordered, and static, which constricts consciousness into ever narrower and narrower grooves. It is thus the result not so much of the "imagination" condemned by some Western philosophers (e.g. Hobbes, or the Renaissance philosopher Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola in his On the Imagination), but rather of the very mental consciousness so praised by these gentlemen, i.e. the mental consciousness in its capacity for fabricating abstract constructions of its own, which are subsequently, according to Vasubandhu, taken far too seriously. Less abstract categorizations fall of course also within the scope of the parikalpita. (Mental consciousness in its colorful image-building fantasizing aspect is not in itself a danger to Vasubandhu, as it is to Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, or else Vasubandhu could hardly have been the great lover of the Mahāyāna sūtras he apparently was).
The previous example of the dyed lemon flower's resulting in a dyed lemon-core is here being used to illustrate the theory of the transformation of the psycho-physical series without the intervention of a dharma external to it. In fact, Vasubandhu uses a vocabulary which completely parallels his example, but which is somewhat difficult to carry over adequately into English. He uses the verb "penetrate (paribhāvayati) in order to express the volition's lasting influence on the psycho-physical series, on an analogy with the liquid lac's penetrating the entire series of the lemon plant. This penetration, or influence, of the volition results in a special force (he could as well have said "seed"), an alteration in the series which leads eventually to its own transformation. For Vasubandhu, the only real retribution lies within the psycho-physical series itself, and this is borne out by his famous arguments in the *Vimśatikā* demonstrating the irrationality of assuming external hells (*Vimśatikā*, 3, 4, pp 3-4).

The transformation of the series theory here is identical to alternative no. 1 diagrammed at note 27, with the addition of the metaphorical concept of "penetration" for the volition's influence on the series. It perhaps does not really explain anything (how many schemata of modern physics, not to speak of modern psychology, might be accused of the same thing), but it does present a plausible model to patch the holes in Buddhist karma theory acutely felt by the Northern Indian scholasticists. In the last analysis, of course, Vasubandhu will abandon it anyway, since it is obviously a *parikalpita* structure.
31. A sentence rendered somewhat obscure not so much by its content as by its grammar. It is quite possible that the original Sanskrit was a good deal clearer than the Tibetan. Nonetheless, Sumatiśīla saw fit to give it a detailed comment, so some ambiguity must have existed in the Sanskrit as well. Filling in Sumatiśīla's glosses, we may read: "Though it is appropriate that when a bodily or verbal action is rendered beneficial or unbeneficial by a beneficial or unbeneficial citta, there be the force necessary for the bodily or verbal action to give a pleasant or unpleasant effect within the citta-series, the citta-series is of itself not capable of giving a pleasant or unpleasant result, and thus it not to be regarded as necessarily beneficial or unbeneficial."

38. The two meditational attainments devoid of citta are the attainment of the absence of conceptions (asamājñīnasamāpatti) and the attainment of the cessation of feelings and conceptions (nirodhasamāpatti). The difference between the two was first noted by Vasumitra in the Prakaranapāda (146, 5, LVP Kośa II, p 200, n 2), and his manner of distinguishing them was retained by Vasubandhu (Kośa II, ad 42 a, LVP, pp 200–204, 210–211; Pañcaskandhaka, Tokyo vol. 113, p 238, 4,8–5,3). In these definitions, the attainment of the absence of conceptions or awarenesses is characterized as a meditation peculiar to non-Buddhist schools. It is in fact mentioned prominently in the Yoga-sūtras of Patanājali. Though both these meditational attainments
involve the cessation of feelings and concepts, the volitions underlying entry into them differ: For Patañjali, awareness of the sensory world is in itself to be avoided, and the meditation which results in their cessation is regarded as the ultimate deliverance. It is practised with the express purpose of eradicating conceptions, though concomitant feelings are also destroyed thereby. It is interesting to note that certain Ch'an groups, notably the ones defeated by Santaraksita and Kamalaśīla in the Council of Lhasa, apparently regarded deliverance in the same way (Demiéville, Concile de Lhasa, p 43). The attainment of cessation, on the other hand, was never regarded in early Buddhism as being deliverance in itself, but rather as the ultimate state conducive to tranquility. It is directed as much against feelings, as against concomitant conceptions. Vasubandhu says that it is correctly practised only by advanced Buddhists. Another difference between the two attainments lies in the fact that the attainment of the absence of conceptions is attainable directly upon the fourth meditational stage, whereas the attainment of cessation is the last of a series of immaterial attainments.

Further states without conceptions or awarenesses (asamjñika) occur not only in deep sleep, etc, but also among certain gods, who have achieved a life entirely without conceptions as a retribution for former beneficial acts. As soon as conceptions arise within these gods, their death is near (Kosa II, ad 41 b-c, LVP, p 199).
39. A directly antecedent condition is any condition which helps give rise to a dharma which is similar to it, and which follows upon it immediately (Kośa II, ad 62 a-b, LVP, p 300). The caitasikas which arise immediately previous to a consciousness are by necessity its directly antecedent conditions, since they not only help give rise to the consciousness, but color its very nature, whereas the eye, for a visual consciousness, serves only as a substratum, and not as such a condition, since it does not condition the emotional nature of the consciousness. As regards a mental consciousness, its substrata are always directly antecedent conditions, though again there are directly antecedent conditions which are not its substrata, namely the immediately previous caitasikas (Kośa I, ad 44 c-d, LVP, p 95). The term "directly antecedent condition" is usually reserved for cittas and caitasikas only, though the Bhadanta Vasumitra was of the opinion that materiality-moments could also serve as such conditions (Kośa II, ad 62 a-b, LVP, p 301).

40. A mental consciousness cannot possibly arise where the material organs exist, but where their function does not give rise to a sensory citta. Here is a passage which demonstrates just how misleading the translation "mind" for "manas" is. By "manas" Vasubandhu means here primarily a sensory consciousness which serves as a directly antecedent condition for a mental consciousness. During the attainment of cessation, such sensory consciousnesses are by necessity absent,
since they are always concomitant with feelings.

41.

If in states with both citta and materiality there is a seed for a manas resting upon the material organs, and another resting upon the citta-series, then manas in these states results from two separate series of seed-moments. Yet two separate series of seed-moments are never found to exist for plants which have natural seeds. A given plant always results from one seed, not two.

It might be argued that Vasubandhu is here making too much of the metaphor "seed". But the positing of a capacity for producing an identical result in two quite different kinds of entities, is actually somewhat puzzling. The position might be saved by assuming that the capacity for engendering a citta is relegated to the series of the material organs during the attainment of cessation and is transferred back to the citta-series once the capacity is actualized. This would be a principle of "vicarious functioning", which is accepted in similar contexts by modern physiological psychology (cf. D.C. Debb, Physiological Psychology, p 210).
Contrary to what Vasubandhu says, and contrary to Sumatisīla's best efforts to bolster up his assertion, it seems to me that the theory, with the emendation suggested at note 41, can indeed explain the re-emergence of the citta-series—at least as well as Vasubandhu himself can. The position is unacceptable to Vasubandhu, as to Sanghabhadra, mainly because of their squeamishness towards accepting a basically non-sensate cause for a sensate result (for the materiality-series must certainly be non-sensate, if there are no co-existant cittas). This is an example of the axiom discussed by Robinson in connection with conceptions of causality in Īsvarakṛṣṇa, Nāgārjuna, and Śaṅkara: "The cause must be like its effects" (Robinson, "Classical Indian Axiomatic", Philosophy East and West XVII, 1967, axiom 6, p 150). But the interrelationship of material and psychic entities had been recognized in Buddhist psychology since the Dhammasaṅgani and the Jñānaprasthāna, and is in fact in several instances admitted by Vasubandhu himself (cf. note 17). If a sensate citta-cum-volition can give rise to a basically non-sensate wind, as Vasubandhu admits in Kosā IX, it is difficult to see why the process in reverse should be so totally unacceptable to him.

In the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang, this citta supposed by the Bhadanta Vasumitra to exist within the attainment of cessation is qualified as a "subtle citta" (sūksma-citta). The theory of a subtle citta existing within this attainment is alluded to also by
Asanga (Mahāyānasamgraha, I, 53, p 73). Vasubandhu gives the same passage from the Bhadanta Vasumitra's Pariprcohā at Kośa II, ad 44 d, LVP, p 212.

The Pariprcohā itself is unfortunately lost. As the Great Master Vasumitra of the Vibhāṣā is most often referred to as "the Bhadanta Vasumitra" (cf. Sanghabhadra, Nyāyānasara, MCB V, p 91; Vibhāṣā, Ibid, pp 166–167), it is most likely that he is identical with the author of the Pariprcohā. La Vallée Poussin (Kośa Introduction, pp XLIV–XLV) and Lamotte (KSP tr, n 11) assume otherwise, but their reasoning does not seem to be based on very good grounds. On the other hand, Lin Li Kuang's thesis that there was only one ancient master Vasumitra, and that he was responsible for the theory of "mahābhūmikas" (cf. note 3), seems insupportable by the internal evidence of the texts involved. (L'Aide-Mémoire de la Vraie Loi, pp 48–49).

The following texts are attributed to a Vasumitra: the Prakaranapada (1541, 1542), the Dhātukāya (1540), both among the six basic texts of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma; the Sangītisāstra (1549), the Pañcaavastuka (1556 and 1557), the lost Pariprcohā, and the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (2031, 2032; Peking–Otani 5639, tr. A. Bareau, Journal Asiatique, 1954, pp 229 ff). There is in addition a commentary on Vasubandhu's Kośa by a Vasumitra of an obviously later date. Now it is true that the Prakaranapada and the Dhātikāya contain the earliest-known mention of "mahābhūmikas", and the Sangītisāstra is apparently also in consonance with the theory (cf. LVP, Kośa intr, p XLIV). But the caitasika-list of the Pañcaavastuka
is conspicuous by its absence of any arrangement which could possibly fit the mahābhūmika-pattern. In the first set of caitasikas given in the Pāñcavastuka, there are listed many of the psychological events which are considered mahābhūnikas by the Prakaranapāda. Yet within this same set there is "carelessness" (प्रमादा, pramāda) and "absence of carelessness" (अप्रमादा, apramāda), which are difficult to imagine as being concomitant in any citta, not to speak of every citta! (± 1556, vol. 28, p 995, 3,10-11). The term "mahābhūmika" itself nowhere occurs in the Pāñcavastuka. It occurs only in the Pāñcavastukavibhāsa, a commentary on the text by Dharmatrāta (± 1555, vol. 28, p 994, 2,3-4), who seems to be inspired in his ordering of the caitasikas primarily by Ghoṣaka (cf. Abhidharmāmrtam, p 66, 12). The whole question of whether there are caitasikas separable from cittas, and the problem of whether there are mahābhūnikas, were two issues on which there was much individual disagreement, as might be expected from the very nature of such an emotional topic! It is highly unlikely that the probably originator of the mahābhūmika-theory in the Prakaranapāda would have so completely ignored the entire concept while discussing the very heart of caitasika-theory in the Pāñcavastuka! The theory of one Vasumitra is also contradicted by the fact that the Saṅgītisāstra, though discussing the existence of past and future dharmas, explains it in a manner quite unlike the Bhadanta Vasumitra's famous theory of "States" discussed in the Vibhāsā (Saṅgītisāstra, chapt. 13, cf. LVP, Kośa intr., p XLIV), and that one Vasumitra quoted by the Vibhāsā (152, 1, Ibid), (not necessarily the Bhadanta Vasumitra
as assumed by LVP), clearly denies the existence of cittas in the 
attainment of cessation, which roundly contradicts the Pariprochā.

Tradition is also uniform in distinguishing three Vasumitra's:
the author of the Prakaranapāda and the Dhatukāya, the Bhadanta
Vasumitra of the Vibhāsa, and the author of the Samayabhedoparacan-
acakra, who is identified with the Kośa commentator, and said to be
a contemporary of Candrakīrti(sixth century, Tārānātha, I, p 68,
p 174). Yasomitra also gives us some valuable information. He tells
us that the Bhadanta Vasumitra wrote not only the Pariprochā, but
also the Pañcavastuka and other treatises. (Yasomitra, Vyakhya,
ad II, 44, Law, II, p 89, 14-15). This seems plausible, as the
Pañcavastuka's ordering of the caitasikas and the Pariprochā's
theory of a subtle citta both have at least this in common: that
they are inimical to the mahābhūmika-theory of the Prakaranapāda,
Dhatukāya, and Saṅghītiśāstra.

The quasi-canonical character of the Prakaranapāda and the
Dhatukāya for the Vibhāsa indicates that these are in all probability
works of an earlier era. The statements of the Bhadanta Vasumitra,
on the other hand, though usually highly respected by the Vibhāsa,
have hardly this kind of status there. Following the internal evi-
dence and the traditional accounts, we thus arrive at three
Vasumitra's: (1) the old Vasumitra, author of the Prakaranapāda, of
the Dhatukāya, and, in all probability, of the Saṅghītiśāstra, the
probable originator of the mahābhūmika-theory; (2) the Bhadanta
Vasumitra, author of the Pariprōchā and the Pañcavastuka, opposed
to the mahābhūmika-theory, upholder of a subtle citta, forger of the
most accepted theory regarding past and future dharmas, cautioner of dogmatists, one of the "Great Masters" of the Vibhāṣā, and, from all we can see, a truly great philosopher; (3) the later Vasumitra, author of a commentary on the Kośa and the Samayabhedoparacanacakra.

According to the traditional accounts, the four great masters Ghosaka, Buddhadeva, the Bhadanta Vasumitra, and the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta were contemporaries, and all had a hand in the "rough draft" of that tremendous team-work compilation, the Vibhāṣā, at the Council of King Kaniska. In spite of their philosophical differences (which become quite apparent in the KSP), Ghosaka and the Bhadanta Vasumitra apparently remained in good terms, and after the death of Kaniska, went together to live in the country of Asmāparāntaka, at the invitation of the king of that country. (Kośa intr, p XLIV; Abhidhāmaṁrtapramatra intr, p I).

By the way, the Dharmatrāta who commented on the Pañcavastuka was apparently an uncle of the Bhadanta Vasumitra's. He was a strict Sarvāstivādin attempting a harmonization between the theories of Ghosaka and his nephew, and was also responsible for the Samyuktabhidharmasāra(±1552), an elaboration of the work of Dharmśrī. He is to be distinguished from that great maverick, the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, whom in fact he criticizes by name in the Samyuktabhidharmasāra. (On this point, and on the philosophies of the two Dharmatrāta's, Lin Li Kuang is quite convincing, cf. L'Aide Mémoire, pp 315-342).
43.

This is identical to the rebuttal to the Bhadanta Vasumitra's thesis given in Kośa II, ad 44 d, LVP, p 212, which is there attributed to the great Ghoṣaka. The necessary connection of a mental consciousness with contact, feelings, and conceptions is of course an irreversible axiom to this upholder of the mahābhūvikas. At Abhidharmāmṛta, pp 66, 12, Ghoṣaka says, "Feeling, conception, contact, volition, mental attention, impulse, mental application towards an object-of-sense or understanding, memory, concentration, and discernment are the ten mahābhūvikas. And for what reason is this? Because they arise together with every citta." "(Vedanā saṁjñā sparśa cetanā manaskāraḥ chandāḥ adhimuktih smṛtiḥ samādhiḥ prajñā ity ete daśa mahābhūvikā dharmāḥ. Tat kasya hetoh? Sarva-citta-sahōtpādat.)" For Ghoṣaka, the attainment of cessation cannot be reduced to a citta of any kind, since the cessation is that of con­cepts and feelings.

44.

This argument is again attributed to the Bhadanta Vasumitra in the Kośa (II, ad 44 d, LVP, p 213).
Western translators of Buddhist texts have usually not given much attention to the various characterizations of mental and physical states traditional in Buddhist Abhidharma. This is unfortunate, for the whole basis of Buddhist ethical theory has been misunderstood thereby, and as a result there have been many erroneous conceptions of Buddhism, e.g. that it is anti-sensual, that it is necessarily anti-passion, that it basically considers all mundane existence evil, and so forth. Actually, a careful examination of the employment of terms used in Abhidharma ethical theory, as well as attention to their true etymological meaning, will destroy many of these misconceptions, which have arisen in part due to the incredibly arbitrary translations which have become "standard" among Western translators. As an example, "kleśa" has never meant, either in Sanskrit or for any people in direct contact with ancient Indian masters, "defilement", as it is usually translated by Conze et al. The Sanskrit root "kliś" means "to be afflicted, to be tormented, to suffer", and a "kleśa" is accordingly "an affliction, pain, anguish, suffering". In Tibetan, the term "kleśa" has been rendered by "nyon mongs pa", which means "misery, trouble, distress", as well as "to be afflicted", as in the expression "tsha bas nyon mongs te/" "to be molested by the heat" (Sarat Candra Das, p 489). In Chinese, it is rendered by both Paramārtha and Hsuan-tsang as "安心" "to be troubled, vexed, grieved, irritated, distressed" (Matthews, characters nos. 1789 and 4635), and together regularly mean "vexed", "vexation". Why therefore introduce into
English a basically meaningless word such as "defilement", which in conjuring up all sorts of angry God, original sin, "man is defiled", and "sex is dirty" guilt-complex hang-ups, is not only etymologically indefensible, but also, for the twentieth century, rotten upāya? We have a good word in English which is in consonance with basic life needs, as well as, which goes without saying, the Four Noble Truths. I translate "klesā" as "affliction", the adjective "klista" as "afflicted". Being totally in harmony with traditional Buddhist translation, I feel my term needs little further defense.

The afflictions are certain caitasikas, attitudes, and emotional predispositions within the cittas, which are directly the cause of suffering. What mental states are specifically included among the klesas vary considerably in Northern Indian Abhidharma according to the slant of individual writers, another fact which has been consistently ignored by Western expositors. Thus, the Vibhāsā lists delusion(moha), carelessness(pramāda), indolence (kausīdya), lack of confidence in Buddhist teachings and saints (āsraddhya), sloth(styāna), and excitedness(auddhatya) as fundamental afflictions(klesā-mahābhūmika), i.e. those which make all other sufferings possible(cf. Vasubandhu's discussion, Kosā II, ad 26–28, LVP, pp 161–168). But Vasubandhu himself later reduces them to only three (the traditional lust, hate, and delusion—Trimsikā 11). To name only the extreme cases, Dharmatrāta the Sarvāstivādin in his Samyuktābhidharmasāra has fifteen fundamental afflictions (Lin Li Kuang, p 49), whereas the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta
says all afflictions are nothing but unbeneficial volitions, and
that there are in fact no caitasikas apart from feelings, and
volitions, conceptualizations (Ibid, p 47). In the Pancaskandhaka,
Vasubandhu has again a different enumeration of fundamental afflic-
tions, giving lust, hate, arrogance(māna), nescience, false views
(drṣṭi), and constant doubts(vicikitsā) as basic afflictions, which
view he adopts from Asanga's Abhdharmasamuccaya(Tokyo vol. 113,
p 237, 7-8). It is characteristic of Vasubandhu that he alters
Vaibhāṣika lists of afflictions in several of his works, and the
tendency within him at least rules against the notion that all pas-
sions are afflictions. Lust for sensuous pleasures, desire for
experiences in the meditational realms, and excitedness are dropped,
for instance, in his most famous listing of the "fetters", and envy,
stinginess, and, characteristically, complacency and aversion, are
substituted in their place(cf. MVB ad II 2-3 a).

To clarify some often confused concepts: Afflicted states are
"bad", being suffering, but are not necessarily unbeneficial (i.e.
"bad" in the sense of ethically reprehensible). There is an entire
category of factors which are categorized as afflicted, but which
are ethically beneficial(the kusalasaśravas), and another which is
similarly afflicted, but ethically indeterminate(the nivrtāvyakrtas,
"obstructed-but-indeterminate dharmas"). For instance, lust ifself
may sometimes be beneficial, and certainly doubts, remorse, and
aversion, though afflicted, may have good results. Similarly, any
afflicted state which has come about as a result of retribution is
by necessity indeterminate("obstructed-but-indeterminate"), since
anything which is retribution itself carries no further retribution.
(A very just credo which leaves everybody an opening for relief from suffering). The term "afflicted" is somewhat broader than "affliction", since an affliction is that basic type of suffering that involves adjunct sufferings. Thus the "obstructed-but-indeterminate" states are "afflicted", but are not afflictions. An affliction itself must always arise from a volition, an impulse, and a mental construction (vikalpa). Furthermore, the terms "obstructed" and "afflicted", themselves synonymous (though for Mahāyāna there are obstructions which are not afflictions, cf. KST, n. 92; MWB II, ad 1) are often equated to "connected with outflows" (sāsrava). However, as Yasomitra says, the last term is actually used in a much broader sense, to mean any state where basic afflictions may attach themselves (Vyākhya) ad I, 4 b, Law, I, p 9). Further principles: Whatever arises from a mental construction is never indeterminate, and whatever arises from an impulse is never retribution. Combining the "ethically good and bad" (beneficial-unbeneficial) with the "intrinsically good and bad" (afflicted-unafflicted) categorizations, we arrive at the following divisions:
entailing retribution] 1. unbenefficial (akusala) U

afflicted

2. beneficial but connected with afflictions, or liable to be connected with afflictions (kusala\sasrava) B

[free from retribution] 3. obstructed-but-indeterminate (nivrtavyakrt) I

entailing retribution] 4. first states free from afflictions (pratham\anasrava) B

unafflicted

[free from retribution] 5. unobstructed-but-indeterminate (anivrtavyakrt) I

entailing retribution] 6. last states free from afflictions (antanasrava or simply an\asrava) I

B: beneficial; U: unbenefficial; I: indeterminate.

The Kosas's categorization of the twenty-two faculties into these groups will serve to demonstrate the subtlety of the entire ethical structure:
1. Faculty of the Ear (śrīśāndriya)  
2. Faculty of the Eye (śīśāndriya)  
3. Gīrīyānādiya  
4. Vājānādiya  
5. Kayānādiya  
6. Mānasānādiya  
7. Faculty of Manliness (vīraśāndriya)  
8. " "  Manliness (ṣtri-śāndriya)  
9. " "  Life-force (jīvānādiya)  
10. " "  Happiness (suḥkāhānādiya)  
11. " "  Unhappiness (duḥkāhānādiya)  
12. " "  Cheerfulness (śāntarūpamāna)  
13. " "  Depression (dauriṇārūpamāna)  
14. " "  Lovelessness (nīlāsāndriya)  
15. 16 Faculties of Faith & Vigor  
17. 18  Memory, Concentration, Insight  
19. 20-22: Highest Faculties

(My entire discussion is derived from Kosa II, ad 7-19, LVP, pp 113-131; II, ad 30 a-b, p 168; II ad 60-61, pp 297 ff; IV, ad 8, p 32; IV, ad 127, pp 254-255.)

KEY

O Nearness
- Distance
+ Potentially linked with selectors
+ Either Absence/Absence or Absence (e.g. in meditatively undisturbed states)
- Both in good & bad destinies, retribution for acts
- acts for good, not in good destiny, unless act in bad destiny
O Always aspirāta
O Always Kṣatā
O Belonging to any ethical category
O Not retribution when good, unless an aspirāta or aṣaritā
O Always retribution
O Always retribution for beneficial act when retribution
O Always retribution for unethical act when retribution
O Always retribution for neutral act when retribution
O Never retribution
The three roots of the beneficial are non-covetousness (alobha), freedom from hate (advēsa), and freedom from delusion (amoha) (Kośa II, ad 25–26 c, LVP, p 160). They are those mental states that make all other beneficial caitasikas possible. By necessity, they involve contact with an object-of-consciousness, and consequently involve feelings and conceptualizations, as caitasikas must depend on conscious volitions to be beneficial. In other words, the "non-covetousness" occurring in the attainment of cessation is not non-covetousness as a root of the beneficial, because no choice can arise there, due to the absence of contact with a specific object-of-consciousness. In the absence of such choice, and in the absence of consciously-conceived roots of the beneficial, there can be no beneficial citta.

This same argument is employed by Vasubandhu in his Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (ad I, 54, Tokyo vol. 112, p 282, 2–4). It is an independent argument there, not found in any developed form in Asanga's Mahāyānasamgraha itself. The fact that most of these independent arguments in the first chapter of this commentary show such close affinities to the KSP, seems to rule against Frauwallner's "last-ditch" effort to save his fabrication of "the two great Vasubandhu's" (i.e. that the Kośa, KSP and Triṃśikā, etc, are indeed by the same Vasubandhu, but that only the Mahāyana commentaries are by Asanga's brother). (Schmidthausen in his article tries to save this desperate theory by alluding to internal evidence. Upon close scrutiny, the attempt, needless to say, is a complete flop. cf.
Analogous Pāli suttas: Anguttara II, 40; III, 388; IV, 161. I have not been able to find a sutta where the topic is subsumed under ten questions, as it apparently is in this Daśaparipρrochasūtra: "the sūtra of the ten questions". The necessary dependence of conceptions, feelings, and psychic formations, upon contact with an object-of-consciousness, is an axiom accepted in all Abhidharma formulations, as it in fact forms one of the links of the dependent-origination formula (sparśa → vedanā and samjñā).

Afflictions presuppose the existence of feelings, conceptualizations, and certain other psychic formations, as they always arise from an impulse and a mental construction. Thus there can be no afflictions without contact with an object-of-consciousness.

Even the meditational attainment of the absence of conceptions praised by Patañjali is beneficial, so one would think that the attainment of cessation practised by Buddhists would be even more so (cf. note 38).
49.

Only these four types of citta are traditionally regarded as unobstructed-but-indeterminate by the Vibhāsā-inspired philosophies. Anything born of retribution, as well as retribution itself, is by necessity indeterminate (cf. note 44 a), and cittas connected with artistic or professional activity, and with postures of the body such as sitting, lying, and standing, are of course also indeterminate and unafflicted. The last category is somewhat more problematic. It seems to refer to any citta which produces pure fantasies, which beholds a magical creation, or which deals with after-images in meditation. An artist's preconception of his creation, on the other hand, seems to belong to the category of "cittas related to artistic or professional activity" (cf. Kośa II, ad 71 b-72, LVP, p 320).

Vasubandhu gives his argumentation a somewhat different twist in the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya. He dismisses beneficial and unbeneficial cittas, and cittas related to postures, professional activity, and mental creations, in the same manner as in the KSP. But he leaves a possibility open for the "born of retribution" category. He says that it would be possible to call the attainment of cessation indeterminate qua "born of retribution", but that only the store-consciousness, of all consciousnesses, can be indeterminate in this sense (MSB ad I, 54, Tokyo vol. 112, p 282, 4,5). The arguments raised in the KSP against a retributional mental consciousness existing directly subsequent to the attainment of cessation would of course still hold.
bhavāgrasamāpatti: attainment of the summit of existence:

meditational stage which is neither conceptual nor non-conceptual (naivasamjñānasamjñayatana). It is the last of the immaterial meditational attainments before the attainment of cessation, and is so called because it is the ultimate state reached by functioning consciousnesses.

The attainment of cessation is reached only after one has passed through the four lower meditational trances and the four other immaterial attainments. These latter are the meditational attainments focused on endless space (ākāsanāntayatana), on infinite consciousness (vijñānanāntayatana), and the stage which is neither conceptual or non-conceptual (naivasamjñānasamjñayatana). All these are extremely advanced meditational states where consciousnesses I-V. are no longer operative. One of the objects of meditation being to sever afflicted cittas which are retributional, it is held that all mental retributinal consciousnesses will be severed by the practise of these meditations.

The citta which occurs immediately after the attainment of cessation has been completed, must be completely without agitations. "Utter non-agitation" is a mark of the fourth meditational trance (cf. Kośa III, LVP, p 216, Kośa IV, ad 46, LVP, p 107, VIII, ad 26, LVP, pp 161-184).
52.

cf. *Dīgha* III, 217; *Samyutta* II, 82; *Majjhima* II, 254, 262.

53.

Afflicted retributinal materiality is gotten rid of permanently by these highest meditations (cf. *Samyutta* IV, 201; *Dīgha* III, 211). It would follow, says Vasubandhu, that this being true, a retributional citta which is susceptible to being connected with affictions, would also be severed permanently at this time.

54.

The nine attainments of successive stages are the four lower meditational trances and the five higher meditational attainments: the attainment focused on endless space, the attainment focused on the infinity of consciousness, the attainment focused on nothing whatever, the stage which is neither conceptual or non-conceptual, and the attainment of cessation. The eight deliverances are preparative stages to the higher attainments, plus these attainments themselves. The preparatives are listed as:

"oneself containing visible forms, one sees visible forms" (rupī rūpāni paśyati)

"not being aware of inward visible forms, one focuses on outward forms" (adhyātman arūpa-samjñi bahirddhā rūpāni paśyati)

"one becomes intent on that it is lovely" (subham ity eva adhimukto bhavati).
The Karmaprajñapti's solution is to make these completely concentrated mediatational cīttas indeterminate (cf. note 17 a). This is indeed another way out, which Vasubandhu, in spite of his apparent sympathies with the treatise, rejects here.

In spite of his own great contributions to Indian logic, people who rely on dialectics only are not for Vasubandhu in a very exalted acategory. In his chapter on "realities" in the MVB, he recognizes arguments based on logical principles as belonging to a special sort of "reality" which has validity while playing a certain kind of dialecticians' game (ad III, 12). But here, as well as later in the Vimśatikā, actual insight into ultimate realities cannot be provided by any amount of reasoning alone. As a writer of treatises, Vasubandhu wishes his statements to be as logically coherent as possible, and in fact in the Vādavidhi makes one of the first real breakthroughs in the history of Indian logic regarding the determination of the nature of logical arguments. But he recognizes nyāya as more than inadequate when dealing with ultimate insights. Labelling himself to some extent as a "tarkika", Vasubandhu at the end of the Vimśatikā says, "It ('cognition-only') cannot be considered by people like me in all its aspects, because it is not a topic proper to dialectics." ("Sarvaprakārah tu sā mādrśais cintayitum na śakyate, tarkāvisayatvāt." Vimśatikā, p 11). Vasubandhu is thus in a same category with Thomas Aquinas: a
scholastic aware of the limits of his structures, because he is also a mystic.

Here in the KSP Vasubandhu uses the term "tarkika" almost as a jeer. This is reminiscent of the Lankavatāra-sūtra, where "tarkikas" are constantly being lambasted. A bit of the same spirit is in evidence also in Asanga (Mahāyānasamgraha X, 3 end, p 274).

56 b.

Some, like the Bhadanta Vasumitra, say the attainment of cessation is endowed with citta; others, like Ghoṣaka, say it is not. Yet they both apparently refer to the same state. Some way must be found to account for the discrepancy (cf. Abhidharmadīpa II, 126, p 149).

57.

Following the Tibetan grammar, one might be able to read: "The retributinal consciousness, which is only the various kinds of seeds themselves—". This is equally plausible, since Vasubandhu is aware that the store-consciousness is, like "seeds", equally a metaphor for "determined potentialities" in the series. But the preferred way of putting this is that the store-consciousness is neither something totally different from the seeds, nor totally non-different (Asanga, Mahāyānasamgraha, I, 16 and 46). Sumatisīla's commentary is susceptible to either interpretation. To play it safe, I adopted the less radical "where there are only the various kinds of seeds themselves".
58.

Impression: impregnation: augmentation of the seeds: the initial point of transformation of the series, particularly that induced by past volitions and further experiences. Yasomitra calls "impression" a synonym for "seed" (cf. Jaini, Dipa, p 109), but, following Asanga, we may regard it as the process of everything in past experience entering the consciousness-stream to help in its transformation (Asanga, Mahāyānasamgraha, I, 18).

59.

The Sanskrit for this verse is given by Sthiramati in Trimsikabhāṣya, p 34:

"Adāna-vijñāna gabhīra-sūkṣmo
ogho yatha vartati sarvabījo/
bālāna eso mayi na prakāṣi
mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuh."

Vasubandhu's citation of the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra is of great interest for several reasons. For one thing, it clearly contradicts Lamotte's thesis that the KSP was written at a time prior to Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahāyana (as do also, by the way, the closing verses of the KSP, with their beautiful Mahāyānistic transferral of merit sentiments). It leaves little doubt that Vasubandhu has been holding back on Mahāyana vocabulary with the intention of leading his old Vaibhaṣika opponents on as far as possible with arguments they more or less have to accept, in order to finally bombard them with the conclusion that only the Yogācāra conception of consciousness can
completely fill the holes in the karma theory. We may regard the entire KSP as a preliminary to the more essential Yogacāra insights, which is directed at the Vaibhāsikas and Sautrāntikas who could by this means be forced to a recognition of the innate worth of Yogacāra, and thus be lured to study additional and more subtle writings of the school. Just as, in Asanga’s Mahāyānasamgraha, the Yogacāra consciousness-theory is a preliminary to the teaching of the three natures and their realization, which form the true heart of his and Vasubandhu’s Yogacāra. (Mahāyānasamgraha, I, II, and III, especially III, 9, pp 164-165). The KSP thus plays a role similar to the Vimsatika, though Vasubandhu there is writing a preliminary directed at somewhat different problems. The emphasis on the store-consciousness in the KSP reminds rather of the Trimsīka, which in turn must be looked upon as a preliminary to the ultimate cosmic insights, hinted at in such playful "mind-blowing" manner in the Trisvabhāvanirdesa.

The Sandhinirmocana is of course not a sutra which is accepted by the Vaibhāsika. But if the Vaibhāsika can cry, "This is not authoritative scripture!", Vasubandhu can counter that neither should the Vibhasa and its beloved Abhidharma "padas" be regarded as such, since they are clearly not the words of the Buddha. Orthodox Vaibhāsikas, such as the Dipakāra, retort that the Abhidharma serves only to interpret the sutras, and furthermore, that these Abhidharma interpretations must be taken as "higher" than any sutras which contradict them, since sutras can be conventional(aupacarika), i.e. conditioned by the exigencies of upāya. (Dīpa II, ad 138–139, pp
The thesis that Abhidharma interpretations must be taken above sutras in contradiction with them is of course "old hat" in the Buddhist schools that evolved Abhidharma: already in the Vibhanga, we have interpretations conformable to the sutras (suttabhājaniya), and interpretations conformable to the Abhidharma (abhidhammabhājaniya), and the latter always takes precedence in the case of any conflict between the two. A whole body of Buddhist teachers however objected: they were the "Sautrāntikas", "those who look to the sutras as the final end of the Buddha's teaching". Vasubandhu of course belongs to this tradition from the inception of his writing career. Though his slashing at Vaibhāsika categories supported only by Abhidharma is perhaps the most thoroughgoing one, he had predecessors in this field—certainly the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, and presumably the "mūlācārya" of the Sautrāntikas, Kumāralāta.

The question of what is to be considered canonical was raised almost at the inception of Buddhism. Because of the absence of a sacerdotal hierarchy and an initial lack of codified collections of texts, and due to the fact that many of the far-flung Buddhist communities became quite isolated from one another, divergences in doctrine naturally arose. The Buddha himself had already given means by which to test the authenticity of scripture. If a man came with something he claimed the Buddha had said, the community was to compare it with what stood in the sutras and the Vinaya they had received, and if it did not conform to them, it was not to be accepted (Dīgha II, 124). In this analysis, it was the spirit rather than
the letter which counted most. Thus the Nettipakarana says of this passage: "With which sūtra should one confront these texts or utterances? With the Four Noble Truths. With which Vinaya should one compare them? With any Vinaya which leads one away from lust, hate, and delusion. With which Dharma should one test them? With (the doctrine of) dependent origination." ("Katamasmiṁ sutte otāretabbāni? Catusu ariyasattesu. Katamasmiṁ vinaye sandassayit-abbāni? Rāgavinaye dosavinaye mohavinaye. Katamiyām dhammatāyām upanikkhipitabbāni? Pātičcasamuppade." p 221). Thus there came to be admitted into several ancient Canons sūtras which were recognized as being post-Buddha (e.g. Majjhima II, 83 ff; Majjhima II, 57; Majjhima III, 7; and Anguttara III, 57 ff, composed under King Munda).

Collections of scriptures were accepted as sūtras in certain schools which never had this status in others (such as the Dhammapada and the Jatakas, challenged as late as the fifth century, by teachers such as Sudinna Thera, cf. Buddhaghosa's Sumangalavilāsinī II, p 566, and Manorathapūranī, III, p 159.)

The case for the Vaibhāṣikas is somewhat weakened by the fact that the Vibhasā itself admits that there are many valid sutras which are not included in its Canon, "because they have been lost"(Vibhasā, 16, p 79 b, quoted Lamotte, "La critique d'authenticité dans le Bouddhisme", Indian Antiqua, p 218). It also says that many "false sūtras", "false Vinayas", and "false Abhidharmas" have been incorporated into many Canon collections (185, p 925 c, Ibid). The problem is further compounded by the Vibhasā's recognition that certain sutras are to be taken literally(nitartha), whereas others must be further

From the Mahāyāna side, reasons for accepting the Mahāyāna sūtras were given by several authors. A cardinal text supporting giving their revelations, or if you will, their forgeries, the status of authoritative scripture was the *Adhyāśrayasāṃcādānasūtra*, which said that everything which is well-spoken can be said to be spoken by the Buddha (cf. Snellgrove, *BSOAS* XXI, 1958, pp 620-623, on this sutra’s re-interpretation of the famous dictum of Aśoka: "E keci bhamte bhagavatā Budhena bhāsīte save se subhāsīte vā.") A defense of the Mahāyana sūtras is given by Santideva (*Siksāsamuccaya*, B, p 15, V, p 12), and Prajñākaramati (*Bodhicaryāvatārapañjika*, IX, 43-44, V, p 205), on the perhaps not unassailable grounds that their inspiration and root-purpose is the same as those of other sūtras. Prajñākaramati further says that in the face of so many dissensions even among the Hinayanists, it is difficult to see how any one transmission of sūtras can be regarded as Āgama. Haribhadra in his *Abhisamayālaṅkāraloka* goes one further, saying that anyone who attempts to do so must be regarded as a fool (pp 260-261).
60 a.


60 b.

The anusayas are traces left by past afflictions, and thus also "proclivities" towards future unbeneficial action. The Vaibhāṣika, with his theory of the existence of the past and the future, regards "anusaya" and "kleśa" as synonymous, a view Vasubandhu had combatted already at Kosā V, ad 1, ff. (See also Jaini, "the Sautrāntika theory of Bīja", and Dipa intr, pp 103-107, and Kathāvatthu XIV, 5.)

61.

"without outflows": any state completely unafflicted. (cf. note 44 a).

62.

Any saint not liable to return to Samsara, who may however, in contrast to the Arhat, be re-born into god-realms.
63.

In the case of foliage, even the Vaibhäusers do not admit a dharma of generic similarity. Refutations of the Vaibhäuser categories of "generic similarity" and "life-force" were given by Vasubandhu already at Kośa II, ad 41 a, pp 197 ff. The Dīpakāra attempted a retort to Vasubandhu at Dīpa II, 126-149.

64.

The Tāmraparṇīyas are the Theravādins of Ceylon. They are only sporadically mentioned in Vaibhäuser and Mahāyāna works. "The island Tāmraparṇī" is a name for Ceylon at least since the days of King Ṛkṣavrata Viśampātadatta, whose Nāgārjunikonda inscription mentions it by that name (c. 200 A.D.). "The Tāmraparṇa" is however properly the Tinnevelly region of the Pāṇḍya Kingdom, which is incidentally also mentioned in the same inscription. However, at this time, Theravāda seems to have been one of dominant sects of this area as well, as both Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta claim it as their home (see Law, Buddhaghosa).

65.

The bhavagravijñāna, "consciousness which is the requisite of existence", is indeed a peculiarly Theravāda conception, which goes back to the Patthāna. (1, 1, 3, 365, B I, p 138; 6, 7, 81, 4, B, II, p 54; 7, 7, 23, B II, p 121). It is a substratum underlying the six consciousnesses, which, though it is also a series of momentary entities, does not undergo much change. It is not entirely sub-
conscious, as it consists of cittas which may at times penetrate to the sixth consciousness. However, it may exist entirely without vitarka and vicāra, and exists in the highest meditational attainments, as well as in deep dreamless sleep. It may be said to be nothing but the six consciousnesses in an unactive state.

This substratum is accepted by Buddhaghosa, who assumes a material base (the "hadayavatthu") for it (Visuddhimagga XIV, 458). Such a material base may itself be deduced from certain passages in the Patthāna, though it does not mention the term "hadayavatthu" itself. Yasomitra (Vyākhya, ad I, 17, Law, I, p 45) alludes to the full-grown theory of a substratum with a material basis, and also identifies it as a Tāmraparnīya doctrine.

66.

On the non-inclusion of the other psychic formations being perhaps due to the absence of other caitasikas in older Buddhism, and that this fact was later explained away, cf. Jaini, Dīpa introduction, p 88.

67.

A similar argument, that it was the subtlety of the store-consciousness which prohibited the Buddha from teaching it to his early disciples, is found also in Asanga, Mahāvānasamgraha, I, 10, pp 23–24. As Sumatiśīla interprets it, the import of Vasubandhu's argument here is however somewhat different. It is rather that the grouping together of dharmas with such dissimilar characteristics
would only serve to confuse the student of Buddhism. It was better to leave the store-consciousness out of the scheme for beginners.

68.

The *Vyākhyāyukti* is a work by Vasubandhu, nowadays preserved only in Tibetan. It seems to deal mainly with the classification of the various Buddhist scriptures, and was used for this purpose by Bu-ston (*Chos 'byung*, Part I).

69.

This is a typically Mahāyāna argument, which must however have some force for the followers of the *Vibhāṣa*, which also admits that many sūtras have been lost. Vasubandhu is here conceding that the Vaibhāśika need not recognize the *Sandhinirmocana* as an authentic sūtra. His intellectual honesty here stands in some contrast to the approach of Asanga, who attempts to make the Vaibhāśikas admit the existence of the store-consciousness by claiming that it is mentioned in the Sarvāstivāda Canon. This he does by wringing a meaning out of an *Ekottarāgama* passage in a most arbitrary and devious way (*Mahāyānasamgraha*, I, 13, p 30). This procedure seems to have somewhat embarrassed Sthiramati, for though he mentions this argument of Asanga's, he doesn't go into any details, and refuses to identify the sūtra (*Triṃśikaviṃśāptibhāṣya*, p 13, bottom).
70.

The store-consciousness conditions the evolving consciousnesses I-VI by coloring all its perceptions through its seeds; the evolving consciousnesses in turn alter the store-consciousness through the process of "impression". Asanga says that this mutual conditioning is not only reciprocal, but simultaneous, just as in the case of the arising of a flame and the combustion of a wick (*Mahayanasamgraha*, I, 17, p 35; I, 27, p 46.)

71.

I do not understand how this statement of Vasubandhu's is very apposite, unless an identity of "root" and "seed" is urged on the grounds that the incipient roots are the locus of the developing seeds. The Vaibhāṣīka argument, which is Sanghabhadra's, rests on the charge that "seed" is not a very good metaphor, since the original seed no longer exists at all when a fruit has developed. A seed, or even a seed-series, is not adequate to explain the sudden retribution occurring for beneficial and unbenevolent actions. The cittas which are present at the time of the moment of retribution may themselves be beneficial, where the retribution is one for an unbenevolent act. Thus the constant relation that exists with natural seeds, that such and such a seed results in such and such a fruit, does not seem to be in evidence either (*Abhidharmayayanusara*, chapt. 51, *MCB* 4-5, tr. LVP). I am not convinced that Vasubandhu meets these objections.
The theory of self criticized here is most probably that of the Vaiśeṣikas, against which Vasubandhu had already directed his supplement to the Kośa (Kośa IX). It is nonetheless interesting to compare his critique here with Śaṅkara's argumentation in favor of an unchanging self, which is directed against the Yogācārins. (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II, II, 31). Śaṅkara says that the Yogācārins' store-consciousness cannot serve as a substratum for the impressions, because it lacks fixity of nature, as it consists only of a series of momentary entities. (The store consciousness is "stable", as Asanga tells us, only in the sense that it forms a continuous, never greatly altered series. Mahāyānasamgraha I, 23, p 41). Thus it cannot be an abiding locus for these impressions. Unless an abiding entity pervading the three times is assumed (or else some conditioning agent which is immutable and omniscient), the processes of impression and memory cannot be explained.

Here is an instance where it is difficult to say who has the better argument. Śaṅkara says that the lack of stability of the store-consciousness makes it inadequate as an explanation for our "sense of continuity". On the other hand, Vasubandhu's argument touches on one of the fundamental difficulties of Advaita-Vedanta: that it is impossible to relate an immutable entity to a world of phenomena constantly changing.
Keeping in mind the definitions of "cetana" given in our note 4, we can see that this statement amounts to a reduction of "act" to "volition".

Bala was a plant commonly used in ancient Indian medicine in the preparation of oil-baths. Avinash Chunder Kaviratna, Ayurvedic physician and translator of Caraka, identifies it with Sida cordifolia. (p 281).

This sutra is identical with the one quoted in full at the inception of the Karmaprajñapti. Entire Āgama sutras in Tibetan are rather rare, and when they occur, may throw new light on the Pāli and Chinese versions. I have made a detailed comparison of the Tibetan and the Pāli and Chinese, which I hope to eventually publish elsewhere.

Compare the highly interesting Kosa discussion of words (Kosa II, ad 47, LWP, pp 238 ff). Also see Jaini, "The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Words" BSOAS 22, 1959, pp 95-101.
The factors accounted for by the Vaibhasika with his concept of "unmanifest action" and with his theory of the existence of past and future dharmas must be accounted for by Vasubandhu in other ways. Vasubandhu admits that the attainment of cessation constitutes a kind of self-control (cf. Kośa IV, ad 38, LVP, p 94). But how, if beneficial and unbeneficial action is only volition, can there be self-control, a kind of beneficial action, in the attainment of cessation, which is necessarily devoid of volitions? Vasubandhu again uses the store consciousness, with its "subconscious" impressions, to fill these theoretical holes.

Obviously these simple acts of performance (Sumatisīla's "activity which is not action") cannot be action in the Buddhist sense, i.e. action carrying retribution. As we have seen in 44 a, the activity of the physical organs themselves must be completely indeterminate.
SUMATISILA: Karmasiddhitikā

The commentary on the Karmasiddhiprakarana, composed by the monk Sumatīśila, begins here. In Sanskrit, its title is Karmasiddhitikā, in Tibetan Las grub pa bshad pa.

Homage to Ārya-Maṇjuśrī-kumārabhūta.

I render homage to Maṇjuśrī, all creatures' sole supporting friend, who, by clearing away the net of mental constructions, teaches for the sake of others.

In order to delight whoever desires to interpret the Karmasiddhiprakarana according to the sutras, I will comment upon it following the sutras.

Objection: To the statement, "It is said in the sutras, 'There are three (kinds of) acts', etc, (it must be said) that if the Prakarana had explained [204,1] it with an underlying purpose prayojana, Nyāya. 4529), it would have been appropriate(yukta), but here there is no underlying purpose (expressed). For this reason, as it is unsuitable(avyaya) that there be the writing(of a treatise) by someone who relies on reasoned reflection(preksapūrvaka, cf. Apte, p 113) without there being an underlying purpose, how could such an interpretation (doubting the value of the Prakarana) be erroneous? Here the formulation of the argument(prayega)⁴ is as follows: Whatever has no underlying purpose is not written by someone who relies on reasoned reflection, and is like, for example, a
treatise that goes about trying to count the teeth of crows. Since the Prakarana also has no underlying purpose, no differentiating factor (viśesana) (between the Prakarana and such useless works) is obtained (upalabhyate), because there is a logical pervasion (vyāpti) of the writing (of a meaningful treatise) by having an underlying purpose.

Reply: The justification (hetu) thus stated at this point, namely, "because what is argued by the opponents in the Prakarana, and what is here expounded by the author, has no underlying purpose" does not hold (na sidhyate). And why? Because ('di ltar; yasmāt Mvt. 5407) there is something by way of an underlying purpose here, namely that the natures (prakṛti, svabhāva, or svarūpa) of the three kinds of acts, i.e. bodily acts, etc, be grasped with an unerroneous (aviparīta) manner. Because these natures are imagined in an erroneous manner by all the other (writers), who are adherents to the theory that objects (of sense and understanding) exist externally (to the viewer, etc) (bāhyārthavādinah). For this reason, the Prakarana is upheld, both because of the Master's denial (pratīṣṭhedha) of those people's view by his maintaining that the knowable exists within (jñeyādhyātmikavāda), and because here it is shown what he himself thinks (on these topics). The source of disput (vivādapada, vivādāśraya) here is the underlying purpose of what was stated by the Exalted One when he said, "There are three (kinds of) acts". Thus, by elucidating the opponents' theories (on this point), it will be shown that they are erroneous by their very nature (svabhāvaviparīta).
Now by expressions such as "On this point certain people say", etc, the opinions of opponents are marked in this treatise. Because once the bases of their opinions are clear, one can easily arrive at one's own position, after having refuted (√ dus, desayati) these positions one by one.

It should be known that the first position is that of the Vaibhāṣikas. Since they are deceived by the interpretations which [204,2] have come down to them from a long line of their own teachers, they say, "The acts which are committed by the body are bodily actions, (speech itself is verbal action, and both of these singly constitute manifest and unmanifest action; acts which are associated with manas are mental actions, and they are equivalent to volitions)." (According to their interpretation), the compounds expressing the three kinds of acts are different, and are to be understood in different ways. In saying that "the acts that are committed by the body are bodily acts", they indicate that this compound is a 

**trīyasamāsa** (a tatpurusa compound in which the first element is to be understood as being in the instrumental case—Pāṇini I, 1, 30; VI, 1, 89). The expression "dependent on the body" is to be understood here, because the body itself does not have the nature of an activity (karana). The statement "Speech itself is verbal action" indicates that the compound "verbal action" is a compound of modification (vīsesanasamāsa). With the statement that "Speech is a (certain kind of) vocal emission (chāsa), speech itself (is seen to have) the nature of an activity. "Singly" here has the meaning of "each". "Both" indicates bodily acts and verbal acts.
As regards the terms "manifest action" and "unmanifest action", manifest action is so called because it informs (or makes manifest). It is a conventional conception (vyavahārikasāṅkāla), meaning "a factor indicating to another what is thought internally". Unmanifest action is so called because it has the natures of materiality and activity, just like manifest action, but it does not inform others (of what is being thought within). The statement "Acts which are associated with manas are mental actions" indicates that the compound "mental action" is a trīyasamāsa. Because manas does not have the nature of an activity, and as it is not action of itself, the action is properly the volition (cetanā) which is associated with it.

"This matter has to be investigated at this point" introduces the questions of the Master. Because once these positions have been described and fixed, he will refute them.

The Vaibhāṣikas determine (vyavasthāpayanti) their own position with the statement, "To begin with, a 'manifest action of the body' (is a configuration which has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it)." In the phrase "to begin with, a 'manifestation of the body'", the expression "to begin with" separates all other manifest actions from manifest actions of the body. In the phrase "which has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it", "it" refers to the configuration. For whatever there is an object-of-consciousness of the configuration of a hand, etc, that has an object-of-consciousness referring to it. As it (the citta) has an object-of-
consciousness referring to it (the configuration), and is also a citta, it is a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it. It is an instigator-citta (pravartaka-citta: a citta of the kind that instigates action). If something has arisen from it, and it has an object-of-consciousness referring to it (this something), then it (this something) has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it. And what is it? The statement "It is a manifest action, which is configuration" should be understood here. The full elucidation runs thus: The object-of-consciousness of any citta which originates (samutthapayati) an action such as the veneration of stūpas, etc, is a configuration (of the body) called "manifest action", as a future bodily action. For this reason, a manifest action which has been originated by such a citta is one "which has arisen from it". 6b

The speaker of the question "Of what is it (a configuration)?" is an objector (prativādin) (to the Vaibhāsika position). It is not the Master, but somebody or another who is sitting both on the right and the left.* The reply "It is (a configuration) of the body" is the Vaibhāsikas'. The question "If it is (a configuration) of the body, (How can one call it an act which has been committed by the body)", belongs again to the objector. Because (the position) of his adversaries is undemonstrated (asiddha), it is his intention (āśaya or abhipreta) to ask how one can say that it is (a configuration of the body, after one has said that it is an action "com-

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*This expression may refer to pupils, who "sit at both the right and the left" of the Master, or may mean someone who is undecided in his opinions.
mitted by the body", in order to consider (preksa) the meaning (of this statement) by any elucidation which would be suitable as an analysis (vibhajana) of it. (The implication) is that both (verbal) conventions (vyavahara) cannot co-exist. The statement "Since the act has reference to one part of the body in general, (it is called 'a configuration of the body', and since it arises dependent upon the great elements of the body, it is called 'an act committed by the body')" is the Vaibhaṣikas' insistence on both conventions. Though the body is to be taken as the entire corporeal mass (kalevara?) which is a collection of primary (bhūta) and secondary (bhautika) materiality, doesn't the expression "(bodily action" refer rather only to a small part of it, [204,4] such as the hand, etc? How can it thus be (a configuration) of the body? In order to object to the idea that this is refuted from their own position (pūrvapaksa), which calls it "(an act) committed by the body", (the Vaibhaṣikas) say that "Verbal expressions which refer to things in general (often refer to their particular parts)." When it is asked at this point "What is the purpose of saying that it has an object-of-consciousness referring to it?", the intention of the questioner at this point is "since it comes about through a citta", i.e. though the phrase "which has arisen from a citta" is appropriate, why is it stated that it is a "citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it"? To this line of reasoning (vicaya) put forth by way of objection, the reply (samādhāna) comes through the Vaibhaṣikas' statement, "Even though in speaking, there may arise a configuration of the lips, (this description is not appropriate for such a configur-
ation, because it has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, but rather has arisen from another citta having an object-of-consciousness referring to words", etc. The statement "It has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it" means that the configuration of the lips, etc (which comes about in speaking) has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to that configuration. The expression "lips, etc", includes the opening and closing (of the lips) in speaking. And why has it not (arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it)? For this reason: "because it has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to words", (the Vaibhāṣika) says. The full elucidation runs as follows: A speaker is disposed towards a word by an object-of-consciousness referring to this word (which lets him know) that the meaning which he wants will be understood with his utterances through the use of this word. In this case, since it has arisen from a citta having an object-of-consciousness referring to words, the configuration of the lips, etc (in speaking) does not arise from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to the configuration itself. The sentence "Though there may be (a configuration) which has arisen from the citta of a former aspiration, (this description) is not appropriate to it" means that whenever a former aspiration is recalled, such as, "May I have lips which are as red as a bimba-fruit!", etc, though (a configuration) may arise from a citta connected with this aspiration, the description "configuration which has arisen from a citta which has an
object-of-consciousness referring to it" will not be appropriate. [204-5] The phrase "because it has also arisen from another citta, which is a retributory cause" means that it has also arisen from some citta which is different from that, a beneficial (kusala) citta which has obtained a special characteristic (vīśeṣa) in being a retributory cause. By this it is also shown that (a configuration) which is defined (avadhata) as one which has arisen only from a citta having an object-of-consciousness referring to it, exists possessed of an effect (saphala).8

Why is it called 'manifest action'?" is the (new) question. The phrase "external motions" means "by motions exterior to citta". The expression "by the transformations" means "by agitations (cala) of the hand, etc." The word "intentions" means "volitions". "As one is shown a fish living hidden in a lake" is an exemplification (drstānta). The meaning of the remainder of the verse can be understood without question.

Wishing to determine the characteristics of bodily manifest action in full (vistarena), and wishing to refute the characteristics (imputed to it by the Vaibhāṣikas), the Master says, "Well, then, what is this which you call 'configuration'?' The implication here is: If configuration were itself established (as a real entity), it might be possible to understand manifest action through its nature, but otherwise, it is not.

The speakers of the sentence, "It is this: length, etc" are the Vaibhāṣikas. The speaker of the sentence "But what is 'length', etc" is the Master. The implication here is: How is this an il-
lustration (of configuration), when this also has a nature which is not established? The sentence "It is that by virtue of which (concepts such as 'This is long! This is short!' arise)" is again the Vaibhāṣikas'. The intention here is: Length, etc, being demonstrated by the means-of-cognition (pramāna) of direct perception (pratyakṣa), how can there be any doubt regarding it? The formulation of the argument is as follows: Whatever is demonstrated by the means-of-cognition of direct perception must be an existing thing, as, for example, jewels, etc, inasmuch as they are visibles that are blue, etc, are demonstrated by the means-of-cognition of direct perception. "It has existence (bhāvatvā) since its existence is demonstrated by the means-of-cognition of direct perception" is a justification deduced from the nature of the thing itself (svabhāvahetu).

The question "To which sense-field does it belong?" is raised by the Master, in order to instigate, for the time being, an elucidation of the (Vaibhāṣika) position, only so that it can (later) be refuted. The implication is: As all real entities (dravya) are included within the twelve sense-fields, if configuration exists as a real entity, in which sense-field is it included?

The Vaibhāṣikas reply, "In the sense-field of visibles". It is included in this sense-field in this manner because of a statement in their basic doctrine (siddhānta) which states that the sense-field of "visibles" has two aspects: color and configuration.
The Master poses a question: "Now (is 'configuration' to be regarded as a special kind of atom, like color, as some special aggregate of atoms, or as some other single entity pervading the aggregated of color-atoms, etc)?" As regards the phrase "like color": Since it is demonstrated that the own-characteristics (svalaksana) of "blue", etc, exist as real entities inasmuch as they are atoms of color which are regarded singly as having no further parts (avayava), and occurring without any separations (abhinna) even when in compound, is configuration also to be regarded in this way? "Or is it some special aggregate of atoms?" means "Is it to be regarded as being some aggregation of atoms which has a special nature (*viśesātmaka)?" "Or is it some other single entity pervading the aggregates of color (atoms), etc?" means "Is it to be regarded as something pervading (the atoms of) color, smell, taste, and the tangible, like the composite whole (avayavī) of the Vaiśeṣikas?" None of these alternatives is true to fact (upapadyante), because there are three [205,2] logical flaws (dosa) (corresponding to them). And how is this? "If it were a special kind of atom, ('long' and 'short' would have to be comprised separately in each part of the aggregate to which it belongs, just as color is)", he says. Thus if the cause of the arising of ideas of "long", etc, is to be regarded as lying in a special kind of atom, then configuration would be apprehended apart from atoms of color: blue, etc, in each single part of the aggregation of primary and secondary materiality. In regard to the phrase "just as color is", it must
be known that (configuration) is not like this(color as regards this characteristic). The formulation of the argument is as follows: Whatever is not apprehended (upalabhyate) through an object-of-consciousness' becoming known is a matter of (pure) conventional designation, as it really does not exist, just like the horns of an ass. And since there is not apprehended any configuration "long", etc, apart from atoms of color, its (separate) nature is not apprehended. Through all this, it is shown that the soundness (yukti) of the justification stated in the opponents' thesis, i.e. that configuration is demonstrated by the means-of-cognition of direct perception, is itself not demonstrated.

If so, how is it that long and short, etc, are perceived? (Actually), they are not (perceived), because it will be demonstrated below that ideas of "long" and "short", etc, arise merely through corresponding juxtapositions of blue, etc.

"If, on the other hand, it were some special aggregate of atoms, (what would be the difference between it and a special aggregate of color-atoms)?" Now if it is to be regarded as some special aggregation of configuration-atoms, what is the difference between that aggregation called "configuration" and a special aggregation of color-atoms, there being an indistinct nature as regards any object-of-consciousness through which "long" and "short", etc, could be metaphorical expressions (nāmopacārāḥ) for a special aggregation of configuration-atoms? With this, [205,3] the meaning of the statement "It could be due to a special aggregation of these colors", blue, etc, "that 'long', etc, arise (as concepts)", has
been explained.

In the statement "Moreover, if it were a single entity pervading the aggregation of color (-atoms), (then, because it would be single, and because it would pervade, it would have to be perceived separately in each part of the aggregation)", the phrase "(pervading) the aggregation" (is to be interpreted) in this way: If configuration is to be regarded as a single (entity) pervading the color (atoms) associated with (atoms of) smell and taste and the tangible, then, because it would be a single entity, and because it would thus be without parts, it would have to be apprehended separately in each part of a column, etc, because it would have to be an (entity) pervading each part separately. If it were apprehended in this manner, to be sure, (the theory would hold), but it is not (thus apprehended). This being so, there is no such single pervasive entity, by a formulation like the one applied previously: "Whatever is not apprehended through an object-of-consciousness' being cognized (is a matter of pure conventional designation, because it really does not exist)". So this "pervasive entity" should be known as being such a thing without a real object-of-consciousness.

As regards the statement "Or else it would not be a single entity", the intended meaning is: Because there is no mistaking that there are parts in the object pervaded, it is necessary for the pervasive objects to be divided into parts. This being so, it cannot be demonstrated that it is an entity having a factor of unity (ekatvākāraṇa). The formulation of the argument is as follows: Whatever is situated with various parts, and in whatever it is
situated, does not properly possess unity, as for example "an army", "a forest", etc. Since configuration is also situated with various parts, it is seen that its being a (single) pervasive entity is contradicted (viruddha). It is this way because there is a logical pervasion of "unity" by "an absence of parts", "having parts" and "being without parts" being mutually exclusive and contrary by their states of being (avasthāviruddha). Accordingly, as it is seen that it is contrary to "having parts", the logical pervader (vyāpaka) "an absence of parts" is vitiated (ārtīyate) (in the case of configuration). If it is false, then the logically pervaded (vyāpya), "unity", is also vitiated (in the case of configuration).

[205,4] Now since the opponent, though he may concede that configuration does not have unity, yet may wonder what is entailed by this, the Master says, "Furthermore, (your) basic doctrine which states that the (first) ten sense-fields (are aggregations of atoms, would be invalidated by this view). As an entity necessarily has a factor of unity, if something does not have it, it cannot be an entity, and thus the basic doctrine (of the Vaibhāṣikas), that the (first) ten sense-fields exist as entities, is also contradicted. Furthermore, there is an additional flaw (in this theory) in that it would strengthen the doctrine of the school of Kanāda. The meaning of "it would strengthen" is "it would further".

4.

Now if that which is called "configuration" does not exist at all, how is it that there is no absence of ideas of "long", etc, generally agreed on (sammata) in the world? Anticipating this
thought, the Master says, "When an aggregation (of color) appears in one direction (in great quantity, it evokes the idea of 'long')", and so forth (iti vistareṇa). Thus, we are not claiming that configuration does not exist at all. It does not exist in the manner in which the Vaibhāṣikas construe it, i.e. as an entity, but this does not mean that that which is generally agreed on in the world does not exist. Because of this, one might ask how it will be clearly known that the configurations "long", etc, are not entities. (In order to demonstrate this, there is the following argument regarding the diverse configurations which can be construed on a section of a variegated quilt.)

"A variegated quilt" is an embroidery, etc. "When it appears in such a manner" means "when various visible objects (rupāṇi), such as deer, bears, etc, (appear on it)." The full elucidation runs as follows: A variegated quilt, etc, is apprehended as something containing diverse configurations, and furthermore, it is proper to say that there is not one single (configuration involved here). If configuration were not an entity, this would be suitable, but otherwise, it is certainly not. Since the adversaries may admit that it is an entity in this manner, and may ask why it cannot be one in this way, (the Master) says that "(following your theory) these various kinds of configuration [205,5] cannot properly be situated within one locus, (just as, for example, various colors cannot)." "Various kinds" means "various sorts" (svarūpa, Apte, p 1737, def 5). "As, for example, various colors cannot", i.e. just as various sorts of colors, blue, etc, are not situated within one locus, because they
rule each other out by an opposition of their characteristics (laksanapratiredha) in not being situated together, configurations such as "long", etc, should (according to the Vaibhāṣikas, for their own views to be consistent) also not be regarded as being situated (within one locus) in this way. Now the adversaries, refusing to see the light*, may say that things contrary in a general way (*sāmānyena viruddhāṇi) may still have only one locus.(i.e. the analogy between different kinds of color and different kinds of configuration does not necessarily hold. Different kinds of configuration may be regarded as being contrary in a general way, i.e. "long" is not "short", but this may not prevent them from being apprehended together within one locus.) For this reason, the Master says, "But if they could, (the idea of every configuration could arise in reference to every locus, and this is also not the case)." The meaning is: "Assuming that things which are contrary could be situated within one locus, (there is nothing that would prevent the idea of any configuration from arising in regard to any visual object-of-consciousness)." As to the statement that "the idea of every configuration could arise in reference to every locus", one may ask "Why?" (The answer is): Because any configuration which can be in any locus must (necessarily) be every sort of configuration (simultaneously). With the sentence, "This being so, there is no separate entity called 'configuration'", the conclusion(nigamana)of what has been expounded is given.¹³

*literally "blinking their eye".
5.

As regards the statement, "if this is so, how is it that (something) is discernable at a long distance (through an object-of-consciousness of its configuration, while it is not discernable through an object-of-consciousness of its color-aggregations)?", the intention here is: If ideas of configurations arise with (real) reference to color-aggregations of blue, etc, how is it that at a long distance, when (the color) is not perceived, (the configuration) is perceived? Only (the configuration) is perceived, and though it is perceived, the other (aspect, its color) is not.

"Well, how is it that some things are discernable through an object-of-consciousness of the configuration of the arrays and groups to which they belong, while they are not discernable through an object-of-consciousness of their main own configuration)?" is said by the Master in order to tell them that theirs is no real rebuttal (samādhāna). The adversaries do not consider the configurations of arrays and groups to be entities, as in fact arrays and groups themselves are not entities in their basic philosophy (siddhānta). [206,1] Our reasoning is also the same on this point. In the phrase "of their arrays and groups", "array" means "order" and "division"; "groups" means "aggregations". The phrase "arrays and groups of trees" could be understood here. Now if this is what is argued here, what can serve as a rebuttal to the adversaries? It is for this reason that (the Master) says, "(When we are confronted with something at a long distance, or in a dark cave, the object is undiscernable through objects of consciousness)" referring
to either." "Referring to either" means that it is undetermined (aviniścaya, anirnaya) as regards both color and configuration.

The implication of the phrase "What are we seeing here?" is that anything else apart from color and configuration appearing in whatever has become visible, is not acknowledged. The sentence "This being so, (it should be recognized that) at this time, its color (is not being clearly perceived, nothing more)" is the rebuttal (of the opponents' thesis.) The full elucidation is as follows: When we ask as we look into the distance, "What are we seeing here?", what is implied is that at the time when something's color is not clearly perceived, nothing else is, either. With the statement, "For this reason, manifest action consisting of configuration cannot be demonstrated", he states his conclusion, as the position of the Vaibhāsikas has been refuted in detail. 14

6.

"Certain other people say": These "certain other people" are the ĀryasāmmitiYas. They say that manifest action is not configuration, since in reality there is no entity [206,2] "configuration", and that it is simply movement, a state of bodily motion. Thus, it is appropriate for manifest action (to be described) as this (motion) itself, and there is no question of configuration. So the methods of demonstration (pratipatti, sādhana) as we explain them in our thesis, are demonstrated (as valid), (the ĀryasāmmitiYas say).
7.

"How do you know that there exists such a progression of the same thing to another locus?" Is this determined through the means-of-cognition of direct perception, or through inference (anumāna)? The meaning is: How do we know that there exists such a progression of the same thing to another locus, and that there isn't simply another thing arising there? The reply is: "Because there is no special (differentiating) characteristic which can be ascertained for the thing." The meaning of this statement is to be understood in this way: It is demonstrated only by inference, as follows: If it were not a case of the progression of the same thing to another locus, then the thing would have at least one other special characteristic to mark it as a new thing, and in this case a special characteristic would have to be ascertained for the thing, but this is not the case. Therefore, a new thing has not arisen there. And so it is known that there is a progression of the same thing (involved here). The formulation of the argument is as follows: There is no difference between things wherever there is not apprehended a special (differentiating) characteristic (between them), just as, for example, there is no difference between a thing possessing one nature and itself, and there is no special characteristic apart from its former nature apprehended as regards the thing in the new locus. Therefore, since there is a logical pervasion of the existence of a difference by the apprehension (of a special characteristic), as no (new) nature is apprehended (in this case), there must be a progression (of the same thing to another locus).
"(But even though there is no special characteristic which can be ascertained for a product arising in a dyeing-process when it is removed immediately after conjoining with the conditions allowing it to arise in the process, i.e.) fire, the sun, ice, (plants, etc, this does not mean that the product is not something else than what has existed before)". With this statement, the Master says that the soundness of the opponents' argument is not certain (niyata, niscita).

"Conjoining" means "being connected". And the meaning here is "coming into contact" (saṃsparsā). "Immediately after conjoining" is said to rule out any long time-intervals. For if they are conjoined for a long time-interval, then a special characteristic would be apprehended (in the product). "When it is removed": What is meant is: immediately after contact (with these conditions). As to what (they are coming into contact with), it is "fire, the sun, ice, plants, etc". With the word "etc", chemical dyes, etc, are also included. [bul tog, Dge bshes chos kyi grags pa, p 563, "alkali", or "soda".]

What sort of a special characteristic do all these things have? He states that they are all "conditions that allow (new products) to arise in the process of dyeing". This means that they are the causes for that which arises in the process of dyeing. In regard to the phrase "when it is removed immediately after conjoining with the conditions that allow (new products) to arise in the process of dyeing", the remainder of the sentence could be "a jar", etc. (In other words, "When it is removed" can be understood as "When a jar is removed".) "This does not mean that it has not become something else" means "It is, simply, something
else." How can this be? To give another exemplification, he says, "(And though there is no special characteristic ascertained for different fire-blazes in contact with) similar sections of (tall grasses) all about to be burned, (this does not mean that they are not different)." The word "similar" is used to rule out those which are dissimilar (in dimensions, species, etc). For if they are not similar, special differences of size will appear (in the fires). The word "grasses" is given so that one can know that if there is a fire there, other blazes will quickly flare up. "Tall" is said in order to determine a special characteristic (in the fires). In shorter grasses, this special characteristic is sometimes not apprehended. (i.e. When fires cover sections of long grass, they flare up in one indistinguishable blaze, but with brush fires involving sections of shorter grasses, one may see individual fires. Thus, the "special characteristic" of flaring up in one blaze may not be seen in fires burning shorter grasses.) The meaning of "in contact with" is "connected with" (anusakta, anusahita, or anusyuta: derivatives from Mvt. 2169, 7505, 9323). The rest is as before. There are various exemplifications given in order to make the intended meaning completely clear. What is shown by all these exemplifications is that even though there may be a special characteristics for "a jar" or [206,4] "a fire-blaze", etc, (at different stages), yet these special characteristics are not apprehended, because we lump them all together through similar concepts (samjnabhih). (A jar which is being dyed undergoes a change immediately upon its contact with dyestuffs, and as it has changed in its characteristics, it has become something new. When a new blaze is added to a jungle
The particle (nipāta) "also" has the function of including (all the sections) in general. "Because of its special characteristics" means "because of the special characteristics of what is about to be burned". In the phrase "there would not be any special characteristic in the blaze's extent, glare, or heat", "a special characteristic of its extent" means "a special characteristic in its being restricted or extended". "A special characteristic in its glare" is the special characteristic of its brightness' being feeble, medium, or strong. "A special characteristic in its heat" is the special characteristic of the sense of touch (sparśa) it incurs being feeble, medium, or strong. These three special characteristics are stated in order to show that a fire which has changing special characteristics as regards configuration, color, and touch, becomes a different thing from each moment to the next. [206,5] With the sentence "For this reason, it is not appropriate to say that something must be the same thing because no (new) special characteristic can be ascertained for it", the Master states his conclusion for his elucidation (of this point).

8.
Now even though it may be conceded (upātta, Mvt. 1892-1893) that the Master has refuted the reasoning (yukti) of the adversary's argument (upapatti) in detail, and that the manner in which the adversary speaks is unsound (avyaya) nonetheless, this other argument, "Well, (but there is such a progression), because there is no cause for the destruction (of the thing previously at locus A)" may come to mind. What is this argument? (In order to complete the meaning
of the word "progression" given therein), the phrase "progression of the same thing to another locus" could be added. The expression "well, but" indicates dissatisfaction (with the preceding conclusion). (The argument) runs thus: Since something new can arise (only) because a previously non-existent nature has been obtained, a previous nature having been dispensed with, since (in the case under discussion) there is no destruction of any nature, because there is no cause of destruction for it, how can some new object arise in this case? In this case (where there is no cause for the destruction of the previous nature which can be found) (we must assume) that there is a progression of the same thing to another locus.

The formulation of the argument runs as follows: Wherever there is no destruction of a previous nature, a new nature is not obtained, as, for example, in the case of "turtle-hair"). Thus, because there is no cause for the destruction of the thing situated in the other (locus, i.e. locus A), there is no destruction of a former nature. And since the arising of a new thing is logically pervaded by the destruction of a (previous) thing and the obtainment of a new nature, in the absence of the logical pervader (the destruction of the previous thing), the logically pervaded (the arising of a new thing) is not obtained. This (entire argument) is framed by people who do not advocate the momentariness theory (aksanikavādinah).

The argument expressed here does not hold (na siddhyate) because conditioned dharmas have an inherent destruction (svarasanirṛddha, cf. Nyāyakośa, p 1056), through which they cease to exist after they have once arisen, and so there is no (special) cause of destruction
which would warrant the same thing's progressing to another locus. Since it may be asked why there is none, it is said, "(What is the cause of destruction for) cittas, caitasikas, (sounds, etc, and flames)?" The (intended) meaning of the phrase "What is the cause for the destruction (for cittas and caitasikas)?" is that there simply isn't one. In regard to the theory that cittas and caitasikas are destroyed inherently from one moment to the next, there is no need to make any effort to demonstrate this, as it is admitted (pratiṣṭhāta, abhyupagata) by the adversaries themselves. "What is the cause of destruction for sounds, etc, and flames?" is added (as a further example). As far as sounds, etc, are concerned, it must be recognized that it is commonly known that they are momentary. Thus, since it is admitted by the adversaries as well as all other kinds of people, that sounds, flames, etc, are also destroyed inherently from one moment to the next, there is, just as before, no need to make any effort to demonstrate this. Cittas and caitasikas, etc, are to be understood as being exemplifications given in order to demonstrate that everything is momentary. The sentence "Similarly, there may not be one for other things, either" is to be understood in terms of its primary (obvious) sense (mukhyārtha-pratipāde). "Similarly" means "just as there is not one for cittas and caitasikas". "For other (things)" means for jars being dyed, etc. "There may not be one" means "There may not be a cause of destruction". Are thus all these existent things (bhāvāḥ) possessed of destruction within their nature in the manner that cittas, caitasikas, etc, are? Now, if it is imaged (vikalpyate)
that they are not possessed of destruction within their nature, then if there is no (specific external) cause of destruction for them, they are not to be regarded as having a cause of destruction. (In the other case, i.e. if they are possessed of an inherent destruction, they can be regarded as having a cause of destruction within their very nature, even though no specific external cause of destruction is present.) Similarly, there may not be one for other things, such as materiality. This is the full elucidation. The formulation of the argument runs as follows: Whatever is conditioned is not dependent on a special cause of destruction, as, for example, cittas and caitasikas, [207,2] etc. Since jars and other objects (vastūni) are also conditioned, the incongruity (virodha) of there being any basic difference (between all these things) can be seen (upalabhya te). Conditioned and unconditioned things being mutually exclusive, and being contrary as regards their respective states of being (avasthā), because "being 'unconditioned'" is really logically pervaded by "being possessed of a dependency on (external) causes of destruction", as soon as something is apprehended as a conditioned thing, i.e. a thing contrary to the unconditioned, the possibility of its being an unconditioned thing is vitiating.* And if the logical

*To Vasubandhu and Sumatiśīla, following Sautrāntika theory, the "unconditioned" exists strictly speaking only as a designation for absences of conditioned things. Thus, the space in a teacup, or the Nirvana "of the Arhat" can conventionally be called unconditioned dharmas, but what we really have is the pure absence of certain conditioned factors: in the case of space, the absence of any impinging material objects; in the case of Nirvana, the absence of the continuing psyche-physical series of the "individual". In this sense, "the destruction of an unconditioned thing" might
pervader ("being unconditioned") does not hold, the logically pervaded, "Being possessed of a dependency upon an (external) cause of destruction" will also be vitiated.

The Master establishes his argument (pramāṇikaroti) in the above manner, but the adversaries, in order to show that his exemplification does not hold, reply, "But these things (do have a cause for their destruction: their own innate lack of duration)." "These things" are cittas and caitasikas, etc. "Their own innate lack of duration" means that their very manner of being (*ātmabhāvavatvā) is the annihilator of their nature. Even if it is conceded that there is no other external cause of destruction for cittas, caitasikas, etc, yet there can be a lack of duration in their very manner of being, though which there is a factor of destruction for them.

In reply to this thought (of the adversaries) that the (previous) exemplification is unrelated (to the demonstrandum)*, the Master shows that there is an unwarranted stretch of the argument (atiprasaṅga, cf. Kajiyama, Intr. Buddh. Phil., p 59) (on the part of the opponents), by saying, "Why don't you similarly accept (such

under certain circumstances take place, e.g. in the case of the filling up of the teacup's space. This "destruction" would depend on the intervention of an external thing, whereas the destruction of a conditioned thing does not, as the conditioned thing is momentary by its very nature. This is such a reversal of the original meaning of "conditioned" and "unconditioned" that the terms no longer fit at all. Alternative translations for saṁskṛta and asaṁskṛta, such as "forceful" and "non-forceful", seem equally problematic. "Composite" and "non-composite", the literal meaning of "saṁskṛta" and "asaṁskṛta", would work except that individual atoms are also "saṁskṛta", but hardly "composites". See the discussion in the body of this paper.

*See note 2.
a cause) for other things, as well?" "Similarly" means "in the manner in which you accept (an innate) lack of duration as a cause of destruction in the case of cittas and caitasikas". "For other things, as well" means "for jars, etc". (In the sentence "Just as there is no other cause for these things, in the same way, there need be no other cause for these other things, either"), "other(cause)" means "an external cause of destruction". "For these things" means "for cittas and caitasikas". "In the same way, there need be no (cause) for these other things, either" means "for jars(being dyed), etc". "(There need be no other cause)" means "It need not be accepted".

What if the adversary says, "There is no case of an unwarranted stretch of the argument, since it is not suitable for you to insist that your exemplification is related to your demonstrandum."? As we are investigating whether only these (things) are (destroyed) through some cause of destruction of this sort, or whether other things are thus destroyed as well, the flaw (of the unrelatedness of our exemplification to our demonstrandum) is not incurred, because of the consistency of what is being argued and investigated by us, namely, whether (for materiality, etc) there may be no other external cause of destruction, but rather similarly an (innate) lack of duration. Now if there is not (any other external cause of destruction), and an (innate) lack of duration is the cause for the destruction of cittas and caitasikas, etc, then if there is no other external cause of destruction which is admitted (for cittas and caitasikas), there could similarly be only this cause (of destruc-
tion) for other things, such as jars, etc. And thus we insist upon our exemplification, through this expedient of demonstrating an unwarranted stretch of the argument (on the part of the opponents).

(Vasubandhu:

Thesis: Materiality, etc, may be non-possessed of a cause of demonstrandum

Justification: because other things are non-possessed of causes of destruction

Exemplification: such as cittas and caitasikas.

Opponent:

The exemplification is unrelated to the demonstrandum, because cittas and caitasikas are possessed of a cause of destruction: their own innate lack of duration.

Vasubandhu:

There is an unwarranted stretch of the argument if the opponent attempts to apply the objection above to the thesis that there is an external cause of destruction for materiality, etc.

Thesis: Materiality may be possessed of no other cause of destruction except its own innate lack of duration

Justification: because other things are possessed of no other cause of destruction except their own innate lack of duration

Exemplification: such as cittas and caitasikas.)
Thus the Master demonstrates an unwarranted stretch of the argument, but the opponents, being non-adherents to the theory of momentariness (aksanikavādinah) insist upon the existence of an external cause of destruction for jars, etc, by saying, "If there were none, (then the materiality of wood, etc, would not be perceived even before its contact with fire, just as it isn't after it)."

"If there were none" means "if there were no external cause of destruction". "Even before its contact with fire" means "anterior to its contact with fire", i.e. in a state in which it is not yet conjoined with fire, etc. "Just as (it isn't) after it" means "just as (it isn't perceived) after its contact with fire, etc".

"Or else, afterwards it would be just as it was before." This is (all) said by way of [207,4] objection (nirākarana).

a. Because external causes for destruction (for conditioned things) are all alike in (really) being non-existent, the Master makes reference to the fact that what is demonstrated here (by the opponent) relates only to non-existence commonly regarded as such, which stems from a flame of a lamp, etc, being perceived or not being perceived (intoto, without the constant states of arising and perishing actually involved being taken into account).

b. "If (the materiality of wood were no longer perceived because it is destroyed by fire, etc, itself, then it would be destroyed even when removed immediately after its simple contact with fire)." This is an additional explanation. As regards the phrase sentence "then it would be even when removed immediately after its simple contact (with fire)", the phrase "it would not be perceived
even (after its simple contact with fire)" should be supplied. [Another possibility, taking into account the absence of a negative in the verb, is to understand the phrase as meaning "then it would be destroyed, even after its simple contact with fire".] And why would this be so? Because there have been no special characteristics (changing) within the conditions. (The condition allowing for the destruction of the materiality of wood, i.e. its connection with fire, does not change radically from the first moment of the contact to the next. And yet the destruction of the total materiality does not take place immediately upon this contact, but only after this contact has allowed certain changes to take place within the materiality of the wood itself. The complete destruction of the materiality of the wood is, properly speaking, due to these changes within the materiality itself.)

c. Furthermore, an (external) cause of destruction is also contrary to fact (nopapadyate) for the following reason: "Though the external conditions for the products which arise in a dyeing-process remain undifferentiated, (these various products arise through a gradual succession of causes first causing them to take on a special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic to a great degree)." "Causing them to take on a special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic to a great degree" means "making them red, etc", "making them very red, etc", etc. As to how these changes come about, he says, "through a gradual succession of causes". The meaning of this statement is
that (the various intensities of) red are results (literally "objects": vastūni) of causes which arise gradually (one after the other).

(Each of the countless gradual differences in the intensity of red corresponds to a cause within a succession of constantly changing causes). What are these (causes)? "Fire", etc, (could be supplied) as the remainder of the sentence. (In the sentence "Through what does the destruction of the previous characteristic come about?"), the phrase "the previous (characteristic)" means the (different intensities of) red, etc, which arose (previously to the intensity of red at a given moment), one after the other. "Through what does their destruction come about?" means: Does it come about through the fire, etc, or else through some other (set of causes which are not identical to the factors of dyeing)? Why should there be this doubt in favor of another (set of causes)? Anticipating an insistence that their cause of destruction is simply their proximity with fire, etc, he says, "It is not appropriate to say that something that exists because of something ceases to exist because of this same thing." And why isn't it? Because, as he says, "It is commonly known that the causes of two contradictory (results cannot be one)."

When causes are different, (only) then can (resulting) objects be different. It is a general rule (pratīniyama, Mvt. 2001) that if one thing is the cause of one (thing), then something else must be the cause of [207,5] something else. Thus (the possibility of saying) that the same thing which aids (upakāreṇi, upavuṣṭyate) the arising of a thing also acts as the cause for this thing's destruction, is contradicted (viruddha). With the sentence, "This being so,
(we must conclude that these previous characteristics are destroyed without a specific cause of destruction)", the conclusion is stated.

Now (the adversaries might say): The objection you raise at this point is no real rebuttal (samādhiṇa), since if things are subject to destruction (nirodhāhīna) without there being any (external) cause of destruction, how is it that after their contact with fire, jars, etc, are not perceived in the same way that they were before? Anticipating this thought, he says, "That 'something' is perceived or no longer perceived (in the manner in which "it" was before, should be known as being due to the continuation of a series of momentary events without the intervention of any extraordinary special characteristics, and to the transformation of the series, respectively)." "Without the intervention) of any extraordinary special characteristic" means that there is no unusual dissimilar characteristic to make things (recognized as being) similar but different or simply different. As regards the terms "continuation" and "transformation", the meaning, in due order (yathākraman) is that it is through the continuation (of the series) that "something" is perceived in the same manner in which "it" was before, and that it is through the transformation (of the series) that "something" is not perceived in the same manner in which "it" was before.

Furthermore, the statement "If (these things that are destroyed become destroyed possessed of a specific cause of destruction, then no cittas, caitasikas, etc, would become destroyed without such a cause, either)" explains an additional justification. The meaning (of the argument) is as follows: Because (a specific
cause of destruction for materiality necessitates a specific cause of destruction for cittas, caitasikas, etc, you should acknowledge the non-existence of a (specific) cause of destruction. The phrase "just as, for example, (they depend on a specific cause) for their arising" means that cittas and caitasikas, on one hand, and other things, jars, etc, on the other, all arise possessed of causes (for their arising). If this were not so, i.e. if they existed without causes (for their arising), then either they would have existed externally, or they could not exist at all. Similarly, if destruction is accepted as having a cause, then it becomes like this (arising) [208,1] itself. And consequently all destruction would be possessed of a cause. But cittas and caitasikas and the other things that have been named previously (sounds, flames, etc) are not accepted even by you (as having causes of destruction).

The opponents' objection is that there is a cause of destruction for these things also, namely their innate lack of duration. Anticipating a statement (by the opponents) that what has been demonstrated as regards everything's being possessed of a cause of destruction is for this reason not anything which is not accepted by them, he says, "(On the other hand), an innate lack of duration (in any way different from the events themselves cannot be demonstrated)." "From the (events)" means "from cittas and caitasikas, etc". "Different from" means "apart from". The full elucidation is: This "lack of duration" through which (their destruction) comes about cannot be demonstrated by any means-of-cognition: direct perception, etc, as being anything apart from the cittas and caitasikas
themselves. (Thus, speaking of "an innate lack of duration" as if it were a cause of destruction which could in any way be isolated from the cittas and caitasikas themselves, is to utterly falsify the picture).

e. Furthermore, he says, "(There would be a special characteristic for it stemming) from each of these special causes (if a special cause of destruction were necessary)." "Stemming from each of these special causes" means "stemming from each of these special causes of destruction". "There would be a special characteristic" means that there would be a special (differentiating) characteristics for destruction. What has similar special characteristics? To explain this, he says, "(Just as there are diverse products which arise in a dyeing-process from) fire, the sun (ice, grasses, etc, respectively)." Though it is possible that there either may or may not be special characteristics in an object, destruction is separate from the characteristic of any object, so isn't it rather a simple non-existence (abhava)? And how could there be special characteristics stemming from these special causes? They simply do not exist. The implication (of the argument) is that if the thesis put forth by these opponents of confused opinions is that things have causes (for their destruction), just as they have them for their arising, then by this very fact, [208,2] there would be a non-existence of any (one thing) "destruction".19

f. Furthermore, there is this additional flaw: "Destruction would also be possessed (of a cause, as are material substances)." Since (destruction) would have a cause (for its arising according
to the opponent's theory), destruction itself would also be a thing (vastu) similar to materiality, etc (which also has a cause for its arising), and would thus itself also have to be destroyed, on account of its being a conditioned thing. It would thus have to have an additional destruction for itself. And because of this, there would be an infinite regress (anavasthāprasānga), since this (additional destruction) would also have to have a destruction. With the statement, "This being so, there can be no special cause of destruction," the conclusion for the elucidation (of this point) is given. The means-of-cognition employed already for a previous purpose (*pūrvarthena): "Whatever is a conditioned thing is not dependent on a special cause of destruction", etc, is also being applied here. Accordingly, materiality and other conditioned things are momentary. The formulation of the argument runs as follows: Whatever is not dependent on a (special) cause of destruction is destroyed inherently, as for example cittas and caitasikas. Since materiality and other conditioned things are also like this, they are not dependent upon (special) causes of destruction. "It has inherent destruction because of its being included only with those things that are not dependent on a (special) cause of destruction" is a justification deduced from the nature of the thing itself (svabhāvahetu).

9.

Even though the two arguments employed by the adversaries have in this way been refuted in detail by the Master, these adversaries, who are non-adherents to the momentariness theory, may think up another argument in order to demonstrate movement: "Well, (the
thing at locus B is ascertained to be the same) because there is no cause for the arising (of anything new) in this manner." The explanation of this argument is as follows: In regard to the arising of another thing in the other locus, if there were a cause (for such an arising), it could come about, because, as regards a state of arising (bhāvāta), there is a dependency on it (a cause), but when there is no cause, how can another thing arise, as it (the cause) is absent? Accordingly, (it being clear that no new thing can arise in such a case), it is evident that (in this case) there is a progression of the same thing (to another locus). The formulation of the argument runs as follows: Whatever is unconnected with a cause does not arise, and is like, for example, the horns of an ass. This supposed other object in the other locus is also unconnected with any causes (for its arising). Since it would be dependent on a cause (for its arising), if there is no cause, it also cannot exist, and (in this case) it is apprehended (upalabhyate) that it is without a cause.

The adversaries set up their side of the argument (pūrvapaksa) in this manner, and the Master, in order to show that their argument is not certain, says, "But since there could be a cause for the arising of a subsequent thing, namely the preceding thing, (there could be such a cause of arising)." The underlying purpose here is: Even if it is admitted that there are no other causes in any other way, yet there may be collections of momentary things one previous to the other that serve as gradual uniform causes (sabhāgahe) for the object which is situated within the other
locus (locus B). So how can there be this objection (nirākarana) saying that it is necessarily unconnected with causes (for its arising)? Various exemplifications are given in order to make the meaning entirely clear. With the statement, "If this were so, (there would be nothing which could be called a true movement which has the characteristic of a progression of the same thing to another locus)", the conclusion is given. "There would be nothing which could be called a (true) movement which has the characteristic of a progression (of the same thing to another locus)". Because, as there are differentiating characteristics involved (for any thing at locus B compared with one previously at locus A), "movement" will be admitted to be a metaphor (upacāra) for something (new) arising at another locus immediately after (the cessation of a thing at locus A).

10.

"Moreover, when a thing is stable, it has no movement. (And if it has no movement, it is constantly stable. On the other hand, if it is not stable, it also has no movement)." For this reason, also, it must be admitted that things are without movement. Thus there must be something new (arising) there (in those cases we construe as being "movement of the same thing"). It is as follows: A thing being either stable, or unstable, there cannot be any movement even for those cases where we imagine that [208,4] there is movement, as long as the thing is stable. For stability and movement are mutually contrary (anyonyaviruddha). But if it is not stable, it is also without movement, since if the same thing does
not occur without stability, there is no movement (i.e. no progression of the same thing to another locus). And why could movement not occur (by a thing losing its stability)? This is explained by the statement, "If it has no movement, it is constantly stable."21

Thus it has been demonstrated by the Master that conditioned things arise from each moment to the next, but, because of a (continued) adherence (abhinivesa) (to the theory of movement), an objection may be made with the statement, "If this is really so, (what is it that appears in another place)"? As to the sentence "What is it that appears in another place?", the intention (here) is that it should be the same thing that appears. "The same thing does not appear" is the Master's contradiction (of the opponent's implication). The poser of the question "Well then what does?" is the adversary. The speaker of the sentence "(It is similar to the case where grass-fires or shadows appear) in each locus as (something new)" is the Master. In regard to the phrase "as something new and something new again", "it appears (as something new), etc" is to be understood. What is this like? "Like a grass-fire", etc, he replies. The full elucidation runs as follows: It is just like when, confronted with a fire-blaze, we suppose (abhimane-) that the same fire is moving, simply because we do not examine (abhinirupa-) the special differentiating characteristics involved, whereas (in actuality) there is no movement. And similarly we think that shadows are moving, simply because they are momentary, but in ultimate reality (paramarthena), there is no movement as far as these fire-blazes and shadows is concerned. Materiality and the rest of
the conditioned things are similarly to be regarded as being things constantly different from each moment to the next.

Anticipating that even if it is admitted that the supposition (abhimaṇa) of motion in a fire-blaze is due to an adherence (to an improperly investigated observation), there remains the question "How (can you 'argue this?)?", because there may be an argument as to whether shadows are like materiality, he says, "(The same) shadow (never appears in another place)" , in order to demonstrate [208,5] that shadows are momentary, also. (In the phrase "while that which is possessed of it remains stationary, it appears to arise, to be obscured, and to change"), "that which is possessed of it" is the man, etc, which is possessed of the shadow. "It appears to arise, to be obscured, and to change" means "a shadow appears to arise, to be obscured, and to change." It is as follows: When the sunlight is at a far distance, a shadow appears to arise; when it is near, it appears to be obscured; and when it is changing, it appears to be changing. The full elucidation is that if a shadow moved to another place, it would have to be because it had one (unchanging) nature. But how can there be any real movement of the shadow, as the shadow itself changes and depends upon the changes in the sunlight, while the man, etc, which is possessed of the shadow remains stationary? If there is the objection that the shadow certainly does move to another place, as it is seen just as it was without there being any changes, because it has unity (of nature), and is not momentary, how does one account for the above-mentioned changes (in the shadow), while that which is possessed of the shadow remains stationary? In
this case, it does not occur that because of (one thing's) remaining stable, (the other) also becomes so. The intention is to confirm (pratijña-) that if it were true (that the shadow had one nature), then it would have to be admitted that the shadow would change only through the agency of that which supports it, as is the case with a vessel and its oil, and it would not be proper for it to change with the changes of the sunlight, while that which is possessed of it remained stationary, because it would exist as one thing.

What is (the implication) of the statement "As soon as a bright area is darkened in another place, a shadow appears"? It should be understood that it is not the same shadow that appears in another place. The intention (of the statement) is that if the same shadow were to move to another place, then (a shadow) arising would not (suddenly) be apprehended when a bright area is darkened in some other place by an awning or a wall, etc. But wherever (a shadow) is apprehended, a bright area is being darkened, because (a shadow) does not have the special characteristic of moving to another place. And since it is not like this, it is demonstrated that it is like a fire-blaze, as it also becomes something else from each moment to the next.

Because of an objection which the adversaries might raise, the Master says, "(Our opponent may well object: 'Though, if someone says that there is a progression of the same thing to another locus, it may be argued, 'How do you arrive at this?'), if someone (says that it is not the same thing moving to another locus, one can equally argue, 'How do you arrive at this?')" As he considers all this to be
an easy matter, he does not explain and order (his statement). "Though,
(if someone says that there is a progression of the same thing to
another locus, it may be argued, 'How do you arrive at this?'', etc,
is said by the objector. The objection is (expressed by the phrase)
"it may be argued"—argued by the advocate of the momentariness theory—is the rest of the phrase. How does this constitute an objection?
Because of the phrase "How do you arrive at this?" (In the phrase
"if someone says that it is not the same thing moving to another locus,
one can equally argue, 'How do you arrive at this'?", "it" refers to
anything that appears in another place (immediately subsequent to
something at another locus). As to the phrase "it is not the same
thing", "(it is not) anything that was seen previously" is the re-
mainder of the phrase. "How do you arrive at this?" means "Through
what (means) do you arrive at this?" "The opponent, may well object"
means "he may argue with this same advocate of the momentariness
theory".

(In the sentence, "The basis for this assumption is the very
argument already given", etc), "the basis(for this assumption) means
"the reason which causes us to believe(pratyāyati: Mvt. 6985, 7147;
Apte, p 1083) that what we construe as movement is something's arising
as something new is that very (argument) elucidated just now. Which
(argument) is this? To explain this, he says, "Moreover, (when a
thing is stable, it has no movement)", etc. And furthermore he says
that even "when the external conditions for the products arising in
dyeing are without variation, (these products become something else
from each moment to the next, a fact which can be ascertained through
their subsequent special characteristic). The full elucidation runs as follows: The external conditions, fire, etc, are "without variation" because they have no (changing) special characteristic, even though they are momentary. If, even for a jar, etc, which is removed immediately after its conjoining (with these conditions), the arising of a special characteristic for a subsequent materiality is not obtained through the destruction of a previous materiality, it (a special characteristic making the final result a changed, hence new, materiality) will not arise even later, either. This is because the conditions are not discontinued, just as they previously were not discontinued. (The conditions' presence is the same throughout any moment of the process). In spite of (the conditions) being like this, a special characteristic is finally apprehended (in the product). This being so, the basis, i.e. the justification for assuming that objects become something else from each moment to the next, as regards both the things undergoing dyeing and the factors of dyeing, is this very apprehension of a subsequent special characteristic (in the product). Furthermore, it should be accepted because there are indeed reasons for their becoming something else which have already been explained in detail.

He also says, "Again, if (you imagine a stable entity because there is no basis for its becoming something else, then why not accept the theory that it does become something else, because there is also no basis for its being a stable entity)")" "For its becoming something else: "to demonstrate that it becomes something else". "Because there is no basis": "because there is no justification".
"If you imagine an entity", i.e. an entity of which it can be thought that it is the same (as before). The meaning is: From what do we have the knowledge to say that this (thing) is the same (as it was before)? Furthermore, the "same entity" is here designated simply as "entity", and means an entity which has both stability and motion.

"For its being an entity": "for its being an entity with one nature, that is, an entity which has an unvarying nature". The conclusion is given with the sentence, "This being so, (as it follows that nothing can be resolved regarding either alternative, all that has been shown here is that a progression cannot be demonstrated)". In other words, how is there (apprehended) a unity which would warrant the positing of an unchanging entity? But perhaps there is a doubt as to whether there is change to something else, because there is no basis (no fool-proof justification) for assuming this, either. "This being so, it follows that nothing can be resolved regarding either": it follows that nothing can be resolved regarding either position (paksa) i.e. it follows that nothing can be resolved as to whether it is the same entity or whether the entity becomes something else. [209,3]

"An entity which (remains) as one entity" and "an entity that becomes something else" are mutually exclusive and are never concomitant (pratisamyukta). "All (that has been shown here) is that a progression cannot be demonstrated" means "all that has been shown here is that a progression cannot be firmly posited".

(In summary of the Master's position), the formulation of his argument (against progression of the same thing to another locus) runs as follows: Whatever is momentary is without progression to
another locus, as for example fire blazes and shadows, etc. Since conditioned things: materiality, etc, are also momentary, "being momentary" and "being non-momentary" being mutually exclusive, and contrary by their states of being (avasthāviruddha), if it is apprehended that something is momentary, its being non-momentary is vitiated, and because there is a logical pervasion of "having a progression" by "being non-momentary", (in the case of materiality, etc), the logical pervader is contradicted. And if its (non-momentariness) is false, then the logically pervaded, "having a progression (to another locus)", is also vitiated.

Thus the position of the Āryasāmmitīyas, that motion is manifest action, has been refuted in detail by the Master, and since at this point certain among special Sautrāntikas, called the Sauryodayikas, state that manifest action has the nature of a special dharma, it is said, "The Sauryodayikas say (that though it is true that conditioned things are without progression to another locus, because they are momentary, yet there arises, in a hand, etc, a special dharma as the cause for something's arising in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing at the first locus, which dharma has a certain citta as its cause)". As to the phrase "the Sauryodayikas say", the Sauryodayikas are thus designated from the title of a treatise by the Sthavira Kumāralāta, called Sūryodaya. 22 Anticipating the question: "If certain people say that conditioned things are without progression because they are destroyed by their natures, and, accordingly, because they are without (progression), there is also no
manifest action, how do the (verbal) conventions of 'motion' and 'manifest action' arise [209,4] in the world?", they speak of "a cause for something's arising in another locus", etc. "A cause for something's arising in another locus" means "a cause for whatever conditioned things which arise in another locus (directly subsequent to a thing which has existed at locus A). To explain what (this cause) is, they say that it is "a special dharma", i.e. a special entity with a special nature. To explain from what cause this (dharma) has arisen, he says, "which has a certain citta as its cause". "The certain citta is a citta which is instigated by a desire. So if it is asked where this special dharma has its cause, it has a certain citta as its cause. If it occurs in this manner, in what locus does it arise? To explain this, he says, "in a hand, etc". As regards the sentence "It is called both 'motion' and 'manifest action'", it is this same special dharma, which has such an aspect (ākāra, prakāra), which is called either "motion" or "manifest action" in the world. It is that which causes another (thing) to arise in another, different locus (immediately upon the disappearance of a previous thing at another locus), and it comes about as an effect of this that this other thing is not in a locus contrary to the notion of movement.

With the sentence "In that case, (why isn't it seen by the eye, as color is)?", the Master begins his refutation (dūsana) of this special dharma. The full elucidation is as follows: If this special dharma is included in the sense-field of visibles, it must be seen, as it is included therein, as color is, because the sense-field of
the visible is (equivalent to) that which can be seen. If it is not (visible) like this, then accordingly, it cannot exist. The same means-of-cognition previously given in order to deny configuration (as a separate entity) is also being employed here: "Whatever is known by an object-of-consciousness (exists)", etc.

[209,5] Anticipating that the adversaries, if they admit that (this special dharma) is not ascertained, yet may claim that it exists as something which is not (directly) ascertained, because of their adherence (to their theory), he says, "And if it isn't seen, (how can it be a manifest action which informs others)?" If it were ascertained, it could (do so), but when it is not ascertained, how can it inform others? Furthermore, if you claim that it exists, and yet it is not revealed (prabhāvita, vivṛta) by its nature being apprehended by some means-of-cognition, it is fitting that it be stated how this special (dharma) can be recognized (pratijñāta, upagata), and furthermore how this "special dharma" can (even be said to) exist. Now the adversaries may concede that it is not cognizable by the means-of-cognition of direct perception, because it is beyond (the scope of) the sense-organs, but still may consider it to be recognizable by inference, through its effect, and in order to explain this, they say, "If it does not exist in this manner, (how can a body arise in another locus)?" The formulation of the argument runs as follows:

In the case of whatever that exists, its arising is preceded by its cause, as for example a sprout arises (only) when there has (previously) been a seed. The arising of a body in another (locus) can also occur (only) if there is some other dharma (serving as its cause). "Be-
cause it can arise only when a cause exists preceding it" is a justification deduced from the natures of the things themselves (svabhāvahetu). So think the Sauryodayikas.

[210,1] Thus, the means-of-cognition (leading them to their assumption) is determined by the adversaries, and at this point, it is said by the Master, in order to show that their argument does not hold, "It is through the element wind, which has arisen from a certain citta, (that something arises in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing in the first locus)." The full elucidation runs as follows: If it exists, then this "special dharma" which is the cause for the arising (of a thing in another locus) must be demonstrated as preceding (it), and if it is, then it is appropriate (yujyate) (as an explanation for the arising of a thing in another locus). But it is appropriate only if it can be demonstrated that (the body) arises (in another locus) when it exists, because if this is not demonstrated, a body is caused to arise in another locus only because of the element wind, which has arisen from a certain citta.25

With the statement "If this is so, (what exactly is the cause for something's arising in another locus)?", (the adversary) insists upon an elucidation of the exact term (anvarthasāmkhyā) to fit the meaning ("cause for something's arising in another locus"). As regards the statement "How can it be in regard to grass and leaves?", "how can it be the cause for their arising in another locus" is to be understood. The intention is: Though the element wind is accepted by you as the cause for an entity's arising in another locus, in the case of grass and leaves, there is no existence of your element wind
which has arisen from a certain citta.

As regards the sentence, "(In this case, "motion" occurs) because of the element wind, which causes a disturbance, causes a thrust, and which has conjoined (with the grasses, etc), "(it is due to this) that there is an arising in another locus as regards grass and leaves, etc" should be understood. This is the reply of the Master. Within the sentence, "which causes an disturbance" means "which causes a perturbation(kampita), etc". The meaning is "which causes a change of position in regard to anything whatsoever".

"Which causes a thrust" means "which causes a push"; and the meaning is "an entity performing its efficacy(kriya) through its possession of a velocity(avedha, vega)." Any element wind which is made up of these two (features) (dvayamaya, cf. Nagae, MSA Index, byung ba: maya, p 92) (i.e. causing a disturbance and causing a thrust) [210,2] is referred to in this way. The meaning is that if we say that the cause of every arising (of something) in another locus in the element wind which has arisen from a certain citta, then there will be a confusion as to how this can refer to grass and leaves, etc, i.e. how we can state that this is so. The explanation is that in some cases it is an element wind which has arisen from a certain citta, and in others it is because there has been a conjoining with (an external element wind) which causes a disturbance, etc, so there is no contradiction. (As regards the sentence "And furthermore, if it is admitted that it is the same thing from which motion is held to arise, that something arises in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing at the first locus, what use is there for an investiga-
tion into a principle of motion which cannot be revealed by any possible object-of-consciousness)?", "(through the same thing) from which (motion) is held to arise", etc, means "through the element wind". As regards the phrase "motion is held to arise", the meaning is "a motion having a nature corresponding to dharma(dharmena, Lokes Candra, p 745)" is held to arise". "Through the same thing" means "through the element wind which allows a new dharma to arise (immediately subsequently to the dharma at locus A). "What use is there for an investigation into a (principle of) motion which cannot be revealed by any object-of-consciousness?": any (principle of) motion which is a factor(kārana) capable neither of being revealed nor ascertained by any object-of-consciousness, is referred to in this way. What use is there for an investigation into such a thing? The (implied) meaning is that it is simply purposeless.

II.

12.

"In that case, (is it that same special wind which has arisen from a special citta, and which is the cause for a body's arising in another locus, which is manifest action)?": With this statement, another Sauryodayika position is brought up, because their "special dharma" has been refuted. If it is improper for this special dharma to be manifest action, because its nature cannot be demonstrated, this same element wind itself, which has arisen from a certain citta, is manifest action, because it is commonly accepted by (all of) us as being the cause for a body's arising in another locus.
With the sentence, "How can something which does not have the capacity for informing (others be manifest action)?", the Master expresses his denial (pratishedha) (of the opponent's thesis). As the element wind belongs to the sense-field of tangibles, it is not manifest action, since (the sense-field of tangibles) is not visible.26 The intention (here) is: If manifest action has its nature (i.e. the nature of the element wind), then how is it that there is no informing (of others) through this "manifest action"? Furthermore, there is also this additional flaw, that "To hold that the sense-field of tangibles is either beneficial or unbeneficial, (is not the doctrine of the sons of Śākya". In the phrase "the sons of Śākya", "Śākya" is the Buddha, the Exalted One. His "sons" are his disciples. Whatever belongs to them is "of the sons of Śākya". And when (something) is not of the sons of Śākya, it is called "not of the sons of Śākya". This is the meaning of the compound.27 The intention (of the argument) is: Because the element wind is included in the sense-field of tangibles, it is demonstrated that it is not one (with manifest action), it being indeterminate (as regards retributioinal results—avyākṛta), and manifest action not being thus, because it and its characteristics (?) are unalike (i.e. they may be beneficial, unbeneficial, or indeterminate). If it were so (that wind were manifest action), it would follow that the element wind would be beneficial, etc, which would be contrary to its nature (svabhāvaviruddha).

What has been stated in the opponents' thesis (pūrvapaksa) has been refuted in detail immediately upon its utterance, and the Sauryodayikas think up another position, with the sentence, "In that
case, (is the body which arises in another locus through the special citta, itself manifest action)?" The meaning is that since it is improper for the element wind to be manifest action, as the absurdity would ensue (prasaṅgam prasajyate) that it would not inform (others), whatever body arises in another locus could itself be manifest action, as the logical flaws which arise in the case of movement by the element wind which has arisen from a special citta, would not exist.

[210,4] Through the statement, "Manifest action would be purely mentally constructed, (and would not be a true entity, since there is no constituency as an entity as regards the body)", the Master presents his refutation. The meaning is that because there is no constituency as an entity as regards the body, if manifest action had its nature, its entitiness (dravyatva) would be impaired. Furthermore, there is this additional flaw, that "manifest action would become non-informing". As there is the flaw that there is no informing (of others) by means of the smell, or any of the other constituents of the body, alone, it follows (yuḥyate) that there is no (informing) through the (complete) materiality (of the body). For this reason, he says, "(There is no informing of others of the intentions of living beings) through the smell, etc, (inherent in the body)." The statement "(To hold that) the sense-field of smell is beneficial (or unbeneficial) is not the doctrine of the sons of Śākya" is as before.

"In that case, (is the color which arises from a special citta itself manifest action)?" is another position thought up by these same people. In order to show that this position is also not suit-
able, the Master says, "It (does not arise from a special citta)", by way of refutation. As regards the phrase "(It arises) from its own seed and from a special element wind", the "own seed" for a color is a uniform gradual cause (sabhāgahetu) which has been collected (samasta) from previous moments. The element wind, being the cause for its arising in another locus, is an auxiliary condition (sahakāripratyaya) for it. The meaning is that (color) arises only from these, but not from any other (factors). At first, (it appears to) move to another locus. 28

[210,5] Objection: But doesn't it occur that when there arises a citta which considers (such action), a hand, etc, (arises in another locus) because of a wind which has arisen from the effort (vyayama) which comes from this (citta)?

Reply: But in this case, the color which resides in the hand has not arisen from a special citta, and so this flaw does not occur. As (in their view) the color which is the cause of the direct perception (of manifest action) has arisen from a special citta, it is held by the adversaries that it is beneficial, etc, on this account, but (actually) it is not, because of the succession (paramparā) (of causes actually involved). In regard to the phrase "To hold that color is beneficial or unbene... sons of Sākya): Because it is held that the sense-field of visibles may be beneficial, etc, how would color, which is included therein, not be (such a) visible which is beneficial, etc? There is no contradiction with (established) teaching. 29 As a manifest action is called beneficial, etc, by reason of its origination (samutthāna), a
visible which is of this nature is called "a visible which is beneficial" (according to the cause that originates it). (In this case, the color which is apprehended during a manifest action, is not itself directly the result of a beneficial or unbeneficial citta. Therefore it cannot itself be beneficial or unbeneficial.) The blue color, etc, (which arises in this case) has a totally unobstructed-indeterminate (anirvṛtāvyākṛta) nature. 30

13.

Because this immediately preceding position has also only been refuted, there is thought out this other position which is expressed with the words "If it is correct that color itself is not (manifest action, is its arising in another locus itself manifest action)?" The refutation is introduced with the irony of the Master, when he says, "Beloved of the gods!", etc. With the phrase "It is not seen, as visibles are", it is indicated that (this new supposed manifest action) is not apprehended by the means-of-cognition of direct perception. With the phrase, "As its force is also an object which is not seen", it is indicated that there can be no inference regarding its force, through (the assumption of a relationship of) cause and effect. (In other words, neither is it itself directly apprehended, nor is there a causal efficacy apprehended from which one could deduce its existence by inference). As regards the phrase "If it is not seen, (how can it be manifest action)?", it is not visible, as it does not have the nature of something visible. The meaning is that if manifest action had its nature, then it would not inform others, as it is not visible. (If it had the nature of a visible, no new
argument would be necessary, since manifest action as color has already been refuted, and a visual configuration has been reduced to color). Furthermore, [211,1] there is this additional flaw, "If color could be beneficial and unbeneficial, (then its arising could be so, but it has already been explained that color is not like this)." "It has already been shown that color is not like this", i.e. through the previous phrase that to hold that color is beneficial and unbeneficial is not (the doctrine) of the sons of Sākyā. The full elucidation is as follows: Since the arising depends on color, and it is by reason of this (color) that it could be beneficial, etc, when it itself (i.e. the color) cannot be beneficial, etc, how could its arising be so?

14.

As manifest action has been refuted in detail, and as the Vaibhāṣikas are pushed to extremes, and may think that it is preferable that there be only unmanifest action, they say, "Then (is bodily action) only an unmanifest action)?"

Wishing to refute unmanifest action also, the Master begins his objections with an extensive question, "What is this which you call 'manifest action'?" The Vaibhāṣikas determine (vyavasthāpayanti) the nature of unmanifest action by saying, "It is materiality, belonging to the sense-field of mentally cognizables, consisting of self-control, etc". By saying "self-control, etc", they include absence of self-control (asaṁvara), etc. As regards the sentence "Then an unmanifest action taking place in the realm of desires (would arise without there being a previous manifest action)", this would be so
because manifest action has been refuted. "Taking place in the realm of desires" is said to exclude that taking place in the realm of materiality. The (implied) meaning is that (an unmanifest action) is brought about without being dependent upon another manifest action only when it is subject to a citta of meditational trance (āhyāna-citta). But in this case, as there is no manifest action in any case, (unmanifest action) would always be without a previous manifest action (which is contrary to the usual Vaibhāṣika position).

The speakers of the sentence, "If this is so, what is entailed?" are the Vaibhāṣikas. "If this is so": if there is an unmanifest action without a (previous) manifest action. "What is entailed?": what flaw is entailed?

The flaw is stated by the Master with the sentence "(Unmanifest action) would be subordinated to citta." What would this (situation) resemble? To explain this, he says, "as it is, for example, in the realm of materiality". Anticipating that the Vaibhāṣikas might say, "If this is the only flaw, we still accept it, so what is another flaw which is entailed by things being like this?", he says, "Accordingly, (there could be neither self-control nor absence of self-control in those who are possessed of a different citta, or in those who are without a citta)". In the phrase "those who are possessed of a different citta and those who are without a citta", "Those who are possessed of a different citta" are those who have a citta apart from the citta which (originally) took hold of self-control, etc. "Those who are without citta" are those who are at the attainment of cessation (of feelings and concepts: nirodhasamāpatti),
etc. As regards the phrase "There could be neither self-control nor absence of self-control", the self-control of meditational trance (dhyāna) should be recalled.

"This is not so, (because it is projected from a determined time by a previous manifest action)" is the Vaibhāśikas' reply to the argument leading to absurdity (prasānga) (raised by the Master).

[211,3] "(But how could there be a lie when there is no talk during a Prātimokṣa recital)?" The intention (of the statement) is: If unmanifest action could arise only when a manifest action preceded it, how, as it does not exist (in this case), could there be the vice (avādya) of lying, which has the nature of an unmanifest action (if it consists of pure silence), when the Sangha is deceived by an offender during the recitation of the Prātimokṣa?32

With the sentence, "Now because unmanifest action is twofold, (it can never be indeterminate)", the Master indicates another flaw. "Because unmanifest action is twofold", i.e. because it is stated that its characteristics are beneficial and unbeneifical (only), there is no occasion for indeterminate (unmanifest action). It should be understood that there cannot be, in the same moment, an unbeneifical action both beneficial and unbeneifical. And why is this? For this reason, he says, "Because unmanifest action is subordinate". The meaning is that because its characteristic is said to be subordinate, when (two kinds of act) occur together in one moment, there can be no unmanifest action.33
As regards the sentence "When the body (has released the action), how (can it be demonstrated as having) a pleasant or unpleasant result at a later time?", it is being indicated by the Master that the beneficiality, etc, (of bodily action) cannot be demonstrated. The full elucidation runs as follows: The beneficiality, etc, of an action is determined by the ability to demonstrate the arising of pleasant or unpleasant results at a later time (because of the actions): If a bodily action is material, then just as the body is destroyed, so (the action) too has to be destroyed, and so how can one demonstrate its beneficiality, etc, which depends on its giving rise to a result (at a future time)?

As to the sentence "Certain people say (that a past act, through which a pleasant or unpleasant result comes about at some later time, also exists at that later time)", this is the attempt by the Vaibhāsikas to demonstrate the beneficiality, etc, of a material bodily act, etc, by means of the existence of the past.

"To say that a past act exists (is a pustule arising on top of a boil)!" is the Master's refutation, introduced by an expression of derision. As to the expression [211,5] "a pustule arising on top of a boil", saying that a past act exists is itself like a boil, and then to say that it is capable of engendering a result at a later time is like a pustule (on top of the boil), because these views (ḍṛṣṭi) are only the cause of profound suffering for the adversaries. Then to tell the adversaries that flaw is involved, he says, "The expression 'past' (designates something that having existed in a
former time, is subsequently no longer existing)." "Something that having existed previously" means something that is demonstrated as being in a former (temporal) state (avasthā). "Subsequently is no longer existing" means that subsequent to that state, what was in the past state no longer exists, i.e. it is (totally) non-existent. The meaning can be (further) explained. The characteristic of the past, etc, is demonstrated by force of reasoning (nyāyabalena), to be only that which has existed formerly, and only this being appropriate, it does not have an efficacy (kriyā) (at the time when it is called "past"), because to say that its nature in any way abides now, is not suitable. The manner in which the past's being an (existing) entity is contrary to fact (nopapadyate) has been demonstrated in detail in other treatises, such as the Šatagathā, etc34, so here it is not further expanded upon.

With the sentence, "But in that case, (how could it have been said by the Exalted One: 'Even after hundreds of aeons, acts do not perish', etc", the Vaibhāṣikas indicate a contradiction to scripture (āgamanpratirodha). The meaning of the verse itself is easy to understand. The basic point here is: "(Acts) do not perish".

With the sentence "What is the meaning of 'do not perish'?", the Master replies to the (alleged) contradiction by (implying a) flaw (in the opponents' interpretation). As regards the sentence "It means that they are not without effects", this means that they are endowed with the force (sakti, samartha) [212,1] for engendering effects, and are not separated from this force. And why is this (interpretation) to be taken)? Because "it is shown by the latter
"half", "the latter half" meaning the second half of the verse, i.e.

"Obtaining their (needed) complex (of conditions),

(and their needed time,

their effects ripen for living beings)."

By this (verse), it is shown that the force of an act (to engender an effect) does not perish. So, it is not like this (i.e. it is not that the past act exists). If there are those who want to speak (of this verse) as demonstrating the existence of a past nature, because they understand (only) the meaning of the prior half (of the verse), the latter half becomes meaningless.

Now if it is admitted that the meaning of "they do not perish" is that they are not without effects, what is entailed? To explain this, he says, "(It is not held that) acts also exist for a long time (along with their effects)."

Since, in this investigation of (an act's) giving an effect there has been nothing determined, he speaks of two alternatives (vikalpa in the sense of "choice"): "(Whether this is through a special transformation of the series), as is the case with the seed of the rice-plant, (or whether it is through a condition in their own-characteristic)." Regarding these two alternatives, as the first, being the author's own opinion, is without a flaw, he alludes (adhikareti) to the second, and shows the flaw (inherent in it), with the statement, "If (only a condition in their own-characteristic can give their effects, then it must be explained that they give their effects through not being destroyed)." I.e. it is explained that this (can only be so) with a violation(ābādha) of (the principle of)
momentary destruction. 36

"(It is not because of their non-existence as far as their own-characteristic is concerned that) they (are said to be destroyed)", is the reply of the Vaibhāṣikas. The meaning is explained (as follows): There would be a violation of (the theory of) momentariness if actions projected their effects without being destroyed, but destruction is not (to be explained) as a total cessation of the nature (of an act, etc). [212,2] Now as something is called "destroyed" as it no longer projects its effect, because it is separated from a state of being able to exercise its efficacy, where is there a violation (of the principle of momentariness)? 37

"Why (don't they project it)?" is said by the Master, by way of (introducing a) refutation. The implication is that their non-activity in projecting an effect is not appropriate (na yujvate), because (according to your theory) they (continue to) abide with their natures without there being any deficiency (vaikalya) within them. With the statement "Because they have already completed projecting it", the Vaibhasikas make their reply. But what in this case is the status of this entity which is a cause for the arising of an effect which is in the future?

16-17.

The speaker of the sentence "(Why doesn't it project) another effect (similar to it)?" is the Master. The full elucidation is as follows: Even if it is admitted that it will not project another effect, because it has already completed projecting it, why couldn't it project another similar effect, since its nature as a projecting
force has not been destroyed? The phrase "similar to it" indicates the projection (of an effect) corresponding to the (already projected) effect (phalapratirūpāksepa). For not every cause will project every effect (thus the effect must be in accordance with the efficacy–nature of the cause). "As far as that goes, how (does it project its effect at all)?" is a question posed by the Master, in order to refute (the Vaibhāṣika position).

With the sentence "Because it prepares it for its arising", the Vaibhāṣikas explain the characteristic of this "projection". With the sentence "But (the last state of one who has destroyed all outflows does not project an effect, and there is also the stoppage of any effect through a cessation which has not come about through deliberation)", the Master shows that this characteristic (supposed by the Vaibhāṣikas) is an illusion (śkhalita). At the last moment before the Arhat attains complete Nirvana (parinirvāṇa), no effect is projected because there is a deficiency of any cooperating causes. And furthermore, as there is no projection of an effect when the effect of some action has been stopped by a cessation which has not come about through deliberation (apratisaṅkhyānirodha), he says, [212,3] "(And there is the stoppage) through any cessation which has not come about through deliberation."

Objection: Though it is settled that an effect does not arise because there is a deficiency of other causes, is it possible that there be no projection (of an effect) by the last (moment of the Arhat before complete Nirvana), etc? How is it that it does not project an effect?
Reply: As long as there is a deficiency of other causes in this manner, it is poor to believe that it has the power to project an effect, since no effect can be apprehended as arising from such a thing.

If it is settled that the power to project an effect does not exist (in these cases), what is entailed? In order to explain this, he says, "Since from the beginning (these cases do not exercise an efficacy, how can they later be destroyed)?" It is as follows: According to the adversaries the destruction of an object (as something present) comes about through the destruction of its state of exercising an efficacy, and not through the severance (chedana) of its own determined own-nature (vyavasthitasvabhāva). Now since, as regards the last (moment of the Arhat), etc, there is no state of exercising an efficacy, how can there be destruction (for it)? With the sentence "Thus, (the projecting of an effect for something with such a nature cannot be demonstrated)", the conclusion is given. "Something with such a nature" means "something of such a sort" (prakāra).

The speakers of the sentence "In that case, how (is an effect projected)?" are the Vaibhāsikas. With the sentence "(An effect is projected) through (the obtainment and development of the effect's seed)", the Master elucidates the nature of the projection (of an effect) in an unerroneous manner. The meaning of "the development of the effect's seed" is the growth of the seed which is connected with an inner (adhyātmika) (not yet realized) effect. And this projection (of an effect) is not the arising of a seed which has [212,4]
previously not existed. It is rather to be known as being only the development (of a seed) which has been situated (previously) within the consciousness-series (vijñānasāntāna). If it were not so, there would be nothing by way of a fixed rule (pratiniyama) as regards the cause of the determination of the lineage of Śrāvakas, etc (*Śrāvakādīgotravyavasthāpana). For this very reason, also, the Master says, "(An effect is projected) through the development of the effect's seed".

With the sentence "As (according to your theory), a future (thing) also exists (as an entity, just as a past thing does, why doesn't it project an effect)?", the Master demonstrates an unwanted conclusion (atiprasaṅgāṁ deśayati) in the position of the adversaries. The meaning is that because the future (thing) would also have a demonstrated nature (siddhasvabhāva), like the present (thing), it would also have to project an effect. Furthermore, there is this additional flaw that "(If there were a) constant (existence for all entities, and nothing would cease to be because destroyed, would an effect ripen only if it obtained the necessary complex of conditions, as the verse says)?" The statement "Thus, (the existence of a past act which causes an effect to arise at a future time is not demonstrated)" is the conclusion.

18.

The Master has thus in detail confuted the existence of beneficmiality, etc, material bodily, etc, actions, and the Vaibhāṣikas raise this additional position: "(In that case, it must be that a
certain other dharma disassociated from citta arises in the aggregate-series associated) with beneficial and unbene
cificial (bodily and verbal acts)". "In the aggregate-series" means (essentially) "In the citta-series", but not in any "self", since the existence of the latter is contrary to fact.42 "A certain other dharma arises": The meaning is that there simply arises (something with) a nature that is not in
ccluded within cittas and caitasikas, and that it is not a development within these (cittas and caitasikas) themselves (that accounts for retribution). Through the sentence "Some people (call it the 'accumulation', others again call it 'the imperishable')", the same object is indicated through terms commonly accepted in other schools, in order to give rise to greater certainty in [212,5] regard to it. "Some people call it the 'accumulation'": these are the Mahasanghikas. They refer to (a dharma) of similar nature with the word "accumulation". "Others again call it the 'imperishable'": these are the Aryasammitiyas. They also, within their own school, refer to it, with the expression "the imperishable".

Now as it is anticipated that there may be a question as to which means-of-cognition reveals that there is such another dharma, the adversary, in order to show that it is demonstrated by an inference referring to its effect, says, "(It is that) through which (a pleasant and unpleasant effect is brought about) at a future time". The im-
port of the previously given means-of-cognition, "If something exists, it must be preceded by a cause" is also to be understood here. It is also for this reason that (the adversary) says, "If this other dharma did not arise in the citta-series, (how could a mental act which has
already disappeared, bring about an effect)?", in order to explain how he is led to believe that there arises this other dharma which has the capacity for demonstrating pleasant (and unpleasant) effects (at a later time). With the sentence "Without a doubt, this (dharma) must be accepted", there is a conclusion (for this portion).

19.

The Master shows that the argument (upapatti) is not demonstrated, because of this other dharma's being an illusion, with the statement "In that case (when one has studied a text, and after a long time has elapsed, a memory is still engendered regarding it, and memories are engendered in regard to other objects that have been seen, etc. What is the dharma through which this memory is later engendered for this object which has been studied or seen, etc)?" The full elucidation runs as follows: It is certainly so that this firm assertion that, as regards the arising of pleasant (and unpleasant) effects, these come about where there is a special dharma, is not demonstrated. And why is this? The argument does not hold if there exists a preceding latent impression (vāsana) (left by the preceding dharma itself). Furthermore, it is possible to understand (avabudh-, cf. Mvt. 2889) that there exists, as regards the arising of these effects, only a preceding latent impression, as it also arises in the case of an object (visaya), such as a text (which is remembered at a later time). If it is not (admitted that this is) so, because it is not acknowledged (upagata) by the adversaries that this other dharma can arise in the case of this kind of an object (i.e. an object basically indeterminate), how does the effect (of memory) arise? Text, etc"
indicates anything with which one has become familiar (ucita, samstuta, paricita). "In regard to objects which have been seen, etc" means "in regard to objects which have been seen or heard or mentally apprehended (bye brag phyed pa: matam, Mvt. 2882) or cognized (vijnata) (in any way)." Now as regards all these, the phrase "a memory (of them) is engendered" is to be understood. Since they do not admit that this dharma which could be called the engenderer of (the memory of) something which has been studied, etc, can be unincluded in the sphere of the beneficial, etc, (the memory, by rights) should not arise. 45

Furthermore, it should be explained "at what moment it is produced". The meaning is: Is it produced at the first moment (when something is studied or seen), or at a second (or third)? The full elucidation is: If it is claimed that it arises in the first moment, then as it is studied (and remembered) simultaneously, it is meaningless to say that it is studied (or remembered) later through the arising of this other dharma. And if it is claimed that it is in the second (or third) etc. moments, this is also contrary to fact, because there is no special condition (warranting its arising at that time). In regard to the question "In what moment does it arise?", it should be known that the non-adherents to the momentariness doctrine have been refuted. (Therefore a non-momentary factor deposited within the aggregate-series, is not acceptable). [213,2] But if it is not like this, because there is some special characteristic (changing) within the conditions at a given moment (to account for memory), how (is this objection) suitable as a refutation (of this
other dharma)? (In that case), it should be asked what sort of a dharma this is, in which moment it engenders (the memory), and also how (this memory) conforms to the past (thing). "Later" means "at another time".

"Also, as regards the citta which attains the attainment of the cessation (of feelings and concepts)" , through what sort of a dharma and at which moment does (the citta which emerges from the state) arise? This is also as was explained previously (in regard to the object remembered). It is necessary for you to explain this also, (since again, there is no particular beneficial and unbene- ficial action which could account for the arising of this other dharma, which you might hold to be the carrier of the citta-series’ continuity).

"When a lemon-flower (is penetrated by the red of liquid, lac, and it perishes along with it, what is the dharma through which there is later produced, within its fruit also, a red within its inner core)"? It is necessary for you to explain this also. "Penetrated" means "stained" (rakta). The meaning of "and it perishes along with it" is that (the lac) perishes along with the lemon-flower. "Within its fruit" means "Within the lemon-fruit". The meaning is that no special dharma has arisen to act as the engenderer (of this red in the core of the fruit). Thus, indeed, the position of the Vaibhasikas that another dharma arises is demonstrated in detail by the Master as being contrary to fact.
20.

In order to elucidate another position, the Sautrāntikas say, "Thus, as (there is no generation of) this other dharma, which seems to be imaginary, (it should be known that, because a special force is produced within the citta-series by a volition, an effect arises at a later time through a special transformation of the series which has been influenced by this volition)." The example of "the lemon-flower (penetrated) by the red of liquid lac" is easy to understand.

21.

"In that case, (why is it that, as regards the citta-series, it is not accepted that it is influenced) by bodily and verbal acts, also?" is a counter-objection of the Vaibhāṣikas. The full elucidation is as follows: If it is inappropriate that a special dharma disassociated from citta is the cause for the arising of an effect, then this is settled as inappropriate. However, why isn't the citta-series influenced (penetrated) by bodily and verbal actions, in the way that it is influenced by volitions?

[213,3] "They (became beneficial and unbeneicicial) in this way (dependent upon citta" is the reply of the Sautrāntikas. "They" indicates bodily and verbal actions. "They become beneficial and unbeneicicial dependent upon citta" means that they become beneficial, etc, dependent upon the citta which originates them(samutthānacitta), but not through their own agency. (In other words, if an act is committed because of a beneficial citta, it will be a beneficial act; the same act committed because of an unbeneicicial citta, will be an unbeneicicial act.)
If it is admitted that bodily and verbal actions become beneficial and unbeneficial dependent upon *citta*, what is entailed by this? In order to explain this, he says, "(Through it is appropriate that when something) is rendered beneficial or unbeneficial by something, (there be the force necessary for the same thing to give a pleasant or unpleasant effect in the series of that thing, the series of that itself is not capable of doing so)." "Something" means a bodily or verbal action. "Is rendered beneficial or unbeneficial by something", i.e. by a citta. "For that same thing"; for the bodily or verbal action. "In the series of that": in the citta-series. "The series of that itself is not (capable of doing so)"; the citta-series is not itself beneficial or unbeneficial. Here the phrase "there be the force (necessary for the same thing) to give a pleasant or unpleasant result in the series of that thing" should be understood as being the normal condition (of things). (In the case of the suspension of consciousness, the effect will not be given, at least not immediately). The meaning is explained as follows: When, through a certain special citta, bodily, etc, action is rendered beneficial, etc, there is the force (necessary) for this same (action) to influence (or penetrate) the series, but since it itself is dependent upon the series which has been influenced (or penetrated) by it, it itself is evidently (*sāksāt*) not to be considered the prime influence(*paribhāvitr*)·

Thus the Sautrāntikas demonstrate their own position in detail, but the Master in order to show that this position is also inappropriate, says [213,4] "In that case, if (an effect arises at a later
time because of a citta-series which has been influenced by an act endowed with this force, how is it that the effect of a former action arises for those who have interrupted the citta-series?" This is a repetition of what was said above to the opponents (i.e. to the Vaibhasikas, when the question regarding the attainment of cessation was asked at 19). It should be known that there is a refutation (of this position) through the phrase "How is it that the effect of a former action arises?" "For those who have interrupted the citta-series": whoever has interrupted the citta-series (in the highest meditational attainments) is referred to in this way. "Of a former action" means "(of an action) which has arisen previously".

22.

Certain among the Sautrántikas make their reply with the statement "Certain people say (that it is through the citta-series, which has been influenced by it, retaking its course at this very time)." "At this very time" means at the time in which the (citta) arises, and not at some other time. "It is through the citta-series, which has been influenced by it, retaking its course" means that it is through the citta-series, which has been influenced by the action, subsequently retaking its course.

The speaker of the phrase "But (how does it retake its course)?" is the Master. The (implied) meaning is: Because there is no reason (for it to retake its course at this time, there having been an interruption of the citta-series), it simply cannot retake its course (unless this is explained in some way).
The speakers of the sentence "(It retakes its course because there is) the citta which attains the meditational attainment (which serves as a directly antecedent condition)" are again certain Sautrāntikas. The citta which attains the meditational attainment is to be understood as that citta which enters there (only to be stopped in the meditational state itself). It means that citta through which the attainment of cessation is realized (sāksātkṛta).

"But since a long time has elapsed (since this citta has come to an end)" is said in order to show that it cannot truly be (a directly antecedent condition), [213,5] since, having come to an end, it does not exist directly antecedent (to the emergence from the meditational attainment), and thus cannot serve as such a condition. "An effect does not arise from that which is past" is a reminder of what was explained by the Master in reference to the Vaibhāṣika position. "So from where (does that other citta which arises when the meditational state has ended arise)?" is the concluding (question).

23.

"Certain people say that it is from its seeds (which rest upon the material organs that this citta arises after the meditational state has been completed)". These "certain people" are other special people among the Sautrāntikas. "It is from its seeds which rest upon the material organs": it is from the seeds of the citta (which rest upon the material organs). It should be understood that they are (the seeds) which cause the citta-series to retake its course. With the statement "The seeds of the cittas and caitasikas rest upon
the citta-series or on the series of the material organs, or on both, depending on the case", there is a specification (of the thesis) which is to be explained. "Depending on the case": In states within the realm of desires and materiality which are endowed with citta, they rest upon the citta-series and the materiality-series. In states that are without citta, they rest upon the materiality-series. In the realm without materiality, they rest upon the citta-series only. This is the meaning of "depending on the case".

With the sentence "But (isn't it said that a mental consciousness arises dependent upon manas and a mentally cognizable? When there is no manas, how can it arise)?", the Master indicates a contradiction to scripture (agamapratirodha), as there is a deficiency (vaikalya) of the necessary cause for the arising of the consciousness.

"(It should be known that) sometimes (there is a metaphor of an effect for a cause)", is the reply of these certain Sautrāntikas. "Sometimes" indicates that though this is not always so, in this case, where there is no continuation of the manifestation (avirbhava) of any manas, there is a metaphorical usage of this kind. The example "Just as (one says 'hunger' and 'thirst' for a certain kind of tangible sensation)" is easy to understand.

The speaker of the statement "In that case, (there would be two separate series of seeds)" is the Master. "There would be two separate series of seeds", i.e. there would be two series of seeds: one which is material, and one which is immaterial. [214,1] In reply to the question "Why cannot this occur?", he says, "(This
situation is not seen in the case of things that naturally have seeds): sprouts, etc." The meaning of "This situation is not seen" is that (it is never seen that) the series of seeds (for one result) have various natures (i.e. so in this case, there cannot be one series of seeds which is material, and another which is immaterial, both having the same result).

Objection: But isn't a sprout produced from many causes, such as earth, etc?

In order to explain that in this case also, various series of seeds (giving rise to one result) are not seen, he says, "Though conditions (for something may not be single, this is not the case with its seeds)." "Conditions" here means auxiliary conditions (sahakāri-pratyaya). "This is not the case with its seeds", i.e. this is not the case with its immediate cause (upādānakarana) (which must be one). For this reason, if, as regards the seeds for cittas and caitasikas, there are various series, then, because their immediate causes are varied, there must certainly be at least a twofold cause for cittas and caitasikas within one body. As this is not accepted, there is a flaw (in the reasoning that would assign two series of seeds to one result).

The speaker of the statement "Furthermore, (with this theory there only remains the flaw as to how the former actions of those who have interrupted the citta-series in the two meditational attainments without citta, give their effects at a later time)" is the Master. The full elucidation is as follows: When it is contrary to fact that the citta-series itself is continuing its course, the formerly men-
tioned flaw only remains, even if its seeds are resting upon the
material organs, (because if the continuity of the citta-series is
interrupted, the continuity of karmic retribution is, as well). 48

24.

"That flaw lies within the theory itself" is the reply of cer-
tain adherents to the existence of external objects (of sense and
understanding: bāhyārthavādinah).

[214, 2] The speaker of the question "In what theory?" is the
Master. The speaker of the sentence "In the view of those (who say
that these states are without citta)" are again the opponents. The
speakers of the sentence "And there is also a basis (for this view)
in a sutra", etc, are also the opponents. There is a middle portion
to the sutra, "For him who has entered the attainment of cessation,
the bodily forces are stopped"—"does not leave the body", which
should be added as follows: "Concepts and volitions and mental
attention (manaskāra) and the sense-organs—" 49 "(But the sense-
organs) are not" means that the sense-organs are not diminished
(sīrṇa, etc). "(And consciousness) is not separated (from the body)"
means that it does not cease to exist (in this state), that it is
not destroyed.

25.

"(What consciousness is held to exist) for them at this time?"
is a question posed by the Master in order to refute the opponents' position. Is it the visual consciousness (eye-consciousness,
caksurūvijñāna), or is it the audial consciousness (ear-consciousness,
śrotravijnāna), etc—or is it the mental consciousness?

"Certain people say that it is a mental consciousness"—these are certain adherents to the existence of external objects (of sense and understanding). They say that at this time, only a mental consciousness occurs, because all the other consciousnesses do not exist (there).

"But (hasn't it been stated by the Exalted One that a mental consciousness arises dependent upon manas and mentally cognizables, and that at the same time there must exist a contact consisting of the conjunction of the three, along with simultaneously arising feelings, concepts, and volitions)?" is said by the Master in order to show that this is contrary to fact. The meanings of the words "contact consisting of a conjunction (of the three)", etc, are easy to understand. The full elucidation runs as follows: Consciousness and feelings, etc, do not arise unless mutually present. Thus, if there is consciousness at this time, there will be contact, etc, without a doubt. [214,3] And if these other (factors) do not exist, then consciousness, alone, also does not exist. 49a

"Certain people say (that though the Exalted One said that craving is conditioned by feeling, yet not all feeling is a condition for craving. So, in the same way, contact is not always a condition for feelings)". This is a reply made by the adversaries to this argument leading to absurdity(prasaṅga). "Though the Exalted One said (that craving is conditioned by feelings)", for instance, in the teaching of dependent origination(pratītyasamutpāda), at the part where it is said, "Craving arises conditioned by feelings",
etc.50 "Yet not all feeling (is a condition for craving)": Because when the three kinds of feeling associated with outflows (āsrava) cease, then craving does not arise. With the phrase "So in the same way (contact is not always a condition for feelings)", the main meaning (of the passage) is made understood through indication of an exemplification (drstāntopadesa).

With the statement "(But these have been clearly differentiated) by the Exalted One", the Master makes a firm insistence on his point. "These" means "the feelings (which are conditions for craving)". In order to show how these are differentiated, he says, "(Craving arises dependent upon feelings that arise from a contact accompanied) by nescience". "A contact accompanied by nescience" is a contact which is conjoined (saṃpravukta) with nescience. (Feelings) which have arisen from this (contact) are called "which arise from a contact accompanied by nescience". Now anticipating that the adversary may think that the contacts that give rise to feelings, etc, have been differentiated, just as the feelings that give rise to craving have been differentiated by the Exalted One, (the Master) says, "But contacts (have not been differentiated anywhere)." The statement "Thus, (what is said by the opponent is no rebuttal)" is the conclusion.

26.

The adversaries reply in yet another manner (anyatha), (and this is expressed) with the statement, "The adversaries say (that when the meeting of manas, mentally cognizable, and mental consciousness is endowed with a special force giving rise to contact, then it is called a 'conjunction')." The full elucidation runs as follows:
Even if it is conceded that contact is nowhere differentiated, yet [214,4] it is acceptable to speak of there being a distinct (prativisista, visista, Lokes Candra, p 251) conjunction of the three which gives rise to feelings, etc. What is this distinct conjunction? It is any meeting (of manas, mentally cognizable, and mental consciousness) which has the force for giving rise to a contact immediately subsequently (mjug thugs su: anantaram, Nagae MSA Index, p 36). As this does not exist at a time when feelings, etc, are forfeited, how can there be contact (at such a time)? And where will there be feelings and such (dharmas), as this (conjunction) does not exist (at this time)? For this reason, only a mental consciousness remains (in this state).

The sentence "In that case, (of what sort is it):" is an effort made by the Master to include (parigrh-) (this mental consciousness supposed by the adversaries) within the alternatives (paksa) "beneficial", etc, so that it can be refuted. As the flaw (in the theory) of the adversaries is not (immediately) seen, the phrase "What is implied by this?" is given.

27.

The speaker of the statement "If it is beneficial, (how can it be beneficial without being conjoined with the roots of the beneficial)?" is the Master. As he wishes to tell the adversary that non-covetousness, etc, does not exist (in a state without feelings and conceptions), he says, "When there is non-covetousness, (can it be that there is no contact)?" If something cannot be beneficial because it is not conjoined with non-covetousness, etc, then this
consciousness (also cannot be beneficial).

Anticipating the thought that it is beneficial because it arises due to the citta which enters the meditational attainment, which is a directly antecedent, beneficial condition, he says, "But this is not (sufficient to guarantee the beneficaility of anything, because immediately subsequently to something beneficial, there may arise cittas of all three kinds)." The meaning of the phrase "because immediately subsequently to something beneficial, there may arise cittas of all three kinds" is as follows: If it is imagined otherwise than that immediately subsequently to something beneficial, cittas of all three kinds, beneficial, etc, may arise, it would follow that if something is beneficial by force of a directly antecedent condition which is beneficial, anything unbenefficial or indeterminate there would be absurd(prasajyate) and this is also not accepted. (Otherwise, an unbenefficial citta could never follow directly upon a beneficial one, and this being so, once a beneficial citta occurred, there could never be a subsequent unbenefficial or indeterminate citta, and this is certainly not acceptable). Furthermore, there is an additional flaw (in this theory), and in order to explain this, he says, "(And because when there is a citta which has beneficaility, which has been projected) by the power of the roots of the beneficial, (it is not suitable that there be a cause for these roots to be removed)." The power, or force, exercised by the roots of the beneficial is "the power of the roots of the beneficial." Whatever in which there is beneficaility because of this (force), and which arises, projected, with a beneficial nature, is referred to
here. And what is it? It is a citta.

In order to explain what is entailed if this is so (i.e. when there is a citta which has been projected by the power of the roots of the beneficial), (the Master) says, "It is not suitable that there be a cause for these (roots) to be removed." If they were removed, then the beneficility (kuśalatvā) (of the meditational state) would be false, as (beneficility) could not exist (in a state which removes the roots of the beneficial). "It is not suitable" means "it is contrary to fact". The full elucidation runs as follows: If a citta which arises at a later time through the power of a directly antecedent beneficial condition is (necessarily) classed within the beneficial, then if something beneficial arises all at once (yugapat), everything which arises at a later time will also be beneficial, (and so on) as long as (vāvat) Samsara exists, and the unbeneficial and the indeterminate would both not exist. As regards the statement "And its being unbeneficial also leads similarly to an absurdity", he does not explain and order his assertion. The meaning is that just as its beneficility is contrary to fact, in the same way, through the reasoning which has been explained immediately previously, its unbeneficility is also contrary to fact.

Now if it is contrary to fact that the citta of meditational attainment [215,1] be either beneficial or unbeneficial, how is it that it is said to be beneficial? In reply to this, (the Master) says, "The attainment of cessation (is beneficial in the same way that final cessation is)." "In the same way that final cessation is": The meaning is that just as final deliverance (mokṣa) is called
beneficial because it has the characteristic of assuaging (upasam-)
all sufferings, but actually is not, because it has a non-existent
nature as far as being an entity, just so the attainment of cessation
is beneficial as far as this is concerned, because it assuages them
for some time, but is actually not (beneficial).\textsuperscript{51}

Now anticipating the thought that since it can be neither
beneficial or unbeneficial, it must certainly be obstructed-
indeterminate (nivrtavyakrta), he says, "If it were afflicted, (how
could it be afflicted without being conjoined with afflictions)?"\textsuperscript{52}
Furthermore, there is this additional flaw, that "If it is not ac-
cepted that the concept-less meditational attainment (is afflicted,
how much the more so in the case of the attainment of cessation)!!

Now anticipating the thought that if it is not afflicted (and
it is neither beneficial nor unbeneficial), it must be unobstructed-
indeterminate, he says, "Now as to (its being unobstructed-indeter-
minate, is it the result of retribution, or is it related to bodily
postures, related to artistic activity, or to magical creations)?"
He investigates (the possibilities) (niriksayati) with the question,
"Is it the result of retribution?", etc. Because there are these
four parts (to the unobstructed-indeterminate).

"What is entailed by this?" is said by the opponent, because
he does not see the flaw (which is involved here).
28.

With the sentences "If it is (supposed) that it is the result of retribution, (how could a retributional citta, which is necessarily of the realm of desires, become manifest immediately after a citta which has entered into the attainment of the summit of existence)", [215,2] etc, the Master states his refutation of these positions one by one. The phrase "how could" is to be construed with the interrupted (predicate) "be at hand". (In the Tibetan construction, as presumably in the original Sanskrit, the first phrase is separated from the latter). The yogin attains (meditational states) of ever increasing subtlety, one after the other. For this reason, it is necessary that the citta of (the attainment of) cessation be realized immediately after the attainment of the summit of existence. If this (citta) were the result of retribution, then it would belong to the sphere of desires, because the yogin would have to be part of the sphere of desires (if a retributional citta were present). But how could such a citta be realized by the yogin immediately upon the attainment of the summit of existence, when for eight successive (meditational) stages it has been interrupted? (This is asked) because there is quite a gap (from the first meditational stage to the attainment of cessation). Similarly, even those who have reached the attainment that allows for transitions from one sphere to another (vyutkrāntasamāpatti)* are not able to realize even the fourth (meditational stage) immediately after the attainment (of cessation), so will they

realize a single citta belonging to the sphere of desires, when for eight successive stages (such cittas) have been interrupted? And there is also this additional flaw: "How could the citta of utter non-agitation, etc, be manifest immediately after this (attainment)?"

Because in this case there is also quite a gap (between a citta of utter non-agitation and a retributonal citta), it could not be manifest when one has emerged (from the attainment of cessation).

With the expression "(citta) of utter non-agitation" are included those of nothing whatever(ākiñcana) and of the signless (anīmitta). "How is there a flaw here (in our theory)? (There may be one) when a citta of utter non-agitation is at hand immediately after the citta of (the attainment of) cessation, but how (is there a flaw) when (such a citta) is not manifest?": Now as he considers that the opponents may say this, he says, "Thus (it has been said in the Mahākausthila-sūtra)", etc, in order to demonstrate (the invariable arising of the citta of non-agitation after the attainment of cessation) through scripture, "The contacts which one reaches": [215,3] "which one realizes", is the meaning. Among these three (utter non-agitation, nothing whatever, and the signless), utter non-agitation is to be known as belonging to the fourth meditational trance, nothing whatever is of the stage of nothing whatever(ākiñcanyāyatana), and the signless is of the stage of the summit of existence, because of the extreme subtlety of the concepts (present in that state).

Furthermore, it is appropriate to ask this additional question: "(Supposing that this mental consciousness were a retributonal citta) projected by former acts (what is the reasoning here that would ensure
that for those who have entered the attainment of cessation, it
would not have been transcended at the period of emergence, as it
was engendered by a former volition)?" "Projected by former acts"
means "projected by the acts of another existence" (jāti, janman).
"Period" means "juncture". "A former volition" means a deliberation
(to action) deliberated upon previously. The (implied) meaning of
the phrase "What is the reasoning here?" is that there simply isn't
any (reasoning which would warrant the non-transcendence of the
retributional citta). The full elucidation runs as follows: As
retribution takes place inherently (svarasena), how, when he has
previously transcended the dharmas proper to it, should the yogin
not have transcended (them) at the period of time of his emergence
(from the attainment of the summit of existence), and why should
they be connected (anubaddha) with his citta (at that time)? To ex­
plain an additional (fact) unfavorable (niramukūla) (to the view of
the opponents), he says, "Indeed, how is it (that when the citta of
the attainment of the summit of existence, which has cessation as
its object-of-consciousness, has come to an end, there should be
obtained the continuation of a retributional citta, which has latent
impressions of the past, and belongs to the realm of desires, when
such a citta has not existed for a long time previously)?" Here,
also, as regards the phrase "there should be obtained, because it is
demonstrated (as being present in the following attainment of cessa­
tion), the continuation of a retributional citta, when (such a citta)
has not existed for a long time previously", the interruption (of
retributional cittas previously alluded to) should be understood.
The expression "which has cessation as its object-of-consciousness" means that it has that cessation which consists of the severance (viccheda), etc, associated with tranquility (sama) as its object-of-consciousness. The expression "when the citta of the attainment of the summit of existence has come to an end" means "at the time when this attainment has come to an end". (The Tibetan, and presumably the Sanskrit before it, being a good deal more ambiguous here than the English translation, Sumatisila's gloss is not quite as superfluous as it might appear to one reading the English only). The expression "when (such a citta) has not existed for a long time previously" [215,4] means that a citta of such another nature has not been manifest since the first (meditational stage). The full elucidation is that for a long time there have been no states favorable (anuloma, etc) to those dharmas connected with the obtainment of the (renewed) continuation of the latent impressions, since, because of their cutting off all feelings, etc, these meditational states are basically inimical (to such a continuation). Thus, how could it be suitable (for a retributinal citta to arise in these states)?54

In order to explain an additional flaw which is also incurred (upeta, sampanna, etc), he says, "And indeed why (would a retributional citta retake its course when retributional materiality, being severed here, does not retake its course)?" The expression "Why?" means "What is the reasoning (that would support the existence of such a phenomenon)?" "Here" means "in the realms of desire and materiality". "When (retributional materiality) does not retake its course", i.e. because its continuity (pravaha), which has been brought
about inherently by being projected by former actions, has been severed. The expression "(Why would) a retributional citta retake its course?" means "(Why would it) retake its course at a time when all other cittas which could be manifest have certainly been severed, i.e. through the attainment of cessation?"

29.

Now anticipating that the adversary may think that even if it is unsuitable that (this mental consciousness) be the result of retribution, it still may relate to bodily postures, etc, (and thus be unobstructed-indeterminate), he says, "Now as to (the theory) that it is related to bodily postures, etc (can there be a citta at this time which has as its object-of-consciousness a bodily posture)?"

With the expression "related to bodily postures, etc" are included cittas related to artistic activity, and to magical creations. The meaning is that since (the citta of the attainment of cessation, i.e. the citta which enters there) enters upon another aspect (akāra), as it has as its object-of-consciousness the cessation which consists of severance associated with tranquility, how can it be formed (abhisamskrta) in reference to bodily postures, etc? Furthermore, when there is no contact [215,5] (of sense-organ, consciousness, and object), how can it be formed in reference to bodily postures, etc? "How can it be?": At this time, i.e. at the time when one realizes the attainment of cessation, it cannot be.

Furthermore, to explain that for this reason (its being related to bodily postures, etc) is also contrary to fact, he says, "(Because it is held that) the nine attainments of successive stages
(and the eight deliverances are beneficial, it is not appropriate that there be an afflicted, or indeterminate, citta at hand at this time)." The nine attainments of successive stages are the eight meditational trances and immaterial attainments (ärupyasamapatti) and the attainment of cessation. The eight deliverances are "Possessing visible forms, he sees visibles", etc. Among these also, the attainment of cessation occurs (as the last of the eight deliverances). It is that state where a cessation is realized in regard to conceptions and feelings, by (this very) body, when having attained (this state), one remains there (upasampadya viharati). As conceptions and feelings do not exist in this state, how can there be a citta relating to bodily postures, etc?

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that "(the attainment of the cessation of concepts and feelings occurs) dependent upon the attainment of the summit of existence." With this additional statement, there is given a prerequisite (or principle: naya, yoga, or vidhi) as to how the attainment of cessation is realized. Later, with the question "What is its object-of-consciousness, and what is its aspect?", there will be a contradiction (of the opponents' thesis). The two prerequisites are demonstrated by scripture, as follows, "Thus (it was said in the Mahākausthīlasūtra in reference to the attainment of cessation, 'The causes and conditions for the attainment of the sphere without signs are two, Mahākausthila: an absence of mental attention to any signs, and a mental attention to any signs, and a mental attention to the sphere without signs.' The sphere without signs" [216,1] means the attainment of cessation."
Here "cause" and "condition" are to be understood in one sense. Or else, the "cause" is the most proximate condition. For there is a succession of causes (involved).

"In that case, wouldn't it be beneficial?" means that it would certainly have to be beneficial (if it had cessation as its object-of-consciousness, and tranquility as its aspect). But if it is thought that it certainly is beneficial, he says, "(And being beneficial, wouldn't it) also be conjoined with non-covetousness, etc)?" (And if it were thus conjoined, wouldn't there be scope for the conditions of contact)?" This is also to be understood in the same way (as previously at 27).

Even if it is conceded that it cannot have cessation as its object-of-consciousness, and tranquility as its aspect, it could still have an object-of-consciousness and an aspect elsewhere. For this reason, he says, "What if it had some other object-of-consciousness and aspect?"

As regards the sentence "How could it be suitable (that the citra immediately after the citra which attains the attainment of cessation, should be agitated)?", it should be understood that through this (new position, i.e. that it does not have cessation as its object-of-consciousness, or tranquility as its aspect), it would be suitable that the citra be agitated. The full elucidation is that if the object-of-consciousness within the meditational trance of the citra without marks, has some other object-of-consciousness and aspect, then (citra) would be agitated immediately after the practice (of the attainment), (since it would not have tranquility as its...
aspect). And through this, the statement that there are two conditions favorable to the practise of (the attainment) without signs, would also be contradicted. And if it were so (that the citta of the attainment of cessation were a mental consciousness of indeterminate nature), then (the established doctrine that) the indeterminate consists of four divisions would be completely contrary to fact. Anticipating that the adversaries may say that here this (citta) becomes yet another kind of indeterminate, he says, "Because of these same two (previously given arguments, another additional indeterminate kind of citta is also contrary to fact)". The meaning (of the phrase "two previously given arguments") is what has been said in reference to the nine attainments of successive stages and in reference to (the attainment of cessation's arising) dependent upon the attainment of the summit of existence. [216,2] Thus, having denied (apakrs-, etc) the position of the adversaries in detail, he gives his conclusion with the statement, "Accordingly, (since you dialecticians do not understand things according to the intent of the scriptures, your understanding that there is a citta which is a mental consciousness within the states of the attainment of cessation, etc, is though out in unheeding rashness)."
"In that case, (how is it held that the attainment of cessation is endowed with citta?)" is a request put by the adversaries to the Master. The meaning is: If it is contrary to fact that the attainment of cessation is endowed with a citta of mental consciousness, then it is necessary for you to say how it can be endowed with citta. Isn't it necessary that this problem be studied without a doubt? Now how can this be requested in such a manner? Now if the Master were to refuse to say that (the attainment of cessation) is endowed with citta, this could not be (proper), because it is said that "Consciousness is not separated from the body (during the attainment of cessation)"*, and this is accepted also by the Master as being authoritative scripture. Accordingly, (if the Master were to refuse to accept the existence of citta in this state), it would be very poor.

(Thus the Master replies): "In the manner in which certain Sautrāntikas hold it." "Hold (the attainment of cessation) to be endowed with citta" is the remainder (of the phrase). With this phrase, the position maintained by the Master is indicated.

"In what manner do these certain Sautrāntikas (hold it)?" is said by the adversaries. "(There is a special retributory consciousness). As this retributory consciousness, (which contains all the seeds, continues in a stream, once it has arisen taking on concep-

* Majjhima I, 296.
tion in the womb, taking on various forms because of various retributory causes, without any interruption until the limit of Nirvana, it is not severed at this time)." This is said by the Master. "Which contains all the seeds" means [216,3] "which has the force to engender beneficial, etc, dharmas (in the future). "Taking on conception (in the womb)" means when conception in the mother's womb has been taken on by the confused retributory consciousness during the coagulation of the semen (of the father) with the blood (of the mother). "Without any interruption" means "without any severance (viccheda) (at any point)". "Taking on various forms because of various retributory causes" means that it becomes varied through the various retributory causes, which are beneficial, etc. "Until the limit of Nirvana" means until the end-point (nisthāgama, nirvāti) of Nirvana, i.e. until termination (ksaya, vyaya) (of the series) in Nirvana. "Continues in a stream" means "continues in a series". It means the consciousness having the nature of retribution, etc, which has been indicated just previously. "At this time" means "at the time of the attainment of cessation". "It is not severed" means that it is not reversed by being separated (from the psyche-physical complex). "On this account" means "because this consciousness is not severed". "It is called 'endowed with citta" means that it is called "endowed with consciousness". "But the group of the (remaining) six consciousnesses does not continue there" means that the group of consciousnesses different from the retributory consciousness (does not continue there). And why do they not continue there? To explain this, he says, "because the seeds of the consciousnesses have been impaired",
i.e. the force of the visual consciousness, (audial consciousness), etc, has been impaired. Through what are these seeds impaired? To explain this, he says "by the force of the citta which has attained the attainment of cessation, etc". [216,4] The citta which has attained the attainment is to be known as being that citta which enters the practice (of the attainment of cessation). If it is asked for how long (the seeds) are impaired, to explain this, he says, "for a short time". "On this account, (this state is called without citta" means "because the visual, (audial), etc, consciousnesses have been severed".

31.

Now if there is a citta (within this state) on account of this consciousness, how is it that this state is called "without citta"? Anticipating that this other citta may be repudiated (upālambhita) (by the opponents) on this ground, (the Master) says, "Citta has two aspects: (The first accumulates the seeds, the second is manifold on account of having various objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and particularities. The state is said to be without citta because there is a deficiency of the second kind there, just as, for example, one calls a chair that has only one leg 'legless', because of the deficiency of its other legs)." With the expression "the first", there is, to begin with (tāvat), a reference to this first (aspect of consciousness). The "seeds" (which it accumulates) are the seeds of the visual, (audial), etc, consciousnesses. "Accumulates" means that it amasses (samacinoti) (these seeds). Following the rules of
etymology (niruktinayāt), it is because it accumulates (v'ci) (the seeds) that a citta is thus designated.58 "The second" is this other (kind of citta). "It is manifold" means that it has manifold aspects. To explain why it is manifold (in this way), he says, "on account of (its) having various objects-of-consciousness, (aspects, and particularities). The various kinds of objects-of-consciousness are visibles, (sounds), etc. The various aspects (are the various aspects within these objects-of-consciousness): thus, within visibles, etc, there is blue, etc. The various particularities are the particularities within blue, etc, such as those within the blue of a peacock's neck. By the rules of the same (science), (these other cittas) are citta because they are manifold (vicitra).59 With the sentence, "(This state is said to be without citta), because there is a deficiency of the second citta there", there is a refutation (of the opponent's thesis that there is no reason for this state to be called "without citta"). The example is easy to understand.

32. [216,5] Understanding (adhigamya, jñātvā) that the adversary may think, "If the visual, (audial) consciousnesses, etc, do not arise because their seeds have been impaired for a short time, how can it be that later, at the time when the yogin emerges (from the attainment), those consciousnesses again arise?", he explains (the situation) in detail: "The state which impairs the seeds (gradually becomes weak, weaker, and even more weak, in the same manner in which there is a gradual diminution in boiling water, or in the
velocity of a projected arrow, and because of this, when at the time of the emergence from the attainment, the conclusion of the projection is reached, through a special transformation in the retributory consciousness from one moment to the next, and through the resumption of the seeds, the mental consciousness, and subsequently the other consciousnesses also, arise as their conditions have renewed themselves.)" "Gradually becomes weak, weaker, and even more weak" means that by degrees it is weakened, thus becoming weak, weaker, and even more weak. To explain what (such a phenomenon) is like, he says, "in the manner in which there is diminution in boiling water, or in the velocity of a projected arrow". The phrase "in the manner in which there is diminution" is to be understood separately (for each of the examples), i.e. "in the manner in which there is diminution in boiling water, and in the manner in which there is diminution in the velocity of a projected arrow". The meaning is that just as boiling water and the velocity of a projected arrow become gradually diminished, becoming weak and weaker and even more weak, just so (this state impairing the seeds of the consciousnesses) becomes so. With the phrase "When at the time of emergence (from the attainment), the conclusion of the projection is reached", this state is delimited. "The projection" is the force of the yogin's citta which allows him to remain in the attainment for this much time. "Its conclusion" is its culmination(puskala). "From one moment to the next" means "from moment to moment". [217,1] "Through a special transformation" means through the arising of a dissimilar effect which has a characteristic unfavorable(pratikūla) to the momentary causes (which have impaired
the seeds of the consciousnesses). "Through the resumption (of the seeds)" means through the resumption of that through which (the consciousnesses) are augmented (pariguṇita). "The other (consciousnesses), also" are the consciousnesses at her than the mental consciousness, i.e. the visual consciousness, etc.

Having thus in detail established the claim that (this state) is endowed with citta, as it is held by those special Sautrantikas, he says, "The retributinal consciousness, where there are only the various kinds of seeds themselves", (is influenced by the other beneficical and unbenevolent dharmas arising together with the consciousnesses different from it, by means of their augmentation of these seeds, according to circumstances). This he says in order to give the (proper) determination (vyavasthāna) of this retributary consciousness. With the phrase "where there are only the various kinds of seeds themselves", its nature is indicated. The meaning is that wherever there is a collection (samucchraya) consisting only of various kinds of seeds, that is designated in this way. By what is it influenced? In order to explain this, he says, "by the other beneficical and unbenevolent dharmas". These are the dharmas which arise together with the consciousnesses different from (the retributary consciousness), i.e. the visual consciousness, etc. "The other (beneficical and unbenevolent) dharmas" means (the various) purifications (suddhi) and passions (rāga), etc. How do these influence (the retributary consciousness)? In order to explain this, he says, "by means of their augmentation of the seeds". The meaning is (that they influence the retributary consciousness) by means of their developing
the seeds, but not by their engendering something which has not existed previously, as was explained previously. "According to circumstances" [217,2] means "according to what has taken place" (yathābhūtam, Apte, p 1302, def 1). "In accordance with the force" means "in accordance with the capacity" (sāmarthya). "The process of impression resumes" means that the process of impression is augmented. The meaning of "In reference to this, it has been said", etc, is that the (quoted) verses were taught by the Sthavira Asvaghosa in reference to this retributory consciousness. With this (reference), what has been taught by that eminent man is indicated. "This citta" should be known as being that citta we have just mentioned. To explain with what special property it is endowed, (the Sthavira Asvaghosa) says that it "has limitless seeds". The meaning is that it is connected with immeasurable seeds of beneficial, etc, dhammas. The meaning is also that it is because these are accumulated by it, that it is described as a "citta", because it accumulates latent impressions. The phrase "continues in a stream" means that it also continues in a series. "It and its seeds are augmented" means that it and its seeds, i.e. the impressions which serve as causes for its existence, have continued from beginningless time. "Augmented" means "developed". "Become" has the implied meaning of "proceed". In order to explain what exists (as a condition) when it is augmented, he says, "when, for this citta, there arise its own conditions". The meaning is "when purifications and passions and other conditions for this citta come about" (sambhavanti). "Augmented by them" means "when the retributory consciousness has been fully
augmented". "Gradually resuming its course, it is able to give its effects in time": This refers to the retributory consciousness which, gradually resuming its course, is able to give its effects in time, i.e. at a later time. [217,3] What is able to effect something in a similar manner? In order to explain this, he says, "As for the dyed lemon-flower, (the color appears in the core of its fruit)." "In the core" means "in the inner core of the lemon". "Being dyed, and retaking its course (from flower to fruit), it is able to give its effects in time" is to be understood.

"Regarding this also, it was said by the Exalted One", etc, indicates that this retributory consciousness was taught by the Exalted One himself. The meaning of the verse "The appropriating consciousness", etc, can be settled grammatically (vyākaranena). (Since the verse can be understood by its grammar itself, there is no need to explain it).

33.

Metaphorical expressions (paryāyanāma) for this appropriating consciousness are indicated with the sentences: "(It is further called 'the appropriating consciousness', because) it (appropriates a body for the factors at conception) during the time of re-birth. (Because it becomes the support of the seeds of all dharmas, it is called 'the store-consciousness'. Because it is retribution for former acts, it is called 'the retributory consciousness')." "Because it appropriates a body" means "because it takes possession of (ātmikaroti) a body". With the phrase "it is called 'the appropriating consciousness'", it is said that it is "appropriating"
because it appropriates (the body). Because it is both appropriating and a consciousness, it is called "the appropriating consciousness". "Because it becomes the support" means "because it becomes the substratum" (āśraya). 62 "The store-consciousness" means that it is the storehouse for the activities (samudācārah, cf. Suzuki Lanka Index, p 180) of all dharmas. The compound is (to be understood) as before. The expression "retributory consciousness" means that it is retribution because of the retribution (of former acts), and here also the compound is to be understood in the same manner as before.

34.

As he has thoroughly demonstrated (prasiddha) the retributory consciousness through scripture, he says, in order to indicate that it can also be demonstrated by reasoning (nyāya), "Furthermore, if it is not accepted, (then by what consciousness is the body appropriated? There is no other consciousness apart from it which does not leave the body for life's duration, or which remains pervading it)."

"Other consciousness apart from it" means the visual consciousness, etc. [217,4] "Which remains without leaving it" means "which remains without abandoning (parityaj-) it. If it is asked what is activity (karana) is as it pervades, it should be understood that it remains (throughout life's duration, pervading and conditioning the other consciousnesses), because the substrata for the eye, etc, (i.e. the visual consciousness, etc) remain only ephemerally. The full elucidation is as follows: It is because the body has been appropriated by a consciousness, that it does not decay as long as it has not died.
Now there is, as has been (commonly) taught (by all of us), no other aspect of consciousness apart from the retributional consciousness which can appropriate (the body) in this way, and which can remain pervading it, or which (can remain there) without any interruption within its consciousness-series. Thus, if this (r.c.) were separated from it, it would decay, as does the flesh of any dead creature, but this does not occur. Thus it must be admitted that that on account of which it does not decay is necessarily this other consciousness. (Since the other consciousnesses are commonly admitted to be ephemeral). The formulation of the argument is as follows: Whatever is demonstrated as not arising as the effect of something must be at variance with that thing, as, for example, the effect of holding water does not arise with woolen blankets, but yet can be demonstrated in regard to jars. Just so the effect of the non-decay of the body cannot arise from the consciousnesses different from (the retributory consciousness), but is demonstrated as arising through the retributory consciousness. 62a

If it is still not accepted, it is necessary for the adversary to say "Where the residues of the afflictions reside (when they are removed by their antidotes)." The meaning of "where they reside" is "in what consciousness they present themselves" (vitisthanti). "By their antidotes" [217,5] means by the Noble (Eight-Fold) Path, which is the antidote to the residues. 63a Now since the collection of five consciousnesses (visual, audial, elfactory, gustatory, and tactile) is agitated (viksipta) in regard to the external, it does not exist at this time. Thus only a mental consciousness remains here, and it
is, furthermore, the antidote to the residues. Because of this, where is it that the residues reside and are abandoned? (It is not in the collection of five consciousnesses, since they are ruled out at the time of the elimination of the residues. It is not in the mental consciousness, since it serves as an antidote to the residues. Thus it must be in some other consciousness.)

Now anticipating that the adversaries may suppose that they reside in the same citta which is their antidote, he says, "If (it is said that it is within this same citta which is their antidote, how would it be suitable that it be the antidote, since it would be conjoined with the residues of afflictions)?" The full elucidation is as follows: As the Noble (Eight-Fold) Path is engaged in because it brings the impressions (of the afflictions) to an end, how can that through which they are altered be favorable to them? It is not proper that something which strives for the eradication of something be a factor of assistance (upakāra) for this same thing. The formulation of the argument is as follows: Whatever is an eradicator (pramardin) of something is not a factor for the same thing's arising, as, for example, in the case of water and fire. Since (the mental consciousness dealing with) the Noble Path is the eradicator of the latent impressions, it is seen that the logical pervader ("not being an eradicator") is contradicted, as the states of being an eradicator (pramardinatvā)* and not being an eradicator (apramardinatvā) are mutually exclusive. Because there is a logical persuasion of "the

*"eradicator-ness", "non-eradicator-ness", "factor-for-arising-ness".
state of being the factor for the arising of something"* by "the state of not being an eradicator",* if the state of being an eradicator* which is contrary to it is apprehended, then its state of not being an eradicator* is vitiated. And if its (state of not being an eradicator) is false, then the logically pervaded, its state of being a factor for the arising (of the thing)* is also vitiated. Accordingly, without a doubt, some other consciousness must be admitted as the support(ādāra) (for the residues). The formulation of the argument is: Whatever arises because something else exists must be preceded by that thing, as, for example, a sprout arises when (previously) there has been a seed; [218,1] so also the impressions of the afflictions can arise only when there is this other consciousness (as their conditioner and locus). "Because its existence can occur only if that other thing exists, because it is connected with it; only when it is preceded by that thing, can it exist" is a justification deduced from the natures of the things themselves.

Furthermore, he says, "For these who, born into the immaterial realm, (possess a citta-series which is afflicted, beneficial, or without outflows, though their body is a certain retributional object collected by their particular destiny, their destiny itself would not be retribution nor connected with retribution, if there were no special retributory consciousness)." The full elucidation is as follows: Because there is no materiality or consciousness dealing with it, as the immaterial realm is separate from all passions con-

*"eradicator-ness", "non-eradicator-ness", "factor-for-arising-ness".
nected with materiality, the (consciousness-)complex (samucchraya) (in this state) is only mental consciousness. Now whenever there are (cittas) of afflicted, etc, natures, there are not retributio
nal objects, because (these kinds of citta) do not have retributionality. Accordingly, this destiny (of being born in the immaterial realm) would not be retribution, nor connected with retribution. And this is also not accepted. This being so, a special consciousness, which is the cause for the destiny's designation (prajñapti) as "retribu
tional", must be admitted without a doubt. (Since cittas of beneficial and afflicted natures—all of which cannot be purely retributio
nal as everything which is retribution must be indeterminate—do occur in the immaterial states, and it is only the mental consciousness which can be held responsible for them, since the other five consciousnesses depend on the presence of materiality for their functioning, the retributionality of the immaterial state, which is commonly accepted by everyone, must be due to a special retributory consciousness underlying the mental consciousness). Here also, the same formulation given just previously: "Whatever arises because something else exists (must be preceded by that thing)" is applied. Here, as regards the immaterial (realm), there must be another consciousness which accounts for its designation as a retributio
nal destiny. The flaw (which is incurred if only a mental consciousness is admitted) occurs also for the Vaibhāṣikas, for they also say that these destinies, (being retribution for past deeds), must be unobstructed—indeterminate.
Furthermore, it is necessary for the adversary to explain the following: "(When Non-returners), at the summit of existence, (are engaged in destroying their outflows, and they manifest the citta without outflows that belongs to the stage of nothing whatever, through what is it that they do not fall away into death)?" The meaning is as follows: When the Non-returner who is within the summit of existence has been engaged in destroying his outflows, and has manifested the citta [218,2] which is without outflows belonging to the stage of nothing whatever, when this citta is also no longer existent, it would follow that his destiny (i.e. his state of life) would be severed. And this is also not accepted. Accordingly, the formulation of the argument here is as before. On account of this flaw, it is necessary for everyone to admit this (special) consciousness.

The Vaibhasikas may object at this point that if no other factor disassociated from citta(cittaviprayukta) unincluded among the caitasikas, is admitted, then this fault will be incurred at this point, but if some factor disassociated from citta: generic similarity(nikayasabhagata), etc, is admitted to exist, then the absurdity does not arise here. But (the Master) objects to this opportunity for the opponents by saying, "Generic similarity (and life-force are not entities which are apart, because they are only metaphors for the similarity and continuity of the retributitional aggregates)." As in the Kosa* he has already explained in detail that generic simi-

*Kosa II, ad 41 a.
larity, etc, do not exist, it is not further expanded upon here. Having completely demonstrated (the retributory consciousness) by reasoning, he gives his conclusion with the statement "Accordingly, (without a doubt, another consciousness of the type as has been described, must be accepted)."

35.

The statement "(The honorable Tāmrāpārṇīyas recognize) this same (consciousness, calling it the consciousness which is the requisite of existence)" shows that this retributory consciousness can be demonstrated by the fact that it is well-known (prasiddha) among other schools. The honorable Tāmrāpārṇīyas are certain Āryasthaviras. They designate this very same store consciousness with the expression "consciousness which is the requisite of existence". "Others again call it the 'root-consciousness'": these are the Ārya-Mahāsāṅghikas. Certain members of their school designate it with the expression "root-consciousness".

36.

With the question "In that case, (what is its object-of-consciousness, and what is its aspect)?", the adversaries pose a question to the Master. [218,3] The intention is: If there is a special store-consciousness unincluded in the visual consciousness, etc, it is necessary to state what its object-of-consciousness is and what its aspect is, as there is no consciousness which does not have an object-of-consciousness and an aspect. With the sentence "Its object-of-consciousness and aspect are undiscerned", the Master
makes his reply. The meaning is that because it has unity, having
the nature of retribution for all time, and because it is known only
by inference, it is unclear that this or that can be said to be its
object-of-consciousness and its aspect, and these are undelimited
(aparičinna): thus it is referred to in this way.

The sentence "How can it be both a consciousness and be like
this?" is said (by the adversaries) in order to indicate that no
other consciousness is like this. With the sentence "(The adversaries
who claim that there exists) a consciousness in the states of the
attainment of cessation, etc, will have to agree to this)"), it is
indicated that (such a consciousness) must be admitted even by those
adversaries who deny the retributional consciousness. The adversaries
who claim that there exists a consciousness (in the attainment of
cessation) are such people as the Bhadanta Vasumitra, who do not
admit a store-consciousness. The meaning of "agree" is that even
though these people may make objections (on other grounds), on this
they have to agree.

The speaker of the sentence "In that case, (in what appropri-
ating aggregate is it included)?" is the adversary. The meaning is:
If there is a special store-consciousness unincluded within the
visual consciousness, etc, (it must be explained) within which appro-
priating aggregate: materiality, etc, it is included, since all
(dharmas) with outflows(sāsrava) are comprised within the appro-
piating aggregates.

With the statement "According to the literal meaning (of the
term), (it would be included) within the appropriating aggregate of
"consciousness", the Master explains the concept. "According to the literal meaning" means that though by its inherent potency (vega, aveda), the store-consciousness has the nature of the appropriating aggregate of consciousness, it is not included there according to the (Master's own) statements, because he does not intend to say [218,4] that (the store consciousness is included within the appropriating aggregate of consciousness as an entity. 66a

37.

With the statement, "In that case, (how can one explain the statement of the sutra which says, 'What is the appropriating aggregate of consciousness? It is the collection of the six consciousnesses''', etc, the adversaries speak of a contradiction to scripture. The meaning is that if there is a special store-consciousness, this is in contradiction with these two sutras, which speak only of the collection of six consciousnesses.

With the statement "(These passages) have an underlying purpose", the Master shows that there is no contradiction to scripture. The speaker of the sentence "What is the underlying purpose in this?" is the adversary. The meaning is that since volitions are the force which condition (abhisamskr-) re-birth, there is a purpose in designating them in this manner 66*, but what is the purpose in teaching (that consciousness) consists of the collection of six consciousnesses?

*cf. Kośa I, ad 15 a-b (LVP, p 29).
With the statement, "Now (this has been stated) by the Exalted One (himself in the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra)," the Master indicates the purpose, (i.e. that fools would imagine the retributory consciousness to be a self).

The speaker of the sentence "Why would they imagine it to be such?" is again the adversary.

The speaker of the statement "Because its aspect (is without fundamental changes as long as Samsara exists)" is the Master. Because the store-consciousness has one nature as retribution, it does not become different as long as Samsara exists. Accordingly, on account of its extreme subtlety, those who do not recognize its nature might imagine it to be a self. [218,5] This is one purpose in not speaking of it in these sutras.

In order to indicate another purpose, he says, "(The purpose here was to indicate only those consciousnesses which are gross on account of their) substrata (objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and particularities, being easily delimited, in which the processes of affliction and alleviation are determined, and through which, being its effects, the consciousness related to their seeds can be inferred, but not to indicate the cause-consciousness, because it is opposite from those other consciousnesses as regards these features)." What can be said in regard to these consciousnesses (included within the six)? That they are gross. In what manner are they gross? To explain this, he says, "On account of their substrata, (objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and particularities being easily delimited)." Among these, their "substrata" are the eye, etc. Their objects-of-
consciousness, etc, have already been indicated previously. "In which" means "in which consciousnesses". What is intended here? (In which consciousnesses) the processes of affliction and alleviation are determined. How are they determined here? To explain this, he says, "on account of their being connected with both afflictions and their antidotes". The meaning is "on account of their being connected with afflictions: passions, etc, and on account of their being connected with the antidotes to these afflictions". "Effects" means "results" (kārya). "Through which" means "through the visual consciousness, etc". What is the meaning here? (The visual consciousnesses, etc) are the grounds for an inference (anumāpaka). And what is that which is to be inferred (anumeya)? To explain this, he says, "the consciousness related to their seeds". "Their seeds" means the seeds of the visual consciousness, etc. If their seeds exist, then there must also be a consciousness (which retains these seeds), i.e., a consciousness related to their seeds. What can be inferred is thus this consciousness related to their seeds. What can be inferred is thus this consciousness related to their seeds. The meaning of the phrase "(The purpose here was) to indicate only those consciousnesses" is (that the purpose was to) indicate here whatever consciousnesses are gross in all the ways that have been indicated, gross (on account of their substrata, etc, being easily delimited), etc. [219,1] "Here" means "in those sutras which indicate only the collection of six consciousnesses". These consciousnesses are to be known as the evolving consciousnesses (pravrtti-vijnāna). "But not the cause-consciousness": the word "to indicate" is to be understood
here. Since the store-consciousness is the cause for the evolving consciousnesses, it is the cause-consciousness. And why (was it not indicated here)? To explain this, he says, "Because it is opposite from those (other consciousnesses as regards these features)", (and thus its inclusion into a set of dharmas with opposite features would only serve as a source of confusion). It is the opposite of being gross, not being gross because its substratum, object-of-consciousness, aspect, and particularities, are not easily delimited in this manner, because the processes of affliction and alleviation are not determined within it because it is connected with both afflictions and their antidotes, and because it is not anything through which, being the effect of it, any other consciousness related to its seeds, can be inferred.

As regards the sentence "In regard to this, (it can be replied that the consciousness which is the requisite of existence can be indicated suitably as being the collection of six consciousnesses)", (the Master) has not ordered and explained his reasoning. The meaning is that the reply in these sutras, dealing with dependent-origination, which gives an analysis (of consciousnesses) as they are connected with (discernable) substrata is as consistent to these purposes, as what we reply in indicating (the make-up of) the aggregate of consciousness (is for ours). "Suitably" means "according to circumstances" (yathāyogam). These (passages) are indicating those consciousnesses which can be clearly felt (vedita) as they appear, but are no (indicating) the store-consciousness, as it is recognizable only be inference.
Furthermore, "(It has been demonstrated) in the Vyākhya-yukti (that nowadays not all sutras are extant)." In his Vyākhya-yukti, it has been demonstrated in detail that because the original collections have disappeared, and because the utterances of the Buddha (pravacana, cf. Mvy. 1266) nowadays are to be seen in various scattered places, nowadays not all sutras are extant. For this reason, the meaning of "in the sutras" is "in those sutras which we have somehow obtained". (In the phrase "Thus, even if in the extant sutras, it is not mentioned explicitly, this does not mean that the store-consciousness is not to be accepted)", "explicitly" means "obviously".

38.

With the sentence "Now if it were thus, (then there would be two consciousness-series simultaneously: the retributional consciousness-series, and the other)", the adversaries state a counter-objection. "The other" is (the series of) the visual, etc, consciousnesses. The meaning is that because the series of the store-consciousness remains constantly, as it occurs without any interruption, at any time when a visual consciousness, etc, is obtained. There will be two consciousness-series existing simultaneously, as there is also a store-consciousness together with it.

"If it is thus, what flaw is incurred?" This is said because the fault on the part of the Master is not perceived. With the sentence "A body which has two consciousness-series must be regarded as two sentient beings existing separately simultaneously", the opponent states the flaw incurred. The meaning is that the concept of a different living being is framed on account of its different
consciousness-series. Thus if it is admitted that there is a two-fold consciousness-series within one body, the absurdity ensues that it must be regarded as two sentient beings. The exemplification "As for example, (in the case of two consciousness-series belonging to different bodies)" is easily understood by its grammar.

With the statement "This is not so, (because of the admission that the two are not different as regards the entitiness of their cause and effect, and because the retributional consciousness is influenced by the other consciousnesses)", the Master states his reply to this absurd consequence. "The two" are the store-consciousness and the evolving consciousnesses. As regards the phrase "Because of the admission that the two are not different as regards the entitiness of their cause and effect", it is admitted that they are not different in their mutual relation as cause and effect: the evolving consciousnesses are brought about by the store-consciousness, and, furthermore, "the retributional (consciousness) is influenced by the other consciousnesses".67 [219,3] "By the other (consciousness)" means "by the evolving consciousnesses". "It is influenced" means "it is altered". (Lit. "penetrated: "stained"). The meaning of the phrase "(In the case of the consciousness-series belonging to different bodies) this state of affairs does not exist" is that there is not this non-difference of cause and effect that was indicated just previously, nor the state of affairs where (one) is affecting (the other).
39.

With the sentence "(Isn't there) sometimes (a difference to be seen between) the (series of the) seed and (the series which has the seed)?", the adversary is attempting to show that (the store-consciousness) does not exist. In the phrase "the (series of the) seed and the series which has the seed", the seed is the cause, and that which has the seed is a certain effect (fruit), and because the seed (is here said to) exist within its (effect), (there seems to be a flaw). 68

With the sentence "In the case of the blue lotus, etc, the roots (and the things possessed of the roots are seen simultaneously)", the Master shows that it does exist. With the sentence "If it is seen (it is suitable, and if it is not seen it is also suitable)", he demonstrates that the store-consciousness must be admitted without a doubt. "If it is seen" means "if it is seen in the effect". "If it is not accepted that it is thus", i.e. that there is a separate store-consciousness, then "all the difficulties as we have described them" ensue, i.e. (all the afore-mentioned holes in rival theories, such as that relating to the question) "By what consciousness is the body appropriated?", etc.

40.

With the statement "In that case, why (not accept) a self (with existence as an entity as the substratum for the six consciousnesses)", the adversary explains his non-acceptance (of the store-consciousness). The meaning is that if it is imagined that there is a special store-consciousness apart from the visual consciousness, etc, which
is the substratum for these, then why (would it be improper) to similarly imagine a self, a soul (purusa) which is the factor of an "internal sense" (ādhyātmakara), as their substratum? The self and this store-consciousness which exists apart from the visual consciousness, etc, [219,4] seem to be quite similar.

With the statement "In what way is (a self) accepted?" , the Master makes his reply, in order to differentiate the two conceptions. (In the sentence "If it presents itself only in a series, and transforms itself through conditions, then what is the difference between it and that store-consciousness?"), "it" is this (supposed) entity "self". In regard to the phrase, (it must be said) that the store-consciousness remains only as a series, because one (entity) within it continues only for one moment, and it is furthermore transformed by conditions, because it is rendered different by them. In regard to the phrase "Then what is the difference between it and that?": If the (supposed) entity self is as described, then there is no difference between it and the store-consciousness. And thus, as it would be the same as the store-consciousness, there would be a case of "demonstrating what has already been demonstrated" (siddhasādhana).

The phrase "But it is one" means that (the self) is without parts (avayava). The meaning of the phrase "and constantly without transformations" is that it is accepted (by those people who affirm a self) as being always separate from transformations coming about through conditions.

(In the sentence "In that case, how can it be demonstrated that it is also influenced by the latent impressions left in it by the
consciousnesses, etc?"), "in regard to this (supposed) entity self" is to be understood. With the expression "by the consciousnesses, etc", passions (and other modifications of the series) are included. The full elucidation is as follows: Though it could be demonstrated that this "self" is simply non-existent, because it is separate from either a gradual(kramika) or sudden(yaugapadya) efficacy(arthakriya), and thus is not an entity\textsuperscript{71}, or (it could be asked) how the consciousnesses, existing simultaneously to it, are subject to it, here it is said that (it must be explained) how, if it is admitted that it is without transformations, such a thing can be demonstrated to be influenced by the latent impressions (left) by the consciousnesses, etc. To explain why it cannot be demonstrated [219,5] (that it is influenced, if it undergoes no transformations), he says, "it is the latent impressions (which produce the special forces which make the consciousness-series continue)". This is the nature of the latent impressions. The meaning is as follows: As they are that which produces a special force within the entity which is being influenced by them, these can also not exist within the (supposed) entity "self", because the latter is without transformations.

As it may be conceded that the latent impressions do not exist (within the self), and it may be asked what is entailed by this, (the Master) says, "If there is no special characteristic which undergoes transformation, (how, as there are no impressions possible in such a case, do there arise in time special memories, cognitions(\textit{\textipa{\textg}}\text{\textna}), passions, etc, from special familiar former experiences, cognitions, and passions)?" The meaning of the phrase, "if there is no special
characteristic which undergoes transformations" is "if there is no special characteristic as regards a gradually increasing (utteśrattara) force". (The increasing "force" of objects with which one becomes more and more familiar being held responsible for the increased rapidity, vividness of recall, etc, and this force being explicable only by means of latent impressions left with some continuous substratum of some sort). "As there are no impressions" means "impressions (left) by consciousness, etc". As regards the phrase "former experiences, cognitions, and passions", because they arose formerly, they are called "former". Among these formerly arisen experiences, cognitions, and passions, "experiences" are the experiences of blue, etc (which one has had), "cognitions" are certain recognitions or knowledges, etc. "Familiar" means "with which one is acquainted". The phrase "memories, cognitions, and passions" is to be understood as corresponding with the former experiences, cognitions, and passions, in the order in which they are presented. 73 Furthermore, he also says, "As this self would occur in these states that are without citta, (through what would it be that the mental consciousness later arises, as there are no special characteristics undergoing transformation within the self)?" As the adversaries hold that a consciousness, once interrupted, can arise only from the self74, [220,1] he says "as there are no special characteristics (undergoing transformation) within the self", (in order to show that such arising of a renewed mental consciousness through a self could only occur with a modification within the self). Thus there is also this flaw, if the self is admitted in such a manner.
To show that it is inadmissible (asahya) that existence separate from an efficacy-force (arthakriyāsakti) be existence, he says, "In what way is consciousness subject to it?", etc. The meaning of "subject to it" is "subject to the self". Here there are two conceptions: If it is considered that the self must be efficacious (kāryakara) in regard to the objects subject to it either gradually or simultaneously, it will be clear that it cannot be efficacious in regard to them simultaneously (to them), because an effect which is subject to something which is simultaneous to it, is never seen. On the other hand, as it may be said that it exercises its efficacy gradually, as it is imagined that the arising and abiding (of the consciousnesses) is subject to the self, he refers to this position regarding their arising with the sentence, "If their arising is (subject to the self), (why do they arise gradually as there are no special transformations within the self)?", and thus refutes a gradual efficacy (for the self). The meaning is that as there is no deficiency of the cause, this gradual arising is inappropriate (avyaya).

The adversaries may claim that there is not an absence of a deficiency of a cause (*hetuvāikalyabhavē nāsti), because the consciousnesses are produced in successive stages by the self, they being dependent on other auxiliary causes as well, and for this reason, he says, "If it is that they are dependent on other auxiliary causes, (why should these causes be acknowledged at all, since the force for making the consciousnesses arise lies in something which is apart from them)?" In regard to the phrase "If it is that they are dependent upon other auxiliary causes", the phrase "that they
arise gradually" is to be understood. (In the phrase "the force for making them arise lies in something apart from them"), "(apart) from them" means "(apart) from those auxiliary conditions". "In something apart (from them)" means "in the self". "For making them arise" means "for making these other consciousnesses arise". "Why should these be acknowledged at all?": the (implied) meaning is that they [220,2] should not be acknowledged. The full elucidation is as follows: If they are dependent upon (one set of) factors conducive (to their arising) (upakarana), and they arise gradually because they are dependent upon other auxiliary causes, they are not dependent upon any conducive factor different from these auxiliary causes, so why is there any need for a self, as they are not produced by it? Accordingly, if the consciousnesses arise in successive stages from auxiliary causes, the force (for making them arise) will be only theirs, and there is no self (acting here). Thus, the position referring to the arising (of the consciousnesses through the self) is contrary to fact.

Referring to the position regarding the stability (of the consciousnesses through the self), he says, "Now it may be claimed that their stability (is subject to it)." The meaning of "their stability" is "the fixity (prasatha) and abiding of the consciousnesses". "Is subject to it", i.e. "is subject to the self". (In the phrase "But what sort of a stability is there for things that cease to abide as soon as they have arisen"), "things that cease to abide as soon as they have arisen" are those that are destroyed immediately after having arisen. The meaning of "and which cannot be attained"
is that they are unattainable dharmas, as they have no substanti-
ality. As regards the phrase "What sort of stability is there?", the (implied) meaning is that there is no stability for things with such a nature. "Accordingly, (such an entity cannot be accepted as their substratum)", is the conclusion, as it has been demonstrated that (such an unchanging, stable entity) does not exist. The formulation of the argument is as follows: Whatever is separate from an efficacy-force is non-existent, as, for example, those things which are not entities. As the "self" is also separate from an efficacy-force, the logical pervader is not obtained, as there is a logical pervasion of existence by being possessed of an efficacy-force. Thus, its being possessed of an efficacy-force being false, the logically pervaded, its existence, is also false.

Having thus demonstrated its non-existence by reasoning, he says, "All dharmas are without a self", in order to demonstrate it also by scriptural authority. [220,3] The phrase "in this way" (within the sentence "And in this way there would be a violation of scriptural authority") means "if it is imagined that there is a self, a soul which is the factor of an internal sense". "Accordingly, the conception that there exists a lasting, independent entity, 'self', is a poor one": i.e. it is without justification, and illogical.

Thus having denied the adversaries' position in detail, he gives his conclusion with the statement, "Thus, (effects seem to be given at a later time by the store-consciousness having been affected by certain volitions)", in order also to demonstrate his own position.
The adversaries indicate a contradiction to scripture with the sentence "if bodily and verbal acts are not accepted in this manner, (is it possible to deny the statement of the sutra, which states that there are three kinds of acts)?" The (implied) meaning is that it is not possible. "In that manner" means "in the manner in which we have stated it" (i.e. in the Vaibhasika manner, where a bodily act is defined as an act committed by the body, etc). With the phrase "It is not possible", the Master makes his reply.

The speakers of the sentence "How will there not be a flaw?" are the adversaries. The speaker of the sentence "(It is our purpose to explain why it has been taught) here (that there are three kinds of acts)", etc, is the Master. The full elucidation is as follows: We intend first to state why this has been taught, etc, and afterwards the manner in which bodily actions, etc, are to be understood. "Why it has been taught that there are three(kinds of) acts" means with what intention (it has been taught), as the teachings of the Buddhas, the Exalted Ones, are not without an underlying purpose. The meaning of "What the body is" is what is expressed with the word "body", and the meaning of the phrase "What an act is" is what is expressed with the word "act". "In what sense (the passage speaks [220,4] of 'body' and 'action')" is a question referring to the sense of these words, and it means for what reason these words "body", etc, have been framed. "Similarly, (it is our purpose to state this also in regard to verbal and mental acts)" means that the questions "What is speech", etc, are to be asked in regard to them also, because
their characteristics are similar (to those of bodily action), and yet they have not been clearly ordered and explained. In the same way, it is our purpose to state "Why (the sutra has spoken only of bodily acts, etc, and not of acts of the eye, etc)". For our views regarding these acts of the eye, etc, should be clearly known.

42.

With the sentence "To begin with, why has this been taught in this manner?", he begins his replies to these questions one by one. "The ten paths of action" are the taking of life (prāṇātipāta), etc,* and their abandonment. "In order to summarise (the ten paths of action) with the three kinds of action" means in order to illuminate (prakāś-) them by summarizing them with the (concepts of) bodily actions, etc. Thus, three (among the paths of action) are summarized by "bodily action": the taking of life, taking what has not been given (adattādāna), and sexual misconduct (kāmamithyācāra), and (on the beneficial side), the abandonment of these. Four (are summarized) by "verbal action": false speech (mṛsavāda), slander (paśūnya), harsh speech (pārusya), and idle talk (sambhinnapralāpa), and the abandonment of these. Three (are summarized) by "mental action:" covetousness (abhidhyā), malice (vyāpāda), and wrong views (mithyādrstī), and the abandonment of these. As it may be asked to what sort of persons this was taught, he says "for those who would be frightened by the many things to be done". Those who would be frightened by many things

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*See the full enumeration just below.*
to be done are those that would become depressed, and think, "It is necessary for me to do so many things: all those duties characterized as the abandonment of taking life, etc!" As it may be asked where there has been a similar teaching by means of illumination through summary, he says, "Just as the three disciplines were taught to Vṛjiputraka for a similar purpose". This was as follows (yathā):

There was a man named Vṛjiputraka who upon hearing the two-hundred-and-fifty-one rules (pāda) 76, abandoned them, not being able to accede to them. (The Exalted One addressed him as follows):

"Vṛjiputraka, would you be able—Vṛjiputraka, could you exert yourself to discipline yourself well in three disciplines?" He replied, "I could exert myself, 0 Exalted One, (in three), 0 Sugata, I could guard myself (with three)"; and (the Exalted One replied), "Then, Vṛjiputraka, discipline yourself from time to time in the discipline of higher morality (adhīśīla), in the discipline of higher attitudes (adhicitta), and in the discipline of higher insight (adhiprajña)."**

With this teaching of the three disciplines of higher morality, etc, he summarized the two-hundred-and-fifty-one rules of discipline with these three disciplines. 76a

Furthermore, "certain people say that only (the actions) committed by the body (truly) exist", and for this reason, also, the three (kinds of) action have been taught. These "certain people" are the Tīrthaṅkaras. 77 "(They say) that verbal and mental (acts) both

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* Of the Prātimokṣa. In the Pāli Pātimokkha there are only 227.

do not exist, because they are only mental constructions", i.e. "because they are completely mentally constructed (parikalpita)\). Because (in their opinion) verbal and mental actions are both only mentally constructed, they hold that no vice (avadya) can be connected (merely with verbal and mental activities\). In the sentence "(And it was also to explain) to them (that these two are also action that the three acts were taught in this manner)\), "to them" means "to these people who speak in this manner", and "these two" are bodily and verbal actions.

43.

Having demonstrated that this has been taught (in this manner) for such reasons, he says, "The body (is a certain collection\ of primary and secondary materiality, a corporeal mass possessed of organs)\), in order to explain the expressed meaning (vācya) of the word "body". That (the body is) "a corporeal mass possessed of organs" has been explained in the sutras. With the phrase "a special collection of primary and secondary materiality", there is a fuller explanation.

With the sentence "Action is a special volition", he explains the expressed meaning of the word "action".

44.

With the sentence "A body exists in the sense that an accumulation exists", the word "body" is explained in summary. As it may be asked "in the sense of what kind of an accumulation?", he says, "For it is an accumulation of atoms of primary and secondary
materiality". "Certain people say that it exists only as an accumulation of defilements": these "certain people" are certain (undefined) people. The phrase "(that it exists only) in the sense of an accumulation of defilements" means that it exists only in the sense of something despicable. To explain in what manner it is despicable, they say that "the body is a well of impure entities". But the Master, in order to show that this thesis contains difficulties, replies that "following the views of these people, (there would be no bodies for gods)." Following the view of these people who claim that the body exists only in the sense of impurities, there could be no bodies for gods, (and this would also contain difficulties), because (it is commonly accepted that) their bodies are resplendent both without and within.79

45.

With the sentence "(An act is a certain conditioning of) the agent's (manas)" , there is a demonstration (of the meaning of) the word "act".

46.

With the sentence "(An act) which sets the body into motion (is called a bodily act)" , there is a demonstration (of the meaning) of the expression "bodily action". Anticipating that if from the prior thesis (pūrva-pākṣa) itself, it is called "that which sets the body into motion", (it must be explained) how it can be called "bodily action", as it would be necessary to call it "action which sets the body into motion", he says, "There are three kinds of
volitions: (that which prepares, that which decides, and that which 'sets into motion')", in order to insist upon his point. With this sentence, he at first simply analyzes volition, and afterwards, makes his reply. "That which prepares" is that which prepares the manas towards anything, [221,2] i.e. any volition dealing with its preparation towards this or that. "That which decides" (is that which decides) that such-and-such a thing should not be done, and such-and-such a thing should not be done, because there has been a deliberated judgement(*mīmāṃsāvibhāvanā). "That which sets into motion" is whatever volition exists afterwards, when the decision has been made. This same (volition) is explained with the sentence "(The one which sets into motion) is that through which (there is brought about the wind which is the cause for the arising in another locus on the part of the series which is possessed of it)." Now since (the body) is momentary (i.e. consists of series of momentary entities), how can there be a setting into motion of the body? It is for this reason that he speaks of the arising in another locus of the series which is possessed of it, "the series which is possessed of it" being any series connected with the volition, which has engendered the volition as it exists. 80

Having analyzed volition, he explains how the act which "sets the body into motion" is "bodily action", with the sentence, "It (is called 'bodily action' because the middle phrase which should properly be included within the term, has been ommitted)." "Because the middle phrase has been ommitted": means "because the phrase "which sets (the body) into motion" has been ommitted. "Just as one speaks
of 'medicinal balā-oil': Here, too, the middle phrase, which would make the term read "the oil prepared from the medicinal balā-plant", has been omitted. With "medicinal balā", the medicinal patelaka plant is to be understood. "Or of a dust-wind"—when what is meant is "a wind which raises dust". He gives various examples so that the (intended) meaning is clarified. It should be known that with this demonstration (of the true meaning of "bodily action"), he has replied to the former objection, "Is it possible to deny the statement of the sutras (which states that there are three kinds of acts)?", as in this manner he has stated that they refer only to [221,3] special kinds of volition. It will be seen in a subsequent reply that this applies also to verbal action.

As bodily action, etc, has been determined as being only a special kind of volition, the adversaries, in order to indicate a contradiction, say at this point, "(But as three divisions) of the paths of action (are admitted to be bodily action, how can this term refer to a volition)?" The elucidation is as follows: As bodily action has been analyzed into three parts with those paths of action "the taking of life, (taking of what has not been given, and sexual misconduct)", if according to your theory "bodily action" refers also to a volition, (it must be explained) how this conventional designation (vyāvahārikaprajñāpti) can be like this: Either it does not refer to the taking of life, taking of what has not been given, and sexual misconduct with women, or it does refer to these manifest bodily actions in that manner.
The Master makes his reply with the statement "(Because this killing and taking and misconduct take place) because of it". "Because of it" means "because of volition". With the sentence "(That which is committed by a bodily series) engendered by it (is said to be committed by it)", this same sentence is commented upon. "Just as one says 'a village burned by thieves' and 'rice cooked with grass'" for a village which has been burned by a fire kindled by thieves, and for rice which has been cooked by fire arising from grass. The meaning is that in this case, also, there is a similar situation. 82

The intention of the opponents in their statement "How (can a volition be called a path of action)?" is as follows: As the taking of life, etc, has the nature of bodily and verbal action, and it is appropriate that the paths of action be called so because (the actual physical activities) constitute a path, it is not appropriate to say that volition constitutes a path of action, even if it is [221,4] conceded that it may be bodily action, etc.

The Master makes his reply with the statement "Though it is also simply action, (it is also a path of action as it is the path which leads to the two kinds of destinies: good and bad)." "It is also simply action": because it is volition which properly has the nature of action. "As it is the path to the two kinds of destinies: good and bad" means because good and bad destinies evolve because of (volition's) nature's being beneficial, etc. He demonstrates the existence of another kind of "path of action" apart from volition when he says, "(Or, if you will, the path of action is) the motion
of the body". Here, "the motion of the body" is actually the former
cognition which perturbs (or agitates) the body. (?) Because it is
a path of action of sorts, it is possible to call it a "path of
action". But in order to show that it is perhaps not to be regarded
as a path of action, he says, "The three kinds of action which we
have called 'volition' (evolve dependent upon it)." "Evolve depend-
ent upon it" means that they evolve subordinate to the acquisition
(upalambha) of "a motion" in the body (and it is not until these
volitions manifest themselves that we can speak, for instance, of
benefic平ality). (?)

47.

Furthermore, "It is as a favor to worldlings that these (are
also described as bodily action)". The meaning is that though those
(activities) which are called "paths of action" are not in any way
(really action, as they do not of themselves possess benefic平ality,
etc), yet they are called "bodily action". And as it may be asked
why they are called "bodily action", he says, "As a favor to world-
ings". This is the manner in which it appears to worldlings, and by
a certain analogy, (they may be bodily actions), though in ultimate
reality (paramārthātas) they are not, as (properly) only certain
volitions can be designated in this way. The meaning of the phrase
"Though there is nothing benefic平al or unbenefic平al within them" is
because in ultimate reality, it is only in [221,5] certain volitions
that there is anything benefic平al and unbenefic平al, etc, there is
nothing of the sort in the body being set into motion. "They are
thus designated metaphorically means that though there is nothing (beneficial or unbeneficial within them), they are still metaphorically (designated in this manner). As it may be asked why there is this metaphor, he says, "Because by that means (the world will undertake resorting to, and abandoning, certain volitions)." The meaning of the phrase "because by that means" is by means of the setting into motion of the body, which depends upon volition. "Certain volitions" means those beneficial, etc., volitions, connected with setting the body into motion. The meaning of the phrase "the world will undertake resorting to, and abandoning, certain volitions" is that the world will undertake resorting to beneficial volitions, and will resort to abandoning unbeneficial volitions.

With the sentence "If only volition is beneficial and unbeneficial action, how is it that it was said in the sutras", etc., the adversaries indicate a contradiction to the sutras. (In the quotation from the sutras, "There is a threefold action, which, when committed by the body after having been intended, is accumulated as unbeneficial, giving rise to suffering, and having suffering as its retribution"), "the threefold (action)" refers to these special (paths of action): the taking of life, (taking of what has not been given, and sexual misconduct). "After having been intended" means "after having been intended, and not suddenly without previous consideration(sahasā), etc. Giving rise to suffering" means that it gives rise to torments, as it brings about a series of suffering (i.e. a physic-psychic series connected with suffering). "Having suffering as its retribution" means that it has an effect of suffering, as suffering is its
The sentence "The intention was to speak of the volition's medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness", is the reply made by the Master. The meaning is that it is only that which is committed by a volition through the medium of the body that is called "committed by the body". [222,1] The medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness are either to be explained (in reference to the three kinds of volition) in reverse order (i.e. the volition which sets the action into motion does so through the medium of the body, the volition which decides has the body as its substratum, and the volition which prepares has the body as its object-of-consciousness), or else these are to be taken as synonyms (parāya). Anticipating that the adversaries may think, "If bodily action, etc, is only volition, then what special characteristic is there for mental action?", he says, "The volition which is different (from those volitions having a medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness in the body or voice are called 'mental actions')". The meaning is "whatever (volition) which is different from the volitions supported by (nīśritya) the setting into motion of the body, etc, or whatever (volition) is not occupied in an object-of-consciousness referring to the body, (is designated in this way)". As it may be asked why it is called "mental action", he says "because it is associated with manas". The meaning is "because it is associated only with manas". As it may be asked
how it is that it is associated only with it, he says "Because it does not incite the body or voice".

With the sentence "If this is so, (how is it that the Exalted One has spoken of 'volition' and 'the act which is committed after having willed?'", the adversaries indicate another contradiction (to scripture). The meaning of "If this is so, how is it that the Exalted One (has spoken)" is "Why (has he spoken in such a manner in that case)?" The intention (of this statement) is: If there were no absence of another kind of action apart (from volition), then it would be appropriate to speak of "(an action committed) after having willed", because bodily and verbal acts would be truly (svabhāvatas) committed by volition, but as volition itself is bodily action, etc (according to your theory), it is not appropriate that anything be willed, and by the same reasoning, there is no activity (after having willed). 86

With the sentence "(Among the three kinds of) volition (which we have indicated) previously, it is the third which is called (an 'act committed after having willed')", the Master makes his reply, "The three kinds of volition which we have indicated previously" are the volition which prepares, (the volition which decides, and the volition which sets into motion). (In the phrase "since the body, etc, is incited by it after this has been willed by the first two volitions, it is the third which is called "action committed after having willed")", "by the (first) two volitions" means "by both (the volition) which prepares and (the volition) which decides". [222,2] "The third" means "(the volition) which sets into motion)." "By it" means "by the volition which sets into motion". 87
Having analyzed bodily action in that manner, and wishing now to explain verbal action, he says "'Speech' means 'words', i.e. these special vocal emissions which communicate meanings." "Those special vocal emissions which communicate meanings" are (such vocal emissions as) "Alas! Conditioned things are impermanent!", etc. "(The action is that volition) which brings it forth" means "which brings speech forth". With the sentence "(Something is speech) because it is certain sorts of syllables, (or inasmuch as it expresses a desired meaning)", he indicates that speech can be demonstrated in yet another manner. "Because it is certain sorts of syllables" means that a certain vocal emission is designated as speech when it has the nature of certain syllables, (which interpretation is) according to its true etymological meaning (niruktyarthat). But here again, also following its etymological meaning, a certain kind of vocal emission is designated as speech "inasmuch as it expresses a desired meaning", i.e. inasmuch as it expresses, or indicates to another, the meaning which is desired by the speaker. The meaning of "Just as before, (the action is the action which originates speech)" is that just as it was explained previously in reference to bodily action, that action is actually a certain conditioning of the agent's manas, so also (this same explanation of act) is to be seen here. "Because, just as before, the middle phrase has been omitted" means just as the middle phrases were omitted in expressions such as "medicinal bala-oil" and a "dust-wind", just so, here, in regard to "verbal actions", (a similar omission) is to be seen (since "verbal action" is
actually "that action, i.e. volition, which instigates speech").

49.

Having discussed (vyutpad-) verbal action in detail, he now says "Consciousness (is manas)", in order to demonstrate (the meaning of) mental action. The meaning of the phrase "Consciousness is manas" is that one is to understand "consciousness" as manas. In order to explain in what way consciousness is manas, [222,3] he says, "Because it produces a sense of ego", etc. The meaning is that it gives a sense of self (atmakaroti), i.e. because it produces a sense of ego with the concepts of "I" and "mine". Consciousness is also to be known as manas "(because it becomes intent on) other births (and objects of sense)". "Because it becomes intent on" means "because it alights upon", i.e. it is because of the efficacy of those events concomitant with citta (cittasamprayukta) that one is directed towards agreeable rebirths, such as the state of gods, and towards objects-of-sense such as visibles, etc. In the sentence "The rest is to be explained just as before", "the rest" means "action" and "mental action". It is to be explained as before, i.e. where it was explained that action is a conditioning of the agent's manas, and similarly, where it was explained that mental action is that action associated with manas, because it does not incite the body or voice. With this, the term "mental action" is also explained with an omission of a certain phrase, i.e. the phrase "associated with".

With the sentence "If (volition only is bodily action) (how can there be either self-control, or absence of self-control, in these who are of distracted citta, or without citta, as there is no
volition in these states), the adversaries state an objection. For those who are of distracted citta, there can be any cittas except the citta which takes hold of self-control, etc. For those without cittas, there can be no citta at all. "As there can be no volition (in these states)" means "as there can be no volition having the nature of bodily and verbal action". The meaning of "How can there be either self-control or absence of self-control?" is that there simply cannot be either of them (in those states).

With the statement "(Because the impressions left) by a special volition (have not been suppressed, both self-control and absence of self-control may exist in these states)", there is a reply (to this objection). These impressions are the impressions (left) by a special volition. "Have not been suppressed", [222,4] i.e. because these impressions left by a special volition have not been suppressed. What ensues (in this case)? That both self-control and absence of self-control may exist there. As regards the phrase "a special volition", the question may come to mind as to why the term "special" has been used. Therefore he says "The term 'special' (refers to that special volition which can be examined as originating the 'unmanifest actions' 'self-control' and 'absence of self-control')." "Which can be examined as originating the 'unmanifest actions' 'self-control' and 'absence of self-control'" means whatever can be examined as arising originating whatever "unmanifest actions" there may be, e.g. those having the nature of "self-control" and "absence of self-control".
With the statement "What is the suppression of these impressions?", the adversaries question the meaning of "suppression". The Master explains (the meaning) with the sentence "(As has been commonly acknowledged, this suppression is the absence of any cause for) a volition of either abandonment or non-abandonment (of the unfavorable paths of action)." Within the phrase "a volition of either abandonment or non-abandonment", a volition of abandonment is a volition which has self-control as its object (*samvārārthīcetana). A volition of non-abandonment is a volition which has absence of self-control as its object(*asamvārārthīcetana). As regards the phrase "the absence of any cause", there is an absence of causes, as those former impressions are the causes of the development of a volition. What is this (absence)? It should be understood that it is the suppression (we have mentioned).

The adversary questions the cause for this suppression with the sentence "Through what does the suppression take place?" With the sentence "(It takes place through whatever volition can be examined as originating a manifestation which is the cause for the rejection of) self-control and absence of self-control", its cause is explained by the Master. [222,5] The rejection of self-control and absence of self-control means the rejection of them both (simultaneously?). The cause for this is the cause for the rejection of self-control and the absence of self-control. Because it is both a cause for the rejection of self-control as well as for the absence of self-control, and it is also a manifest action, it is a manifest action which is the cause for the rejection of self-control and the
absence of self-control. What kind (of a manifest action) is it? The manifest action of rejecting the disciplines(sīksā) (undergone by a monk or lay Buddhist—cf. 42), and the manifest action of engaging(samudācār-) in them. It is through whatever volition which originates that manifest action which becomes the cause for the rejection, that the impressions (left by former volitions of self-control and absence of self-control) are impaired. "Other causes of rejection different from that" are the severance of the roots of the beneficial, (which destroys self-control), etc.

50.

The reply to the previously(cf end of 41) posed (question): "What is the explanation for the fact that only bodily actions, etc, are spoken of, and not actions of the eye?" is the sentence "Actions of the eye, etc, (are not spoken of by the Exalted One in the sutras, because he desired to speak only of those acts connected with an effort, and not of simple acts of performance)." The meaning of "connected with an effort" means "which conditions the manas towards the beneficial, etc".

The speaker of the sentence "What is an act connected with an effort?" is the adversary. The speaker of the sentence "Anything which conditions the agent's manas" is the Master.

The question "What is a simple act of performance" is posed by the adversary on this occasion in reference to the performance of the eye, etc.
With the sentence "(Wherever there is simply) the distinct force of the eye, etc, (there is a simple act of performance)"; the Master makes his reply. "Distinct" means that which exists separately for the eye, etc. The meaning of "force" is the (power to cause) the arising of visual consciousness, etc.

So that all sentient beings may obtain the supreme state (anuttarapada) through whatever merit (he may have gained) by having fully completed this Treatise, [223,1] the Master utters these verses:

"(Having explained) the three (kinds of) acts

(which were spoken of by the Exalted One, completely demonstrating them in a manner in which they had not been explained before,

with these solemnly declared demonstrations of actions, may the (beings in the) destinies, through whatever merit I have gained, obtain the purities belonging to the Buddhas)."

"The three (kinds of) acts" are the three: bodily action, (verbal action and mental action). "Which were spoken of by the Exalted One" means "which were declared in the sutras by the Exalted One". In order to explain what was the special feature of these acts, he says that "they had not been explained", i.e. they had not been fully analyzed. If it is asked by whom they were not fully explained, the remainder of the phrase which could be supplied is "by those who claim that objects of sense and understanding exist externally" (bāhyārthavādibhiḥ).90 As it may be asked in what manner they were not explained, he says "in a manner (in which they had not been explained before)," meaning that the three (kinds of) action had not
been explained and demonstrated in a manner following teachings conformable with Yogācāra theory. In order that one should understand that these Yogācāra theories are not simply framed through his own opinions, he speaks of "solemnly declared (demonstrations of actions)". The meaning is that the manners of explanation give above (within this Treatise) have all been declared in detail by the Exalted One in various sutras, such as the Sandhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra.91

The meaning of the phrase "with these demonstrations of actions", etc, is: "May all (the sentient beings in all) the destinies obtain the purities belonging to the Buddhas, by the merit which I have gained by explaining these demonstrations of actions! These purities are of two kinds: that which comes by overcoming the obstructions of the afflictions (kleśāvarana), and that which comes by overcoming the obstructions of the knowable (jñeyāvarana).92

Through whatever merit I have gained today

through this Karmasiddhițīkā,

may (the sentient beings in all) the destinies
obtain pure understanding,
and become utterly free of agitations.

The commentary on the Karmasiddhiprakarana, composed by Sumatiśīla, a teacher-monk residing in the Great Vihāra of Śrī Nālandā, ends here.

* * *

Translated by Viśuddhisimha, the preceptor from India, [223,2] and the translator-monk, the venerable Devendraraksita. Corrected and published by the revisor, the venerable dPal-brtsegs.
1. In Indian philosophical circles, when writing a treatise, it was customary to give a brief statement of its underlying purpose somewhere near the beginning of the text, usually immediately after the verses of homage. Thus Vasubandhu in his *Kośa* gives a statement of his general purpose (*Kośa* I, ad I, LVP, p 1), and in the *MVB* presents a framework of the topics to be discussed (*MVB* ad I, 1 a). Sumatiśīla himself gives us such an underlying purpose, immediately after his verses of homage to Mañjuśrī, the Bodhisattva of true intellectuality, who with his sword cuts away the ensnaring mental constructions. As the *KSP* is conspicuous by its absence of such a statement of purpose, Sumatiśīla is eager to supply it. The manner in which he does this is however somewhat curious. He has an opponent set up an entire inference proving that the treatise is absolutely without value. Maybe some student, tired of Sumatiśīla's Abhidharma lectures at Nālandā, had actually raised such an objection. At any rate, Sumatiśīla meets it, saves the *KSP*'s honor, and in so doing supplies us with the needed "underlying purpose".

2. In the context of logic, the Tibetan term "sbyor ba" is equivalent to the Sanskrit terms "pravoga" (*Mvt.* 2317) or "nibandhana" (*Lokes Candra*, p 1751). A "pravoga" is a complete formulation of an inference schema (cf. Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu*, 7; *Tikā* 22, 3, Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic II*, p 61, n), a "nibandhana" is the statement of the invariable connection of one object or property
with another (Nyāyakosā, p 423). In Sumatisīla, the first term seems the more likely, though it is interesting that his formulations always begin with a nibandhana. In the case of Sumatisīla, we are in fact justified in calling these formulations "formalizations" as well, since they are series of statements expressing the relations of properties in a manner fulfilling the strictest canons of formal logic. Their form is highly interesting, invariably conforming to the following pattern:

- **Udāharana:** statement of an invariable connection (nibandhana), plus an exemplification (drstānta)
- **Upanaya:** the application of the above to the special case in question (this member also serves as a hetu or justification)
- **Nigamana:** Conclusion.

As an example, let us take the formulation at KST 205, 3, 6:

- **U:** Whatever consists of various parts does not properly possess unity as, for example, "an army", "a forest", etc,
- **Up:** since "configuration" also consists of various parts
- **N:** "configuration" is not a single entity.

The terms of the inference are in a quite different order than in the usual Indian formulations, where the thesis (here included in the upanaya) always precedes the justification, and the exemplifications always follow. Precedence for Sumatisīla's manner of formalizing arguments may however be found in Dharmakīrti, who has the following example:
"Whatever is the product of an effort is impermanent, as a jar, etc, the sounds of our speech are products, thus the sounds of our speech are impermanent".

(Nyāyabindu 13).

But even Dharmakīrti does not use this manner of formulation with the strict consistency maintained by Sumatisīla.

3.

A "logical pervasion of X by Y" is the invariable concomitance of X with Y such that X("the logically pervaded") can never occur without Y("the logical pervader"). Its necessity for an inference of the type "X must exist because Y exists" was recognized already in the Nyāya-sūtras. But curiously enough, while the demonstration of a parallel instance was regarded as a necessary part of a valid inference in the Nyāya-sūtras, the statement of the logical pervasion itself could be omitted, to give an argument of the type:

Thesis: This mountain is fire-possessing (demonstrandum)
Justification: because it is smoke-possessing
Exemplification: just as a kitchen (is smoke-possessing and fire-possessing). (parallel instance)

As it is stated, such an argument can hardly be called an inference at all.

It is Vasubandhu himself who first discovered that a statement of the logical pervasion was a necessary part of the inference-schema. "The exemplification," he says, "must take the form of a
specific parallel instance 'like a kitchen', plus the statement of the inseparable connection 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.'"
(paraphrase of Vadavidhi, fragment 5). This discovery, which has sometimes wrongly been attributed to Dignāga, is of great importance, as it marks the beginning of Indian formal logic. It is also Vasubandhu who evolved one of the first more exact definitions of "logical pervasion". He reduces it to an inseparable connection (avinābhava) of the type: "Whenever Y is absent, X must be absent." (Vadavidhi, fr's 1-4). (Previous definitions had focused on regular co-existence(sahācarya): "Whenever X is present, Y is present", but these definitions were not strong enough to handle the principle of implication.) The Navya-Naiyāyikas later found instances where Vasubandhu's definition also doesn't work (Barlingay, A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, p 138 ff), and a fool-proof definition of "logical pervasion" became one of their main concerns (cf. Mathuranātha's Vyāptipañcakarahasya, given in Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, p 90 ff).

Relating the concept of logical pervasion to an inference, the property designated in the demonstrandum must always be the logical pervader, and the property denoted in the justification must always be the logically pervaded. Using Vasubandhu's method of formalizing an inference, we may re-phrase the "fire-smoke" argument as follows:
Thesis: This mountain is fire-possessing

Justification: because of its property of possessing smoke,

Udaharana: (and) whatever is smoke-possessing, that is fire-
(parallel instance)
possessing, as a kitchen

Potter has expressed the relation of the terms in a valid inference
by using a method resembling Venn diagrams:

\[ p \text{ - pakṣa} \]
\[ h \text{ - justification} \]
\[ s \text{ - demonstrandum} \]
\[ sp \text{ - parallel instance} \]

(Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, p 61).

It is however important to note a distinction between the Indian
inference-schema and the Western syllogism which Potter does not
make there, but which he has discussed subsequently ("Astītva,
jñeyatva, and abhidheyatva", Frauwallner Festschrift), and which
has also been noted by Barlingay (p 57), Motilal ("The Intensional
Character of Lākṣaṇa and Saṁkara in Nyāya-Nyāya", Indo-Iranian
Journal VIII, 1964, p 88f), and Daye ("Logic and Methodology in
Nyāya", p 16). The focus of the Indian inference-schema is always
on properties of individuals, rather than on their classes. Even
where classes are referred to, they must always be made up of exist-
ing particulars. There is thus an intensional rather than exten-
sional focus in Indian logic, with an emphasis on properties
(relations-in-intension). (Potter however speaks of the possibility
of "property extensionality" in his article.)
This focus explains the emphasis on the parallel instance, without which no inference-schema is held to be valid. The parallel instance ensures that the property X is non-empty and relates to actual particulars. The pakṣa itself must be either an existing particular, or consist of existing particular entities, the existence of which is guaranteed by direct perception. As Barlingay says, the mere study of logical principles in itself was never, except at a very late date, the aim of an Indian logician—only inference leading to the knowledge of a reality was for them a topic worthy of investigation (p 144, p 151).

4.

That a perceived object of sense or cognized object of consciousness cannot be regarded as anything but internal at the moment of its apprehension is one of the main points with which Vasubandhu closes his Viṃśatikā. That this is not the final point of his Yogācāra, and that this view cannot be equated to a Berkleyan idealism, becomes apparent when one goes on to the Trimsikā and Trisvabhāvanirdesa. "Jñeyādhyātmikavāda" however does not occur in the KSP, and in fact Sumatisīla may here be under the influence of Dharmapāla.
5.

Passages given within parentheses have been re-included in my translation from the *KSP* itself. Sumatiśīla here consistently abbreviates the statements, indicating the remainder with "*la sogs pa*".

6 and 6 a.

Sumatiśīla is somewhat jumping the gun by calling "manifest action" a conventional construction, as Vasubandhu has not demonstrated this yet. For the Vasālhasika, a citta may have as its effect-of-consciousness a future bodily action, since for him future dharmas exist.

7.


8.

That it is the intention behind an act that determines its beneficiality or unbeneficiality will be demonstrated in the *KSP* and *KST*. 
Barlingay says that "pramāṇa" can mean both a means of knowledge (which cannot be false) and a means of cognition (which can be false). Sometimes, the emphasis is on the means of cognition (true or false), sometimes on true knowledge, and its certain authority or evidence. (pp 14-18).

The problem of how many valid means of cognition there may be occupied many Indian philosophers. The Nyāya-Vaisesika schools recognized direct perception (pratyākṣa), inference (anumāṇa), analogy (upamāṇa), and appeal to authoritative scripture (śabda). Vasubandhu allows three: direct perception, inference, and appeal to authoritative scripture, though, as the argumentation in the Kṣaṇaṇiśīla shows, the last is used only as an ancillary to the other two. Sumatiśīla himself, who belongs to the post-Dharmakirti epistemological tradition, accepts only two: direct perception and inference. For all, direct perception is the most reliable of all the means-of-cognition, though the perceptions of one sense must sometimes be checked against those of another.

10.

A svabhāvahetu is a justification derived entirely from the nature of the object discussed. For instance, if something exists "having an origin" and "being produced from causes", we can arrive at the property "being non-eternal". (cf. Nyāyakosā, and Nyāyabindu 47, 6).
11.

The meaning of "tha mi dad pa" here is not entirely clear to me. If it does stand for "abhinna", this atomic theory is certainly not the one subscribed to by Sanghabhadra. It may be Vasumitra's, but seems more akin to that of the Bhadanta Dharmatrata. (See notes to Kosa I 43 in LVP's translation).

12.

On the component whole of the Vaisesikas, see KSP, note 11.

13.

A quilt may contain figures which may form a square when one section is looked at, but which may sub-divide into triangles, etc, if narrower divisions are observed. If one section of a quilt can be construed as containing diverse configurations, there is nothing which would keep one from maintaining any configuration there.

14.

We may perceive the outline of a group of trees before we distinguish the single trees, and yet the adversaries would not argue for the existence of an entity "configuration of the group" apart from the configuration of the single trees. In reality, the reasoning of the adversaries is inexact, for at the time when an object's main configuration is discerned, color is always discerned, also. Without the contrast of the colors of the distinguished object and the background, there would be no object visible at all.
There being no possibility for the apprehension of any configuration in the absence of contrasts of color, it appears that the Vaibhāṣīka position is refuted.

15.

The Tibetan has identical repetitions; the Sanskrit probably had synonyms. I will omit most of these identical repetitions in the future.

16.

Since the existence of a fixed number of "natures" within the universe is not to my knowledge an axiom of any Indian philosophy, this argument must probably be interpreted as follows: In the case of the phenomenon where a dharma exists in one locus, and subsequently doesn't, but a dharma exists in another locus which might be held to be identical to the first dharma, we cannot speak of a new nature which warrants the positing of a new dharma at the second locus, because the nature of the new dharma has in no way been changed or destroyed, as it exists in the dharma in the new locus. The exemplification demonstrates perhaps that the only manner in which "turtle-hair" could exist would be if "turtle-shells" no longer existed. To suddenly refer to the dharma in locus B as a new dharma is like designating a turtle-shell as "turtle-shell" in one moment, and in the next as "turtle-hair".
17.

The exemplification "jar" may be inadequate, though a jar also changes in contact with fire in a firing process. A better exemplification might have been "wood".

18.

This is an allusion to Nāgārjuna's dialectic in Mūla-Mādhyamika-kārikās, I. There Nāgārjuna says that assuming a cause for either the existing or for the non-existing entails an absurdity, for if the thing is already existing, it needs no cause, and if it is non-existing, then the cause is a cause of nothing. Sumatisīla's reply is ingenious and actually far less sophistical.

19.

If a special cause for each case of destruction is necessary, then destruction is no one thing.

20.

For homogeneous causes, see KSP, note 16.

21.

The question which arises here is whether this argument rests on an equivocation of the term "stability". However, if "stability" is defined as a lack of the propensity for change within the thing itself, then it would appear that Vasubandhu's argument is valid. For the thing's moving to another locus must be the result of such
a change within the thing itself, even if this movement to another locus is effected by another moving object impinging upon the thing, or by the removal of a supporting object. Since "stability" is the lack of a propensity, to speak of its suddenly becoming lost does not make sense, as Vasubandhu tells us. On the other hand, there must be a certain amount of this propensity for lack of change within the object, if it is to truly move, since true movement can occur only when the same object progresses to another locus.

This argument is an example of a prasanga, an argument which, in regard to a problem, raises all the possible alternatives, and demonstrates that each of them leads to an absurdity. This form of argumentation is the basic tool used by Nāgārjuna in the Mūla-Mādhyamika-kārikās and Vigrahavyāvartanī. It is found far less frequently in Vasubandhu, though Vasubandhu here demonstrates his familiarity, and considerable skill, with the method.

22.

Kumāralāta, the "mūlācārya" of the Sautrāntikas, has been variously dated. Péri ("À propos de la date de Vasubandhu", BEFEO XI, 1911, p 360) and Nobel ("Kumāralāta und sein Werk", Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, phil. hist. Klasse, 1928, p 2 ff) assume that he lived ca. 344-413. This is on account of his being dated ca. 890 after the Buddha's Nirvana by Chinese historians. But according to K'uei-ki (ad Siddhi II, 1, 36 b, p 48), he is stated to have lived in the first century after the Buddha's Nirvana. If Kumāralāta is the teacher of Harivarman
and Śrīlāta, as tradition affirms, he must certainly belong to a period preceding the fourth century A.D., since Harivarman's main work was translated already in the beginning of that century. The near-contemporaneity of Kumāralāṭa with Vasubandhu, which Pēri urges, is not even supported by the Chinese tradition, for Vasubandhu is there said to be born within 1000 A.B.N. Also, the Vibhasā already knows the Sautrāntikas by that name, and thus it is likely that Kumāralāṭa antedates that work.

Hsuan-tsang in fact tells us (Records of the Western Countries, II, p 302) that Kumāralāṭa was a contemporary of Nāgarjuna, Āśvaghosa, and Āryadeva. These four are referred to as Buddhism's "four suns" or "luminaries". The title of Kumāralāṭa's work mentioned here, "The Rising of the Sun", probably has nothing to do with this epithet, as Lamotte supposes (MCB IV-V, p 219, n. 31), but rather rests on the sun-similes beloved of this master (cf. the Dīpakāra's quotation from Kumāralāṭa ad 317, p 271). This treatise is frequently mentioned in Chinese sources as being one of the main philosophical works of Kumāralāṭa. There it is called (Pēri, p 361). Unfortunately this work is lost. In fact, the only work of Kumaralata's which has survived are fragments of the Kalpanāmandatikā, or Drstāntapāṇki, (from which the Sautrāntikas' other name, "the Dārstantikas", may be derived.) It is a collection of stories based in part on Āśvaghosa's Sūtrālaṅkāra.

From what Sumatiśīla tells us, the Sauryodayikas were apparently a certain branch of the Sautrāntikas which took the Sūryodaya as their main text.
23. i.e. the desire to move the hand sets into motion a special dharma which accounts for the continuation of the series in another locus.

24. i.e. through its effect being directly perceived, and from this directly perceived effect an inference of the cause being possible.

25. On the element wind as a cause of bodily motion, see KSP, notes 7, 17.

26. The great elements themselves are susceptible to cognition only by the tactual consciousness. Wind in particular can only be sensed by touch. Yet manifest action must be visible to others (see KSP, note 5).

27. In the original Sanskrit, probably the compound "asākyaputriyaṃ".
28.

This is at least what occurs conventionally speaking, when we say we have seen a manifest action. We actually imagine that we are seeing the movement of a hand to another locus. The color actually does not arise from a citta, but rather to a "seed", a latent cause ultimately linked to retribution.

29.

According to Kosa I, ad 30 a, the sense-field of visibles is beneficial or unbeneicial when it has arisen from a beneficial or unbeneicial citta, and is indeterminate in all other cases. This is the orthodox Vaibhāsika view, not Vasubandhu's, for it is the Vaibhāsika who is concerned with giving visible manifest bodily actions themselves the status of beneficicility and unbeneiciality.

30.

On the meaning of "unobstructed-but-indeterminate", see KSP, note 44 a.

31.

On the connection of unmanifest action and the meditational trances, see Kosa IV, LVP, p 13.
32.

Thus the statement of the Vaibhāśika, that there is always a previous citta, connected with a manifest action, projecting the unmanifest action, is not always so.

33.

For an explanation of this statement, see KSP, note 24.

34.

The only famous work by this name is the Śatagāthā of Vararuci, which is preserved in the Tibetan Canon. This work of folksy wisdom, rich in metaphor, does in fact allude briefly and derisively to the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the existence of the past and the future. This work is highly interesting for other reasons as well. It establishes that the traditional identification of Vararuci and the grammarian Kātyāyana must be taken seriously, since Vararuci here in one verse refers to himself as "Ka-ta-yā-ṇa" (v. 7). It also supports the account of Hsuan-tsang, who says that Vararuci was converted to Buddhism, and spent his last days in a Buddhist monastery.

"Kātyāyana" is of course a Brahminical gotra name. It was also the gotra of the author of the Jñānapraṇasthāna, the first "pada" of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Vararuci himself was apparently raised in the Brahmanical faith, and one of his works, the Candravākyas, deals with the establishment of the dates for the ancient lunar rites. But his Śatagāthā was written after his conversion to Buddhism, as much of its wisdom is very Buddhistic, and
it begins with a verse of homage to the Three Gems. Vararuci is
often mentioned in legends dealing with Kālidasā. This is not sur-
prising, as both he and Kālidasā were among the "nine gems" at the
court of Candragupta II. Vikramāditya. Thus he was in all probabil-
ity a contemporary of Vasubandhu's, as well. In some collections
of folk-tales, such as Somadeva's Kathāsaritsāgara (I, p 36 ff),
Vararuci Katyāyana is called a contemporary of Kings Nanda and
Candragupta Maurya. The confusion may rest on the intermingling of
the two great Candraguptas in the popular imagination.

Vararuci was a man of extraordinary erudition. According to
the Kālidāsa legends, his name was in fact equivalent to "erudition"
at the court of Vikramāditya. Aside from his forays into Buddhist
philosophy towards the end of his life, he is known for his command
of astrology and grammar. It is particularly as a grammarian that
he is remembered, for he wrote the earliest authoritative grammar
of the Prakrit languages (the Prakṛtaprākāśa with the auto-commentary
Prakṛtamāṇjari).

A more thoroughgoing refutation of the existence of the past
and future than is contained in the Satagāthā exists of course in

35.

In the Tibetan, due to the peculiarities of the Tibetan syntax,
the phrases are far enough apart to warrant some ambiguity. The same
was presumably true of the original Sanskrit.
36.

For the Vaibhāṣīka's maintaining the momentariness principle, see KSP, note 27.

37.

The action exercises its full efficacy, and "projects" its effect, when it is a present dharma. The later karmic retribution of an act is always spoken of as the act's "giving" its effect. As a present dharma projecting its full range of efficacy, the act is momentary. This is the Vaibhāṣīka reply to Vasubandhu's charge that its theory of past and future dharmas violates the momentariness principle. Vasubandhu never seems to fully reply to this Vaibhāṣīka explanation.

38.

"de ni gvi na'o/" is an idiomatic Tibetan expression, meaning "It is a poor (statement or argument)", according to Geshe Sopa.

39.

The projection of an effect is not the arising of a seed previously non-existent. It is rather the development of potentialities already present within the consciousness-series.
When one belongs to "the lineage of the Sravakas", this means that one is or has the capacity to become a Hinayana saint, i.e. an Arhat. The other spiritual lineages are those of the Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva (on these, cf. MVB ad III, 22 a). There may also be people of "indeterminate lineage", and those who have no spiritual lineage at all. (See the discussion of Dutt, Aspects of Mahayana and its Relation with Hinayana, pp 84-87, and Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp 51-53)

Sumatisīla's statement seems to mean that without "seeds" being present within the consciousness-series of an "individual", there would be no way to determine his spiritual capacities and predispositions. According to Yasomitra, when the Buddha recognized innate capacities in individuals, as he did in the case of Sariputra (Vinaya I, p 55; Asvaghosa, Sūtrālaṅkāra tr, Hubner, p 283), this rested upon his recognition of the "seeds" within the "individual's" consciousness-stream. ("Sautrāntikāḥ punar varṇayanti: bījam sāmartyāṃ cetaso gotram iti", quoted Jañi, Dīpa intr, p 116). Without the presence of such latent forces, it would be difficult to see how such "determination of ones spiritual lineage" could be effected.

Some of these arguments seem to be deliberately ignoring the Vaibhāsika manner of explaining the loss of full efficacy for past dharmas, and the anticipation of such efficacy for future dharmas.
Arguments against the idea of an underlying, unified self appear in 40.

On the "latent impressions", the traces left by past volitions and experiences, which remain in the store-consciousness and gradually effect clearly-experienced transformations of the consciousness-series, see KSP, note 58. The theory of a latent impression makes a special dharma for the arising of karmic effects unnecessary, since they can thus be explained as a gradual transformation of the consciousness-series. The theory of a latent impression is also far more economical, as it can explain memory and recognition. The Āryasāṁitiya and Mahāsāṅghika concepts of "the imperishable" and "the accumulated" cannot do this, as this special dharma arises only in the case of beneficial and unbeneﬁcial acts, according to their theory.

Memory cannot be accounted for by this special dharma. What is wanted is a factor which can account for memory and retribution.

This special dharma could account for memory only if it were not insisted that it is necessarily derived from beneﬁcial and unbeneﬁcial actions.
46. The lemon-flower argument is a rather inadequate argument by analogy.

47. Bodily and verbal actions are of a different order than mental actions, since mental actions preceding the bodily and verbal actions is what renders the latter beneficial, etc. Though it is true that bodily and verbal actions exercise an efficacy on the citta-series, their very origination is due to a previous mental action.

48. It would seem that contrary to what Vasubandhu and Sumatisīla say, the theory is actually cogent, as long as it is admitted that the material series has the capacity for retaining the seeds of the mental series.

49. The manner in which this phrase is to be inserted into the sutra is not at all clear. According to Majjhima I, 296, the bodily, verbal, and mental forces are all stopped in the attainment of cessation, and "mental forces" include concepts, volitions, and mental attention. But the sense-organs and consciousness remain in operation.
With this passage, can Vasubandhu really be called a "maintainer that the knowable exists within", as Sumatīṣīla claims? It is clear, at any rate, that Vasubandhu's Yogācāra can in no way be equated to Western idealism.

On the dependent origination links, see MVĀ ad I, 11.

It is the thesis of the Karmaprajñāpāti that the attainment of cessation is basically indeterminate. The final cessation of Nirvana is not a real entity to Vasubandhu, but only the discontinuation of the psycho-physical complex of the "individual".

On the relation of the afflictions to the obstructed-indeterminate, see KSP note 44 a.

Even with a meditational attainment of the sort that allows transitions from one sphere to another, there can be only a gradual descent from the highest meditations. The greatest descent that can be effected is by skipping one meditational stage, e.g. falling from the fourth to the second (Kṣaṇa VIII, ad 18-19, LVP, p 173). One can thus fall from the attainment of cessation only as far as
the meditational stage where one is focused on nothing whatever. And a citta in the attainment of nothing whatever cannot possibly be of the realm of desires, as even the first meditational trance belongs to the "realm of materiality". (cf. KSP, note 23).

54.

The attainments work against retributinal materiality—in fact, this is one reason for practising them.

55.

On the realms, see KSP, note 23.

56.

The expression "gnyer gsad" is not found in any lexicon available to me, but means "study", "make an effort to explain", according to Geshe Sopa.

57.

Biological conception is analyzed already by Caraka as the combination of the semen of the father with the internal blood of the mother, with the intervention of a consciousness from a previous life-source. Caraka, Samhita, "Sarirasthanam", adhyaya 3, v. 3, Rajeśvaradatta Sastri ed, p 851: "Puruṣasyaṇupahataretasah striyās cāpraduṣṭa-yoni-sonita-garbhasayā yadā bhavati samsargah rtukāle, yadā canayos tathāyukte samsarge sukra-sonita-samsargam antargarbhasayā-gatam jīvo 'vikrāmati sattva-samyogat tada garbho
'bhinirvartate." "Conception takes place when sexual intercourse occurs, during the first sixteen days after the completion of the menstrual period (rtukāla), between a man whose semen is unaffected by disease, and a woman whose vagina, blood, and uterus have no defects, and when during such intercourse between the two, the semen and the blood combined finds its way to the uterus, and life-force enters it due to attachment to existence (on the part of a consciousness previously within another body which has died)."

In another passage, Caraka specifies this blood of the mother to be the same as the blood appearing in menstrual flow. ("Śarīrasthānam", adhyāya 4, 7: "Bījarūpo dhātuḥ puruṣa-śarīrād abhinispattyōcitena pathā garbhāsāya anupraviśya ārtavenābhīsaṁsargam eti." "That ingredient like a seed (i.e. the semen) issues out from the body of the man, and entering the uterus by the passage already indicated, comes to mingle with the menstrual blood (of the woman)."

Vasubandhu took over Caraka's description of biological conception, differing but little with the theories of the "Great Physician" (Kośa III, ad 15, LVP, pp 51-52).

58.

The Sanskrit root ci- (cinti) "to amass", is here considered the etymological base of the word "citta". It is thus called, according to the Kośa, because various impressions are amassed by means of these basic psychological events. (cf. Kośa II, ad 34 a-b).
59.
This is a second, and less viable, etymology for "citta", deriving it from "citra", "variegated", "manifold".

60.
Or; "Whatever is a collection consisting only of the various kinds of seeds, is designated in this way". See KSP, note 57.

61.
Sumatisīla's attribution of these verses to Asvaghosa is startling, as it supports the traditional Chinese view that Asvaghosa was not only a patriarch of the Mādhyamikas, but equally one of the Yogācārins. It even gives some credence to the Chinese tradition that The Awakening of the Mahāyāna Faith, which uses the concept of the store-consciousness, is by Asvaghosa. Modern scholarship has doubted this attribution on doctrinal and stylistic grounds, moreover, does not appear in The Awakening of the Mahāyāna Faith, which touches on similar ideas with quite different similes. Certainly, a detailed investigation of the works attributed to Asvaghosa, of which quite a number are preserved in Tibetan, is a desideratum. Many unsuspected things might be revealed.

62.
On the "āṇrayas" or "supports"/"substrata", see KSP, note 3.
Only the retributory consciousness, as it is conceived by Vasubandhu, has the non-ephemeral nature necessary for such an action.

The Buddhist Eight-Fold Path is of course the primary obstacle to the residues of afflictions.

The same principle is employed in KSP 8, c.

It is only some substratum-consciousness which will prevent death at a time when all mundane consciousnesses are reversed.

This is an embarrassing juncture for all those who wish to determine "subconscious" elements. See also Sthiramati, Trimsikavijnaptibhasya, who raises identical questions.

Yes, but many do not admit the existence of such a consciousness. The argument seems to be an ad hominem, and quite poor.

All dharmas with outflows, or susceptible to being associated with outflows, (cf; KSP, note 44 a) have to be subsumed under one of the appropriating aggregates materiality, feelings, conceptualizations, psychic formations, and consciousness-perceptions. This
principle is enunciated already in Theravāda Abhidharma in the Dhātukathā, in Sarvastivāda Abhidharma in the Dhātukāya.

66. On volition and the psychic formations, see Kośa I, ad 15 a–b, LVP, p 29.

67. On the mutual relationship of the store-consciousness and vijñanas I–VI, see Asanga, Mahāyānasāṃgraha I, 17, p 35.

68. The seed metaphors seems here to vitiate the existence of the store-consciousness, rather than support it.

69. The store-consciousness consists actually of a series of momentary entities, altered by conditions such as the impressions of the seeds it holds, but continuing constantly "in a stream" in such a manner that it can be held to be a non-ephemeral event, and thus unlike vijñanas I–VI. Or more accurately, the store-consciousness may be regarded as being the changing series of seeds, which however is not interrupted until final cessation.

70. Siddhasadhana is a flaw in Indian dialectics, and consists of making a point which is obvious to everyone, and so not worthy of debate.
71. Efficacy (arthakriya) and entitiness: Arthakriya is not the mark of the sva-laksana even in Dignāga (cf. Hattori, n. 1, 14, p 80), but is an addition of Dharmakīrti. (cf. Hagatomi, "Arthakriya", Brahmaidya 31, 1961, pp 52-73. Sumatiśila is here betraying his true allegiances, as the philosophically dominant school at his time was that of Dharmakīrti. To the Vaibhāṣika, efficacy is a mark of the present thing, not the existent thing. Vasubandhu's criteria for entitiness have been discussed already at KSP, note 5 a.

72. Again there were probably synonyms rather than identical words in the original Sanskrit.

73. Memory explained by the store-consciousness.

74. For Kanāda, all consciousnesses arise from self. (cf. Vaisesika-sūtras IV, II, 3).

75. "loči ba" lit. "weight". Both "loči ba" and "ltung ba" are unclear to me. They are also not very clear to Geshe Sopa.

76. Presumably of the Prātimokṣa, though in the Pāli version of this text there are only 227 rules.
76 a.

Poor Vrjiputraka was cheated.

77.

"Tīrthāṅkaras" is the name given by the Jains to their completely enlightened saints. Some of the Jain sūtras actually do state that mental acts and intentions are only "half-acts", and do not carry as great a retribution as actual physical acts (Uvāsakadasaṇa, pp 83, 165, 179). The Sūtrakṛtāṅga however clearly states that even an unfulfilled evil intention has its bad retribution (I, I, 2,23-30). But it clearly mocks the ancient Buddhist focus on volition (which is again taken up by Vasubandhu after the Vaibhāsikas had let the emphasis somewhat drop). For the Jains, any physical action, whether intentional or unintentional, carries the same kind of retribution, and it is chiefly physical action which receives their full attention. The Sūtrakṛtāṅga has a Buddhist say: "If one thrusts a spear through the side of a granary, mistaking it for a man, or through a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it, one will be guilty of murder according to our views. If one puts a man on a spit and roasts him, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, or a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder, according to our views. If anybody thrusts a spear through a man or a baby, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, puts him on the fire, and roasts him, that will be a meal fit for the Buddhas to breakfast upon." (II, VI, 26-29).
An "activity", in Sumatīśīla's vocabulary, is any act, whether it results in retribution or not. "Act" and "action" are reserved for those acts that have retributitional results.

Alas, I know not where!

On the fascinating question of which gods have bodies (a topic of vast relevance today), please consult the third chapter of the Kosa.

This is the standard Vasubandhu explanation of "motion".

However, according to Avinash Chunder Kaviratna, Ayurvedic physician and translator of Caraka, the two plants are different. "Patola" is Trichosanthes dincia Rox (p 293, n 9), whereas "balā" is Sida cordifolia (p 281).

cetanā→kāyasāṃtāna("movement")→prāṇātipāta called "done by cetanā"; brigands→fire→burning of village / "committed by brigands"

I am not certain this is what is intended, but it is consistent with Sumatīśīla's main purpose.
84. Crimes of sudden passion apparently do not carry as much retribution as crimes which have been deliberated for a long time.

85. Since if the act which is committed by the body itself is beneficial or unbeneficial, Vasubandhu's thesis reducing beneficiality and unbeneficiality to volition obviously cannot hold.

86. An act which is committed upon volition would of course not be accepted as being something distinct by some modern philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle—or rather, the volition would not be separable from the overt act (Concept of Mind). Vasubandhu's view, a rather more reasonable one, is just the opposite.

87. The differing syntax of the English and the Tibetan have made some changes necessary in my translation of the glosses.

88. The root vac in Sanskrit means both "to utter" and "to communicate" (Apte, p 1379-1380). The noun "vak" is being derived from the root in both these meanings.
89.

The particular Yogācāra manas, i.e. ego-consciousness, the seventh consciousness discussed by Asanga, may be intended here. On the other hand, any citta may be held responsible for a sense of ego, and for attachments to objects-of-sense, etc.

89 a.

Cetanā needs a citta as its substratum, cf. Asanga, Mahāyānasamgraha VIII, 2.

90.

This "bāhyārthavādinah" phrase is a spring-board to go from here to further Yogācāra analysis.

91.

Sumatiśīla is here assuming too much, or too little. As Vasubandhu's verse itself clearly states, his manner of filling holes in the karma theory is original to him. But as originality is never in itself a desideratum in a traditional society, Sumatiśīla wants to make sure that we are aware of the vast sūtra literature inspiring the Yogācārins. The mention of the Laṅkāvatāra makes it clear that this sūtra stands in no opposition to Yogācāra theory, as has sometimes been supposed. Another marvellous sūtra Sumatiśīla could have mentioned in this context is the Suvarnaprabhāsa.
92.

The "obstructions of the afflictions" or "obstructions consisting simply of afflictions" are the afflictions themselves, the only obstructions recognized by Hinayana. "The obstructions of the knowable" are factors which are not afflictions in themselves, but which obstruct one in fulfilling the Mahayana. They are mainly intellectual attitudes. Examples are given and discussed by Vasubandhu in his MVB II, ad 4-8.
VASUBANDHU: Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya

I.

Reverencing both this Treatise's author, the son of Sugata*, and its expounder to us and others**, I will attempt to explain its meaning.

The author has at first set down a framework for his treatise, which goes as follows:

"Characteristics, obstacles, reality, the cultivation of antidotes, one's situations there, the attainment of the fruit, and the supremacy of the vehicle"  I 1 a

That is to say that the following seven topics are dealt with in the treatise: the main characteristics of beings and the world, their obstacles, reality, the cultivation of antidotes to the obstacles, situations that may arise in this cultivation of antidotes, the attainment of the fruit there, and a path to the attainment of the fruit, a path having no superior.

Referring to the characteristics, the author says:

* Maitreyanātha, one of the most original but enigmatic minds of India under the Guptas, considered to be one of the earliest Yogācāra philosophers, is the author of the Madhyāntavibhāga (roughly "Separation of the Middle from Extremes"); to which this work by Vasubandhu is a commentary.

** Asanga, pupil of Maitreyanātha, and elder brother of Vasubandhu, systematized the theory of the ālaya-vijñāna(store-consciousness) which plays no part in Maitreyanātha's system, but is amenable to it. It is through his brother that Vasubandhu became interested in the works of Maitreyanātha, which seem to have had a greater fascination for him than Asanga's own.
"There is the imagination of unreals; duality is not found there. But emptiness is found there, and it is found in emptiness as well." I 1.

In this passage, "the imagination of unreals" is the constructed discrimination between the object grasped and the grasper, the "duality" is the object grasped and the grasper, and "Emptiness" is what results when the imagination of unreals is separated from the idea of the object grasped and the grasper as being two distinct entities. This imagination of unreals is found to be in emptiness, that is to say, when this process has taken place, it is seen that this imagination itself has constructed anything that would make it other than emptiness.

"Therefore, everything springs up neither as empty nor non-empty, because of its existence, its non-existence, and its existence, and this is the Middle Path." I 2.

Everything that springs up in experience is not empty, because there is emptiness and the imagination of unreals. It isn't non-empty because of the idea of there being distinction between the object grasped and its grasper being present (which idea is void). That which is conditioned we term "the imagination of unreals", and that which is unconditioned we term "emptiness". Everything that springs up in experience is called neither empty nor non-empty because of the existence of the imagination of unreals, because of the non-existence of the two (grasper and grasped as things apart), and because of the existence of both emptiness in the imagination of unreals, and of the imagination of unreals in emptiness. And
this is the Middle Path, that everything is neither totally empty nor totally non-empty. This is why the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras continually say, "All this is neither empty nor non-empty."

The author describes the special characteristic of the imagination of unreals as follows:

"Consciousness springs up as the appearance of the objects of the senses and of understanding, and as the appearance of sentient beings, self, and cognitions. If it has no real objects, then in their absence, it itself is not." I 3.

In this passage, the appearance of objects of senses is that which appears because of the presence of visibles, etc. The appearance of sentient beings is that which appears because of there being sense-organs abstractable in the life-continua of one's self and others. The appearance of self is simply an afflicted conception that appears because of delusions of permanence, "own-nature", and limitations superimposed upon the ever-changing life-stream that exists at the bottom and top of what is called "I". The appearance of cognitions is the taking shape of the six consciousnesses. He (the author) can say that consciousness has no real separate objects, because of the lack of clearly-cleaved identities that would make objects and beings absolutely apart, and because of the changeable forms of the appearances of self and cognitions. But if consciousness has no real separate objects, then it is absurd to speak of consciousness, as if it were something apart, and as a matter of fact, "consciousness" is here nothing more than a fixed, hence unreal, imagination. And yet the very fact of this imagination points
to a consciousness, which, however, is nothing fixed.

"Consciousness' character as the imagination of unreals can be established, because it does not exist in the manner in which it often appears, but it is not totally non-existent".

1 4.

It is not totally non-existent, of course, because of the actual arising of this much confusion! Furthermore, it couldn't be simply non-existent because, as the author says,

"An emancipation through its extinction is what we are striving for." I 4 b.

If it didn't exist, purely and simply, then there would be neither bondage nor emancipation, and this would mean denying the fundamental facts of affliction and alleviation.

Having explained the own-nature of the imagination of unreals in this manner, the author proceeds to explain its comprising characteristic. Even within the imagination of unreals itself, there are comprised three natures:

"The constructed, the relative, and the fulfilled, arise from the objects of sense and understanding, the imagination of unreals, and the absence of all dualities." I 5.

Actually, "objects of sense and understanding" are equivalent to the constructed, illusory nature. The imagination of unreals is equivalent to the relative nature, and the absence of any distinctions between the object grasped and its grasper is equivalent to the
fulfilled nature.*

*These are the "three natures" (tri-svabhāva), the acceptance of which marks a Buddhist philosopher as "Yogācāra". Over against Nāgārjuna, the Yogācārinīs, beginning with Maitreyanātha, assert that the division of experience into two natures (the saṃvṛti and the paramārtha—the universe of discourse and inexpressible but experiential Reality) is basically sterile. Not that the goals of Nāgārjuna and Maitreyanātha are really that different: both seem to be motivated by a desire to extricate people from ensnaring conceptions and to hint at "a realm of infinite possibilities", but their upāya's are basically different. Nāgārjuna's method is abrupt and on the surface destructive, at least in his stricter works like the Mādhyamika-kārikās and the Vigrāhavyāvartani. He smashes a variety of clear-cut theories, makes the creation of any clear-cut theory basically impossible, but remains often extremely reticent in expressing his own motivations. Maitreyanātha's and Vasubandhu's methods are in a sense more gradual—you are "strung along" further, in one sense, because layers of therapeutic theories are expounded, none of which retain their literal significance once they have attained their real aim, but in the course of all this the authors' intentions are openly expressed at various levels. They often find the Mādhyamika lacking in effective upāya. To their feeling, Mādhyamika does not make the existence, the reality of confusion and suffering clear enough. The upāya of dividing reality into three, rather than two, fulfills this purpose as well as many others, if it is correctly understood. What I translate as "the constructed" is the parikalpita, that which is fixed, clearly ordered, and static. It exists because of the imagination of unreals, and it may fulfill very useful purposes, but complete reliance on it, or any attempt to force experience to fit it, is bound to lead to all kinds of anguish. In fact according to the Yogācārinīs, it is the chief reason why things get screwed up. A state where its constricting hold is no longer felt, where one is "free", is however possible, and this state is called the "fulfilled", the parinīpāna. So you'll hear it said that "The parinīpāna is equivalent to the non-existence of the parikalpita". It is a state where the parikalpita (all the parikalpita, even therapeutic varieties such as the Mādhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and, hopefully, what I am writing here) is seen as totally fictitious. The relative, the paratantra, is the connecting link, and in a sense the only one of the three that really deserves the title "nature" or "own-being". It is equivalent to the old Buddhist conception of pratītyasamutpāda, dependent origination, and in that sense equivalent to "the realm of infinite possibilities", or rather "infinite possibilities and actualities". It is the imagination of unreals, because it has the potentiality of superimposing over itself the web of the parikalpita (the imagination of unreals is itself, you see, sublimely real) but it also has the potentiality of getting rid of the constricting hold of that parikalpita altogether. The "parikalpita" and the "parinīpāna" are really only the paratantra in different states. In the parinīpāna, the paratantra exempt
Next the author illuminates the characteristic within that imagination of unreals, allowing it to penetrate its own non-existent character.

"A non-apprehension comes about dependent on apprehension, a non-apprehension comes about dependent on this non-apprehension." I 6.

A non-apprehension of objects as separate objects of sense and understanding comes about depending on the apprehension of the idea that everything is cognition-only. (vijñaptimātra). Accordingly, a non-apprehension of "cognition-only" comes about depending on this non-apprehension of objects. And thus it enters into the non-existent character of object grasped and grasper.

"Thus it is established that this 'apprehension' has the nature of a non-apprehension". I 7,a

because of the impossibility of a true apprehension in the absence of a separate object for apprehension.

"Because of this, it should be known that there is an identity between apprehension and non-apprehension". I 7.

Because of the inability to establish an apprehension through its apprehending anything. Nevertheless, it is called "apprehension" because of the appearance of objects of understanding that are not real. Or one can also say that it is "apprehension" inasmuch as it appears as an unreal object. But it really has the nature of a non-

from all parikalpita, there is of course also no "parinispanna"—i.e. there is no goal "parinispanna" except when there are the afflictions of the parikalpita, and there is, of course, no conception of "parinispanna" in a realm that has freed itself of conceptions. The paratantra, i.e. Samsara or Nirvana-Samsara, cannot be denied in a similar fashion, because we really have no concept of it at all.
apprehension.

Next, the author mentions the imagination of unreal's characteristic of being divided.

"And the imagination of unreals is the cittas and caittas of the three realms." I 8a.

That is to say, it exists with the division of experience into the ordinary sphere, the sphere of simple images, and the imageless sphere. [The three conventional spheres of experience according to earlier Buddhism, the last two representing transic states.]

"Cittas" and "caittas" are synonyms for the imagination of unreals.

"Viewing an object there, is citta; viewing it in its special qualities, are the caittas." I 8

Viewing in terms of a simple object is a citta; viewing in terms of the special qualities of an object are the caittas (caitasikas) i.e. the ākandhas feeling and conception, and motivating dispositions such as longing, conviction, memory, shame, vigor, hate, etc.

Then the author explains the imagination of unreal's characteristic of evolution.

"One factor can be called 'the condition-consciousness', another is the experience" in the latter are the caittas that experience, discern, and impel." I 9

Because the store-consciousness is the conditional ground for all the other consciousnesses, it is here called "the condition-consciousness". Conditioned by it, there are the evolving consciousnesses that make up the experiencer. Experiencing itself is basically
feeling, discernment involves conception, and the impellers of consciousness are the motivating dispositions, such as longing, etc.

Then the author proceeds to discuss the imagination of unreal's characteristic of having afflictions.

"Because of 'concealment', 'planting', 'conducting', and 'holding fast', because of 'completion', the triple discernment, experiencing, being pulled along, because of confinement, confrontation, and the more palpable states causing suffering, the living world is afflicted."

I 10 and lla.

In this passage, "concealment" means the obstruction of real vision that comes about through nescience; "planting" means the setting up of karmic impregnations through consciousness by the motivating dispositions, "conducting" means the acquisition of a locus for the further arising of consciousness, "holding fast" means holding fast to the idea of an unalterable, permanent self, "completion" is the filling up of experience done by the six sense-fields, the "triple discernment" is the triple determination of sense-organ, object, and corresponding consciousness, the "experiencing" is feeling, the "being pulled along" is that which comes about through the insatiable cravings propelled by the parikalpita, "confinement" is the resulting further construction causing further cravings, "confrontation" is the resultant staring into despair, and the more palpable states causing suffering are those that do not arise directly from the parikalpita such as disease, hunger, old age, etc. The living world is afflicted by all of these.
"Threefold, two fold, and sevenfold affliction, because of the imagination of unreals." 11.

Afflictions are threefold: the affliction of afflictions proper, the afflictions of karma, and the affliction of birth. Among these, nescience, craving, and clinging are the afflictions proper, motivating dispositions and becoming are the afflictions of karma, and the afflictions of birth are the rest of the limbs of dependent origination.

Dependent origination (traditional formulation)

Nescience → motivating dispositions → consciousness → conceptualization with material basis → 6 sense-fields → contact → feelings and accompanying further conceptions → craving → clinging → becoming rigidification of personality and potentiality for rebirth → old age and death. This ancient scheme can be judged in almost any order, and has been explained "embryologically" as well as "taking place in a single moment."

Afflictions are twofold: causal and resultant. Some minor afflictions may give rise to greater ones through the power of the parikalpita; some great ones may be in themselves dead-ends, but none the less afflictions. Afflictions are sevenfold: These are essentially causal afflictions in their seven modes: the cause of error, the cause of being thrown forth, the cause of conducting, the cause of being pulled along, and the cause of harrassment. Among these, nescience as to the nature of the imagination of unreals and emptiness is the cause of error, motivating dispositions are the cause of being thrown forth, consciousness is the cause of conducting,
conceptualization and the six sense-fields are the causes of holding fast, and that which cannot be attained and is striven for, that which cannot be erradicated and is attacked or shunned, the cause of harrassment.

We have discussed various characteristics of the imagination of unreals and its results. We should now look towards its antidote, emptiness,

"The absence of duality, and the presence of this absence, is emptiness." I 12

It is the absence of a duality between the object grasped and its grasper. The author says that it is also the presence of this absence, and this he does to show that emptiness is both an absence, and a present own-nature. Thus, in a sense, it is, as he says,

"neither a presence nor an absence".

It is

"a characteristic neither one nor different from"

the imagination of unreals. If it were different, the real nature of a dharma would be different from the dharma itself, since emptiness is the real nature of the imagination of unreals. To speak of emptiness and the imagination of unreals as being different would be as absurd as speaking of "impermanence" and "suffering" being things different from impermanent and suffering beings themselves. On the other hand, emptiness is that by which there arises freedom from affliction, and the imagination of unreals, inasmuch as it gives rise to the parikalpita, is a cause of affliction, thus they are not one.
the emptiness of non-rejection. Finally,
"to receive the characteristics and secondary marks of a great man, and for the purity of the Buddha-dharmas, the Bodhisattva has recourse to objects of understanding". I 18

Emptiness is further
"the absence of any fixed personality or dharmas". I 19 and
"The existing presence of this absence in him is another emptiness." I 20

These two verses are brought forward in order to show that emptiness is both the nature of Samsara, and the realization of this nature.

"It is neither of itself completely afflicted or unafflicted" I 21

Both affliction and alleviation from affliction come about in emptiness, since emptiness is the fluxional nature of the world itself. But the insight into it leads to alleviation, because it puts false thought-constructions, fears, inactivity, and doubts to complete rest.

II. The Obstructions or Obstacles

Concerning the obstacles, the author says:

"The pervading and the limited ones, the excessive and the equal, abandoning the taking up, are called obstructions of the two." II 1

In this passage, the "pervading one" is for those of the lineage of the Bodhisattvas, the obstructions consisting simply of afflictions,
and the obstructions of the knowable. Because to the Bodhisattva, both are obstructions. The "limited one" is the obstruction to the lineage of the Śrāvakas, which is affliction only (i.e. the sole goal of the Śrāvakas, that is the followers of the Hinayana, is the eradication of their own affliction.) The "excessive" is the obstruction in those of violent, empassioned deeds. The "equal" is that in those who make everything alike. The obstruction of abandoning the taking up of Samsara pertains to the Bodhisattvas, because of the danger of seeking a Nirvana without abode (i.e. a Nirvana outside of Samsara). Furthermore,

"The characteristics of the obstructions that are simply affliction are nine-fold, being the fetters." II 1b.
The nine fetters are obstructions. To what are they obstructions?
"to excitement and to equanimity." II 2 a.
The fetter of complacency is the obstruction to excitement, and the fetter of aversion is the obstruction to equanimity. Because of the latter, one cannot stay calm in face of the disagreeable and hostile.
The rest of the fetters are obstructions to the seeing of reality. How does this occur?
"Leading towards the view of unalterable self, obstructing insights regarding this and "exterior objects", regarding the extinction of suffering, the Path, the Gems, others' attainments, towards knowledge regarding the evil of hoarding." II 3 a
The fetters become specific obstructions. The fetter of conceit becomes an obstacle leading to the view of an unalterable self.
This is because this view has not been cast off through proper action working against the conceit that those things within me and outside me are unalterably "mine". The fetter of nescience is an obstacle towards knowledge about exterior objects and the view of an unalterable self. This is because it is a lack of knowledge concerning the appropriating skandhas. The fetter of adherence to fixed theories is an obstruction to the knowledge of the truth of the extinction of suffering. This is because such adherence goes against the possibility of the extinction of suffering, because of the various anxieties produced by such false views, such as the view of an unalterable self, or fixed views regarding the permanence or impermanence of the elements of personality. The fetter of adherence to mere rules and rituals is an obstruction to the knowledge of the real truth of the Path. The fetter of constant doubt is an obstruction to the knowledge of the Three Gems (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha), because it involves a lack of confidence in the qualities of these three. The fetter of envy is an obstruction to satisfaction in others' attainments. The fetter of selfish greed leads to a lack of recognition of the anxieties caused by hoarding. [Vasubandhu has here noticeably altered the old Buddhist list of "the fetters",\textit{samyojanāni}:]

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textbf{Vasubandhu, MVB} & \textbf{Old Buddhist List} \\
māna - conceit & māna \\
avidyā - nescience & avidyā \\
\textit{drsti}-satkāya-\textit{drsti}- view of a fixed self & satkāya-\textit{drsti} \\
\textit{antagrāha}-\textit{drsti} - views of the per-
\end{tabular}
Vasubandhu, MVB

manence or impermanence of the elements constituting personality

śīlavṛata-paramārṣa - adherence to mere rule and ritual

vicikītssā - constant doubts

īrṣya - envy

mātsaryā - stinginess and selfish greed

anunāya - complacency

pratigha - aversion

Old Buddhist List

śīlavṛata-paramārṣa

cījustikā

Kāma-chanda—lust for sensuous pleasure

Rūpa-rāga—desire for experiences in the realm of images

Ārūpya-rāga—desire for experiences in the imageless sphere

vyāpāda - ill-will

auddhatya - exitedness

Vasubandhu has dropped excitedness, desires, and lusts from his list of "fetters", and has also given a much more explicit breakdown of what is called simply "ill-will" in the early lists (envy, stinginess, aversion). In another work of Vasubandhu's, the Pañcaskandhaka, the major afflictions are enumerated as insatiable greeds, aversion, conceit, nescience, doubts, and false views. Envy and stinginess are minor afflictions coming from these major ones, whereas complacency is only a possible ground for further afflictions].

"Further obstructions stand in the way of welfare, etc, in ten ways." II 3.
There are further obstructions that stand in the way of welfare, etc., in ten ways. What are these obstructions, and what is meant here by "welfare, etc."?

"The lack of means to rouse oneself from inactivity,

the lack of complete use of one's sense-fields,

careless activity,

the non-production of the good,

the lack of advertedness, lack of attention to what lies around you,

the unfulfillment of the necessary preparation to live in the Great Vehicle,

separation from people of your spiritual lineage, and separation from good friends,

wearying distress and agitation of mind,

lack of opportunity to practise the Great Vehicle,

being forced to live with stupid or depraved people,

depression, sloth, and carelessness,

attachment to a rigid becoming, and longing for property,

muddle-headedness,

lack of trust, lack of confidence, never-ending deliberation,

lack of reverence for the Noble Dharma,

respect for riches and gain,

lack of compassion,

casting away the scripture,

being ill-read in scripture,

and lack of engagement in meditation." II 4-8.
These are the obstructions to welfare and the other blessings that come from coursing in the Great Vehicle. They are called "obstructions to that which should be known." What are these blessings we have mentioned?

"Welfare, enlightenment, the full taking up of Samsara, insight, lack of confusion, lack of obstructions, ability to evolve, fearlessness, lack of envy, and potency, self-command." II 9.

To each of these blessings, three obstructions can arise. To welfare, arises the lack of means to rouse oneself from inactivity, the lack of complete use of one's sense-fields, and careless activity. To enlightenment, arise the non-production of good caittas, lack of advertedness to what lies around you, and the unfulfillment of necessary preparation. To the full taking up of Samsara, which is the Bodhisattva's vow, arise separation from your spiritual lineage, separation from good friends, and agitation and distress of mind. To insight, arise the lack of opportunity to practice the Great Vehicle, and being forced to live with either stupid or depraved people. Constant association with either the stupid, or the hopelessly depraved, warps insight. To lack of confusion, and the lack of other obstructions, even in the absence of other factors, often arise as obstructions depression, sloth, and carelessness. To the ability to evolve, arise attachment to rigid becoming, longing for property, and muddle-headedness. To fearlessness, arise lack of trust, lack of confidence, and never-ending deliberation. To lack of envy and greed, arise lack of reverence for the Dharma, respect
for riches and gain, and lack of compassion and lack of rejoicing at the joy of others. To potency, which is self-command, the ability to practice the Great Vehicle, arise casting away the scripture, being ill-read in scripture pertaining to Dharma, and lack of engagement in meditation.

Ten factors play in Samsara, in affliction and alleviation. There is the factor of one thing's being the direct condition for the arising of another, such as when eye gives rise to visual consciousness. There is the factor of one thing maintaining another's existence, such as the four foods maintaining living beings. [The four "foods" are: morsel-food maintaining the organism itself, contact giving stimuli to the living being, manas and volition motivating its activity, and consciousness.] There is the factor of one thing's manifesting another, as the action of looking does the visible. There is the factor of one thing's transforming another, as fire does that which is being cooked. There is the factor of one thing's disjoining another, forcing it out of its self-embrace—such is the relation of a cutting instrument to that which is being cut. There is the factor of one thing's evolving another step by step, such as the action of a goldsmith, who works bracelets out of masses of gold. There is the factor of one thing's giving rise to the notion of another, such as the perception of smoke, etc, giving rise to the notion of fire, etc. There is the factor of one thing's causing us to form the notion of another, such as the flux that makes us speak of "cause". There is the factor of one thing's leading to the attainment of the other, as the Path leads to Nirvana, etc. These factors play in alleviation,
The direct condition for the arising of alleviation is welfare's; maintaining it is enlightenment, because of its resulting in an absence of anger and frustration. Supporting it is the full taking up of Samsara; manifesting it to others is insight; bringing about its transformation is lack of confusion, because of its folding away all confusions obstructing alleviation. Disjoining it is the lack of obstruction. Its evolvement step by step takes place through one's cittas' ability to evolve towards enlightenment. Fearlessness without lack of reverence gives rise to the notion of enlightenment, whereas we form the notion of "alleviation" when there is no restless envy or greed. The attainment of alleviation is essentially through potency in the Great Vehicle.

The roots of the beneficial are to be made to arise by the desire to attain enlightenment. It is through these roots that enlightenment is attained. The bed for these roots is the Bodhisattva's vow to take up Samsara supported by the ten pāramitās (giving, good conduct towards others, forbearance, vigor, meditation, insight, upāya, resolution to the vow, force, knowledge.) First entering into the Path of Vision, where perverse views are to be cast off by him, he then enters into the Path of Cultivation, where the afflictions are left behind. Through this there can arise his full practice of the pāramitās, and his transformation to complete enlightenment. Along with this comes the ability to truly alleviate others' afflictions.
The pāramitā of giving to others is obstructed by the fear of Samsara, and by the clinging to rigid conceptions of "I" and "mine". The pāramitā of good conduct towards others is obstructed by the ignorance that lets acts harming others come about unnoticed, and any motivational dispositions connected with anger, jealousy, and greed. The pāramitā of forbearance is obstructed by impatience and clinging; the pāramitā of vigor by sitting in endless meditation. The pāramitā of meditation is obstructed by restlessness, as well as that ignorance that makes one turn ones back on Samsara and seek a Nirvana. The pāramitā of insight is obstructed by looking at the unessential. The pāramitā of upāya is obstructed by the ignorance that makes one dwell completely in signless thought, whereas the pāramitā of the vow is obstructed by the ignorance that makes one weaken in signless thinking. [Here is the idea that realization of emptiness, the signless, is only one half of the picture for Mahāyāna. Upāya, which makes the pāramitā of giving possible, is the other half. Upāya again involves the play of the imagination of unreals, but with the consciousness of emptiness as a ballasting substratum.] The pāramitā of force, that is strength, is obstructed by the inexperience that makes one unsure of the necessary words, written symbols, and other skills, and the inexperience that makes one unconvincing in disputations. The pāramitā of knowledge, finally, is obstructed by not developing the range of ones sense-fields to the fullest.
III. Realities

In reference to realities, the author at first says:
"Basic reality, characteristic reality, the reality that is non-perversion, the reality of the fruit and its cause, subtle and gross realities, the approved, the range of alleviation, comprising reality, the mark of differentiation, and the ten-fold reality of skill in means, dispellers of the self-view." Ten-fold reality has been enumerated here, namely: the basic reality, the reality of the characteristics, the reality of non-perversion, the reality of the fruit and its cause, the reality qua that which is approved, more gross and more subtle realities, the reality of the scope of alleviation, the comprising reality, the reality of differentiation, and the reality of skill in means. And the reality of skill in means is to be known as being in ten-fold opposition to the ten-fold grasping after self, namely as skill concerning skandhas, skill concerning sensory sense-fields, skill concerning the sensory realms, skills concerning dependent origination, skill concerning good and bad states, skills concerning the twenty-two faculties, skills concerning the concept of time, skills concerning the Truths, skill concerning the Vehicles, and skills concerning the conditioned and the unconditioned.

What is here called "basic reality" is essentially "the three-fold nature", the constructed, the relative, and the fulfilled. They make possible all other reals. Among these three, the constructed is that which
has no reality outside of the confusions of the relative, and the fulfilled is the relative without the constructed. As to what he means by "characteristic reality" or "the reality of the characteristics," the author says:

"The characteristic of reality here is that from the knowledge of which the views of false superimposition and negation regarding dharmas and personalities, objects grasped and their graspers, existence and non-existence, do not arise." III 4.

In other words, as seen through the characteristics of the relative, that is of emptiness and the imagination of unreals.

Inasmuch as it is an antidote to the perverted views of permanence, etc, the reality of non-perversion is the existence of impermanence, suffering, the empty, and the lack of a fixed, permanent self. And how is one to know that this impermanence, etc, are properly a part of basic reality?

"Objects actually non-existent, objects impermanent, the characteristic of arising and perishing, are all, in due form, within basic reality, along with the presence of affliction and alleviation". III 5

Basic reality is the three natures. In them, there are, in due order: objects of sense and understanding which are really non-existent, in the constructed, imagined, nature; objects of sense and understanding which are impermanent and fluxional, and the characteristic of arising and perishing, in the relative nature; and the presence of affliction and alleviation, fully realized in
the fulfilled nature. (It is not until one is in the fulfilled nature that one realized the extent of ones past afflictions, as states are known fully only by their contrasts.)

"Moreover, suffering is seen to exist because of adherence, the characteristics, and connection." III 6.

There is suffering in basic reality because of the following reasons, in due order: because of clinging, that is to say, because of the clinging that comes through adherence to fixed views of personality and dharmas; because of the basic characteristics of the world itself; because of connection, that is to say, voluntary connection with suffering. These three exist in basic reality in a certain order: The adherence to fixed views of personality and dharmas is adherence to the constructed, imagined; the basic characteristics of the world itself are the characteristics of the relative and impermanent; voluntary connection with the suffering of Samsara, even after having realized the nature of the imagined and relative, is one of the marks of a truly fulfilled own-nature.

"Basic reality is seen to be emptiness: as simple non-existence, as non-existence of this or that, or as the fundamental nature." III 7 a

Since the constructed, imagined nature is not truly existent in any form, it is empty as containing no really existent thing. Since the relative nature is not as it is usually imagined, but is not totally non-existent, it is void inasmuch as it entails the non-existence of this or that definite thing. Since the fulfilled nature has the very own-being of emptiness itself, it is emptiness in its funda-
mental nature.

"The absence of real self in fundamental reality is expressed as 'no characteristic', 'characteristic apart from that', and 'own-characteristic"'. III 7 b

Since the characteristics of the imagined, constructed themselves do not exist, its absence of real self is that it has "no characteristic". Since the characteristics of the relative exist, but not as they are constructed in imagination, its absence of real self is that it has a "characteristic apart from that". (the focused, filtered construct). Since the fulfilled has an absence of self through the realization of its nature, its absence of self is in its fundamental nature. Impermanence is illuminated as being triple in basic reality: impermanent in the sense of not being a real object at all, i.e. vanishing once its real nature is realized; impermanent in the sense of arising and shattering; and impermanent as far as characteristics is concerned, being first afflicted and then alleviated.

Suffering is triple: the suffering of adherence, the suffering coming about through the basic characteristics of the world, and voluntary connection with this suffering. Emptiness is triple: the emptiness of non-existence, the emptiness of being other than this or that, and the emptiness of own-nature. Thus, absence of self is triple: the absence of self of having no characteristic, the absence of self of having a characteristic other than this or that, and the absence of self through own-nature.

The reality of the fruit and its cause is the truths of suffering, origination of suffering, cessation of suffering, and a Path
to the cessation of suffering, which exist in basic reality. How is this threefold basic reality to be considered to be "the truth of suffering", etc? Because of its having the characteristics of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and absence of self, the last two being both the causes, and the antidotes to the second. (Causes when unrealized, antidotes when realized.) It is suffering, because there is the constant existence of suffering. It is the truth of the origination of suffering, because it involves

"residual impressions, installation, and lack of separation." III 8.

[The residual impressions, vāsanā, are the residues of past experiences that condition, and often restrict, present experiences. In the provisional systems of Asanga and Vasubandhu, they remain latent in the store-consciousness.]

There is origination of suffering by means of the residual impressions that cause adherence to the constructed, imagined nature. Actions causing afflictions are the origination occurring by means of installation, and the non-separation of Suchness from the obscurations is the origination occurring through "lack of separation."

[Connect this with the voluntary connection with suffering that marks a fulfilled nature]. Furthermore, the truth of cessation involves:

"non-arising by nature, non-arising of duality, and the two, defilement and peace." III 9 a.

There is that which is non-arising by its nature, there is non-arising of the object grasped and its grasper as things apart, and there is the process from defilement by afflictions to peace, which
process is called fulfilled cessation which has come through deliberation (pratisānkhyānifodha) and Suchness. How is the truth of the Path arranged in three-fold basic reality?

"In full knowledge, in abandoning, in obtaining and intuitively realizing, the Truth of the Path is fully explained." III 9 b–III 10 a.

The arrangement of the truth of the Path is basic reality is to be known in full knowledge of the constructed, imagined which leads to its dissolving as a major force, in the full knowledge of the relative and its abandonment as far as it involves the process of the arising of suffering; and in the full knowledge, obtainment, and intuitive realization of the fulfilled.

Furthermore, conventional and ultimate truth are, respectively, more gross and more subtle realities.

"The gross exists in the form of designations, perceptions, and revelation." III 10 b

The conventional is here divided into three basic kinds: the conventionality of designations, the conventionality of perceptions as strained through various constricting caittas, and the conventionality of all words used in the manner of religious revelation. Designations all belong to the constructed nature; perceptions of sense and understanding properly to the relative nature, but a relative nature often obscured into the constructed; and revelation in the scriptures pertaining to Dharma, though this revelation points to the fulfilled nature, is itself cast in designations, and thus does not represent ultimate, but only conventional truth. Even designations spoken by
the Buddha involve a covering of true direct experience. Yet they are hints of the dharmadhātu which has itself no talk, and an education in this kind of conventional truth is necessary for the realization of the ultimate truth.

"Whereas the ultimate exists only in relation to the one." III 10.

Ultimate truth is to be known as existing because of the one fulfilled nature, only. In what way is it "the ultimate"?

"It is ultimate in three ways, as regards object, acquisition, and performance." III 11 a.

It is ultimate as an object because it is the object of ultimate knowledge, of the six consciousnesses driven to their ultimate point. It is ultimate as acquisition because its acquisition is equal to complete alleviation, the highest good. It is ultimate as an undertaking, because it is the Path, which has the ultimate goal. How can the fulfilled nature be called both unconditioned and conditioned?

"It is both, inasmuch as it consummates a lack of change, and consummates a lack of perversion." III 11.

The fulfilled is unconditioned in the sense of consummating a lack of further transformation back into what was before, and it is conditioned as those things that are comprised in the Truth of the Path, which are "fulfilled" in the sense that they consummate a lack of perversion, and in all those things that are to be known, which are "fulfilled" because of their basic non-perversion. The stages comprised in the Truth of the Path, and all those things that are to be known, are, of course, conditioned.
What is "the approved" that was mentioned earlier? What we term "approved reality" of "reality qua that which is accepted" is of two kinds: that accepted by the world at large, and that which is accepted by right reasoning. Among these two,

"That accepted by the world at large is due to the one" III 12 a,

the constructed, imagined nature, in which, regarding its objects, there is a certain sameness of views among all worldly people because their minds have adapted themselves in an agreement to certain conventional symbols. E.G.: "This is earth, not fire! This is a visible, not sound!" etc.

"Whereas that which is accepted by right reasoning is due to three factors." III 12

It is any object which is accepted by "reasoning of conclusive substantiation", which must rely on the three pramāṇas accepted by dialecticians who are experts in such matters of reasoning. (The three pramāṇas are direct perception, including intuitive yogic perception, inference, and appeal to reliable authority.)

The reality of the range of alleviation is of two kinds: that of the range of the knowledge that cleans away the obstructions which are pure afflictions from one's life-continuum, and that of the range of the knowledge which cleans away the obstructions to that which is to be known. Thus

"reality of the range of alleviation is thus two-fold, though it is well-known that it comes from only one" III 12 b
the fulfilled nature. The double scope of the knowledge of alleviation is nothing else than the fulfilled nature.

How is the expression "comprising reality" to be understood?

"There are two kinds of comprising things together—that of the sign perceived and its discrimination, and that of naming." III 13

There is the comprising done by seizing objects of senses of the five varieties (visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles), and the discrimination of their sensuous characteristics—this occurs through the relative nature. Then there is the comprising together of things done by naming and categorizing them, which occurs because of the constructed nature.

"And there is the comprising of right knowledge and that things are so, through the one," III 13 b.

And there is the comprising of suchness and right knowledge through the fulfilled nature.

How is the reality of differentiation to be known in basic reality? In seven different ways: as the reality of evolution and transformation, as the reality of the characteristics, as the reality of cognitions, as the reality of settlement into them, as the reality of there existing false practice, as the reality of purification from obstructions, as the reality of right practice, which seven-fold Suchness was discussed in the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra.

"Attachment and harmful actions, characteristics, cognitions, purification from afflictions, and right practice are all in basic reality" III 14,
The author says in reference to these seven.

[These seven realities, regarded as basic "Suchnesses" of the world by the sixth-century Yogācāra philosopher Sthiramati, can be listed as follows:

1. the evolution of beings in Samsara
2. beings' having no fixed natures
3. all dharmas being cognition-only
4. conditioned beings' necessary connection with suffering
5. mistakes and errors getting beings into further, unnecessary suffering
6. beings getting out of sufferings
7. the correct application of insight getting beings out of sufferings]

The reality of skill in means has been called an antidote to fixed views. [As will be seen, Vasubandhu tends to regard the basic concepts of Buddhism (skandhas, etc.) as expedients serving as antidotes against the rigidity of various notions, primarily those regarding a fixed self.]

There are ten kinds of self-view related to the skandhas, etc:

"There is a fixed self-view when there is the idea of one thing underlying the living being—one central cause, one experiencer, one doer, one in power of all its movements, one possessor, one entity lasting through time, one substratum for affliction and alleviation, one entity in steady concentration, one entity that is either bound or freed." III 15.
Against adherence to these ten kinds of self-view, there can evolve ten kinds of skill in means, involving the concepts of "skandhas", etc. How are these ten kinds of skill in means made to lie in basic reality? In such a way that the skandhas are included in the three natures. (One might paraphrase: "How does this skill in means get its basic punch? By including the concepts of "skandhas", etc, within each of the three natures.")

"as constructions, as objects of discrimination, and as objects of Dharmatā." III 16.

Inasmuch as the concept of the material bases of personality (the first skandha) is a construction, it belongs to the constructed nature. Inasmuch as this construction rests on a real object of discrimination, it belongs to the relative nature. Inasmuch as material bases in this sense take part in the realization of Dharmatā, they belong to the fulfilled nature. The same holds for the other skandhas: feeling, conception, motivating dispositions, and consciousness. These ten kinds of skill in means regarding the view of a fixed self become part of basic reality with the inclusion of the skandhas, etc, within the three natures. It has already been mentioned that skill in the concepts of skandhas, etc, works as an antidote to the ten kinds of self-view. But the meaning of the skandhas, etc, themselves has not yet been mentioned.

"At first, from the points of view of separatedness heaping together, and analysis." III 17 a

To begin with, the skandhas are to be known in three different senses. Under the aspect of separatedness, every present moment of material
bases is distinct from past and future moments, and so on for the rest of the skandhas. Heap ing all these various moments together because of the singleness of their efficacy-sets, is also possible, so we can speak of past and future material bases, etc. Finally, the five skandhas can be regarded as interacting to such a degree that they constitute one undividable heap, an undividable heap of varying efficacies.

"The sensory domains are the seeds of the grasper, the objects grasped, and its being grasped." III 17 b.

The sensory domains are the seeds of the "grasper", the domains eye, etc; the seeds of the objects grasped, the domains visibles, etc; and the seeds for its being grasped, the domains eye-consciousness, etc. The concept of these eighteen domains also works against the ten kinds of self-view.

The six internal sense-field s (eye; ear; nose; tongue, body, and intellective-reflective consciousness) exist in the sense of being doors to the experience of various impressions. The six external sense fields (visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas) exist in the sense of being doors to the experience of discriminated objects. [Add to these twelve the six consciousnesses corresponding to the senses (eye-consc, ear-consc, nose-consc, tongue-consc, body-consc, and manas), and you have the eighteen sensory domains mentioned in the preceding paragraph.]

The concept of dependent origination serves as an antidote against any false superimposition or denial regarding the reality of the process called "causality", "fruit", and the efficacy of
effort. A superimposition regarding causality would be to give ensnaring motivating dispositions any other cause but nescience, or to assure that motivating dispositions arise from a cause in any way dissimilar. (i.e. a cause that isn't itself an effect, a permanent cause, etc. All such notions are ruled out by dependent origination.) A denial regarding causality would be to imagine that nothing like causality takes place at all. A superimposition regarding the fruit, the effect, would be to imagine that the motivating dispositions arising from nescience do so with a fixed self. A denial regarding the fruit would be to say that even where nescience is absent, ensnaring motivating dispositions would arise. A superimposition regarding efficacy would be to imagine an activity apart from nescience being necessary for the arising of motivating dispositions; a denial regarding efficacy would be to say that even nescience has no power to make the motivating dispositions arise. The absence of all these superimpositions and denials is brought about by skill in the concept of dependent origination.

"Dependence with regard to what is not desired, and to what is desired, with regard to purification, simultaneous birth, sovereignty, attainment, and proper practice, are the meaning of the good and bad states." III 19.

The so-called good and bad states are to be known as referring to seven kinds of dependance. Dependance in regard to what is not desired is to be explained as taking place through arrival in a bad state, an undesired state at which one arrives because of actions, undesirable to others, and dependance in a desirable state is to be explained as
taking place through arrival at a good state occurring because of
good actions. Then there is a dependance regarding what is called
purification, since this cannot be obtained without abandoning the
five obstructions and without practicing the seven limbs of enlight-
enment, (mindfulness, investigation into dharmas, vigor, joyous zest,
tranquility, concentration, even-mindedness). Dependance in regard
to simultaneous rebirth means the impossibility of two Tathāgatas,
or two world-emperors, arising at the same time in the same world-
realm. Dependance regarding sovereignty refers to the impossibility
of women functioning as world-emperors, and regarding attainment it
means the impossibility of their attaining either the Pratyekabuddha's
or the fully enlightened Buddha's types of enlightenment. (They may
certainly become Bodhisattvīs of the Great Vehicle, however!) De-
pendance regarding right practice means that those perceiving reality
have little trouble in right practice, and naturally do not commit
actions harming living beings. But people separated from the Dharma
do so. For details in these matters, one should consult the
Bahudhātuka-sūtra. (Pāli version: Majjhima CXV).

The twenty-two faculties, or organs, are sovereign in six ways:

"Grasping, duration, continuation, experience, and
the two kinds of purification." III 20 a.

The twenty-two organs are thus established according to their
sovereignty regarding six functions. The sovereignty of the six
organs beginning with eye (eye, ear, tongue, nose, body, manas) refers
to the grasping of sensuous objects such as visibles, etc. The vital
organ is sovereign with regard to prolonging continuous existence for
one period of life. The male and female organs are sovereign with regard to continuing the species, and sovereign in the experience of pleasure, etc. The five faculties of faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and insight are sovereign with regard to mundane purification from affliction, which weakens afflictions without uprooting them. The faculties of coming to know what is not known, etc, are sovereign with regard to supermundane purification which uproots the afflictions.

"The action of effect or cause which has already taken place or is yet to take place is to be understood as the meaning of 'the times'". III 20 b.

It should be understood that the action of effect and cause which has already taken place or is yet to take place, is, as the case demands, the distinguishing element marking what is called "the three times". The completed efficacy of both cause and effect is referred to as "something in past time". If neither the efficacy of the cause or the effect has been completed, we call it "something in future time". And if the efficacy of the cause has been completed, but the efficacy of the effect has not yet been completed, we call it "something in present time".

"Feeling and its preparatory causes, the activity causing suffering, the extinction of the two, and their counteractive, are to be accepted as that." III 21.

That: the topic under discussion, is the four Noble Truths. The Truth of Suffering is here called equivalent to feeling when it has preparatory, ensnaring factors constricting it: whatever is felt
in such a way involves or will involve suffering. The Truth of the Origination of Suffering is here equivalent to the action of these preparatory factors which are causes of the Truth of Suffering. The Truth of the Cessation of Suffering is the bringing to rest of both these preparatory factors and the feelings conditioned by them. The Truth of the Path to the Cessation of Suffering is to be known as whatever serves as antidotes to such feelings and their preparatory causes.

"Deliverance relying on oneself or others through the knowledge of good qualities and faults, and through knowledge free from the constructed, is to be understood as the meaning of the vehicles." III 22 a.

If through hearing from others about the so-called merits of Nirvana and the so-called evils of Samsara, there arises a knowledge into these so-called merits and evils, and through this knowledge, a deliverance from Samsara is attained, this is the vehicle of the Śrāvakas. If one does not hear anything about the merits of Nirvana and the evils of Samsara from others, but produces the knowledge of so-called merits and evils by oneself, and through this knowledge attains deliverance from Samsara, this is the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddhas. If knowledge free from the constructed, a pure intuition, arises from one's inner nature, and through this pure intuition one attains deliverance from afflictions, this is the supreme vehicle, the Mahāyāna.
"The meaning of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is designation, cause, images, tranquility, and the objects contemplated in it." III 23.

The topic under discussion is the meaning of the concepts "conditioned and "unconditioned". The author's term "designation" means everything that goes into the function of naming, etc. "Cause" is the store-consciousness that takes up the seeds—"seeds" being a metaphor for the latent potency of the residual impressions. Images are the world-receptacle, body, and the objects of experience along with manas, perception, and conceptualization included in the evolving consciousnesses. Manas is that consciousness, linked with the idea of "I", etc, whose mode of existence is to be always thinking. Perception or grasping is the five consciousnesses of sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, because they grasp actual objects. Discrimination is the sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana) because it discriminates all these objects, categorizes them, etc. Designation, cause, images, and the dharmas associated with the store-consciousness, the manas, the five sensuous consciousnesses, and the sixth consciousness, are in general called "conditioned".

Tranquility is the extinction to be attained (the extinction of the constructed) and the way to its attainment, because these two constitute tranquilization. The object of consciousness contemplated in tranquility is Suchness, since this is the object that constitutes both the way to tranquility and tranquility itself. The above-mentioned tranquilities and the object contemplated there are in general called "unconditioned".
It should be known that skill in these knowledges regarding the concepts "skandhas" up to the concepts of "conditioned" and "unconditioned" is all skill in means.

A brief way to summarize the realities that constitute the topic of this chapter is to divide them into two: the mirror-reality and the reality of that which is seen (in the mirror). The mirror reality is the primary three-fold basic reality (constructed, relative, fulfilled) because it manifests all the others. The seen realities would then be the subsequent nine, because they are seen in primary basic reality. The nine seen realities are: (1) the reality seen in the absence of false conceptions, (2) the reality seen in the antidotes to perversions, (3) the reality seen in the deliverance of the Sravakas, (4) the reality seen in the deliverance of the Great Vehicle—gross reality having the power of maturing beings, and subtle reality the power of delivering them, (5) the reality seen in the flaws of others' theories, seen in the flaws in their examples and justifications, (6) the reality seen while revealing the Great Vehicle to others, (7) the reality seen when one penetrates into all sorts of knowable objects, (8) the reality seen in revealing true reality, signless Suchness, and (9) the reality seen in penetrating into the motives lying behind the different manners of grasping after "self".

(Yasomitra on Mahāyāna ethics):
"The Arhat, having expelled self-love from the series of saṃskāras that constitutes his pseudo-individuality, develops an interest in the affairs of others, an interest born of compassion,
and that destroys all pain. The Pratyekabuddha desires mere de-
deliverance, that is to say, an end to suffering, and not happiness
during the existence of Samsara, because this temporal happiness
is an abode of suffering. The Bodhisattva wishes to bring temporal
happiness to others and also the end of suffering, which is supreme
happiness, or he desires for others supreme and temporal happiness
(sukham abhyudāyika-naihāreyasikam), and for himself the end of
suffering, i.e. Buddhahood, as a means of realizing this service to
others." (Dutt, Aspects, q, p. 82)

V. The Supremacy of the Vehicle

Now the supremacy of the Vehicle is to be discussed. The
author introduces the topic thus:

"Its supremacy is considered to lie in its practise,
its support, and its full realization." V l a

The threefold Supremacy in the Great Vehicle, by which it is reckoned
as a Vehicle having no superior, is the supremacy of its practise,
the supremacy of its support, and the supremacy of its full realiza-
tion.

The supremacy of its practise is to be known as lying in the
practice of the ten pāramitās. With these pāramitās,

"Practise, moreover, is sixfold" V. l.

"The highest, that lying in mental attention, in con-
formity to Dharma, in avoidance of the extremes, and
distinguished and undistinguished practise." V. 2
This is the sixfold practise: practise developed to its highest, practise of mental attention, practise in conformity to Dharma, practise of avoidance of extremes, distinguished practise, and undistinguished practise.

"Practise is considered to take its highest form with magnanimity, persistence, sovereignty, in-exhaustibility, continuity, ease, wealth, an encompassing quality, success in its commencement, its possession, its steady flow, and consummation." V. 3.

Practise is considered to take on its highest form when it is characterized by the following twelve features: magnanimity, persistence, sovereignty in effort, in-exhaustibility, continuity, lack of pain and mortification, wealth, an encompassing quality, the success of its commencement, possession, steady flow, and consummation.

The highest form of practise through magnanimity is to be known through eminence in desirelessness for all those things that constitute "prosperity" in common parlance. The highest form of practise through persistence is to be known by the ability to cultivate it even for three uncountable aeons. The highest form of practise through sovereignty in effort is to be known through an ability to understand the actions of all sentient beings. The highest form of practise through in-exhaustibility is to be known through the endlessness of ones effortless coursing in the pāramitās, which comes about through a transformation one undergoes with the Great Enlightenment. The highest form through continuity is to be known through fulfillment of all the pāramitās of giving, etc,
towards all sentient beings without any interruption, the ability for which comes about by the trust that you and others are really the same. The highest form through ease, that is, lack of pain and mortification, is to be known through the fulfillment of all the paramitas, of giving to others, etc, being accompanied only with great rejoicing. (If giving, etc, is practised only grudgingly, one is not fulfilling the paramitas of the Great Vehicle. Their full practise can be affected only when they are accompanied by a feeling of great joy). The highest form of practise through wealth means the fulfillment of the paramitas of giving, etc, accompanied by meditational concentration on the Treasury of the Firmament.

The highest form of practise that comes about through its encompassing quality, means that which comes through the encompassment of the knowledge free from constructions. The highest form of practise through success in its undertaking depends on equanimity for its beginning stages; the highest form of practise through success in its possession comes with the first stage, and the highest form of practise through success of steady flow is characterized by continuing strong in later stages. The highest form of practise, finally, through success in its consummation, means that it is climaxed with ones becoming a Bodhisattva, or ones becoming a Buddha.

"Because of them, the ten paramitas exist in an ultimate sense." V. 4

The ten paramitas exist, ultimately, only when practise has attained these highest forms, and such a practise is found in the full practise of the paramitas. The author at this point reminds us of the
various pāramitās:

"Giving, good conduct, forbearance, vigor, meditation, insight, upāya, the vow, force, and knowledge, These are the ten pāramitās." V. 5.

What is the action of each of these pāramitās separately?

"Favoring, not harming, forgiveness, the increase of merit, ability, descent and delivery, being unfailing, constantly coursing, sovereign skill and maturation." V. 6.

The Bodhisattva obliges others, favors them, and supports them through the pāramitā of giving. The pāramitā of good conduct means that he does no harm to others. The pāramitā of forbearance means that he pardons the harm done him by others. He increases his merits through the pāramitā of vigor. Through the pāramitā of meditation, he plunges down and sets things going with the supernatural faculties, and so on. Through the pāramitā of insight, he is able to deliver others by giving them the right advice. Through the pāramitā of skill in upāya that comes with the transformation one undergoes with the Great Enlightenment, one is able to make ones giving, etc, unfailing. Through the pāramitā of the vow, because one is able to embrace all occurrences favorable to the pāramitās, one courses constantly in giving, etc, empassioned for the birth of Enlightenment in all sentient beings. Through the twin forces of reflection and cultivation, one is able to course constantly in giving, etc. This is the pāramitā of force, because it does not allow the antidotes to weaken. Through the pāramitā of knowledge, one experiences
again the enjoyment of all the dharmas which are sovereign in giving, etc, because one has rid oneself of confusion as regards these much-praised dharmas, and one brings sentient beings to maturity.

ad V., 7. What is the practise of mental attention? The practise of mental attention comes about through discernment which consists of listening, reflecting, and meditating., and is a mental advertedness to the Great Vehicle, as regards the dharmas in its sutras, etc, which, if understood, are sovereign in giving, etc. What quality is brought about through this threefold mental attention, this insight?

ad V., 8. By being mentally attentive with the discernment that consists of listening, there arises a nurturing of the basic constituents of experience. With that which consists of reflection, one enters into the meaning of that which one has heard. By meditation, finally, one attains ultimate success, by completely purifying ones sentrance into the Bodhisattva-stages.

ad V., 8, b. The practise of mental attention is furthermore to be known as being embraced by ten acts of Dharma. And what ten acts of Dharma are these?

ad V., 9. The writing up of the Great Vehicle (i.e. the copying of sutras), worship, giving to others, listening to that which is said by others, extolling (the Great Vehicle) oneself, perserving it, instructing others, studying the meanings of the texts for oneself, reflecting, and meditating.

Why is the great fruit of these acts of Dharma spoken of to a great degree only in the Great Vehicle, but not in the sutras of the
Sravaka-vehicle?

"Because of its distinctiveness and its inexhaustibility."

V. 10 a.

What sort of "distinctiveness" is this? And what sort of inexhaustibility?

"due to its favoring others, due to its lack of repose."

V. 10 b.

It has distinctiveness due to its favoring of others, kindness towards others. Its inexhaustibility should be known as being due to its never stopping, because it does not rest even in complete Nirvana (but rather remains forever in Samsara).

What is the practise in conformity to Dharma? It is two-fold, being the development of lack of agitation, and of lack of perversity. ad V, 11

Lack of agitation comes about through six-fold absence of agitation, corresponding to the following six-fold agitation: agitation in the nature of things, agitation towards the external, agitation towards the internal, agitation due to marks, agitation due to depression, agitation due to mental attention.

At the time of ones emergence from meditation, there is agitation due to the nature of things, because the collection of five consciousnesses, gliding to the objects-of-sense is agitation towards the external, excess or slackness in meditational experience is agitation towards the internal, inflexible beliefs regarding that which is experienced is agitation because of mental marks, because of belief's attachment to certain marks; morbid
anxious states within one are agitation due to depression, and agitation due to mental attention comes about through the practise of paying attention to the Lesser Vehicle and all those who would assert a fundamental duality. ad V., 12

The development of lack of perversity is to be know as lying in ten things, which are

"Not gliding into a mental attention towards clearly-cleaved named categories" When an experience presents itself, not immediately to say, "Such and such is its name!"

"avoiding the perversity of the two characteristics" i.e. dividing up all into grasper and grasped as things apart,

"realizing the adventitious nature of the 'pure' and the 'impure'" V. 13-14

"realizing the illusory nature as regards the two" V. 15 a objectivity and subjectivity

"and what accordingly does not exist, being free from perversity as regards the objects-of-sense and understanding, being deprived from notions of existence and non-existence."

With a mental attention towards talk, seeing what has arisen only from talk, and its basis," V. 16 the false division of grasper and grasped;

"realizing the interrelationship of the three natures which is like that of a magical creation, its
creation, and its disappearance." V. 17

"Being unperveted as regards the evolvement of all mental constructions, all these being but names" is non-perversity in regard to the own-characteristics, perversion consisting in attainment to them—this lack of perversity as regards the own-characteristics comes about through the antidote to all mental constructions, i.e. the knowledge that all this, from visible forms perceived by the eye up to mental cognizables seized by the mental consciousness, is only names.

"Abiding in the own-characteristic of ultimate truth" V. 18

which cannot be comprised in such a conventional truth, that "It is only a name", for that which cannot be thus seized cannot be thus subsumed.

"Because of being delivered in the Dharma-dhatu, as no dharmas exist there, the universal characteristic arises, this is a further lack of perversity." V. 19

Because of the absence of self in all dharmas, not a single dharma exists, therefore this Dharma-dhatu, emptiness, is the universal characteristic, and the knowledge of this in this manner is a lack of perversity in regard to the universal characteristic. The knowledge that the impurity of this Dharma-dhatu consists only in the non-abandonment of perverse mental attention, and that purity is its abandonment, is non-perversity in regard to impurity and
purity, respectively. ad V, 20

"Because of the Dharma-dhatu's purity by nature, it is like the sky, there is a total adventitiousness of the two (pure and impure), and this is an additional lack of perversity." V. 21

The Dharma-dhatu being like space, it is pure by nature, and the duality "pure" and "impure" is only adventitious, arising later. The knowledge of this in this manner is a lack of perversity as regards the purely adventitious.

"There is no affliction and purification either for dharmas or persons" and because of this non-existence, there can be neither fear nor pride, and this is an additional lack of perversity." V 22

Because there is neither a "person" nor dharmas, there can be neither affliction or purification for them. So there is no affliction or alleviation of anyone or anything at all. Thus there is no real detriment as regards the afflictions, nor any real excellence as regards alleviation. So how can there be fear? How can there be self-exaltation?

These ten lacks of perversity may be in due order joined to the ten vajra-words (or vajra-feet!). The ten vajra-words: existence, non-existence, the substrata, their likeness to a magical creation, lack of mental construction, self-luminousness of nature, affliction and alleviation, their likeness to space, lack of detriment and lack of excellence. The setting-up of the body(essence) of the vajra-words takes place through own-nature, objects-of-consciousness, lack of mental constructions, and the refutation of
objections. "through own-nature": through the three natures which are called the fulfilled, the constructed, and the relative: they relate to the first three vajra-words in order; and through objects-of-consciousness, and lack of mental constructions in regard to them, one arrives at the self-luminousness of nature, and through this to the establishment of that which can be known, and its knowledge, because of the lack of mental constructions as regards the three own-natures. The refutation of objections is as follows: To these remaining vajra-words, the objection "If these dharmas which have the characteristics of the constructed and the relative do not exist, how are they perceived, how is it that they are perceived? And if they exist, self-luminousness of nature becomes illogical." This (objection) is refuted by the likeness to magical creations, for that which is magically created does not exist, and yet is perceived. (The second objection): "If there is self-luminousness of nature, how can there be affliction for dharmas, and only subsequently alleviation?" To refutation of this objection should be known as coming about through the likeness of affliction and alleviation to space. For space, which is perfectly pure by nature, may yet be disturbed, and alleviated (from disturbance). (The third objection): "If the afflictions of limitless beings have gone to rest with the arising of limitless Buddhas, how is it that there has not been an eradication of Samsara, and an increase of Nirvana?" The refutation to this comes through the lack of detriment and lack of excellence (in affliction and alleviation, respectively, which is seen by the saint of the Great Vehicle.) And
because of their very limitlessness, the realms of the sentient beings are of the side, alternative, of alleviation.

The second setting up of the body of the vajra-words:
Where, which, and from which confusion; and where and which lack of confusion, the two fruits of confusion and lack of confusion; the termination of them both; lack of perversity of "existence and "non-existence"; likeness of the substrata to magical creations; lack of mental construction; self-luminousness by nature itself eternally; affliction and alleviation; their likeness to space; thus an absence of detriment and excellence: these are the ten vajra-words.

Practise in conformity to Dharma has been spoken of.

What is practise in the avoidance of extremes? This is what is taught in the Ratnakūta-sūtra as "the middle practise". Through the avoidance of which extremes is it to be known?

"The extremes of separateness and identity of the Tīrthyas and Śrāvakas, the twofold extremes of superimposition and negation, in regard to personality and dharmas, V. 23
the extreme of assuming opposing forces and their antidotes, the conceptualization of eternity and annihilation, grasped and grasper, affliction and alleviation, in two ways, in three ways, V. 24
The extremes of mental construction are known to be seven-fold: extremes relating to existence and non-existence, tranquility and fear, no occupation with truth and falsehood as regards grasped and grasper, the extremes of mental constructions as regards non-birth and simultaneity." V. 26

The middle path has as its aim the avoidance of the extremes of saying that materiality, etc, is separate from oneself, or that it is identical with oneself, which (middle path) is a non-regard of "self". When there is no regard of the human state, and one says that as far as view concerning self is concerned, there is no life-force except body, and another life equals another body, the extreme of the Tīrthikas is to say that this materiality is eternal, whereas the extreme of the Śrāvakas is to say that it is not eternal. The middle path has as its aim the avoidance of these extremes, as it is non-regard for either the eternality or the non-eternality of materiality, etc. "There is a self" is the extreme of superimposing a fixed personality, and the extreme of negation is to say that "All is without a self". The middle path has as its aim the avoidance of these extremes, since it is a knowledge free from mental constructions standing midway (between these views?). "Citta is real" is an extreme of superimposition as regards dharmanas, and "They are unreal" is an extreme of denial. The middle path has as its aim the avoidance of these extremes, as there is neither "citta" nor "volition" nor "manas" nor "consciousness" there. The extreme of assuming opposing forces is to say that unbenefficial dharmanas, etc,
are affliction, the extreme of assuming antidotes is to say that beneficial dharmas are alleviation. The middle path has as its aim the avoidance of these two extremes, as it does not admit these two extremes, does not speak of them, and has nothing to do with them. The extreme of eternality is to say, in regard to personality and dharmas, that they (continue to) exist. The extreme of annihilation is to say of them that they do not continue to exist. The middle path has as its aim the avoidance of these, as it stands in the middle as regards these two extremes. To suppose that subjects and objects always imply nescience, is another extreme. Thus this extreme which says that conditioned things constitute wisdom, and the extreme which says that the unconditioned works as an antidote to nescience, and thus to conditioned things until the time of old age and death, or the extreme which says that grasped and grasper constitute the virtual destruction of the unconditioned, or that they in turn are destroyed by the Path, constitute extremes in regard to grasped and grasper in two ways, by making divisions into black and white fixed alternatives. The Middle Path has as its aim the avoidance of this extreme, because of the absence of the notion of wisdom, nescience, grasped and grasper, and because it recognizes that wisdom and nescience are not two.

Affliction is of three kinds: the affliction of the afflictions, the affliction of actions, and the afflictions of birth. Among these, the affliction of the afflictions is three-fold: false views, that marked by lust, hate, and delusion, and aspiration for rebirth, of which the antidotes is emptiness of knowledge, the
signlessness of knowledge, the lack of fixed intention in knowledge. The affliction of action is the performance of good and bad (beneficial and unbeneficial) actions, of which the antidote is the non-performance of actions implicit in knowledge. The affliction of birth, in regard to re-birth is the arising of antidotes in the cittas and caitasikas of one who has been born, and thus being held in bondage by re-birth, of which the true antidote is lack of birth in knowledge, the non-arising of knowledge, the lack of an own-nature in knowledge. The disappearance of these three kinds of affliction constitutes alleviation. But alleviation itself comes with the realization that the Dharma-dhatu is unafflicted by nature. Through the Dharma-dhatu's being unafflicted by nature, with emptiness realized, that extreme which makes constructions, saying that the Dharma-dhatu is being afflicted, or being purified, is counteracted by the middle path which has as its aim the avoidance of this extreme, effected through the realization of the non-existence of affliction and purification in that which is unafflicted by nature.

What is distinguished and undistinguished practise?

"Distinguished and undistinguished are to be known in reference to the Ten Stages." V. 26 b.

The excellence in the pāramitās which relate to certain specific stages in the Bodhisattva's career is distinguished practise. Undistinguished practise is that which springs up everywhere (without any distinctions).

And what is the superiority of its support?
"That which serves to establish it (the pāramitās); the basic constituents of existence as they emerge (the dharma: tathatā); the demonstration of what can be demonstrated (effected through the pāramitās); retention (through the pāramitās); resolve (which comes through descending into and understanding what is made of citta only);) preserverance; penetration; extensiveness V. 27 its going forth to meet others; its tranquility (which comes through descending into and understanding the modes of both worldly and supermundane paths), and its support in its attraction powers." V. 28.

The supremacy of its full realization is in its constituting an absence of deficiency of the conditions necessary for the following ten fulfillments: the fulfillment of the lineage, the fulfillment of a resolve in the Great Vehicle which cannot be turned away, the fulfillment of the arising of a citta which is undisturbed and undistracted by the Lesser Vehicle, the fulfillment of the practise which perfects the pāramitās, the fulfillment of plunging down into the vows, the fulfillment of maturing living beings, familiarity with their beneficial roots, which comes through long acquaintance with these sentient beings and their ways; the fulfillment of development of the fields to their fullest, which is a skill of citta, the fulfillment of the acquisition of the prediction of the irreversible stage, which means the state of
being unestablished in either Samsara or Nirvana, because one re­
nounces neither Samsara nor Nirvana; the fulfillment of the Bud­
stage, which is equivalent simply to a lack of obstructions, and
the fulfillment of being able to exhibit Enlightenment to those who
have no confidence in this regard.

This

"Treatise is the Separating Out, the Explanation of
the Middle" V. 30 a

because of its illumination of the Middle Path, and it is also the
Separation of the Middle from Extremes, because of its illumination
of both the Middle and the extremes, and its illumination of the
exclusion of the Middle from the first or second of clear-cut alter­
natives.

"And it has as its import the hidden essence of
things" V. 30 b

because it is beyond the range of dialectics, and because it is
impenetrable by antagonists in dialectic debate,

"and is of great use"
both to oneself and to others

"it has use for all"
because it relates to all the three Vehicles

"and it is the pushing away of all unhappiness." V. 30.
because it brings one close to the disappearance of the obstructions
which are afflictions and the obstructions of the knowable.

The compact meaning of supremacy: supremacy in practise, in
preserverence in practise, and in fruit of practise.
The compact meaning of lack of perversity: through lack of perversity in marks in that which is manifested, one penetrates the target of tranquility; and through lack of perversity in meanings, one penetrates the target of discernment. Through lack of perversity in mental attention, one avoids the fetters of theversions, and through the lack of perversity which comes from that which has no strength, and which is unessential, one brings about it that these targets, aims, are well taken hold of. By lack of perversity in own-characteristics, one practises the path without mental constructions that serves as its antidote. And by lack of perversity in the common characteristic, one penetrates the nature of alleviation. Through the lack of perversity of mental attention to the "impure" and "pure", one comes to know the state that is both the abandonment and the non-abandonment of the obstructions, and by the non-perversity of realizing their adventitiousness, one comes to know affliction and alleviation as they truly are. Through the non-perversity which consists of being neither terrified or proud, one goes forth to freedom from all obstructions.

Herewith,

the Madhyāntavibhāga is completed.

If there is any merit in composing this commentary, may it be helpful for all beings' growth in merit and discernment

By this, may all the beings acquire before too long Great prosperity and the three kinds of enlightenment.

The commentary on the verses of the Madhyāntavibhāga, a work of the Master Vasubandhu, is completed.
Abhidharmāvatāra,
an orthodox Vaibhāṣika work preserved both in Tibetan (Tokyo vol. 119, pp 43 ff) and in Chinese (No. 1554). Its author's name is sometimes given as Skandhila, sometimes as Sugandhara, and according to P'u-kuang, its author was the teacher of Sanghabhadra. This seems possible, as it is definitely a work antedating Vasubandhu at most by a century (see the article by Sakurabe).

Abhidharmadīpa,
cf. Dīpakāra.

Anguttara-Nikāya,
one of the fundamental sūtra collections of the Theravāda Canon. Much of it may be paraphrases and elaborations of actual sermons of the Buddha.

Anuruddha,
Theravādin theorist of the early twelfth century, author of the Abhidhammatthasangaha, or Compendium of Philosophy. The famous Burmese monk Capata wrote a commentary upon this work in the latter half of the twelfth century.

Āryadeva,
Madhyamika of the second century A.D., the most famous disciple of Nāgārjuna.
Asanga,

Elder brother of Vasubandhu, one of the founding fathers of Yogācāra.

Āśvaghoṣa,

Mahāyānist writer of the first-second centuries A.D., perhaps best known for his Buddhacarita, a biography of the Buddha in early kāvya style.

Buddhadatta,

Theravādin master from Uraiyūr in the Tamil country (ca. 410–480 A.D.)

Buddhadeva,

One of the four "Great Vaibhāṣika Masters". He may be the same Buddhadeva who is mentioned in the Lion Capital of Mathurā, erected by Sodāśa, son of the great satrap Rajuvula, under King Azes II. (10 B.C.–5 A.D.). On the other hand, B. may have been contemporary with the other great masters of the Vibhāṣā, and have lived in the second century A.D. His works are lost, but many of his views are known from quotations in the Vibhāṣā.

Buddhaghosa,

the most prolific and authoritative of the Theravāda commentators. Theravāda doctrine after the fifth century A.D. is largely his creation. Belongs to the latter half of the fifth century.
Candrakīrti,
sixth-century Madhyamika, author of the Prasannapada commentary on Nāgārjuna.

Devasārman,
ancient Sarvāstivādin master, author of the polemical Vijñānakāya. His period is most probably the first century B.C.

Dhammapada,
one of the most ancient Buddhist collections of didactic verse.

Dhammasaṅgani
first book of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, compiled ca. 380–330 B.C.

Dharmakīrti
seventh-century Buddhist logician and epistemological theorist, whose philosophy colored most subsequent Buddhist sāstras.

Dharmapāla
sixth-century Yogācārin master at Nālandā, who radically altered the focus of Yogācāra to the consciousness-theory. Had a tremendous impact on Hsüan-tsang, and through the latter on all Chinese and Japanese formulations of Yogācāra theory, which was probably unfortunate.

Dharmāśrī
Sarvāstivādin master; his main work was translated in 250 A.D. As he knew Nāgārjuna's methodology, must be assigned to either the second or third century A.D.
Dharmatrāta, the Bhadanta

maverick philosopher of quite an individual stamp, one of the
"Four Great Masters" of the Vibhāṣa, most probably lived in
the second century, A.D.

Dharmatrāta the Sarvāstivādin

orthodox Sarvāstivādin, the uncle of the Bhadanta Vasumitra,
and author of several works extant in Chinese. Second century
A.D.

Dhātukāya

one of the padas of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, most often
attributed to the old Vasumitra.

Dhātukathā

text of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, possibly of the second
century B.C.

Dīgha-Nikāya

one of the fundamental sūtra collections of the Theravāda
Canon. Contains many sermons which may actually be the Buddha's.

Dignāga

fifth-century Mahāyāna philosopher and logician, may have been
a direct pupil of Vasubandhu.

Dīpakāra

name assigned to the author of the anonymous Abhidharmadīpa,
an orthodox Vaibhāṣīka work attempting to retort to Vasubandhu's
criticisms of Vaibhasīka. Fifth century.
Gautama Akṣapāda

author of the Nyāya-sūtras, which above all give the earliest rules of debate in Indian philosophy. ca. 1 century B.C.

Ghoṣaka

one of the Great Masters of the Vibhāṣa, second century A.D.

Haribhadra

Buddhist writer, died around 790.

Harivarman,

author of the Satyasiddhiśāstra, pupil of Kumāralāta, thus probably of the second to third centuries A.D.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa

reputed author of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās.

Jñānapraṣṭhāna

one of the padas of Sarvastivada Abhidharma, ca. second century B.C. or earlier.

Kamalaśīla

Mahāyāna writer, ca. 740–795.

Kaṇāda,

author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, ca. first or second centuries B.C.

Karmaprajñaptiśāstra

early anonymous Abhidharma treatise.

Kathāvatthu

the early polemical text of the Theravāda Abhidharma, perhaps composed as early as the third century, B.C.
Kumaralāta

the founding master of the Sautrāntikas, probably of the second century A.D.

Madhyamika

upholder of sūnyatā(voidness) following Nāgarjuna's methodology.

Mahāsāṅghikas

one of the earliest groups to break away from the original Sangha, at the Council of Asoka in the third century B.C., considered precursors of Mahāyāna.

Majjhima-Nikāya

comments under Dīgha-Nikāya apply here, too.

Mathurānātha

seventeenth-century Nāyāya-Naiyāyika.

Nāgarjuna

author of the Mūla-Mādhyaṃkikā-kārikās, etc, one of Mahāyāna's first systematic philosophers, ca. second century A.D.

Naiyāyikas

followers of the Nyāya system of Gautama Ākṣapāda, became amalgamated with the Vaiśeṣika of Kanāda—hence the expression "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika".

Nāyāya-Naiyāyikas

the new logicians, beginning with Gaṅgesa in the thirteenth century. Developed Indian logic to fantastic heights.

Patanjali,

author of the Yoga-sūtras, usually considered a contemporary of the Śungas, ca. 100 B.C.
Patthāna,
vast text of the Theravāda Abhidhamma (fourth century B.C.?)

Pratimoksa,
the fundamental monastic rules of the Vinaya, recited at the
Uposatha or Posatha gathering by all monks in unison.

Sāmmitiyas or Āryasāmmitiyas
Hinayana school best known for its positing of a "personality-
entity", basic text, Sāmmitiyanikāyasāstra, available in
Chinese and in English.

Prajñākaramati
Mahāyāna writer, later than 800, as he quotes Santaraksita
profusely.

Prakaranapāda
one of the basic "padas" of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, ca.
first century B.C., usually attributed to the old Vasumitra.

Praśātapatāda,
streamliner of the Vaiśeṣika system, early fourth century A.D.

Samyutta-Nīkāya
comments under Anguttara-Nīkāya apply here, too.

Sanghabhadra,
orthodox Vaibhāṣika master, hater of Vasubandhu (fourth-fifth
centuries A.D.) Criticized Vasubandhu in several invective
works.

Śaṅkara,
the famous master of Advaita-Vedānta, 788-820.
Sānkhyā,

one of the earliest Indian philosophical systems, characterized by an elaborate metaphysical scheme.

Śāntaraksita

Mahāyana writer, 725–788, arrived in Tibet 763, best known for his comprehensive work, the Tattvasamgraha.

Śantideva

Mahāyāna writer, seventh century A.D.

Sarvāstivādins

ancient Hinayana school, advocates of the theory of the existence of past and future.

Śatapatha-Brahmana

one of the great post-Vedic texts speculating upon the nature of sacrifice. A real mind-blower. ca. 800 B.C.

Sautrāntikas

group of Buddhist philosophers rejecting the Abhidharma interpretations of the sutras.

Śrīdhāra,

Nyāya-Vaisēśika philosopher, author of the Nyāyakandali (991 A.D.)

Śrīlāta

pupil of Kumāralāta, second-third centuries A.D.

Sthiramati

sixth-century Yogacārīn, closer to the original position of Vasubandhu than Dharmapāla.
Sūtrakṛtāṅga
one of the basic Jain sūtras reporting the teachings of Mahāvīra (fifth century B.C.)

Sutta-nipāta
one of the earliest collections of the Buddha's sermons.

Theravāda
the ancient Buddhist sect, today dominant in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.

Uddyotakara
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher, senior contemporary of Dharmakīrti (7th c.)

Vaiśeṣikas
Hinayana scholastic school taking the Vibhasa as its authority.

Vaiśeṣikas
proto-scientific Indian system.

Vararuci
fourth-century writer on a variety of subjects.

Vasumitra, the old
reputed author of the Prakaraṇapāda and Dhātukāya (first century B.C.?)

Vasumitra, the Bhadanta
one of the Great Masters of the Vibhasa, second century A.D.

Vatsīputriya
the mother-school of the Sammitiyas.

Vatsyayana
Naiyāyika, composed a commentary to the Nyāya-sūtras about 350 A.D.
Vibhaṅga
second book of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, ca. 300 B.C.

Vibhāsā
tremendous Abhidharma work begun at the Council of Kaniṣka in the second century A.D., but almost certainly completed later. A team-work compilation which had an amazing influence on all subsequent Buddhist thought. Takes a Sarvāstivāda viewpoint.

Vijñānakāya
see Devasarman

Vinaya
the basic monastic rules of Buddhism.

Vyāsa
reputed commentator on the Yoga-sutras, time unknown.

Yamaka
one of the fundamental books of Theravāda Abhidhamma, ca. third century B.C.

Yasomitra

Yogācāra,
"the yogic practise", the name given to Asanga’s and Vasubandhu’s Mahāyāna.
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